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Abstract 
 
Greece provides an interesting setting for corporate governance research since it is a 
country characterized by weak governance structures, low audit quality, moderate tax and 
financial conformity, low importance of capital markets and low financial transparency 
compared to other developed countries (Bushman et al., 2004; Dimitropoulos and 
Asteriou, 2010). Additionally, the 2008 global financial crisis triggered the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010, which highlighted pre-existing structural weaknesses and 
macroeconomic imbalances and led the economy into a deep recession (Repousis, 2015).  
In such a setting, this thesis investigates corporate governance mechanisms in Greece and 
their effect on earnings management and firm performance, examining non-financial 
firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) from 2006-2012.   
Efforts to increase investor confidence and improve the long-term success and 
competitiveness of Greek firms by improving corporate governance have come through 
the enacting and enforcement of laws and specific codes of good governance practice.  
The first empirical study examines the extent to which the implementation of corporate 
governance Law 3693/2008, which made audit committees mandatory for all Greek listed 
firms, constrains earnings management practices by these firms.  Using panel data 
analysis, the negative relationship that is found to exist between corporate governance 
quality and earnings management before the implementation of the law changes to a 
positive one after the law’s implementation.  This suggests that firms are more interested 
in adhering to the letter of the law rather than its spirit and that this particular corporate 
governance mechanism is not achieving its purpose.    
The second empirical study examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance in a financial crisis setting, where the expected relationship between 
the two variables is not a priori clear.  Using panel data analysis, it is found that the 
positive relationship between corporate governance and firm performance prior to the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis period changes to a negative relationship during this period.  
This suggest that what is considered as ‘good’ governance in steady times can be 
counterproductive in times of crisis. 
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Chapter 1 – Motivation, objectives and overview of the study 
1.1 Corporate governance in Greece 
Corporate governance is a set of relationships between the firm and its various 
stakeholders, such as the board, management, and shareholders.  It consists of internal 
and external mechanisms by which firms are directed and controlled to ensure that all 
stakeholders’ interests are balanced.  It is needed to deal with conflicts that could 
potentially arise among the firm’s stakeholders (Dey, 2008). For many, the issue of 
corporate governance lies in finding a solution to the underlying agency problems and 
so ensuring that the suppliers of finance get a return on their investment (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).    
Numerous laws and codes of corporate governance have been created in different 
countries to improve corporate governance practices, an issue that has become of 
utmost importance, after serious corporate scandals that have occurred in various 
countries around the world (Hassan et al., 2017).  Improvements in corporate 
governance practices can result in a wide range of benefits for a country’s economy by 
improving international competitiveness, attracting local and foreign investments and 
building modern financial and capital markets  (OECD, 2004). 
Although corporate governance is a topic that many developed countries considered as 
far back as 1776, in Greece, the country of interest for this study, corporate governance 
has only lately become an issue of concern.  A change in corporate culture, which was 
primarily focused on government affairs since the creation of the modern Greek state, 
was initiated by legislators and business people in Greece in the late 1990’s (Mertzanis, 
2001).  The unprecedented increase in the value of the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) 
during 1995-2000, followed by the tremendous decrease in the early 2000s, created the 
need for effective corporate governance in an effort to re-establish investors’ 
confidence.  It became evident that effective corporate governance structures were 
needed to protect shareholders’ rights, restore investors’ confidence and increase firm 
performance (Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; Dasilas and Leventis, 2013). 
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Although the topic of corporate governance in Greece was first formally introduced in 
1998 through a paper published by the ASE, the year 2002 was critical.  In May 2002, 
the Greek Ministry of National economy enacted Law 3016/2002, entitled “On 
Corporate Governance, board remuneration and other issues”.  For the first time, Greek 
listed companies were obliged to abide by a set of governance guidelines, mainly 
involving the composition of the board of directors, non-executive directors’ 
remuneration, internal auditing, share capital increases and the participation of 
shareholders in the decision-making process (Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; 
Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015).   
Based on a desire to make continuous improvements, additional corporate governance 
(CG) laws were enacted in later periods.  More specifically, Law 3693/2008, entitled 
“Mandatory audit of annual and consolidated financial reports”, was enacted in 2008 
requiring all Greek listed firms to have an audit committee and complete disclosure of 
the firm’s relationship with the external auditor was required.  In 2010, Law 3873/2010, 
entitled “Mandatory reports by a certified expert for mergers and dissolutions of 
corporations”,  was enacted.  This required all listed firms to disclose a CG statement 
in their annual report, which gives information on CG practices the firm uses beyond 
those legally required, while also providing reasons for not conforming to the 
requirements of CG laws.  In addition to this law, in 2010, Law 3884/2010, entitled 
“Exercise of shareholders’ rights for listed firms”,  was introduced concerning the rights 
of shareholders and the company’s obligations regarding disclosure of information 
prior to general meetings (Nerantzidis and Filos, 2014). 
In addition, the establishment of laws concerning corporate governance mechanisms 
provided a stimulus for the Hellenic Federation of Industries to prepare a Corporate 
Governance Code for listed companies.  A first draft was published in 2010 and after 
suggestions and feedback, the final draft, with minor amendments, was published in 
2011.    
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1.2 Motivation of the thesis 
This thesis investigates the effect of CG mechanisms in Greece on earnings 
management and firm performance. 
The first study examines the relationship between CG and earnings management.  
Motivated by the implementation of Law 3693/2008, the effect of corporate governance 
on earnings management practices is studied for the periods before and after its 
implementation.  Inter alia, the law prescribed the following: the existence of an audit 
committee; the characteristics of the audit committee, such as member independence 
and expertise must be disclosed; the audit committee is responsible for all financial 
reporting processes of the firm and supervises the work of the external auditors;  all 
processes and relationships with the external auditors need to be disclosed so as to 
ensure an objective and independent audit; although the audit committee is required to 
overlook the work of the external auditor, the full responsibility still lies with the full 
board.  These mandatory disclosures oblige firms to explicitly discuss corporate 
governance issues and companies are thus forced to examine and improve key CG 
issues.  As such, CG as a whole is influenced and positive changes are expected, such 
as the mitigation of earnings management practices. 
The second study examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms of Greek 
listed firms on firm performance before and during the Greek sovereign debt crisis.  The 
existing literature indicates that the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance in a crisis setting is not a priori clear.  The positive relationship between 
the two variables that is evident in a non-crisis setting is not as distinct in a crisis setting.  
The need for corporate governance to respond effectively in a crisis setting is 
imperative.  Boards are primarily needed to assist the firm by providing guidance and 
control.  The recent financial crisis suggests that boards in other countries did not live 
up to this role by taking risks and implementing financing policies that were ineffective 
(Erkens et al., 2012).  These failures of internal corporate governance mechanisms are 
key parts of the explanation for the financial crisis, despite the fact that its triggering 
has been attributed to external financial and economic factors (Bekiaris et al., 2013).  
As such, the relationship between governance quality and firm performance is initially 
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tested and this relationship is also examined in light of the sovereign debt crisis in 
Greece. 
1.3 Research questions 
The first study examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms of Greek listed 
firms on earnings management, as a result of Law 3693/2008.  Thus, the first research 
question is: 
“Do corporate governance mechanisms in Greece restrain earnings management 
practices and is this relationship more negative after the implementation of Law 
3693/2008?” 
This study covers all non-financial Greek listed companies for the fiscal years 2006 
(two years before the implementation of the law), 2008 (the year the law was created), 
2010 (two years after the implementation of the law) and 2012 (four years after the 
implementation of the law).1  These specific years are intentionally chosen to examine 
the change of any potential effect of corporate governance on earnings management 
before and after the implementation of Law 3693/2008.  The data is broken down into 
two periods, the pre-law period sample (2006/2008) and the post-law period sample 
(2010/2012).  It is expected that the negative effect of corporate governance variables 
on EM will be stronger after the implementation of the law.   
Accruals-based earnings management is measured using the cross-sectional version of 
the modified Jones model of Dechow et al. (1995) and the DeFond and Park (2001) 
model.   
Corporate governance is measured through the use of a composite measure of 
governance quality that captures audit committee effectiveness and consists of the 
following: independence of audit committee members; financial expertise of audit 
committee members; size of audit committee; and frequency of meetings of the audit 
committee.  Additionally, a multi-dimensional indicator of corporate governance is 
                                                 
1 Due to the fact that data for corporate governance variables had to be hand-collected from firms’ annual 
reports, limiting the study to four years made the task feasible within the time available. 
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created for the purpose of this study in the form of a corporate governance index.  The 
CG index is developed based on the requirements of Greek CG laws, as well as 
particular features of the Greek CG code created by the Hellenic Federation of 
Industries in 2010.  Figure 1-1 illustrates the first study. 
  
Chapter 1- Motivation, Objectives and Overview of the Study 
 
14 
 
Figure 1-1 Illustration of Study #1 
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The second study examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms of Greek 
listed firms on firm performance before and during the Greek sovereign debt crisis.  
Thus, the second research question is: 
“Does the expected positive relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance also exist during the sovereign debt crisis in Greece?” 
The study examines Greek listed firms for the fiscal years 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011, and 2012.2  The data is disaggregated into two periods: the pre-crisis sample in 
2006, 2008 and 2009 and the crisis sample in 2010, 2011 and 2012.  It is expected that 
firms with stronger governance quality will have higher firm performance during the 
crisis years when firms are under greater pressure. 
Firm performance is measured using the market-based performance measure, Tobin’s 
Q and an operating performance measure, ROA.  Both firm performance measures are 
employed in this study since the former is a market-based measure, while the latter an 
operating performance measure, and so they complement each other (Elsayed, 2007). 
Corporate governance quality is measured through the use of individual corporate 
governance items, namely board size, board independence and the absence of CEO 
duality, and also through the use of a corporate governance index, as in the first study.  
Figure 1-2 illustrates the second study. 
  
                                                 
2As stated earlier, due to the fact that data for corporate governance variables had to be hand-collected 
from firms’ annual reports, this study was limited to six years so as to make the task feasible within the 
time available. 
Chapter 1- Motivation, Objectives and Overview of the Study 
 
16 
 
Figure 1-2 Illustration of study #2 
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1.4 Contribution of the study 
Greece provides an interesting setting for research, since it has a distinctive financial 
reporting regime, culture and socio-economic context (Tsalavoutas et al., 2012).  It is a 
country characterized by weak governance structures, low audit quality, moderate tax 
and financial conformity, low importance of capital markets and low financial 
transparency compared to developed countries (Bushman et al., 2004; Dimitropoulos 
and Asteriou, 2010).  Studies have shown that corporate governance practices are more 
important in countries with weaker legal systems (Klapper and Love, 2004; Durnev and 
Kim, 2005).  Such a case is that of Greece, which has a relatively young and weak 
accounting profession with inadequate enforcement of accounting regulations and a 
high incidence of earnings management (La Porta et al., 1998; Baralexis, 2004; 
Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; Leuz et al., 2003).  It is indicative that these differences from 
other developed markets have led to the Greek accounting regime’s classification 
within the emerging Asian and Near East countries (Myring, 2006).3   
Although most European countries only have corporate governance codes with best 
practices instead of a compulsory legal framework, Greece is a European country with 
legislation.  Law 3016/2002 provides detailed standards for improvement of managerial 
efficiency and transparency for all Greek listed firms, so as to protect shareholders 
rights (Drakos and Bekiris, 2010; Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010).  Thus, studying 
the impact of mandatory CG mechanisms in Greece provides a unique setting with 
useful insights.   
Both research questions are examined in the context of the ASE, a small capital market.4  
The ASE was considered a developed market from 2000 until 20155 and approximately 
40% of the market capitalization belongs to foreign investors during that period (FTSE, 
2011; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; FTSE, 2015).  All non-financial Greek listed firms for 
the period 2006-2012 are used in the study, covering all sectors of the ASE. 
                                                 
3 Alongside India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Turkey. 
4 The market capitalisation in ASE in 2008 is at $90.2 billion, while the UK is at $1.9 trillion, France is 
at $1.5 trillion, Germany is at $1.1 trillion and Italy at $522 billion.   
5 Greece was demoted to an advanced emerging market according to FTSE Russell in its FTSE Annual 
Country Classification Review-2015 as of March 2016. 
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The first study examines the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and earnings management for Greek listed firms.  There have been a limited number of 
studies on Greek corporate governance and its effect on accruals-based earnings 
management (i.e. Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010), and Bekiris and Doukakis 
(2011)).  However, none of these studies examines the effect of CG practices on 
earnings management after the implementation of Law 3693/2008, concerning the 
mandatory existence of an audit committee for all Greek listed firms.  Studying the 
extent to which CG mechanisms improve the quality of financial statements prepared 
by Greek listed firms, as a result of this law, provides important findings for firms’ 
stakeholders.   
More specifically, the findings indicate that the negative relationship between corporate 
governance quality on EM that exists in the pre-law period sample changes to a positive 
relationship after the implementation of the law.  This signifies that firms are more 
interested in adhering to the letter rather than the spirit of the law after its 
implementation and thus, CG was not fulfilling its role of mitigating EM.  Additionally, 
it is observed that when examining the best practice CG index with the interaction year 
dummy variable, a negative relationship between CG and EM exists.  Thus, firms that 
follow voluntary, best practice governance items are more successful in mitigating EM 
since they appear to follow the substance and not the form of governance attributes. 
These results are in line with the Hellenic Federation of Industries beliefs that CG items 
should be voluntary and not legally enforceable.6    
The 2008 global financial crisis triggered the Greek sovereign debt crisis, one of a 
number of European sovereign debt crises.  The 2008 global financial crisis had a 
lagged impact on the Greek economy and brought forth pre-existing structural 
weaknesses and macroeconomic imbalances that led the economy into a deep recession 
(Repousis, 2015).  In such a setting, this study examines the effects of governance 
practices on firm performance, before and during the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, 
examining all non-financial listed firms for the period 2006-2012.  Moreover, the 
conflicting results found in the literature in studying the effect of corporate governance 
                                                 
6 See Chapter 2, section 2.5 for more details. 
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mechanisms on firm performance (i.e. Bhagat and Black (2002), Bozec (2005), Dahya 
et al. (2008), Essen et al. (2013) and Duru et al. (2016)) is an additional motivation for 
this study, especially in light of the sovereign debt crisis.  According to agency theory, 
firms with boards consisting of non-executive members are better-governed and thus 
have higher firm performance.  On the other hand, resource dependency theory argues 
that executive directors add value to firms by providing information and expertise to 
the firm, suggesting that boards with executive members have higher firm performance.  
This study examines both the monitoring and advisory role of boards and how this 
affects firm performance in Greece during the sovereign debt crisis. Although a few 
studies examine the effect of corporate governance on firm performance in Greece (i.e. 
Toudas (2009), Drakos and Bekiris (2010), Hermes and Katsigianni (2012) and Zhou 
et al. (2018)), no study examines the relationship between these two variables in the 
context of the financial crisis, where the relationship between the two is not a priori 
clear.    
This study finds a positive relationship between board size and firm performance in 
both the pre-crisis and crisis periods sample.  Board independence and firm 
performance has a negative relationship in the pre-crisis period sample, while in the 
crisis period sample, this relationship becomes positive.  As for the absence of CEO 
duality and firm performance, although the relationship between the two is positive in 
the pre-crisis period sample, this relationship becomes negative in the crisis period 
sample.  This illustrates that in uncertain times, such as a financial crisis, a unitary 
leadership structure is more suitable so as to make quick decisions without the need for 
continuous consensus.  Additionally, although the relationship between the CG indices 
and firm performance is positive in the pre-crisis period sample, as expected, this 
relationship becomes negative in the crisis period sample indicating that what is 
considered as ‘good’ governance in steady times can be counterproductive in times of 
crisis. 
Overall, this study examines the effect of corporate governance laws and codes in a 
single country setting, Greece.  It is more difficult to control for the factors that affect 
firms’ financial reporting and firm performance in an international comparative study 
than it is in a single country study.  The board’s monitoring activities can better be 
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isolated in our single country study of Greece since institutional, socio-economic, 
political and environmental factors remain constant over the period of investigation 
(Marra et al., 2011; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012).   
Finally, much of the existing literature applies to economies with Anglo-Saxon types 
of financial systems, i.e. the US and the UK (Bedard and Gendron, 2010).  The Greek 
context provides a more bank-based financial system with a relatively small stock 
market in which the issue of corporate governance does not have a long history 
(Kapopoulos et al, 2007).  Additionally, the ownership structure in Greece differs 
greatly from that of the US and the UK in that that shareholders are more concentrated 
and family shareholders are more significant (Drakos and Bekiris, 2010). Thus, this 
study builds on the existing strand of literature on corporate governance in a non-Anglo- 
Saxon context, such as Osma and Noguer (2007), Jackling and Johl (2009), Marra et 
al. (2011), Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013) and Zhou et al. (2018).    
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This chapter has discussed the background of this thesis and specified the research 
questions.  Additionally, the motives of the thesis and its contributions have been 
highlighted.   
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter two provides a discussion 
of corporate governance, examining the theories and systems of corporate governance.  
The chapter then discusses the institutional setting of Greece and proceeds with the 
review of the evolution of corporate governance in Greece.     
Chapters three, four and five pertain to the first research question regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings management following the 
implementation of Law 3693/2008. 
Chapter three provides the literature review and hypothesis development focusing on 
the relationship between corporate governance and earnings management.  The 
literature review discusses studies that examine corporate governance mechanisms in 
relation to audit committee characteristics such as independence, size, diligence and 
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expertise, as well as corporate governance indices, and reviews their ability to constrain 
accrual-based earnings management.  As such, this literature review forms the basis for 
the development of the hypotheses tested and discussed in chapter five. 
Chapter four provides the relevant research design.  The chapter begins by reviewing 
the earnings management models used in the literature.  It continues by reviewing 
corporate governance indices created in prior literature.  The process of how these CG 
indices have been created are discussed and common elements in this process are 
reviewed.   The chapter continues by analysing the measures of earnings management 
used in the first study, as well as the corporate governance mechanisms employed.  The 
process of the creation of the CG index used in this study is explained and discussed.  
The empirical research model of this study is then reviewed, and the sample selection 
and data collection procedures are analysed.   
Chapter five reports the results of the data analysis and provides a discussion of the 
findings regarding Q1.  The chapter begins with the univariate analysis of the data, 
examining the descriptive statistics, and continues with a bivariate analysis, reporting 
the correlation coefficients, and proceeds to a multivariate analysis of the data.  
Presentation of the results follow, and the inferences drawn from tests of the hypotheses 
are discussed.   
Chapters six, seven and eight relate to the second research question regarding the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the pre-crisis and 
crisis periods. 
Chapter six discusses the relevant literature review focusing on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance.  The chapter begins with the literature 
review that contains studies that examine corporate governance mechanisms in relation 
to individual corporate governance variables, such as board size, board independence, 
and CEO duality, as well as corporate governance indices, which incorporate many 
governance attributes in one measure, and reviews their effects on firm performance.  
A review of studies examining the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance in a crisis setting is then examined. A discussion of the sovereign debt 
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crisis in Greece follows.  This literature review forms the basis for the development of 
the hypotheses that are tested and discussed in chapter eight.   
Chapter seven provides the relevant research design pertaining to corporate governance 
and firm performance for Greek listed firms before and during the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis.  The chapter discusses the measures of firm performance used in the study, as 
well as how corporate governance is examined both through individual governance 
measures, as well as through a multi-dimensional proxy for governance in the form of 
a CG index.  Empirical research models used to test the hypotheses are presented and 
an analysis of how the data is collected and prepared to test the relationship between 
corporate governance and the financial performance of Greek listed firms before and 
during the Greek sovereign debt crisis is discussed.   
Chapter eight provides a report of the data analysis and a discussion of the findings.  
The chapter begins by examining the descriptive statistics of the data, continues with a 
discussion of the correlation coefficients and proceeds to a multivariate analysis of the 
data.  Presentation of the results follow, and the inferences drawn from tests of the 
hypotheses are discussed.   
Chapter nine presents a summary of this research study and draws conclusions and 
implications.  The limitations of the study are presented and recommendations for 
future research are also provided.  
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Chapter 2  – Corporate Governance 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance is a system that prescribes how firms are directed and controlled 
(Tihanyi et al., 2014).  Board of directors, shareholders and auditors are key 
components of how a firm is governed.  The various views on corporate governance 
mainly stem from a financial perspective whereby Shleifer and Vishny (1997:737) 
define corporate governance as  
“The way in which suppliers of finance to a corporation are assured 
of adequate returns on their investments”. 
Corporate governance is a necessary tool to deal with potential conflicts among the 
stakeholders of a company.  These conflicts, which are called agency problems, exist 
because stakeholders of a company have different goals and preferences, as well as 
limited access to information concerning each other’s actions, knowledge and 
preferences.  These conflicting interests exist primarily between shareholders and 
corporate managers and arise from the separation of ownership and control (Gillan and 
Starks, 2003; Dey, 2008).  The mechanisms, both internal and external, that deal with 
these potential conflicts are known as corporate governance (Garay and González, 
2008). 
Denis and McConnell (2003) classify corporate governance mechanisms into internal 
and external mechanisms.  Internal governance mechanisms are determined by firms’ 
internal factors and include the board of directors’ structure and characteristics, board 
committees and ownership structures.  External governance mechanisms refer to 
outside forces that ensure that firms are governed in support of shareholders’ and other 
stakeholders’ interests and includes mechanisms, such as country legal systems and 
takeover rules.  Internal governance mechanisms consist of individual governance 
variables and are applicable to research involving either individual or multi-country 
settings.  External governance mechanisms, such as the impact of a different legal 
system on the effectiveness of corporate governance, are applicable only in research 
involving the comparison of various corporate governance systems across countries for 
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studies in a multi-country setting (Denis and McConnell, 2003).  This research 
concentrates on internal governance mechanisms since the analysis is based on a single 
country, Greece.7  
2.2 Theories of corporate governance 
Although corporate governance does not have one set of theories based on one 
discipline or one common theoretical base, the disciplines that have influenced the 
development of corporate governance are many (Mallin, 2010:14).  The basic theories 
are agency theory, resource dependency theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship 
theory.  Out of all the theories that set the foundation for corporate governance, the 
fundamental theory on which the development of corporate governance rests is agency 
theory.   
Agency Theory 
Modern businesses are characterized by the separation of ownership and control, which 
creates the context for agency theory.  Capitalism is a system where independent 
companies compete with each other to maximize their wealth and in sequence the 
wealth of their shareholders.  These companies are directed by a chief executive officer 
(CEO), who works on behalf of shareholders for this purpose.  Agency theory refers to 
the relationship between the principal, who authorizes another party, the agent, to work 
on his or her behalf.  In a corporate setting the principals are the shareholders and the 
agents are the managers (Mallin, 2010:15).  It is thus possible for the managers to take 
advantage of their power for their own benefit, against the interests of the companies 
they serve.  There are times the real owners of companies are often powerless and 
incapable of safeguarding their interests and verifying if the agent has behaved properly 
(Morck and Lloyd, 2005; Eisenhardt, 1989).  These conflicting interests give rise to 
what is termed as the principal-agent conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).   
                                                 
7 External governance mechanisms, such as legal systems and takeover rules, are not included in this 
study because all firms in the data set are from a single country therefore a single legal system is applied 
and a limited amount of mergers and acquisitions took place during the sample period.  
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Conflicts arise between the managers who pursue personal wealth, in the form of 
enhanced salaries and bonuses, strengthening their reputations and shareholders who 
pursue firm value maximization (Raelin and Bondy, 2013).   This misuse of power can 
be either in the form of extraction of direct financial benefits for the agent or in the form 
of the agent not taking the necessary risks to pursue the principals’ interests and 
increase shareholder value (Mallin, 2010:15).    
The potential problems associated with this separation of ownership and control were 
identified as early as the 18th century by Adam Smith (1776).  Much later, Berle and 
Means (1932) illustrated that as countries develop and industrialize, the separation of 
ownership and control becomes more evident (Mallin, 2010:15).  These early advocates 
of agency theory argued that a logical relationship exists between shareholders, 
managers and the board of directors (Christopher, 2010).  Since the interests of 
managers and shareholders have the potential to be at odds, a need for realignment of 
these interests is desirable.  The process of realigning these parties’ interests creates 
costs for the firm, which are known as agency costs; most of which are attributed to the 
control and monitoring of managers by the firms’ board of directors.  The board’s 
primary role, according to agency theory, is to monitor and control the CEO and they 
are accountable to shareholders to fulfill this role (Christopher, 2010).   
According to advocates of agency theory, the monitoring role of the board can be 
compromised if CEO duality exists, a term used if the chairman of the board and the 
CEO is the same person.  If this position is held by the same person, potential conflicts 
of interest can exist, since the flow of information can be subjectively filtered by the 
CEO (Jensen, 1993).  Thus, best practice, institutional investors and recommendations 
of agency theorists suggest the absence of CEO duality (Nordberg 2011:120).  In 
addition to the costs associated with the supervision and control of agents, incorrect 
decisions taken by agents, as a result of the pursuit of their personal interests, are also 
considered agency costs.  This agency problem, between the principal and agent is 
known as Type I agency problem or a P-A conflict and is mainly observed where there 
is a high level of ownership diffusion (Ding et al., 2011).   
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Another type of agency problem, known as Type II, exists between a firm’s majority 
controlling shareholders and its minority shareholders (Ali et al., 2007).  This type of 
agency problem usually exists where ownership of listed firms is concentrated in the 
hands of a few shareholders, and is known as the principal-principal (P-P) conflict (Fan 
and Wong, 2002; Morck and Yeung, 2003; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006).  In a 
P-P conflict, expropriation of minority shareholders can take place in many forms such 
as placing less-qualified family members in key positions, purchase of products or 
services by organizations owned or associated with controlling shareholders in higher 
market prices, and engagement in strategies for personal advancement at the expense 
of firm performance (Young et al., 2008).    
An additional potential conflict also exists between equity and debt holders.  This 
conflict is a result of diversified shareholders expropriating wealth from bondholders 
by investing in new projects that are riskier than the current investment portfolio of the 
firm.  In cases where the high-risk projects pay off, shareholders receive the additional 
gains, while debtholders’ returns are fixed.  As a result, bondholders in anticipation of 
such actions, demand higher returns, resulting in higher cost of debt capital for firms 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Anderson et al., 2003(b)).   
To deal with agency problems, corporate governance mechanisms are developed in an 
effort to align all parties’ interests, and thus reduce agency costs (Denis and McConnell, 
2003; Gillan, 2006; Christopher, 2010).  Corporate governance incorporates all 
institutional and market mechanisms that assist ‘the controllers’, i.e. managers to 
maximize the firm’s value on behalf of ‘the owners’ i.e. shareholders (Denis, 2001).  
Actions such as the development of auditing systems to restrict unwanted behaviour, 
contractual agreements that bond managers so as to minimize, if not eliminate, their 
self- interest, and a change in the organizational system, such as boards consisting of 
non-executive members, are mechanisms to restrict the ability of managers to engage 
in such undesirable behaviour (Weston et al., 2004).  
Corporate governance mechanisms that align manager’s actions with the decisions 
delegated to them by shareholders through the board of directors, deals with the 
principal-agent conflict, or Type I agency problem.  Good governance mechanisms that 
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deal with the principal-principal conflict or Type II agency problem, includes ways to 
reduce the private benefits of control or majority shareholders, by limiting the 
occurrences of  tunnelling8, asset stripping, related-party transactions, and other ways 
of diverting firm assets and cash flows from minority shareholders (Renders and 
Gaeremynck, 2012).  ‘Effective governance’ schemes regulate managerial power so as 
to improve corporate governance effectiveness (Brennan and Solomon, 2008; 
Christopher, 2010).   
Stewardship Theory 
An alternative view to agency theory is formally introduced by Donaldson and Davis 
(1991).  Their work suggests that agents can be good stewards of the firms and if 
entrusted with the appropriate resources, can act in the interests of owners.  In these 
circumstances, monitoring is unnecessary and their relationship should be based on 
trust (Davis et al., 1997).  They reject the opinion cultivated by agency theory that 
agents are self-serving and should be monitored. The cost of monitoring is thus 
eliminated and sanctions and incentives as a means of control should not exist.  
Stewardship theory is based on a psychological approach in which peoples’ intrinsic 
need for achievement is reinforced by a positive relationship with the firm.  Managers’ 
motivation comes from their excellent performance on the job (Dedman, 2015).  These 
intrinsic non-financial motives are based on the need for successful performance, 
authority, and a desire for recognition.  Thus, managers’ incentives are aligned with 
those of shareholders, since the behaviour of the steward is collective, seeking to 
achieve the firm’s goals.  This achievement results in the steward’s personal satisfaction 
(Davis et al., 1997; Dedman, 2015).  Stewards are considered individuals that place the 
best interests of the group ahead of personal benefits (Hernandez, 2008).   
According to stewardship theory, the board of directors acts as an assistant to the CEO 
rather than as a monitor, as claimed by the agency theory.  Managers feel part of the 
firm and want to succeed so as to maintain their reputation in the workplace.  Therefore, 
                                                 
8 The expropriation of minority shareholders by majority shareholders is known as ‘tunneling’ and can 
take the form of expropriation of cash flows, assets, equity or a combination of these (Bhaumik and 
Gregoriou, 2010).  
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a firm’s successful performance is a reflection of the performance of managers (Daily 
et al., 2003).  Stewards are created not through regulations and rules, but through firm 
structures that promote the feeling of trust, openness and disclosure (Hernandez, 2008).  
According to the advocates of stewardship theory, employees are motivated if they feel 
they have autonomous responsibility in their work.  Thus, control devices are not only 
needless, but are also counterproductive (Hernandez, 2012). 
According to stewardship theory, an effective board is one that is mainly made up of 
executive members, whose expertise, access to critical information and commitment,  
leads to better decision-making and thus, superior firm performance (Donaldson and 
Davis, 1994).  Similarly, CEO duality, in contrast to the advocates of agency theory, is 
preferable.  A single person acting as chairman of the board and CEO leads to superior 
firm performance due to a clear and unified leadership structure, facilitating better 
channels of communication between the CEO and the board of directors (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1994; Davis et al., 1997; Chen et al., 2007).   
In terms of corporate governance, the board of directors’ role is that of a consultant and 
not of a monitor.  Boards serve to empower managers to engage in self-directed actions 
(Davis et al., 1997).  Governance mechanisms create a trust system between managers 
and shareholders and encourage cooperation and involvement to promote the natural 
alignment of interests between the two parties (Madison et al., 2016). 
Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is based on the broad framework which emphasizes the wider group 
of stakeholders, such as employees, creditors, suppliers, government and the 
community at large, rather than only shareholders.  Stakeholder theory was first 
introduced by Freeman (1984) who argues that each firm’s primary purpose is to serve 
its stakeholders.  Stakeholder management is based on the assumption that the firm’s 
focus is not only on the fair treatment of primary or direct stakeholders, such as 
shareholders, management, employees, and customers but also on indirect groups such 
as creditors, suppliers and competitors (Schilling, 2000).  Primary stakeholders are 
those that have a direct and contractual relationship with the firm, while secondary 
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stakeholders are those without any contractual association (Collier and Roberts, 2001; 
Fassin, 2012).  Apart from the classical categorization of stakeholders as either 
primary/direct or secondary/indirect, another classification of stakeholders is given by 
Phillips (2003b) whereby stakeholders are either normative or derivative.  Normative 
stakeholders are those towards whom the company has a moral obligation of fairness, 
while derivative stakeholders are those individuals who have the ability to benefit or 
harm the firm but to whom the firm has no moral obligation, such as competitors and 
activists (Phillips, 2003a; Fassin, 2012).  The stakeholder approach focuses on 
transparency and dialogue among all parties involved so as to balance their divergent 
needs (Fassin, 2012).  However, there has been disagreement on whether all parties 
should be treated with the same level of priority (Schilling, 2000).  Some state that 
stakeholders’ interests with greater power and legitimacy, should be prioritized, while 
others, that all groups should benefit without setting one group’s interests over the other 
(Schilling, 2000). 
Furthermore, ambiguity exists in the definition of stakeholders, depending on whether 
a narrow or broad definition is adopted (Orts and Strudler, 2002; Fassin, 2012).  Kaler 
(2002) defines stakeholders using two opposing theories, the ‘claimant’ definition and 
the ‘influencer’ definition.  The former defines stakeholders as all individuals or groups 
that have a claim or right on the firm, while the latter as those that are influenced by the 
firm.  The combinatory use of the various definitions of stakeholders has created an 
increased ambiguity and uncertainty around the issue of stakeholders (Kaler, 2002; 
Fassin, 2012).  
Businesses that emphasize only shareholders, consider profit as the primary, if not the 
only reason for a firm’s existence, thus considering shareholders the only stakeholder 
that should be considered.  However, stakeholder theory is based on a different 
perspective.  It recognizes that a firm is a system of interdependencies among a large 
group of parties that are to be served and that shareholders, are just one of those groups.  
The firm exists to serve all stakeholders and profit is only one small part of a firm’s 
total performance (Schilling, 2000).  According to Clarkson (1995) if the firm focuses 
only on the needs of shareholders and does not meet the needs of all its stakeholders, it 
will fail (Schilling, 2000).  Stakeholder theory is a great defender of corporate 
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governance.  It is essential to integrate the interests of all stakeholders into the firm’s 
decision-making process.  The connection of stakeholder theory and corporate 
governance has focused on representation of stakeholders on the firm’s board, on the 
board members’ perception regarding their stakeholders, and the effects of board 
composition on a firm’s stakeholder performance (Ayuso et al., 2014). 
However, stakeholder theory has been criticized a lot since it ignores a business’s basic 
function, which is to maximize shareholder value. A business where accountability lies 
in everyone can lead to unsuccessful businesses since no one is actually accountable. 
Additionally, although stakeholder theory recognizes that boards are influenced by 
internal and external groups, it fails to consider the possibility that the absence or 
ineffectiveness of external institutions can hinder the board’s ability to direct and 
control the firm (Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014). 
Resource Dependency Theory 
Resource-dependency theory states that the board is the means to access and manage 
the resources needed for managers and stockholders to achieve their strategic goals.  
The board’s role is not to monitor management, as stated by the agency theory, but to 
act as a partner to management to assist them in effectively setting policies and 
strategies for the company (Cohen et al., 2008).   
According to Dalton and Daily (1999) resource dependency theory advocates that board 
members supply strategic resources, networking, information and other resources that 
develop a firm’s long-term success.   Since board members are actively involved in the 
firm’s business strategy, they should have industry expertise, know-how in setting 
corporate strategy, and access to external resources (Cohen et al., 2008).  Board 
members are key elements in setting a firm’s strategic direction.  Independent board 
members’ contributions are their connections and specific technological knowledge, 
rather than only their independent perspective.  These attributes assist managers in 
taking effective actions.  The ideal situation would be to appoint board members that 
are independent, possess industry expertise, and have significant access to strategic 
resources.  Such board members have a greater ability to understand, interpret and 
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access the quality of financial information.  However, hiring and retaining  such board 
members can be costly for firms, thus difficult choices have to often be made (Cohen 
et al., 2008).  
Resource-dependency theory focuses on how boards’ characteristics contribute to more 
effective governance.  For example, an audit committee, with members who have 
industry expertise, is expected to significantly improve audit committee effectiveness.  
From a resource dependence perspective such audit committee members have the 
knowledge to evaluate business activities and risks, and assess whether the accounting 
methods applied reflect the financial position of the firm, thus leading to higher quality 
financial reporting (Cohen et al., 2008).  
Managerial Hegemony Theory 
Another corporate governance theory found in the strategic management literature is 
that of managerial hegemony (Cohen et al., 2008).  This theory states that managers 
choose associates that always agree with their actions, are passive participants in the 
governance process, and are dependent on management for information on the firm and 
its industry.  According to this theory, the board’s role is more symbolic that substantial.  
Its role is limited to ratifying and legitimizing management’s actions, satisfying 
regulatory requirements, and developing senior management’s compensation schemes.  
The board is not perceived as a tool for organizational change or substantial overview 
of management.  This contrasts agency theory in which boards act as independent and 
effective monitors of management’s actions (Cohen et al., 2008).  From a hegemony 
perspective, boards are dominated by management and play a passive role in developing 
strategies and directing firms (Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Chen et al., 2009).   
According to Henry and Kiel (2004), managerial hegemony theory relies on five 
management control mechanisms.  First, separation of ownership and control, as 
expressed by Berle and Means (1932), in conjunction with  share capital growth, leads 
to ownership diffusion, whereby large shareholders lose their power and control.  This 
decrease in shareholder control gives management greater control, which according to 
agency theory, could be self-serving, and makes many boards play a passive role.  A 
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second factor that contributes to managers’ control is information asymmetry between 
top management and non-executive board members.  Management has deep knowledge 
of the business, placing the board, especially non-executive members at a disadvantage.  
This limits the boards contribution in the decision-making process.  A third element 
that increases managerial control is managers of profitable firms depend less on 
shareholders for capital.  They finance their investment decisions through retained 
earnings and hence, are able to enhance their control.  Fourth, boards are chosen by 
management and consequently management controls these board members, both 
executive and non-executive.  Finally, executive members are dependent on the CEO 
for their career and compensation advancement, and as a result, are unlikely to 
challenge decisions made by CEOs.  The greater the number of executive members, the 
greater the control of the CEO.  The net effect of these mechanisms is boards dominated 
by management, that play a passive role in developing strategies and directing firms 
(Hendry and Kiel, 2004). 
According to managerial hegemony theory, boards have negative consequences for 
shareholders, since they are often powerless and do not fulfil their essential role.  
Independent board members often recognise that CEOs control the information flow, 
however this can influence the effective performance of even the most conscientious 
board member (Nowak and McCabe, 2003; Cohen et al., 2008).  There is limited 
independent monitoring and management’s position is reinforced (Westphal and Zajac, 
1994; Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Core et al., 1999; Cohen et al., 2008).  Thus, according 
to managerial hegemony theory, simply having regulatory requirements for 
independent board members, does not solve the problem (Cohen et al., 2008).   
This theory considers the inner workings of firms, rather than how external institutions 
can adjust the board’s ability to control the firm (Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014).  Critics 
of this theory state that empirical support is limited, and its theoretical basis depends 
on the definition of ‘control’.  For example, according to Mizruchi (1983)  boards have 
the ultimate control over management in their ability to fire the CEO, thus undermining 
the very basis of this theory (Hendry and Kiel, 2004). 
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Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory states that corporate governance is based on a comprehensive set of 
organizational dynamics linking the institutional environment and individuals.  
According to this theory, corporate governance defines organizational goals in 
accordance with the expectations of the relevant participants of their institutional 
environment, such as suppliers, consumers, regulatory agencies and competitors 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Institutional theory highlights the difference between 
what a firm can accomplish given its structures and what the external environment 
suggests it should accomplish (Fogarty and Rogers, 2005).      
According to Cohen et al. (2008), institutions tend to organize themselves in a similar 
manner to other organizations that face similar environmental factors.  They tend to 
adapt structures and practices of other firms that operate in similar environmental 
conditions.  Although a large number of organizational forms and practices initially 
display a great amount of diversity, as they develop, there is a push toward 
homogenization (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).   Initially, various agents participate in 
open and free competition, but as some gain advantage by accumulating power and 
resources, the so-called ‘strong participants’, institutional validity is created for those 
entities.  As such, these entities’ behaviours become routine and create pressure for 
others to adopt to their ‘successful’ behaviour.  Once this institutional structure is 
created, it is continuously supported by these strong participants so as to create 
institutions that legitimize and promote their own behaviour.  Thus, change, as a result 
of these institutional processes is resisted and cannot be accomplished by participants 
that have low levels of power and influence (Tuttle and Dillard, 2007).  This process of 
homogenization is best depicted by the theory of isomorphism, which is described as 
the practice that forces one unit of the population to resemble the other units that 
experience similar environmental conditions (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Cohen et 
al., 2008; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008).   
Isomorphism is accomplished either through coercive, normative or mimetic means 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Coercive/regulative isomorphism is a result of both 
formal and informal pressures on firms by other firms on which they are dependent on, 
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as well as cultural expectations by the society in which they function in.  These 
pressures are either felt as forced, as persuasive, or as an invitation to join a group, so 
as to conform to accepted standards.  In some cases, legal regulations are imposed on 
firms for organizational convergence.  For example, according to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) regulation, all listed firms in the US have to have independent audit 
committee members, irrespective of the environment that each firm operates in (Cohen 
et al., 2008). 
Normative isomorphism states that convergence to expected and accepted social 
behaviours is achieved through information provided, either through academic 
institutions or through professional bodies such as auditing firms.  Universities and 
professional training institutions often possess similar viewpoints, which often deter 
change in tradition, which could otherwise shape organizational behaviour differently.  
Positions are occupied by individuals with similar orientations and viewpoints, often 
hired from similar industries or from a narrow range of training institutions.  Many 
managers for example, are recruited from the same universities, that tend to view 
problems in a similar manner, and make decisions in much the same way (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983).   
Finally, mimetic/cognitive isomorphism is a result of environmental uncertainty that 
makes firms want to ‘follow the leader’, irrespective of whether the leader’s practices 
are effective or a suitable for the specific firm operating in a particular industry (Cohen 
et al., 2008).  The use of models is a response to uncertainty.  When a firm faces an 
ambiguous situation, copying others’ behaviour is a viable solution with a small cost 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  There are instances where the modelled firm may be 
unaware of this process or might not even have the desire to be modelled.  This 
modelling process occurs unintentionally, either as a result of employee transfer or 
turnover, or intentionally, through organizations, such as consulting firms or industry 
trade associations. Mimetic isomorphism also has a ritual aspect.  Companies adopt 
successful prototypes so as to enhance their legitimacy and illustrate their effort to 
improve their working conditions.  Firms with a large customer base and a greater 
number of personnel employed, experience stronger pressures to engage in mimetic 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Although all three means of isomorphism 
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somehow overlap, they stem from different conditions.  Mimetic and normative 
develop from internal drives and explain how roles and structures are created, while 
coercive is linked to the environment in which the organization operates (Frumkin and 
Galaskiewicz, 2004).  
The basic underlying implication of institutional theory for corporate governance is that 
in uncertain conditions, the board and its committees’ roles may be symbolic or 
ceremonial.  For instance, a ceremonial role of the audit committee may be hiring and 
firing the auditor, whereby a symbolic role may be redefining the business relationship 
with the auditor.  This can add credibility to the auditor-client relationship in the eyes 
of investors (Orton and Weick, 1990; Cohen et al., 2008).  Audit committees need to 
accomplish legitimacy in the eyes of the public, thus member expertise is emphasized.  
Therefore the case might exist whereby individuals hired to serve on the board will 
have objective credentials, such as prior experience and degrees, but not necessarily 
have the ability to effectively monitor managers (Cohen et al., 2008).  Additionally, 
according to institutional theory, firms look for homogeneous individuals.  Their 
similar backgrounds act as a signal to outsiders that trust and competency exists in the 
work of the board and its committees (Cohen et al., 2008).  Therefore board members 
are selected from similar backgrounds and consequently are less likely to challenge 
each other or management (Tuttle and Dillard, 2007).   
Under institutional theory, firms follow social rules and conventions that influence the 
way they do business.  As such boards must identify such institutional deficiencies and 
pressures and direct the firm accordingly.  Institutional theory emphasizes the presence 
and effectiveness of external institutions, when evaluating the ability of the board to 
direct and control the company (Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014) 
Corporate governance mechanisms created are a result of an organization’s goals linked 
to the expectations of the strong participants in the environment in which they operate.  
Thus, board members, board leadership and board committees are chosen so as to 
conform to the strong participants expectations and tend to become similar to others in 
the same industry (Cohen et al., 2008).  Institutional theory is subject to criticism and 
limitations.  Yazdifar (2003) states that it lacks consideration of the relationship 
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between the environment, political and cultural elements within the firm.  It ignores 
interest-based behaviour and neglects to examine the processes of organizational 
change.  He states that institutional theory cannot stand on its own but must be 
accompanied with other theories.   
Limited studies, such as Ntim and Soobaroyen (2013), Young and Thyil (2014), 
Chakrabarty and Bass (2014) have been conducted with a focus on  institutional theory 
and corporate governance.  Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) find that audit committees 
operate in an environment where power is gained from interactions with others and they 
are effective when they have institutional support, such as access to information 
provided by management and auditors, as well as function in a supportive environment 
provided by top management (Cohen et al., 2008).  Additional corporate governance 
research based on institutional theory examining changes in governance practices as a 
result of changes in the environment are seen in Chang (2006) and Kim (2010), where 
the effects of institutional changes on the transparency and accountability of business 
groups are a result of the Asian financial crisis as stated in Colli and Colpan (2016).  
Summary 
Among the various theories discussed in the context of corporate governance, agency 
theory is by far the most popular and the one that has been used most by academics and 
practitioners (Eisenhardt, 1989; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Aguilera et al., 2008; 
Christopher, 2010).  Although alternative corporate governance theories, such as 
institutional theory, stakeholder theory and stewardship theory have also been the 
subject of research by academics, agency theory has been the primary basis for the 
development of corporate governance standards, principles, and codes (Christopher, 
2010).  According to Mallin (2010:21), who provides a comprehensive analysis of 
corporate governance theories, agency theory provides the best explanation for 
corporate governance roles in relation to legal, cultural, ownership and other structural 
characteristics.   
All corporate governance theoretical perspectives are complements to agency theory 
and not substitutes for it (Daily et al., 2003).  Although various corporate governance 
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theories influence the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
earnings management and firm performance, agency theory is the fundamental 
underlying theory that forms the basis for the examination of the hypothesized 
relationships between the variables. 
This study initially examines the effect of corporate governance on earnings 
management.  From an agency perspective, board of directors effective monitoring 
mechanisms are crucial in mitigating earnings management practices.  The second issue 
examined in this study is the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance.  Agency theory sets the context for aligning the interests of all 
parties involved in governing the firm, with the ultimate objective of increasing 
shareholder value.  Properly designed board of directors is of utmost importance in 
minimizing agency costs and any sort of closely connected private benefits that affect 
firm performance.   
Agency theory provides the theoretical framework to explain the motives and reasons 
for earnings management and firm performance.  Thus, this study will draw on agency 
theory to develop hypotheses to test the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and earnings management and firm performance.   
2.3 Corporate governance systems 
Corporate governance systems are mainly classified in two categories: a shareholder-
interest driven Anglo-American business system and a stakeholder driven Continental 
European business system (Aguilera and Jackson, 2010).  The Anglo-American 
business system’s characteristics are equity finance, dispersed ownership, strong 
shareholder rights, active markets for capital control and flexible labor markets where 
the basic conflict lies between managers and shareholders, the Type I agency problem.  
Such systems are seen in countries such as the US, Canada and the UK.  The Continental 
European business system is characterized by long-term debt financing, the 
predominant role of the government on economic and social affairs, the group 
alignment of society, close ties between banks and industry, weaker shareholder rights, 
less active markets for capital control, rigid labor markets and concentrated block 
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holder ownership.  In such a governance system the basic conflict lies between majority 
and minority shareholders, the so-called Type II agency problem (Millar et al., 2005; 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Cuervo, 2002).  The risk that potential investors face is 
insider expropriation where the few strong owners manage the firm.  The role of 
corporate governance in this case is to align the interests of strong shareholders with 
weak minority shareholders (Ali et al., 2007).  This classification is the basis for 
analyzing corporate governance, although it does not entirely represent governance in 
Japan, East Asia, a wide range of European countries and the new emerging markets 
(Aguilera and Jackson, 2010).   
Although corporate governance is defined similarly around the world there are 
differences in the approach, based on the law and history of each country.  Dispersed 
shareholders have led to one approach to corporate governance, different legal systems 
to another, while history and geography have also played a detrimental role in how 
firms are organized, and their activities monitored and controlled. Corporate 
governance is thus perceived in different ways in the US compared to Continental 
Europe and the UK. 
Firms in the US indicate the important role of the separation of ownership and control 
of modern firms, as stated by Berle and Means (1932).  In these firms, the Type I agency 
problem is evident and corporate governance mechanisms are aimed principally at 
dealing with these issues.  Shareholders have a limited ability to control the board and 
much power resides with the CEO.  In many US boards CEO duality exists, whereby 
the CEO and chairman of the board are the same individual (Cuervo, 2002; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Grossman and Hart, 1986; Ali et al., 2007).  The abuse of power by strong 
CEOs has led to governance failures, as seen in the examples of WorldCom and Enron 
(Nordberg, 2011:78).    
In the US, corporate governance is based on rules set by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).  Although 
CG guidelines do not mandate a separation of CEO and the chairman of the board, it is 
highly recommended that an independent vice president of the board exists, in cases of 
CEO duality (Nordberg, 2011:107).  More emphasis is placed on boards consisting of 
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independent non-executive members and the ‘comply or explain’ principle is enforced, 
which was originally introduced in the Cadbury Code (1992) in the UK.  The greatest 
change in US corporate governance was the development of a statute, Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX), Public Law 107-204 in 2002.  The most important feature of this Act was 
that CEOs and CFOs personally certify the accuracy of financial information supplied, 
whereby false information leads not only to civil actions taken against them, but also 
criminal action, which could even lead to imprisonment (Nordberg, 2011: 107-108).  
SOX also requires US listed firms to establish internal control processes and all external 
auditors are required to register with Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) so as to 
ensure and endorse their oversight procedure (Fletcher and Miles, 2004).  
The UK’s governance system is somewhat different from that of the US, though both 
are classified as a shareholder-interest driven Anglo-American business systems.  
Corporate governance in the UK is based on principles, voluntary compliance of CG 
codes and application of the ‘comply or explain’ principle.  On the other hand, the US, 
after SOX, bases its corporate governance on rules, mandatory compliance or penalty 
enforcement (Tricker, 2008; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010).  Another difference between 
the UK and the US, as a result of the Cadbury Code, is that in the UK the role of the 
CEO and the chairman of the board are separate, with the chairman of the board being 
an independent non-executive member, while in the US most firms have CEO duality 
(Nordberg, 2011:81).   However, in both the UK and the US, the corporate governance 
system is based on a unitary board of directors, comprised of both executive and non-
executive members whose task is to protect shareholders’ interests.  
Corporate governance in Germany follows a stakeholder-oriented approach, illustrating 
how different continental Europe is from the US and the UK (Cioffi, 2002; Lane, 2003; 
Fiss and Zajac, 2004).  The basic difference in the German corporate governance system 
is the existence of a dual-board structure, consisting of a ‘management board’ and a 
‘supervisory board’.  The ‘management board’ consists of managers dealing with daily 
operations which reports to a ‘supervisory board’ that is responsible for monitoring, 
control and policy-making.  ‘Supervisory boards’ consist of independent non-executive 
members and employees, whose aim is to protect workers’ interests.  Management is 
not allowed to sit on ‘supervisory boards’ (Nordberg, 2011:74).  The main advantage 
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of a dual board system is that the ambiguity of roles in a board is eliminated, since each 
board’s role is different and clearly specified (Nordberg, 2011: 83).         
Other Continental European countries that also follow the stakeholder driven business 
system have either a unitary board, similar to the US and the UK, or a two-tier board, 
similar to Germany’s structure.  Italy, Spain and Greece follow the unitary board 
structure, while Austria, Switzerland, and the Netherlands mandates dual boards.  Other 
countries, such as France, leave the choice of unitary or dual boards to the shareholders 
(Nordberg, 2011: 83).   
2.4 The institutional setting in Greece 
Greece is a European country with distinct economic and socio-political characteristics. 
Although Greece seems to have been influenced by free market thinking over the last 
thirty years, it continues to reflect a mixture of Eastern and Western influences in terms 
of culture, politics and economics (Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2014).  Greece 
“industrialized” in the early post-world war II years and after a few years of rapid 
growth, it entered an era of stagnation and structural economic problems until the mid-
1990’s (Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004).  During that period, investor’s interest in the 
ASE was insignificant. Very few Greek firms raised capital through IPOs and most 
domestic and international investors were reluctant to invest in such a small capital 
market (Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015).  The ASE’s underdevelopment was a 
result of the heavy reliance of firms on debt financing and thus, the predominance of 
the banking sector, the high level of state intervention in the economy, the high 
ownership concentration of listed firms, as well as a lack of transparent and credible 
information disclosed to investors by firms (Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015). 
During the period 1995-2000, there was an unprecedented increase in the value of 
shares quoted on ASE when Greece met the Maastricht criteria and joined Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) in 2001, together with the expansion of many Greek firms 
in Southern Europe.  During this period, Greece maintained a high growth rate, mainly 
through the entry of international funds listed on the ASE, with the ASE increasing in 
value much faster than other capital markets in developed countries (Tsipouri and 
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Xanthakis, 2004; Dasilas and Leventis, 2013).  Additionally, the ASE went through 
market microstructure changes such as the expansion of trading hours, the operation of 
OASIS, an integrated electronic system of settlements, and the extension of margin 
accounts (Dasilas and Leventis, 2013).  As a result, Greece experienced a remarkable 
increase in its stock market and the ASE was considered a developed market from 2000 
until 20159 (FTSE, 2011; Tsalavoutas et al., 2012; Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004; 
Dasilas and Leventis, 2013).  During this positive economic growth period, the number 
of companies listed on the ASE increased, and the significant use of IPO’s changed 
many private-family owned companies to public listed companies, and the need for 
modernization and supervision by the market became a necessity (Tsipouri and 
Xanthakis, 2004).  Although many private-family owned businesses became publicly 
listed firms through this expansion of the ASE, this did not change the relatively high 
levels of concentrated family ownership (Lazarides, 2010).  The massive entrance of 
institutional and individual investors into the capital market, mainly through 
placements on small and medium capitalization firms, increased the stock prices and 
liquidity of these companies.   
This unprecedented rise in value of the ASE came to an end when international 
institutional investors discovered that the ASE was overvalued and wanted to realize 
their profits (Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015).  The stock market started 
experiencing losses, which reached an average of almost 90% of its peak value, there 
was a great reduction in trade turnover and the number of IPOs, and thus firms turned 
to alternative forms of financing, such as bank lending, where access to credit was easy 
and the cost of debt low (Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004; Dasilas and Leventis, 2013).  
More specifically, the ASE General Index realized an annual decrease of 38.8% in 
2000, a 23.5% decrease in 2001 and a 32.5% decrease in 2002.  In 2002, the total value 
of transactions in the ASE decreased by 85.7% in comparison to 1999.  Total market 
capitalization in 2002 amounted to 65.7 billion euros, a decrease of 66.7% in relation 
to 1999 (Spanos, 2005).   Later on, the global credit crunch crisis of 2008 and Greece’s 
subsequent sovereign debt crisis resulted in the ASE reaching even lower levels 
                                                 
9 Greece was demoted to an advanced emerging market according to FTSE Russell in its FTSE Annual 
Country Classification Review-2015 as of March 2016. 
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(Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015).10  Greece was demoted from a developed market 
to an advanced emerging market as of March 2016, due to recent extended market 
closure, capital control imposition on domestic markets and continuous economic 
instability (FTSE, 2015).     
Nowadays, the ASE is small in comparison to other European stock markets in terms 
of market capitalization, turnover and number of listed firms (Sikalidis and Leventis, 
2017).  Greek firms are still to a large extent family owned with high ownership 
concentration.  Only 20-50% of Greek firms are freely floated firms, thus the ability to 
achieve control of a firm through capital markets is limited.  Family members or the 
controlling shareholders are part of the management group and there is often no 
distinction between management and ownership.  Thus, financial statements have lower 
value as a prime source of information and communication for owners (Tzovas, 2006; 
Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2010; Dasilas and Leventis, 2013).  Even in cases where 
managers are not part of the family or the controlling shareholder, they have close ties 
with them and are often subject to their control (Lazarides and Drimpetas, 2011). 
Furthermore, the Greek legal system is based on civil law, resembling the French-code 
system, which typically is related to high ownership concentration, weak legal 
protection for shareholders and poor law enforcement (Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2010; 
Caramanis et al., 2015).  Banks are still the main source of capital for firms, which has 
fostered the development of personal relationships between banks and firms, where 
bank lending relies on personal relationships, collateral, political intervention and social 
criteria (Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2010).  Additionally, the need for external financing is 
greater given the fact that internal financing of projects by Greek firms is limited, due 
to Greek corporate law which mandates an annual minimum cash dividend distribution 
equal to 35% of net profits minus the amount needed to maintain regular reserves (net 
distributable earnings) or 6% of share capital, whichever is higher (Corporate Law 
2190/1920, as amended by Laws 148/1967 and 876/1979).  The main reason for this 
law is to minimize potential agency conflicts and protect minority shareholders 
(Sikalidis and Leventis, 2017).  If a firm wants to bypass this requirement and not 
                                                 
10 For an analytical discussion of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece consult Chapter 6. 
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distribute a cash dividend, 70% of the voting rights are required, while a smaller 
distribution than the one required by law needs a 65% voting right agreement.  
However, most Greek shareholders vote in favor of the proposed dividend distribution.  
Therefore Greek firms rely on external debt and equity financing for their financial 
needs (Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015; Sikalidis and Leventis, 2017).11   
The Greek accounting environment is tax-driven and conservative (Ballas, 1994).   Tax 
rates are perceived to be high and in their attempt to avoid taxes firms use earnings 
management techniques (Baralexis, 2004).  The link between tax avoidance and 
earnings management of Greek firms has been examined extensively in the literature 
(see for example, Leuz et al. (2003), Baralexis (2004), Caramanis and Spathis (2006), 
Burgstahler et al. (2006),  Ghicas et al. (2008)) as stated by Tsalavoutas and Evans 
(2010).12 
2.5 Evolution of corporate governance in Greece 
Although the issue of Corporate Governance can be dated back as far as 1776 (Adam 
Smith) in developed countries, in Greece the topic was considered much later.  
Legislators and business people in Greece began trying to change a corporate culture 
that was highly focused on government affairs since the creation of the modern Greek 
state  (Mertzanis, 2001).  It was only after the two major financial crises in South-East 
Asia in 1997 and in Russia in 1998, that concerns about corporate governance rose in 
Greece (Mertzanis, 2001).   
The great increase in the ASE from 1995-2000, followed by the record decrease, created 
the need to re-establish investor confidence and effective corporate governance was an 
essential part of this effort.  Although international capital providers required effective 
corporate governance after the expansion of the ASE, the great decline of the ASE that 
                                                 
11 According to recently enacted Law 4548/2018, named “Amendment of Corporate Law”, the annual 
minimum cash dividend distribution equals 35% of net profits minus the amount needed to maintain 
regular reserves.  This amount can decrease to 10% of net profits with a majority voting right.  However, 
non-distribution of this cash dividend requires 80% of voting rights. 
12 Although financial reporting and tax accounting are measured by different measurement rules for 
consolidated financial statements of listed firms after the implementation of IFRS in 2005, there is a link 
between tax avoidance and EM, since taxable income calculation depends on financial reporting income.   
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followed indicated that the governance structure of Greek firms was inefficient.  Many 
instances of corporate scandals took place and it became evident that implementation 
of modern forms of corporate governance structures were necessary so as to protect 
shareholders’ rights, restore investor’s confidence and increase firm performance 
(Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010; Dasilas and Leventis, 2013).   
Following along these lines, the Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC) in 
collaboration with market participants, company experts, auditors, legal practitioners 
and investors, began discussing extensively the corporate governance issue (Florou and 
Galarniotis, 2007; Mertzanis, 2001; Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004).  
More specifically, the corporate governance topic was first formally introduced in 1998 
through a paper published by the ASE.   A number of discussions and conferences led 
to the creation of a voluntary code of conduct in October 1999, known as the Blue Book 
(Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004).  The Blue Book has five chapters that are basically a 
replicate of the structure of the OECD principles (Governance, 1999).  In collaboration 
with all relevant agents, the HCMC developed a Committee of Corporate Governance 
in Greece, which presented a white paper in 1999, titled “Principles of Corporate 
Governance in Greece-Recommendations for its Competitive Transformation” whose 
voluntary corporate governance code was based on internationally accepted corporate 
governance principles (Florou and Galarniotis, 2007).  This voluntary Greek CG code 
reflected OECD principles (Mallin, 2010: 38).  The changes the Committee opted for 
were focused mainly on corporate transparency, consistency and accountability 
(Mertzanis, 2001; Zhou et al., 2018).   
The Committee opted for the view that the set of practices set out would be effective if 
they were characterized by the voluntary behavior of all relevant parties involved and 
should conform to the best practices of the member-states of the European Union and 
the OECD recommendations (Mertzanis, 2001).  The motive behind the voluntary 
nature rather than a mandatory one was to minimize the risk of companies complying 
with the letter rather that the spirit of efficient governance (Mertzanis, 2001).   
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In 2000, the Center of Financial Studies in the Department of Economics of the 
University of Athens began a project financed by the ASE, aimed at creating a rating 
system for compliance with the corporate governance criteria for listed companies on 
the ASE.  This indicated to the financial community that the corporate governance 
debate was an important issue (Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004; Spanos, 2005).   
The importance of corporate governance led to the development of two major rules 
created by the HCMC in 2000.  The first rule, Rule 5/204/2000, named “A code of 
conduct for companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange and their affiliated parties”, 
set the duties and obligations of major shareholders, the board of directors, executive 
management and others. Its aim was to eliminate uncertainty in the market on corporate 
matters (HCMC Rule 5/204/2000).  The second rule, Rule 1/195/2000, named “Tender 
offers in the capital market for the acquisition of securities”, set the new framework for 
takeover bids (HCMC Rule 1/195/2000) (Spanos, 2005). 
In alliance with the HCMC, the Ministry of National Economy and Development set 
up a law in 2000, creating a committee on corporate governance, the Rokkas 
Committee.  This led to an intense debate between the Hellenic Federation of Industries, 
which believed that a corporate governance voluntary code should be applied, and the 
State, which wanted a law that would make additional corporate governance items 
mandatory (Spanos, 2005). 
In August 2001, the Hellenic Federation of Industries introduced voluntary principles 
of corporate governance primarily for companies listed in the ASE (Tsipouri and 
Xanthakis, 2004).  In March 2002, a corporate governance rating system was presented 
by the Center of Financial Studies of the University of Athens, based on these voluntary 
principles (Spanos, 2005).  The main conclusions drawn from this survey were that, 
overall, Greek companies listed on the ASE demonstrated a fairly satisfactory degree 
of compliance with corporate governance principles (Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 2004). 
The year 2002 was a critical year for corporate governance in Greece.  In May 2002, 
the Greek Ministry of National economy created Law 3016/2002, named “On 
Chapter 2- Corporate Governance 
 
46 
 
Corporate Governance, board remuneration and other issues”.13  The law set by the 
Greek Ministry of National Economy was based on the initial plan of the Rokkas 
Committee.  For the first time, Greek listed companies were obliged to enforce a set of 
governance guidelines.  The main requirements according to the new law involved the 
composition of the board of directors, non-executive directors’ remuneration, internal 
auditing, share capital increases and the participation of shareholders in the decision-
making process (Dimitropoulos and Asteriou, 2010). Law 3016/2002 mandates that the 
number of non-executive directors be at least 1/3 of the total number of board members. 
At least two of the non-executive directors should be independent, whereby 
independence is defined as board members that do not own any stock of the firm and 
are not on the company’s payroll (Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015).  Additionally, 
the law requires all listed firms to adopt an internal audit function so as to ensure the 
credibility of the disclosed information.  Greek firms are free to choose their leadership 
structure between a unitary leadership structure, that is CEO duality, or a two-tier 
leadership structure (non-duality) (Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos, 2015).  It is worth 
noting that throughout this legal process of the creation and implementation of the 
governance law, the Hellenic Federation of Industries firmly believed that governance 
codes should be voluntary and not legally enforceable (Florou and Galarniotis, 2007). 
In an effort to continuously reform and revise the existing corporate governance law, 
in July 2002, the ASE established qualitative criteria covering corporate governance, 
transparency and communication.  These were optional and in addition to the laws that 
already existed (Spanos, 2005).   
Based on this effort of continuous improvement, Greece transposed a number of 
discrete legislative acts from several European directives in the area of company law 
into the Greek legal framework, creating new CG rules.  More specifically, Law 
3693/2008, named “Mandatory audit of annual and consolidated financial reports” 
requires the existence of an audit committee for all listed firms and complete disclosure 
of the firm’s relationship with the external auditor is required.  In accordance with this 
                                                 
13 Many argued that this law was a response to numerous scandals in the 1990s (Dasilas and 
Papasyriopoulos, 2015). 
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law, firms are obliged to provide a comprehensive description of their external audit 
firm including its corporate governance structure, its professional relationship with the 
firm and all fees provided to it.  The audit committee oversees the external auditor and 
ensures its independency and objectivity, especially in cases where the external audit 
firm provides non-audit services, such as consulting or tax-related services, that could 
potentially compromise its objectivity and independence.  Additionally, audit 
committee characteristics, such as member independence and expertise need to be 
disclosed.  Law 3693/2008 transposes the 8th European Directive 2006/43/EC on 
Company Law into Greek legislation on statutory audits of annual and consolidated 
accounts (Nerantzidis and Filos, 2014; Zhou et al., 2018). 
In 2010, Law 3873/2010, named “Mandatory reports by a certified expert for mergers 
and dissolutions of corporations”  was created, incorporating into Greek legislation EU 
Directive 2006/46/EC and 2007/63/EC.  This law’s greatest contribution is the 
requirement for all listed firms to disclose a CG statement in their annual report.  This 
CG statement gives information on mandatory and voluntary CG practices the firm 
applies, while providing reasons for not conforming to the requirements of CG laws.  
The law also permits firms to either adopt existing CG codes or create their own CG 
code based on their firm’s needs.  The CG statement should include information on the 
main features of any principle risk management system the firm has, existing internal 
controls for the preparation of the firm’s financial statements and the composition of 
the board and its committees.  Penalties should be imposed on the board members of 
firms that do not prepare such a CG statement in their annual report (Nerantzidis and 
Filos, 2014).    
In addition to this law, in 2010, Law 3884/2010, named “Exercise of shareholders’ 
rights for listed firms”, was introduced concerning the rights of shareholders and the 
company’s obligation regarding disclosure of information prior to general meetings.  
This law incorporated into Greek legislation EU Directive 2007/36/EC.  This law 
enables all shareholders to either personally participate and vote in general meetings or 
appoint a representative for the general meeting.  The principle innovation of this law 
is the establishment of e-participation, i.e. watching or interacting in real time, as well 
as mail voting or e-voting, to allow for distant voting (Nerantzidis and Filos, 2014). 
Chapter 2- Corporate Governance 
 
48 
 
A voluntary CG code in Greece appeared in December 2010 by the Hellenic 
Association of Investors & Internet (SED), a non-profit association that acts as a 
representative of private investors of Greece in the advisory Committee of Hellenic 
Capital Market.  In the 8th Conference of their Association, a ‘Charter-Map of Corporate 
Governance’ was introduced for Greek listed firms in the ASE.  This ‘Charter-Map’ 
promotes the use of international CG best practices so as to enhance transparency and 
shareholder activism.  SED also created a CG index based on the ‘Charter-Map’, so as 
to assess Greek listed firms on CG practices they adopted (Nerantzidis and Filos, 2014). 
The establishment of laws concerning corporate governance mechanisms provided a 
stimulus for the Hellenic Federation of Industries to prepare a formal Corporate 
Governance Code for listed companies.  A well-developed first draft was published in 
2010 and after suggestions and feedback the final draft, with minor amendments, was 
published in 2011.   The main objective of the Code was to educate and guide board of 
directors of Greek companies on governance best practice.  Another crucial aim of the 
Code was to improve shareholder information and provide an easily available reference 
system for listed companies, which, as of 2011, are required by Law 3873/2010, as 
mentioned earlier, to disclose annually information about their corporate governance, 
in a statement as a specific and clearly identifiable section of the annual report.  
Additionally, this Code was the first CG code that explicitly stated that Greek firms 
should apply the ‘comply or explain’ concept, a concept that other EU members had 
already practiced.  
In 2012, the Hellenic Exchanges in a joint collaboration with the Hellenic Federation 
of Industries formed the Hellenic Corporate Governance Council (HCG Council).  The 
HCG Council encourages, supports and monitors the implementation of a CG code by 
Greek firms.  The Code implemented could either be the existing CG Code or one that 
a firm creates based on its needs.  HCG Council as a distinct body that certifies the 
relevance and implementation of a CG code, indicates the recognition of the importance 
of corporate governance in sustaining the competitiveness of Greek firms and 
enhancing their credibility in the eyes of Greek and foreign investors (Grose et al., 
2014).  
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A first review of the Greek CG code created at the initiative of the Hellenic Federation 
of Industries in 2010, was conducted in 2013 by the Hellenic Corporate Governance 
Council. The revised code, created in 2013, is now called the Hellenic Corporate 
Governance Code, which continues to promote the enhancement of the Greek corporate 
institutional framework.  
2.6 Conclusion 
Greece is a country with the characteristics of a Continental European corporate 
governance system.  Nevertheless, the characteristics of Greek corporate governance 
laws are influenced by SOX (2002).  SOX was seen by legislators as a medicine for CG 
problems and a way of creating a more stable international business environment  by 
enforcing the same rules and regulations, so as to help capital movement (Lazarides, 
2010).   
The improvements of the CG system in Greece have come about through the 
enforcement both of laws and specific codes of good governance.  All Greek CG laws 
and codes are aimed at increasing investor confidence and establishing the long-term 
success and competitiveness of Greek firms (Nerantzidis and Filos, 2014).  Greek CG 
laws are either national laws or laws created to implement European directives.  As for 
CG codes, Greek firms have the option to either adopt the voluntary national Greek 
code created or generate their own CG code (Nerantzidis and Filos, 2014).  CG codes 
aim at creating a framework for a set of best practices in terms of good governance and 
address deficiencies directly related to the country’s legal system.  Hence, different 
attributes are found in CG codes created for countries that follow the common-law 
based system compared to those that follow the civil-law based system, as is the case 
of Greece.   
 Although the legal framework in Greece has fully complied with EU guidelines and 
directives, the question of whether this synchronization of legal frameworks has led to 
the successful strengthening of shareholder rights has not yet been completely answered 
(Spanos, 2005; Nerantzidis, 2015).   
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In this context, this study examines the effectiveness of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms of a non-Anglo Saxon country, Greece, on earnings management and firm 
performance.  Motivated by the enactment of Law 3693/2008, the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on earnings management practices is tested.  Additionally, in 
light of the current sovereign-debt crisis in Greece, corporate governance mechanisms 
effect on Greek firm’s performance is studied.  Table 2-1 shows the main events 
concerning the evolution of corporate governance in Greece.   
Table 2-1 Evolution of CG laws and codes in Greece 
1998 Paper published by ASE resulting in the first formal introduction of CG 
1999 Development of a voluntary CG Code developed by the Committee of CG in Greece, titled “Principles of Corporate 
Governance in Greece-Recommendations for its Competitive Transformation”. 
2000 
Development of two major rules by the HCMC concerning CG practices.  The first rule, Rule 5/204/2000, named “A code 
of conduct for companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange and their affiliated parties” and the second rule, Rule 
1/195/2000, named “Tender offers in the capital market for the acquisition of securities”. 
2001 Introduction of voluntary CG principles by the Hellenic Federation of Industries. 
2002 Enactment of CG law for listed firms, Law 3016/2002, named “On Corporate Governance, board remuneration and other 
issues”. 
2002 The ASE established qualitative criteria covering corporate governance, transparency and communication. 
2008 Enactment of CG law, Law 3693/2008, named “Mandatory audit of annual and consolidated financial reports” requiring 
all listed firms to have an audit committee.  
2010 Enactment of CG law, Law 3873/2010,  named “Mandatory reports by a certified expert for mergers and dissolutions of 
corporations” requiring listed firms to disclose an annual CG statement in their annual report. 
2010 Enactment of CG law, Law 3884/2010, named “Exercise of shareholders rights’ for listed firms”  concerning the rights of 
shareholders and the firm’s obligation to disclose information prior to general meetings. 
2010 Additional CG codes were introduced by the Hellenic Association of Investors & Internet (SED) 
2010 Hellenic Federation of Industries prepared a formal voluntary CG code for listed firms named Corporate Governance Code 
2013 Hellenic Corporate Governance Council updated the voluntary CG code for listed firms now called the Hellenic Corporate 
Governance Code 
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Chapter 3 – Literature Review and Hypothesis Development (CG & EM) 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter one identifies the research questions tackled in this thesis.  Chapter two 
discusses issues pertaining to corporate governance, focusing on the issue of corporate 
governance in Greece.  This chapter reviews the literature pertaining to the association 
between facets of corporate governance and earnings management.  The chapter begins 
by examining the theoretical framework concerning the impact of CG on EM in section 
3.2.  Corporate governance is examined from two perspectives - audit committee 
effectiveness in section 3.3, and overall CG quality, proxied by a corporate governance 
index, in section 3.4.  Earnings management is examined through accrual-based EM 
studies, in line with most EM literature.14  The literature review forms the basis for the 
hypotheses development in section 3.5.  Finally, section 3.6 concludes the chapter.  
Consequently, the hypotheses are tested and discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
3.2 Theoretical framework for the impact of CG on earnings management 
Among the various theories that apply to corporate governance, the key theories that 
provide the theoretical framework that help to explain the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings management are agency theory, stakeholder theory 
and stewardship theory. 
The basis of agency theory is the separation of ownership and control.  Managers are 
often motivated by their own self-interest, rather than those of shareholders.  This 
conflict of interest is costly and difficulties exist in verifying that managers strive for 
maximization of shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  The pursuit of self-interest by management creates an incentive to manage a 
firm’s earnings so as to achieve specific personal benefits.  Managers can exercise 
                                                 
14 According to Dechow et al. (2010) abnormal accrual-based, which reflect earnings management, are 
the most extensively used proxy of earnings quality in empirical accounting research.  As such in line 
with most EM literature and data constraints accrual-based EM studies are examined in this study.    
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discretion on accruals, which can reduce the relevance and reliability of reported 
earnings, whereby earnings management is a type of agency cost.  As a result, managers 
cannot be trusted and strict monitoring is needed.  The role of the board of directors is 
significant in monitoring top management so as to ensure that managers act in the best 
interests of shareholders.  Corporate governance literature emphasizes this role in 
resolving agency problems (Peasnell et al., 2005).  The use of audit committees is also 
considered an important part of the decision control system, in an effort to deal with 
agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Given agency 
assumptions, enhancing corporate governance mechanisms should result in the 
reduction of earnings management practices.   
Stewardship theory takes an opposing perspective.  Under this theory the interests of 
managers and shareholders are aligned.  Managers are trustworthy and are good 
stewards of the firm and should be entrusted with the firm’s resources.  Monitoring is 
unnecessary since managers are not opportunistic and act in the best interest of the 
shareholders.  They should be given autonomy, since they gain satisfaction through 
effectively performing their work and achieving organization’s goals.  Non-financial 
motives, such as the need for achievement, recognition, respect and work ethic 
influence the decisions made by managers (Donaldson and Davis, 1994; Davis et al., 
1997; Chen et al., 2007).  Under stewardship theory, managers are less likely to practice 
earnings management and the board of directors is an instrument that assists managers 
rather than monitors them.   
Stakeholder theory advocates the concept that firms and society are interdependent and 
firms are not only responsible to their shareholders, but also serve a broader social 
purpose (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003).  Although agency theory expects the board to look 
after the interests of shareholders, stakeholder theory expects the board to consider the 
interests of many stakeholder groups, including social, environmental and ethical 
interest groups (Freeman, 2004). The link between earnings management and 
stakeholder theory suggests that management might conduct EM in order to obtain 
personal benefits, at the expense not only of the shareholders but also of additional 
stakeholders. Under stakeholder theory effective corporate governance mechanisms 
should protect all stakeholders’ interests (Prior et al., 2006).  The difficulty of 
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stakeholder theory is to align the various interests of different stakeholders and consider 
their needs of equal value.  As such, it has less impact on policy making of corporate 
governance due to the common criticism that aligning various conflicting stakeholder 
interests can undermine the welfare of the firm (Sternberg, 1997). 
Each of these theories are useful in considering the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
monitoring and control functions of corporate governance.  However, these theories are 
considered complements not substitutes to agency theory, thus this study draws upon 
agency theory to examine the relationship between earnings management and corporate 
governance.   
Prior literature examining the relationship between earnings management and corporate 
governance, either through audit committee variables, such as size, independence, 
diligence and expertise, as well as corporate governance indices, is presented in the 
following sections.  The relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
management is examined to develop research hypotheses for further analysis. 
3.3 The audit committee and earnings management 
Among the designated board committees, such as the audit committee, the nomination 
committee, and the remuneration committee, the audit committee is responsible for 
ensuring compliance to generally accepted accounting principles, so as to maintain the 
credibility of a firm’s financial statements (Lin and Hwang, 2010).  An audit committee 
is responsible for supervising the accounting process and works as a coordinator 
between external and internal auditors (Piot and Janin, 2007).  It is an important part of 
the decision control system, with respect to the internal monitoring by the board of 
directors, and has the delegated responsibility of protecting and progressing 
shareholders’ interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Chen and Zhang, 2014).  It ensures that 
accurate financial information is provided to decision-makers by monitoring 
management’s possible opportunistic behaviour (Chen and Zhang, 2014).  The 
committee’s composition, size, activity, expertise, ownership and tenure are 
manifestations of the level of corporate governance of firms (Ghosh et al., 2010). 
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The board of directors delegates the process of monitoring financial reporting to the 
members of the audit committee.  They are responsible for the accuracy of the financial 
statements in consultation with the external auditors (Abed et al., 2012).  Although they 
are primarily responsible for  the reliability of reported earnings, legal responsibility 
still lies with the full board (Marra et al., 2011). 
An audit committee increases the quality of the audit process in two ways.  Firstly, an 
audit committee supervises the major accounting choices made and therefore mitigates 
EM.  Second, it works as a coordinator between internal and external auditors and 
protects the independence of external auditors from managerial pressures.  This 
increases the probability that auditors will report irregularities discovered without 
hesitation (Piot and Janin, 2007). 
Most of the literature indicates that the existence of audit committees mitigates EM.  
More specifically, Dechow et al. (1996) with a sample of 92 US firms under SEC 
investigation for manipulating earnings between April 1982 and December 1992, Jaggi 
and Leung (2007) for Hong Kong for a total of 523 firm-year observations for the period 
1999-2000, Piot and Janin (2007) with 225 firm-year observations for France for the 
period 1999-2001, Baxter and Cotter (2009) for 309 Australian firms for the year 2001, 
Marra et al. (2011) for a sample of 888 Italian firm-year observations from 2003 to 
2006 and Chen and Zhang (2014) for a sample of 3,129 firm-year observations of 
Chinese listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2000 to 2006, 
find that audit committees constrain EM.  The only exception is the study by Peasnell 
et al. (2005) for 1,271 firm-year observations for UK listed firms for the period 1993-
1996 who find no link between the existence of audit committees and EM.   
The effectiveness of audit committees depends on its widely recognized monitoring 
roles.  Literature has identified many aspects that contribute to an effective audit 
committee.  Composition of an audit committee, primarily in terms of independence, 
diligence, shown as committee size, number and length of meetings, and competence, 
in terms of financial and industry expertise are key factors that make an audit committee 
effective (Carcello et al., 2002; Abbott et al., 2004; Zaman et al., 2011; Al-Shaer and 
Zaman, 2016; Lary and Taylor, 2012).    
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The characteristics of the audit committee such as its size, independence, diligence and 
expertise have been studied in relation to EM, as a monitoring mechanism of 
management in the financial reporting process (Lin and Hwang, 2010; Ellwood and 
Garcia-Lacalle, 2016). 
Audit Committee Size and Earnings Management 
The complexity of a company’s financial information requires audit committee 
members to exert considerable effort.  As such, a large committee is needed so as to 
ensure the necessary resources and manpower needed to control EM.  However, as the 
size of the audit committee increases, the risk of facing ‘the free-rider’ problem also 
increases, whereby individual members of the committee may not apply the effort 
needed (He and Yang, 2014).   
Many codes and recommendations on Corporate Governance, such as the UK 
Corporate Governance Code recommends a minimum audit committee size of three, 
while SOX (2002) requires a minimum of three members (Sierra Garcia et al., 2012).  
Bedard et al. (2004) state the larger audit committees have a greater probability of 
detecting potential financial reporting problems, due to the wide range of views and 
expertise that ensures effective monitoring (Katmon and Farooque, 2017).  Greater 
diversity of intellectual, social and professional backgrounds is more likely to exist in 
larger audit committees, thus increasing the committee’s effectiveness in mitigating 
EM (Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Ellwood and Garcia-Lacalle, 2016).    
Research examining the relationship between audit committee size and accrual-based 
EM is seen in Anglo-American and non-Anglo-American settings.  Some studies find 
a negative relationship between audit committee size and accrual-based EM (Ghosh et 
al., 2010; Kent et al., 2010; Sierra Garcia et al., 2012), while others find no association 
(Xie et al., 2003; Bedard et al., 2004; Davidson et al., 2005; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; 
Jaggi et al., 2009; Katmon and Farooque, 2017; He and Yang, 2014; Ramachandran et 
al., 2015).  
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Audit Committee Independence and Earnings Management 
The existence of an audit committee is not necessarily sufficient in mitigating EM and 
the effectiveness of the audit committee’s monitoring role arguably depends on how 
the committee is structured and organized.  Independent members of audit committees 
are considered to be more effective monitors, and so are more capable of constraining 
EM, as they do not have personal incentives and can better restrain managerial reporting 
discretion (Ghosh et al., 2010).  Additionally, independent members have the incentive 
to maintain their reputation in the market as independent, competent professionals and 
do not want to risk potential litigation and loss of directorships (Sharma and Kuang, 
2014).  For this reason, international regulations such as SOX (2002), the UK Corporate 
Governance Code and the code of Australian Stock Exchange CG Council (ASX) 
(2003), all emphasize the importance of independent audit committee members in 
effectively monitoring financial reporting (Sharma and Kuang, 2014).  As an example, 
the New York Stock Exchange Standards and the UK Corporate Governance Code 
require listed firms on NYSE and the LSE respectively, to have audit committees with 
a minimum of three independent members (Chen and Zhang, 2014).  
The relationship between audit committee independence and accrual-based EM has 
been studied by many researchers both in Anglo-Saxon settings such as the US and 
Australia, as well as non-Anglo-Saxon settings, such as in Spain, France, and Malaysia.   
Klein (2002a), Xie et al. (2003), Bedard et al. (2004), Davidson et al. (2005), Bradbury 
et al. (2006), Hutchinson et al. (2008), Kent et al. (2010), Chen and Zhang (2014) and 
Sharma and Kuang (2014) all find that the presence of a majority of independent 
members on the audit committees limits accrual-based EM.  However, there is no 
definite conclusion in the literature on the issue of whether a majority of independent 
audit committee members or an audit committee comprised of only independent 
members is more effective in mitigating EM (Sharma and Kuang, 2014).  More 
specifically, Klein (2002a) and Davidson et al. (2005) suggest that the critical threshold 
for the number of independent audit committee members is over  fifty percent.  Instead, 
Bedard et al. (2004) and Sharma and Kuang (2014) find that an audit committee 
consisting of 50-99% independent members has no significant effect on mitigating EM, 
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while a significant reduction in EM is found only when 100% of the members of the 
audit committee are independent. On the other hand, Rashidah and Fairuzana, (2006), 
Yang and Krishnan (2005), Ghosh (2010), Katmon and Farooque (2017), Osma and 
Noguer (2007) and Sierra Garcia et al. (2012), Piot and Janin (2007) and Baxter and 
Cotter (2009) find that the degree of independence of audit committees has no 
incremental effect on the mitigation of accrual-based EM. 
Audit Committee Expertise and Earnings Management 
Members of the audit committee that have financial expertise are in a superior position 
to monitor the integrity of the financial statements.  They possess similar heuristic 
techniques to external auditors in the decision making process, positively impacting 
their oversight judgement, demanding higher quality audits and facilitating the effective 
communication with internal and external auditors on the issue of controls  (Lary and 
Taylor, 2012; Alzeban and Sawan, 2015).   This expertise helps the audit committee 
better understand the firm’s risk management strategies.  They can make more 
appropriate financial decisions and conduct an accurate cost-benefit analysis of the 
operational decisions (Alzeban and Sawan, 2015).  Accounting and auditing expertise 
allows members of the audit committee to assess independently financial issues that are 
presented to them (Baxter and Cotter, 2009). 
The competence of an audit committee depends on its ability to detect financial 
irregularities, such as EM.  Financial knowledge is often needed by audit committee 
members to maintain attention over the firm’s financial reporting.  Xie et al. (2003) 
state that an independent member that has financial background is more likely to be 
acquainted with various forms of earnings manipulation, such as EM.   
The importance of financial expertise in audit committees, is shown by the fact that 
regulations and codes require at least one member of the audit committee to possess 
financial expertise (e.g. the UK Corporate Governance Code and SOX (2002)).   
Literature examining audit committee expertise, such as Xie et al. (2003), Bedard et al. 
(2004), Sharma and Kuang (2014), He and Yang (2014) and Chen and Zhang (2014) 
reveal that audit committees with financial experts mitigates EM.  However, the work 
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by Yang and Krishnan (2005), Rashidah and Fairuzana (2006), Baxter and Cotter 
(2009), Ghosh et al. (2010),  Kent et al. (2010), and Katmon and Farooque (2017) find 
no association between audit committee expertise and EM. 
Audit Committee Meetings and Earnings Management 
The frequency of meetings between audit committee members enhances the 
communication process.  Bedard et al. (2004) state that frequency is an indicator of 
effectiveness.  Audit committees should allocate sufficient time to discuss key financial 
issues of the firm.  An active audit committee is in a position to rectify any problem 
immediately and is in a better position to accomplish its monitoring role.  This results 
in higher quality financial reporting and thus less EM (Sierra Garcia et al., 2012; 
Katmon and Farooque, 2017).  
Various codes and recommendations, such as the UK Corporate Governance Code and 
SOX (2002) state that audit committee meetings should not be less than three or four 
times per year and should correspond to important financial reporting dates and the 
audit cycle.  
Prior studies have shown inconsistent results between audit committee meetings and 
accrual-based EM.  Some have shown an inverse relationship between the number of 
meetings and EM (Xie et al., 2003; Baxter and Cotter, 2009; Kent et al., 2010; Sierra 
Garcia et al., 2012).  Some have shown a positive relationship between the two (Ghosh 
et al., 2010; Katmon and Farooque, 2017), while others find no association (Bedard et 
al., 2004; Davidson et al., 2005; Yang and Krishnan, 2005; Rashidah and Fairuzana, 
2006; Hutchinson et al., 2008). 
Audit Committee Effectiveness and Earnings Management 
Research has also indicated that the effectiveness of an audit committee may depend 
on multiple characteristics and not a single one (e.g. independence), so researchers have 
developed composite measures. Each audit committee variable used in a composite 
measure individually influences audit committee quality, but the joint effect of all audit 
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committee variables is considered to have the greatest impact on the effectiveness of 
audit committees (Zaman et al., 2011).   
In line with this premise, Kent et al. (2010) and Zaman et al. (2011) extend prior 
research by using audit committee variables not in isolation but as a group, creating a 
composite measure of ‘audit committee effectiveness’ (ACE).  Their composite 
measure (ACE) consists of four audit committees variables: independence, financial 
expertise, size, and frequency of meetings.   
Kent et al. (2010)  examine the association between corporate governance mechanisms, 
such as board independence, a Big 4 audit firm, individual audit committee 
characteristics such as audit committee size, diligence, independence and expertise, as 
well as a composite measure of audit committee effectiveness and accruals quality.  
Their sample consists of 392 listed Australian firms for governance data for the year 
2004 and accruals quality measures for the period 2001-2005.  They find a significant 
positive relationship between a Big 4 audit firm and a large, independent and diligent 
audit committee and accruals quality.  Zaman et al. (2011) examine the effect of ACE 
in audit fees and non-audit service fees for a sample of 540 UK listed non-financial 
firm-year observations for the period 2001-2004.  They find a significant positive 
relationship between ACE and audit fees and non-audit fees for larger clients.     
3.4 Corporate governance index and earnings management 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) state that looking at each individual CG variable by 
itself limits the ability to measure the entire magnitude of CG and provides an 
incomplete analysis of the determinants of EM.  A corporate governance index provides 
a complete picture of the quality of corporate governance, capturing the 
multidimensional character of corporate governance.   
In line with this, Larcker et al. (2007) use 39 individual measures of CG grouped into 
seven categories: characteristics of the board of directors; stock ownership by 
executives and board members;  stock ownership by institutions; stock ownership by 
activist shareholders; debt and preferred stock holdings; compensation mix variables; 
and anti-takeover devices.  These 39 individual governance items result in the creation 
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of 14 multi-indicator CG indices based on exploratory principal component analysis 
(Larcker et al., 2007).  The authors examine 2,106 firms in the year 2003 and find that 
the 14 CG indices15 are associated with EM.  Their research reveals an association 
between some governance indices and EM, such as stock ownership by activist holders, 
board size, antitakeover devices and old directors.  However, the association between 
the majority of governance factors and EM produces mixed results. 
Shen and Chih (2007) also examine the relationship between CG and EM by using a 
CG index.  Their CG index is created using CG data found in the Credit Lyonnais 
Security Asia (CLSA) report for nine Asian countries.16  The CLSA report includes CG 
information about 495 firms in 25 Asian countries for the period between April 2001 
and February 2002, covering seven categories: management discipline; transparency; 
independence; accountability; responsibility; fairness; and social awareness.  Shen and 
Chih (2007) find that firms with poor CG quality, based on these measures, engage in 
more EM.   
Similarly, Bowen et al. (2008) test a CG score, based on the Gompers et al. (2003) G-
index,17 and test the association of this CG score with EM.  Their CG index is based on 
3,154 US firm-year observations for the period 1992-1995.  They find no significant 
relationship between CG and EM.   
Jiang et al. (2008) used the Gov-Score based on the research by Brown and Taylor 
(2006),18 to examine the relationship between CG and earnings quality.  They use US 
data for 4,311 firm-year observations for the period 2002- 2004 and examine the effect 
of the CG index on earnings quality.  Their study concludes that higher levels of CG 
are associated with lower levels of EM, thus higher earnings quality.  
                                                 
15 CG data for the sample was generated from two comprehensive datasets: Equilar Inc. and TrueCourse 
Inc and covered 70% of the Russell 3000 market capitalization in the US.  Equilar Inc. provides complete 
data on board, board committees (audit and compensation) and equity ownership by executives and board 
members.  TrueCourse Inc. is a dataset that consists of anti-takeover provisions for US firms that are 
incorporated in major indices such as the Fortune 500, Standard & Poor’s Super 1500  and others.  
16 The nine Asian countries used in the study are Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. 
17 For more details on the Gompers et al. (2003) G-index consult Chapter 4. 
18 For more information on the research of Brown and Taylor (2006) consult Chapter 4. 
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Bekiris and Doukakis (2011) examine the association between CG and EM for firms 
listed in the Athens, Milan and Madrid Stock Exchanges for the year 2008.  Their CG 
index consists of 55 individual CG items, categorized into five areas: board of directors; 
audit; remuneration; shareholder rights; and transparency.  Variables included in their 
CG index were taken from the existing literature,19 two basic CG rating firms,20 as well 
as the Standard and Poor’s Disclosure and Transparency Index.  Their sample consists 
of 185 firms listed on the Athens Stock Exchange, 155 firms listed on the Milan stock 
exchange and 87 firms on the Madrid Stock Exchange, resulting in a total sample of 
427 firms.  Their research concludes that an inverse relationship between CG and EM 
exists, both overall as well as in each market separately. 
Shan (2015) examines whether good governance practices are more likely to constrain 
EM for firms listed on the Shanghai SSE 180 and Shenzhen SSE 100.  His final sample 
consists of 1,012 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2005.  Corporate 
governance quality is proxied through the creation of a CG index, consisting of eight 
corporate governance mechanisms: state & foreign ownership concentration, board 
size, board independence, supervisory board, professional supervisor, audit committee 
independence and Big 4 auditor.  His research suggests that firms with good governance 
practices mitigate EM. 
Table 3-1 illustrates the findings of prior studies conducted on internal corporate 
governance mechanisms and accrual-based earnings management found in the 
literature.   
 
                                                 
19 See Florou and Galarniotis (2007). 
20 Risk Metrics, former ISS and GMI Ratings. 
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Table 3-1 Findings of prior studies on Corporate Governance and Accrual-based Earnings Management  
AUTHORS PERIOD SAMPLE SIZE CG VARIABLES COUNTRY 
Dechow et al. (1996) 1982-1992 92 firms Board independence (-), Board size (+), Audit Committee (-) USA  
Klein (2002a) 1992-1993 692 firm-year observations Board independence (-), CEO duality (+), Audit Committee 
independence (-) 
USA  
Xie et al. (2003) 1992/1994/1996 282 firm-year observations Board size (-), Board independence (-), CEO duality (0), Audit 
Committee independence (-) Audit Committee expertise (-) 
Audit Committee size (0) Audit Committee meetings (-) 
USA  
Bedard et al. (2004) 1996 300 firms  Audit Committee independence (-) Audit Committee expertise (-) 
Audit Committee size (0) Audit Committee meetings (0) 
USA  
Peasnell et al. (2005) 
 
1993-1996 1271 firm-year observations Board independence (-) , Audit Committee(0) UK  
Davidson et al. (2005) 2000 434 firms Board independence (-), CEO duality (0), Audit committee (0) 
Audit Committee independence (-)Audit Committee size (0) Audit 
Committee meetings (0) 
Australia  
Yang and Krishnan (2005) 1996-2000 896 firm-year observations Audit Committee independence (0) Audit Committee expertise (0)  
Audit Committee meetings (0) 
USA  
Bradbury et al. (2006) 2000 139 firms/113 firms CEO duality (0), Board size (-), Board independence(0), Audit 
Committee independence(-) 
Singapore and 
Malaysia  
Rashidah and Fairuzana (2006) 2002-2003 97 firm-year observations Board independence (0), CEO duality (0), Board Size (+), Audit 
Committee independence (0) Audit Committee expertise (0) Audit 
Committee meetings (0) 
Malaysia  
Jaggi and Leung (2007) 1999-2000 523 firm-year observations Board Size (+), Audit Committee (-) Hong Kong  
Larcker et al. (2007) 2003 2109 firms CG index (mixed results) USA  
Osma and Noguer (2007) 1999-2001 155 firm-year observations Board independence (+), Audit Committee independence (0) Spain  
Piot and Janin (2007) 1999-2001 225 firm-year observations Audit committee (-) Audit Committee independence (0) France  
Shen and Chih (2007) 2001-2002 495 firms  CG index taken from CLSA (-) Asian countries 
Hutchinson et al. (2008) 2000 & 2005 200 firms Board independence (-) Audit Committee independence (-) Audit 
Committee meetings (0) 
Australia 
Jiang et al. (2008) 2002-2004 4311 firm-year observations CG index based on the Gov-score (-) USA  
Bowen et al. (2008) 1992-1995 3154 firm-year observations CG index using G-score (0) USA  
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AUTHORS PERIOD SAMPLE SIZE CG VARIABLES COUNTRY 
Baxter and Cotter (2009) 2001 309 firms Audit Committee (-) Audit Committee independence (0) Audit 
Committee expertise (0) Audit Committee size (0) Audit Committee 
meetings (-) 
Australia 
Ghosh et al. (2010) 1999-2006 9290 firm-year observations Board independence (0), Board size (-), CEO duality (0), Audit 
Committee independence (0) Audit Committee size (-)  
Audit Committee meetings (+) Audit Committee expertise (0) 
USA  
Kent et al. (2010) 2001-2005 392 firms Board independence (0), Audit Committee Independence (-), Audit 
Committee expertise (0), Audit Committee size (-), Audit Committee 
meetings (-), Audit Committee Effectiveness (0) 
Australia 
Marra et al. (2011) 2003-2006 888 firm-year observations Board independence (-), Audit Committee (-) Italy  
Bekiris and Doukakis (2011) 2008 185 firms/155 firms/ 87 firms  CG index (-) Greece, Italy, Spain  
Sierra Garcia et al. (2012) 2003-2006 432 firm-year observations Audit Committee independence (0) Audit Committee size (-) Audit 
Committee meetings (-) 
Spain  
Chen and Zhang (2014) 2000-2006 3129 firm-year observations Board independence (-), Audit Committee (-), Audit Committee 
independence (-) Audit Committee expertise (-) 
China  
Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca 
(2014) 
2006-2009 1740 firm-year observations Board size (+), Board independence (-), CEO duality (0), Government 
Index (-) 
Latin America  
Sharma and Kuang (2014) 2004-2005 194 firm-year observations Audit Committee independence (-) Audit Committee expertise (-) New Zealand 
He and Yang (2014) 2003-2007 1500 S&P firms Audit Committee Size (0) Audit Committee expertise (-) USA 
Ramachandran et al. (2015) 2010-2011 326 firms Board size (+) Board independence (0) CEO duality (0) Audit 
Committee Size (0) 
Singapore 
Shan (2015) 2001-2005 1012 firm-year observations CG index (-) China 
Katmon and Farooque (2017) 2005-2008 145 matched-pair sample (290 observations) Board size (0), Board independence (0),  Audit Committee Independence 
(0), Audit Committee expertise (0), Audit Committee size (0), Audit 
Committee meetings (+) 
UK 
Studies in this table only include accrual-based earnings management research and proxy corporate governance using internal corporate governance mechanisms such as board size & independence, CEO duality, 
audit committee composition, as well as CG indices.  Studies are listed in chronological order according to publication date.   
(0): no relationship between CG variable and EM.  
(+): positive relationship between CG variable and EM.  
(-): negative relationship between CG variable and EM. 
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3.5 Hypothesis development 
The following section discusses the development of the hypotheses on the effect of 
composite measures of governance, such as audit committees’ effectiveness and CG 
indices, on EM in a Greek context.   
Kent et al. (2010) and Zaman et al. (2011) use audit committee variables not in isolation 
but as a group, creating a composite measure of ‘audit committee effectiveness’ (ACE).  
Their composite measure (ACE) consists of four audit committees variables: 
independence, financial expertise, size, and frequency of meetings.   
The use of these four audit committee variables is considered suitable to measure audit 
committee effectiveness since they have been included in governance codes at both an 
international level, for example in the UK Corporate Governance Code as well as at a 
local level, as proposed by the Greek CG code.   
In the Greek setting, Greek CG law does not require a minimum audit committee size, 
while the 2010 Greek CG Code Section B1-Internal Controls (2013) recommends three 
members as a minimum size, to ensure that they function effectively.  In the Greek 
context, it is recommended that the majority of members of the audit committee to be 
independent non-executive members.  Greek Law No.3693/2008, article 37, states that 
an audit committee should have at least one independent non-executive member, while 
the 2010 Greek CG Code, Section B1-Internal Controls (2013) strongly advises Greek 
listed firms to have an audit committee with non-executive members where the majority 
consists of independent non-executive members.  It is evident that importance is placed 
on the independence of audit committee members to ensure their effectiveness in the 
process of monitoring financial reporting.  In Greece, at least one member of the audit 
committee should have relevant financial and/or accounting expertise to ensure the 
reliability of financial reports.  Greek Law 3693/2008, Article 37 states that the 
independent audit committee member should have financial expertise, defined as 
holding a degree in accounting or finance, or professional qualifications such as CPA, 
CMA, or ACCA.  The 2010 Greek CG Code, Section B1-Internal Controls (2013) 
confirms that at least one member of the audit committee should have proven adequate 
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accounting experience.  Thus, importance is placed in audit committee expertise for 
effective monitoring of financial statements.  Although Law 3693/2008 or earlier Greek 
laws does not mandate a minimum number of meetings per year, the 2010 Greek CG 
Code, Section B1-Internal Controls (2013) recommends the minimum number of 
meetings per year to be four, as it coincides with the required quarterly audit review.   
In the spirit of Kent et al. (2010) and Zaman et al. (2011), this study uses a composite 
measure of audit effectiveness (ACE), incorporating the four audit committee variables, 
to examine its effect on EM.  The use of ACE, as an indication of audit committee 
effectiveness, assists in the creation of the following hypothesis:  
H1. A negative relationship between the composite measure of audit committee 
effectiveness (ACE) and EM is expected.  
Although the Greek CG code recommended the existence of an audit committee for 
Greek firms since 1999, it only became mandatory in 2008 with Law 3693/2008, article 
37.  The implementation of Greek law 3693/2008 is expected to create a greater 
association between ACE and EM, and accordingly, the following hypothesis is also 
tested: 
H1a. For the periods after 2008, a more negative relationship between the composite 
measure of audit committee effectiveness (ACE) and EM is expected.   
In line with the rationale behind the composite measure of an audit committee, there is 
also a rationale for creating a composite measure of corporate governance, in the form 
of a corporate governance index.  The use of an overall corporate governance index 
captures the multidimensional character of corporate governance and provides a more 
holistic indication of corporate governance quality.   
In the Greek context, the effect of a CG index on EM has been examined only by Bekiris 
and Doukakis (2011), where they report a significant negative relationship between the 
two variables.  Their study focuses on the year 2008 whereby the basic governance law 
that existed was Law 3016/2002.  Additionally, their sample includes 427 firms of 
which 185 are Greek listed firms, 155 Italian and 87 Spanish.  This study also examines 
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the relationship between a CG index created for Greek listed firms and EM.  However 
it focuses on the period 2006-2012, where apart from Law 3016/2002, additional 
governance-related laws are enacted, such as Law 3016/2008, Law 3873/2010 and Law 
3884/2010, as well as the 2010 Greek CG Code that affect the governance mechanisms 
of Greek listed firms.21  Finally, this study includes 788 firm-year observations 
examining a single country setting, Greece.   
Based on the overall view in the literature the following hypothesis is tested: 
H2. A negative relationship between the CG index created for Greek firms and EM is 
expected.  
The implementation of Greek law 3693/2008 is expected to create a stronger negative 
association between the CG index created for Greek firms and EM, and accordingly the 
following hypothesis is also tested: 
H2a. For the periods after 2008, a more negative relationship between the CG index 
created for Greek firms and EM is expected. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the literature concerning the internal governance mechanisms 
that mitigate accruals earnings management.  Corporate governance quality is 
examined through a composite measure of audit committee characteristics and a multi-
dimensional proxy of governance quality, a CG index.  
Literature examining audit committee effectiveness, proxied by audit committee 
independence, size, frequency of meetings and member expertise, as well as a 
composite measure and its effect on accruals EM is demonstrated.  Finally, literature 
discussing the relationship between CG indices and accruals EM is considered.   
This literature review forms the basis for the development of the hypotheses that are 
tested in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
21 For a discussion of the Greek CG laws and Greek CG codes consult Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 4 – Research Design (CG & EM) 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviews prior empirical studies examining the effect of corporate 
governance on earnings management and discusses the development of the relevant 
hypotheses.  This chapter provides a description and analysis of the methods applied in 
collecting and preparing the data necessary to test these hypotheses.  Section 4.2 
describes the earnings management models employed in the literature, while section 
4.3 describes how international CG indices and Greek CG indices have been created.  
Weighting methods used to create CG indices are discussed in section 4.4.  The 
methodology used to measure the dependent variable, earnings management in this 
study, is described in section 4.5.  The independent variable, corporate governance, 
measured by a corporate governance (CG) index, as well as audit committee 
characteristics as captured in this study, are all discussed in section 4.6 and section 4.7 
analyzes the control variables used.  Finally, the empirical research models used are 
presented in sections 4.8 and 4.9 and the sample selection and data collection 
procedures in section 4.10.  Section 4.11 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Methods of earnings management  
Earnings quality, also called earnings informativeness, is defined as the ability of 
earnings to provide information about a firm’s financial performance to assist decision-
makers (Dechow et al., 2010). The most commonly used representation of earnings 
quality is through properties of earnings, applying techniques such as earnings 
persistence, earnings smoothing and abnormal accruals.   
Earnings persistence mainly examines earnings quality not as a decision tool for all 
types of decision-making, but as a tool for equity investors on how useful earnings is 
for company valuation.  The basis for earnings persistence, as a proxy of earnings 
quality, is that more persistent earnings are of higher quality than less persistent 
earnings because they lead to better decision inputs for equity valuation (Dechow et al., 
2010).   
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Earnings smoothing is another technique that affects earnings and can be used as a 
proxy for earnings quality.  Accruals can be used to smooth the random fluctuations of 
cash payments and receipts, so that earnings focus on performance instead of cash 
flows, for superior decision making.  However, further development of models to 
distinguish normal smoothness as a result of fundamental performance and artificial 
smoothing, is needed.  Consequently, mixed results are found in various studies about 
the effect of earnings smoothness on earnings quality (Dechow et al., 2010).     
The most commonly used measure of earnings quality is earnings management (EM). 
Earnings management can be classified into two types (1) EM arising from purely 
financial reporting decisions and (2) real earnings management (Peasnell et al., 2000a).  
The first type of earnings management is accomplished through accounting method 
changes and accrual choices. It is possible to distinguish between abnormal or 
discretionary accruals and normal or non-discretionary accruals.  Normal accruals are 
the result of the firm’s actual performance, while abnormal accruals indicate the firm’s 
attempt to create distortions that result in earnings management due to an imperfect 
measurement system (Dechow et al., 2010).  The second type of earnings management, 
namely real earnings management, arises from actions that are concerned with the real 
operating decisions of the company, such as the timing of the sale of assets or 
manipulating R&D expenditures (Peasnell et al., 2000a).  
Managers who engage in either form of EM face costs.  The cost of applying accrual 
accounting EM is that their effects will reverse sometime in the future. For example, 
earnings that are boosted in year one, due to accrual choices, result in a reduction of 
earnings in the following year (Peasnell et al., 2000a).  Furthermore, accrual EM 
generally does not have a direct cash flow consequence (Peasnell et al., 2005).22  
However, if managers choose to conduct real EM, they are in essence changing the way 
their firm does business.  For example, if increased profits is the goal, firms could 
decrease advertising or R&D expenses. This action is costly since it negatively affects 
                                                 
22 Although financial reporting and tax accounting are measured by different measurement rules for 
consolidated financial statements of listed firms after the implementation of IFRS in 2005, accruals can 
have tax effects, thus affecting cash flows, in a Greek context since taxable income calculation depends 
on financial reporting income.   
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future cash flows and might negatively affect shareholder value (Peasnell et al., 2000a; 
Peasnell et al., 2005).  Since the cost of reversals (i.e. choosing accrual accounting EM) 
is less than choosing an inappropriate operating decision (i.e. choosing real EM), it is 
likely that accrual EM will be managers’ first alternative before they choose more costly 
real changes in investment and operating activities (Peasnell et al., 2005).23  Accrual 
accounting EM is also preferred by managers whose goal is to temporarily alter reported 
profits for the respective year (Peasnell et al., 2000a).  Moreover, accrual accounting 
EM is considered less visible than real EM and is therefore more frequently preferred 
by firms (Osma, 2008).  Zang (2012) illustrates that firms prefer accrual accounting 
EM in situations when they are less competitive in the industry, have a poor financial 
health, are monitored heavily by institutional investors and/or are associated with 
higher tax expenses.  However, firms prefer real EM in cases when they have exercised 
excessive accrual manipulation in previous years and/or have a short operating cycle.  
In both cases managers weigh each EM technique based on their relative costs (Ho et 
al., 2015).  Finally, according to Dechow et al. (2010) abnormal accruals, which lead 
to earnings management, are the most extensively used proxy of earnings quality in 
empirical accounting research.  Thus, this research will apply accrual EM models. 
4.2.1 Accrual Earnings Management Models 
Accruals summarize in a single measure the net effect of numerous recognition and 
measurement decisions, thereby capturing the portfolio nature of income determination 
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1990).  Accrual-based measures are commonly used to test for 
the existence of EM (Peasnell et al., 2000b).  The EM literature distinguishes between 
“abnormal” and “normal” accruals.  Normal accruals tend to show adjustments that 
reflect fundamental performance, while abnormal accruals reflect distortions due to the 
particular application of accounting rules (Dechow et al., 2010).  The use of 
abnormal/discretionary accruals by managers is based on three basic managerial 
hypotheses: the performance measure hypothesis, the opportunistic management 
hypothesis and the noise hypothesis (Guay et al., 1996).  The performance measure 
                                                 
23 There are however cases where managers prefer real EM to accrual EM, as stated in Lo (2008) based 
on survey evidence found in Graham et al. (2005).  
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hypothesis states that managers exercise discretion so as to produce reliable and timely 
performance related information (that is earnings) which would not be conveyed 
through the use of nondiscretionary accruals only.  The opportunistic management 
hypothesis states that discretionary accruals are used to conceal mediocre performance 
or maintain a portion of unusual good performance for the future.  Finally, the noise 
hypothesis is the case where discretionary accruals represent noise in earnings (Guay 
et al., 1996).   
A problem with the accruals EM method is the difficulty in accurately separating 
reported accruals into their managed (discretionary/abnormal) and unmanaged (non-
discretionary/normal) parts (Peasnell et al., 2000b).  Additionally, another challenge 
accruals models face is that measures of abnormal accruals tend to be positively 
correlated with the level of accruals.  That is, firms that extensively use accruals, will 
also consequently have more abnormal accruals.  This can affect the interpretation of 
the results and can indicate uncertainty about whether abnormal accruals are due to 
accounting distortions or are a result of poor accruals models that also incorporate an 
element of true performance (Dechow et al., 2010).   
Various accrual-based EM models have been implemented, such as those developed by 
Healy (1985) and DeAngelo (1986; 1988).  These early works are a benchmark against 
which to evaluate the Jones (1991) model, which is considered a landmark in the 
evolution of accruals-based earnings management research (Ronen and Yarri, 2010: 
389).24 
The Healy (1985) accruals-based EM model is based on total accruals, consisting of 
both discretionary (abnormal) and non-discretionary (normal) accruals, the latter 
defined as deflated long-run accruals.  Discretionary accruals are those that differ from 
the long-run average.  Healy (1985) tests for EM by comparing mean total accruals, 
scaled by lagged total assets.  
                                                 
24 According to the work of McNichols (2000) aggregate accrual models, from Healy (1985) to Kang 
and Sivaramakrishnan (1995), which attempt to find discretionary accruals based on the relation between 
total accruals and some explanatory variables are extensively used in the literature.  McNichols (2000) 
finds however that the greatest number of studies that use the aggregate accruals approach are based on 
the Jones model. 
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The equation for the Healy (1985) EM model is as follows:  
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
                                                                     𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟏 
where: 
DAit is discretionary accruals of firm i at the end of year t 
TACit  is total accruals of firm i at the end of year t 
TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1. 
This method is the simplest accrual EM method and assumes that expected normal 
accruals for the period are zero, and so total accruals are a result of managerial 
discretion (Young, 1999).  This assumption is restrictive because working capital 
accruals change according to economic conditions (Young, 1999).25   
Another accrual-based EM model is proposed by DeAngelo (1988; 1986).  She 
criticizes the Healy (1985) model by pointing out that it lacks a benchmark for what 
normal accruals should be.  Therefore, her model calculates normal accruals as the 
previous period’s accruals deflated by lagged assets. Since the expected accruals in a 
given year are equal to those of the previous year, all changes in accruals are considered 
discretionary.   
Therefore the equation for the DeAngelo (1988; 1986) EM model is as follows:  
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 − 1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
                                                                 𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟐  
where: 
TACit is total accruals of firm i at the end of year t 
TACit-1 is total accruals of firm i at the end of year t-1 
TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1. 
The major weakness of this model is  that it assumes that normal accruals follow a 
random walk (Young, 1999).26  Since normal accruals change over time due to changes 
in business activities, the model might misclassify normal accruals as discretionary 
                                                 
25 Dechow et al. (1995) created the mean-reverting model which is slightly different to the Healy (1985) 
model because it is based on a time-series firm specific mean rather than a cross-sectional mean (Thomas 
et al. (2000).  Some papers in the literature, such as Guay et al. (1996), refer to the Dechow et al. (1995) 
mean-reverting model as the Healy model (Thomas et al. (2000)).   
26 Although there are limitations to the random walk model, DeAngelo (1986) considers it a suitable way 
of finding normal accruals, since there is no estimation period (Thomas et al. (2000)). 
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accruals, thus creating the possibility of a Type I error.  Furthermore, the total accruals 
of the previous period, which are considered as a benchmark for non-discretionary 
accruals, might also contain a discretionary accruals component that could bias the 
results.  Studies today do not use the DeAngelo approach unless they want to compare 
the efficiency of various models of discretionary accruals (Ronen and Yarri, 2010: 402).   
A landmark for accrual-based EM models is the model proposed by Jones (1991).  Her 
model controls for changes in the economic circumstances of a firm.27  While Healy 
(1985) and DeAngelo (1986) consider non-discretionary accruals as constant, Jones 
models consider non-discretionary accruals as a linear function of changes in revenues 
and fixed assets. 
The Jones (1991) model estimates normal accruals as a function of revenue growth and 
depreciation as a function of property, plant and equipment (PPE).  All variables are 
scaled by lagged total assets.  Residuals from the Jones (1991) model constitute the 
measure of abnormal accruals (Dechow et al., 2010).  
The Jones (1991) model uses a two-stage approach to separate total accruals into 
discretionary and non-discretionary components.  First, to identify the non-
discretionary component for each sample firm, total accruals (TAC) are regressed on 
the change in sales (Δ REV) and investment in PPE for all non-sample firms in the 
same industry (Xie et al., 2003).  Then, the estimated parameters of this regression are 
combined with total assets (TA), change in sales (Δ REV) and PPE data so as to find 
the discretionary component of total accruals for each sample firm (Peasnell et al., 
2000b).  As noted earlier, the Jones model relaxes the assumption that nondiscretionary 
accruals are constant.  In contrast to previous EM models, this regression-based model 
incorporates changes in the economic activities of the firm and the depreciation charge 
                                                 
27 The Healy (1985) and the DeAngelo (1986) models are considered ‘non-peek ahead’ models while the 
Jones-type models are considered ‘peek ahead’ models.  ‘Peek ahead’ models use information from the 
year being forecasted, while ‘non-peek ahead’ models only use information from the prior year (Thomas 
et al. (2000)). 
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(through the use of revenues and PPE respectively as independent variables in the first 
regression), which affects the changes in non-discretionary accruals.28   
 The equation for the Jones (1991) EM model is as follows:  
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
= 𝛼 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) +  𝛽1 (
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                   𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟑  
where: 
TACit  is total accruals of firm i at the end of year t 
TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1. 
Δ REVit / TAit-1 is sales revenue of firm i in year t less revenues in year t-1 
scaled by TAit-1 
PPEit / TAit-1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t 
scaled by  TAit-1 
All variables in the accruals expectations model are scaled by lagged total assets to 
reduce heteroscedasticity, as it is assumed that lagged assets are positively associated 
with the variance of the disturbance term in the regression equation (Jones, 1991; 
Davidson et al., 2005) 
Although growth in sales and investment in PPE are reasonable drivers of firm value, 
and the Jones model confirms a correlation between these attributes of the firm and 
accruals, the explanatory power of the model is usually low, with only about 10% of 
the variation in accruals explained (Dechow et al., 2010).  One reason for this low 
explanatory power is that managers have significant discretion over the accrual process, 
which they can use to cover true performance (Dechow et al., 2010).  According to 
Dechow et al (2011), discretionary accruals are less robust in identifying EM than total 
accruals, which suggests that the use of the Jones model residuals, as a proxy for poor 
quality accruals because of EM, can create the possibility of a Type II error, where 
accruals are classified as normal when they are not (Dechow et al., 2010).  A major 
                                                 
28 Boynton et al. (1992) estimate the Jones model with pooled data from each industry rather than using 
data for each firm separately (Thomas et al., 2000).  Additionally, Beneish (1997) suggest that the Jones 
model include two additional variables, lagged total accruals and the market performance of the year.  
Thomas et al. (2000) examined both proposed changes but did not find much improvement to the original 
Jones model. 
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limitation of this model is the underlying assumption that managers do not exercise 
discretion over revenues.  Therefore sales-based manipulation cannot be detected since 
changes in sales are assumed to increase non-discretionary accruals (Peasnell et al., 
2000b).  Additionally, the model may also provide biased accruals because it does not 
include a regressor for expenses (Dechow et al., 2010). 
In an effort to improve the standard-Jones model, Teoh et al. (1998c) and DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) used a working capital component instead of total accruals.  
According to Beneish (1998) and Young (1999) this is preferable due to the fact that 
the use of depreciation as a continuous form of earnings management is unlikely 
because of its visibility and predictability (Peasnell et al., 2000b).  Furthermore, Young 
(1999) shows that the use of total accruals in the standard-Jones model creates a 
significant measurement error in the estimation of discretionary accruals (Peasnell et 
al., 2000b).   
Research has also been conducted around the question of how the Jones model can be 
improved to reduce the potential errors it creates and whether there are other tests of 
EM that can support the results of the Jones Model (Ronen and Yarri, 2010: 433). 
Improvements to the Jones model have been developed, for example, through the 
development of the ‘modified Jones’ model of Dechow et al. (1995), the cash flow 
model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) and the linear performance model of Kothari et 
al. (2005) (Ronen and Yarri, 2010: 433).    
Dechow et al. (1995) developed the so-called modified Jones model to eliminate the 
inclination of the Jones (1991) model to measure discretionary accruals with errors in 
cases where there is managerial discretion over revenues (Bartov et al., 2001).  The 
basis of their model revolves around the treatment of accounts receivable.  The initial 
stage of this model is the same as the Jones model, but in the second stage the change 
in receivables (Δ REC) is subtracted from change in sales (Δ REV).  This model 
assumes that all changes in credit sales in the ‘event’ year are as a result of EM (Peasnell 
et al., 2000b).   This is an attempt to reduce Type II errors.  As credit sales can 
potentially be manipulated by managers, this modification can increase the power of 
the Jones model to produce a residual that is uncorrelated with normal revenue accruals 
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and therefore better indicate possible revenue manipulation (Dechow et al., 2010).  
Despite the improvements of the modified Jones Model, it still suffers from the 
possibility of Type I errors, which means identifying accruals as abnormal when they 
are a representation of true performance (Dechow et al., 2010).   
The equation for the modified Jones model, as developed by Dechow et al. (1995), is 
as follows:  
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
= 𝛼 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) +  𝛽1 (
(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡) 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡      𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟒 
where: 
TACit  is total accruals of firm i at the end of year t 
TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1. 
Δ REVit - Δ RECit / TAit-1 is sales revenue of firm i in year t less revenues in year t-1 – 
the change of accounts receivables scaled by TAit-1 
PPEit / TAit-1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t 
scaled by  TAit-1 
The adjustment for changes in receivables (that is the use of the modified Jones model) 
is only applied in the second stage where discretionary accruals are calculated.  To 
estimate the specific regression coefficients in the equation, that is the first stage of the 
model whereby non-discretionary accruals are estimated, the original Jones model is 
used (Dechow et al., 1995; Bartov et al., 2001; Davidson et al., 2005). 
Dechow et al. (1995) find in tests comparing the power of the modified Jones model 
and the Jones (1991) model, that the modified Jones model is substantially better at 
detecting sales-based EM.  Nonetheless, research has shown that both models are 
poorly specified in situations of extreme financial performance, each generating a 
significant proportion of Type I errors when companies have extreme cash flows.  This 
creates an issue in evaluating the effectiveness of both models in isolating accruals 
management in time-series analysis (Peasnell et al., 2000b).   
The cash flow model of Dechow and Dichev (2002) examines accruals as a function of 
past, present and future cash flows, since the purpose of accruals is to change the timing 
of the cash flow recognition of earnings.  Abnormal accruals are measured by the 
residuals from the model (Dechow et al., 2010).  In this model matching accruals to 
cash flows is considered of utmost importance and therefore past, current and future 
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cash flows are modeled as accruals, since accruals anticipate future cash payments 
and/or collections, and reverse when cash previously recorded in accruals is paid and/or 
received (Dechow et al., 2010).  Their focus is on working capital and short-term 
accruals and they do not examine long-term accruals and their relation to cash flows 
(Dechow et al., 2010).   
The equation for the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is as follows: 
𝛥𝑊𝐶 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 − 1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                  𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟓  
where: 
ΔWC is the change of working capital 
CFOt-1 is the operating cash flows at the end of year t-1. 
CFOt is the operating cash flows at the end of year t. 
CFOt+1 is the operating cash flows at the end of year t+1. 
The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model does not predict the direction of earnings 
management, which can decrease the power of tests when it is important for the 
researcher to predict the direction (Dechow et al., 2010).  Another limitation of this 
model is that it cannot identify distortions created by long-term accruals.  This is a 
major disadvantage of this model since impairments of PPE and goodwill, which are 
related to long-term aspects of the firm, can indicate EM (Dechow et al., 2010). 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) use the modified Jones model and add book to market 
(BM) and operating cash flows (CFO) to it.  They find that, with this addition, the 
measurement error associated with discretionary accruals is reduced.  BM is used to 
control for expected growth in operations which, if not controlled for, can be picked up 
as discretionary accruals.  CFO is used to control for current operating performance as 
companies with extreme levels of performance may result in misspecified discretionary 
accruals (Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011).  Larcker and Richardson (2004) state that their 
model is superior to the modified Jones model because it has greater explanatory power 
and recognizes unexpected accruals that are not as persistent as other elements of 
earnings (Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011). 
The equation for the Larcker and Richardson (2004) model is as follows:  
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𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
= 𝛼 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) +  𝛽1 (
(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡)
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽3 (𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 (
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟔  
where: 
TACit is total accruals of firm I at the end of year t 
TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1 
Δ REVit - Δ RECit / TAit-1 is sales revenue of firm i in year t less revenues in year t-1 – 
the change of accounts receivables scaled by TAit-1 
PPEit / TAit-1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t scaled 
by  TAit-1 
BMit is the book value of common equity for firm i in year t over market value of 
common equity for firm i in year t 
CFOit is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t. 
Kothari et al. (2005) develop a performance-matching EM model (a type of control 
sample approach) concerned with normal accruals and performance (Ronen and Yarri, 
2010: 445).  This is a response to the conclusion of Dechow et al. (1995) that 
discretionary accruals are positively related to return on assets.  To overcome the issue 
of misspecification due to performance, Kothari et al. (2005) remove the effect of the 
correlation between discretionary accruals and performance by using a performance-
matching model.  They believe that errors in measurement occur when the models 
employed do not control for the prior period performance of a company.   
This model matches a firm-year observation with another sample company from the 
same industry and year with the closest return on assets and deducts the firm’s 
discretionary accruals (that is their residuals) from those of the sample firm to generate 
“performance-matched” residuals.  The discretionary accruals are estimated using the 
Jones model or the modified Jones model (Dechow et al., 2010).    
Kothari et al. (2005) study the results of the Jones model or the modified Jones model 
discretionary accruals and retest them after they have been adjusted for performance.  
They find that performance-matched discretionary accruals improve the conclusions of 
EM research, when the hypothesis does not suggest that EM will vary with performance 
or when the sample company is not expected to engage in EM. 
The equation for the Kothari et al. (2005) model is as follows: 
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𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) +  𝛽1 (
(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡) 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
                                                                                                                                                              𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟕  
 
where: 
TACit is total accruals of firm i at the end of year t 
TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1. 
Δ REVit - Δ RECit / TAit-1 is sales revenue of firm i in year t less revenues in year t-1 – 
the change of accounts receivables scaled by TAit-1                             
PPEit / TAit-1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t scaled 
by  TAit-1 
ROAit-1 is return on assets of firm i at the end of year t-1  
Dechow et al. (2012) propose a new method to identify accruals based EM.  Their 
concept is based on the fact that any accrual-based EM in one period must be reversed 
in the next (Gerakos, 2012).  Their method is based on the fact that the underlying 
purpose of all discretionary accruals is to shift earnings.  Thus, misstatements in one 
period will reverse in the next (Dechow et al., 2012).  This concept of reversal could 
result in potentially increasing the statistical power of the method and thus better control 
for omitted variables so as to improve specification and model the dynamics of earnings 
and accruals (Gerakos, 2012).  Dechow et al. (2012) state that their technique can 
establish the existence of EM in historical data, and thus their model can be considered 
a much needed innovation in EM research.  Furthermore, according to Keung and Shih 
(2014), incorporating the reversal of discretionary accruals in future periods in test of 
the Dechow et al. (2012) model, will greatly decrease the existence of Type I errors for 
skewed samples, without implementing the Kothari et al. (2005) performance matching 
model, while additionally often resulting in lower Type II errors than can be attained 
with performance matching. 
In this model, EM is tested not only in the period for which the presence of EM is 
examined, but also for the reversals of these discretionary accruals in an adjacent 
period.  It involves regressing discretionary accruals on two partitioning variables.  The 
first one (PARTit) is a dummy variable that is denoted as one in the period the 
hypothesized accrual-based EM should occur and zero otherwise.  The second 
(PARTP1it) partitioning variable is identified as one in the period in which accrual-
based EM should reverse and zero otherwise.  The following regression is estimated as 
a pooled cross section: 
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 𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑃1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                              𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟖 
where: 
DAit  is discretionary accruals of firm i at the end of year t 
PARTit is a dummy variable that is denoted as one in the period the hypothesized 
accrual-based EM should occur and zero otherwise 
PARTP1it is a dummy variable that is denoted as one in the period in which the accrual-
based EM should reverse and zero otherwise 
EM is then identified by rejecting the null hypothesis that β1-β2=0.  To estimate 
discretionary accruals, Dechow et al. (2012) suggest that the traditional accrual-based 
EM methods, such as the Jones model, the modified Jones model and the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) model can be used.  The limitations of the traditional methods are 
addressed by the new method proposed by Dechow et al. (2012) by specifying a null 
hypothesis of the equality of the estimated coefficients, β1-β2=0.  This way, correlated 
omitted variables that are constant in both the manipulation and reversal periods are 
controlled for and this should lead to the coefficients being equal (Gerakos, 2012).  
Dechow et al. (2012)’s method allows researchers to classify accruals as income-
increasing or income-decreasing through the test statistic specified.  The sign of 
statistically significant differences between the two coefficients (β1 and β2) indicate 
whether EM is for income-increasing purposes (β1-β2>0) or income-decreasing 
purposes (β1-β2<0) (Gerakos, 2012).   
All of the aforementioned EM proxies primarily calculate discretionary accruals 
through the use of regressions and are classified as Jones type EM measures.  However, 
other EM measures are also used in the literature to find discretionary accruals.   
DeFond and Park (2001) estimate abnormal accruals based upon the firm specific, 
seasonally adjusted ratio of working capital to sales.  Abnormal Working Capital 
Accruals (AWCA) is defined as the difference between the firm’s realized working 
capital and the working capital required to sustain its following year’s sales (Prencipe 
and Bar-Yosef, 2011).  Anticipated working capital is projected from the historical 
relationship between working capital and sales (Becker et al., 1998; Ashbaugh et al., 
2003; Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 2011).  This model aims to distinguish normal working 
capital accruals and abnormal working capital accruals.  Normal working capital 
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accruals represent the change in noncash working capital accounts, such as inventory, 
accounts receivable and accrued expenses.  This model is based upon the notion that 
normal working capital accruals are based on a fixed portion of sales and the income-
increasing or income-decreasing accruals in the period of a change in sales does not 
reverse in future periods.  On the other hand, if abnormal working capital accruals 
reverse in future periods, they will have a smaller net impact on lifetime earnings.  The 
proxy for abnormal accruals measures the difference between realized working capital 
and a proxy for the market’s expectations of the level of working capital needed to 
support future sales levels.  The logic behind this measure is that this difference is the 
amount of working capital accruals that are unlikely to be continued and that are 
expected to reverse in future periods.  The use of the historical relationship between 
working capital to sales to find expected working capital is consistent with Dechow et 
al. (1998) who also consider working capital as a fixed proportion of contemporary 
sales (Defond and Park, 2001).  AWCA is estimated separately for each company. 
The equation for the DeFond and Park (2001) model is as follows: 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝑊𝐶𝑡 −   ((
𝑊𝐶𝑡 − 1 
𝑆𝑡 − 1
) ∗ 𝑆𝑡)                                                               𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟗 
where: 
AWCAt is abnormal working capital accrual in year t; 
WCt is non-cash working capital accruals in year t, computed as: 
(current assets-cash and short-term investments) - (current liabilities-short-term debt); 
WCt-1 is non-cash working capital at the end of year t-; 
St is sales in year t; and 
St-1 is sales in year t-1. 
AWCA is scaled by the end-of-year total assets.   
The DeFond and Park (2001) model differs from the Jones-type abnormal accrual 
models since abnormal accruals are estimated using a seasonal firm-specific ratio of 
working capital to sales, while the Jones-type models do not account for seasonality 
between accruals and sales changes (Defond and Park, 2001).  DeFond and Park 
consider their method superior to the Jones-type methods because the Jones models 
calculate non-discretionary accruals based on a coefficient from a pooled cross-
sectional regression and uses the intercept term from this regression, while DeFond and 
Park (2001) measurement of  non-discretionary accruals is specifically tailored for each 
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observation in the sample.  Thus, the DeFond and Park (2001) model removes the 
average variation across all observations, as is the case in the Jones-type models, and 
considers that the firm-specific measures it employs are likely to give superior results 
compared to industry-wide estimates (Defond and Park, 2001). 
Leuz et al. (2003) propose an aggregate measurement of earnings management so as to 
minimize possible measurement errors.  Their EM measure is based on existing EM 
literature, such as Healy and Wahlen (1999) and Dechow and Skinner (2000), while 
also incorporating various extended dimensions.  Their aggregate EM score is 
constructed by averaging four individual EM measures, consisting of two earnings 
smoothing measures, the magnitude of accruals and a small loss avoidance measure.   
The equations for the EM measures are as follows: 
𝐸𝑀1 =
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐹 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
 
 
 
𝐸𝑀2 = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
𝛥𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝛥𝐶𝐹 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
 
  
 
𝐸𝑀3 =
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐹 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
  
 
𝐸𝑀4 =
𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
  
 
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑀 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐸𝑀 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠                      𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟏𝟎  
 
where: 
CF from operations is operating earnings – accruals; 
Accruals is (ΔCAit - Δcashit) - (ΔCLit - ΔSTDit- ΔTPit) - Depit; 
TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1; 
ΔCAit - Δcashit is change in total current assets – change in cash / cash equivalents; 
ΔCLit - ΔSTDit- ΔTPit- Depit is change in total current liabilities – change in short term 
debt - change in taxes payable - depreciation expense of firm i in year t; 
Small profits = net earnings / TAit-1 if in the range of 0 to 0.01; 
Small losses = net earnings / TAit-1 if in the range of -0.01 to 0. 
 
It is worth noting that research examining the relationship between corporate 
governance and earnings management primarily utilizes accrual-based EM measures, 
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in which the Jones-type models are primarily used to calculate EM.         Table 4-1 
summarizes the main EM accrual-based models used in the literature.
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        Table 4-1 Summary of EM accrual models employed in prior literature 
 
 Google 
Citations 
as of  
March 2018 
Jones (1991) model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
= 𝛼 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) +  𝛽1 (
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  7134 
where: TACit  is total accruals of firm i at the end of year t; TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1; Δ REVit / TAit-1 is sales revenue of firm i in year t less revenues in year t-1 
scaled by TAit-1; PPEit / TAit-1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t scaled by  TAit-1 
 
Dechow et al. (1995) Modified Jones model 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
= 𝛼 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) +  𝛽1 (
(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡) 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  7315 
where: TACit is total accruals of firm i at the end of year t; TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1; Δ REVit - Δ RECit / TAit-1 is sales revenue of firm i in year t less revenues in year 
t-1 – the change of accounts receivables scaled by TAit-1; PPEit / TAit-1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t scaled by  TAit-1 
 
DeFond and Park (2001) model 𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝑊𝐶𝑡 − ((
𝑊𝐶𝑡 − 1 
𝑆𝑡 − 1
) ∗ 𝑆𝑡) 549 
where: AWCAt=abnormal working capital accrual in year t; WCt=non-cash working capital accruals in year t, computed as: (current assets-cash and short-term investments)-(current liabilities-short-term 
debt); WCt-1=working capital at the end of year t-1; St=sales in year t; and St-1=sales in year t-1 
 
 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
𝛥𝑊𝐶 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 − 1 + 𝛽2𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡 + 1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  3898 
where: ΔWC  is the change of working capital; CFOt-1  is the operating cash flows at the end of year t-1; CFOt  is the operating cash flows at the end of year t; CFOt+1  is the operating cash flows at the end 
of year t+1 
 
Leuz et al. (2003) model 𝐸𝑀1 =
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐹 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
 
 
𝐸𝑀2 = 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛
𝛥𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝛥𝐶𝐹 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
 
 
𝐸𝑀3 =
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑒 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝐹 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠/𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
 
𝐸𝑀4 =
𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠
𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
 
 
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐸𝑀 = 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝐸𝑀 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 
 
4016 
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where: CF from operations is operating earnings – accruals; accruals is (ΔCAit - Δcashit) - (ΔCLit - ΔSTDit- ΔTPit) - Depit; ; TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1; ΔCAit - Δcashit 
is change in total current assets –change in cash / cash equivalents; ΔCLit - ΔSTDit- ΔTPit- Depit is change in total current liabilities –change in short term debt- change in taxes payable-depreciation expense 
of firm i in year t; small profits = net earnings / TAit-1 if in the range of 0 to 0.01; small losses = net earnings / TAit-1 if in the range of -0.01 to 0. 
 
 
Larcker and Richardson (2004) 
𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
= 𝛼 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) +  𝛽1 (
(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡) 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽3 (𝐵𝑀𝑖𝑡) + 𝛽4 (
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  817 
where: TACit is total accruals of firm I at the end of year t; TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1; Δ REVit - Δ RECit / TAit-1 is sales revenue of firm i in year t less revenues in 
year t-1 – the change of accounts receivables scaled by TAit-1; PPEit / TAit-1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t; scaled by  TAit-1; BMit is the book value of common equity for 
firm i in year t over market value of common equity for firm i in year t; CFOit is the operating cash flows for firm i in year t. 
 
Kothari et al.(2005) model 𝑇𝐴𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) +  𝛽1 (
(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡) 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽2 (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽3 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  4378 
where: TACit  is total accruals of firm i at the end of year t; TAit-1 is the book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1; Δ REVit - Δ RECit / TAit-1 is sales revenue of firm i in year t less revenues in 
year t-1 – the change of accounts receivables scaled by TAit-1; PPEit / TAit-1 is gross property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of year t scaled by  TAit-1; ROAit-1 is return on assets of firm i at the end 
of year t-1  
 
Dechow et al. (2012) model 
𝐷𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝐴𝑅𝑇𝑃1𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
 
351 
where: DAit  is discretionary accruals of firm i at the end of year t; PARTit is a dummy variable that is denoted as one in the period the hypothesized accrual-based EM should occur and zero otherwise; 
PARTP1it is a dummy variable that is denoted as one in the period in which the accrual-based EM should reverse and zero otherwise 
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4.3 CG indices in the literature 
CG indices used in different countries29 
Many indices are used in academic studies as a proxy for corporate governance 
performance so as to encapsulate firms’ overall CG quality.  These measures of CG 
quality are used as independent/explanatory variables in a vast number of studies on 
market performance, earnings management, cost of capital, and other dependent 
variables.  In all studies that construct CG indices, various categories of governance are 
used, incorporating specific CG items that firms are assessed upon, and their CG scores 
calculated.  The term category, criterion, theme and dimension is interchangeably used 
to indicate the broad categories that a firm’s CG quality is tested on (e.g. staggered 
boards, shareholder rights and ownership parity), while the terms items, variables, 
attributes and provisions are interchangeably used to indicate the specific CG item that 
the firm is evaluated on (e.g. audit committee has an independent non-executive chair, 
CEO and chairman are different people, the firm has a remuneration committee). 
Gompers et al. (2003) construct an index assessing governance quality for a large 
number of publicly traded US firms. They use data from the Investor Responsibility 
Research Center (IRRC)30 and create a “Governance Index” named G-index31, which 
measures corporate governance characteristics based on 24 distinct corporate 
governance provisions classified into five groups: tactics for delaying hostile takeovers; 
voting rights; director/officer protection; other takeover defenses; and state laws.  
Relying on the judgment of IRRC as to what corporate governance mechanisms are 
considered important to investors, the index is created by summing 24 binary 
governance factors.  
                                                 
29 This section summarizes the most commonly used CG indices used in the literature.  For an in depth 
coverage of this strand of the literature, readers can consult Ammann et al. (2011), Nerantzidis (2016), 
and Nerantzidis (2017). 
30 IRRC is a nonprofit research group that serves institutional investors and publishes detailed listings of 
CG provisions for individual firms in Corporate Takeover Defenses.  This data come from a broad set of 
public sources such as corporate bylaws and charters, proxy statements, annual reports and 10-K and 10-
Q documents filed with SEC. 
31 In the most of the analysis of the paper, the IRRC data was matched to data obtained from the Center 
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and to the Standard and Poor’s Compustat database.   
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Drobetz et al. (2004) create a broad corporate governance rating (CGR) for  German 
public firms.  Their CGR was created based on responses to 30 survey questions, 
divided into five categories: corporate governance commitment, shareholder rights, 
transparency, management and supervisory matters, and auditing.  The survey was sent 
out to all firms in the four principal market segments of the German stock exchange.  
The survey consisted of a Likert five-point scale for each question.  For each 
governance item present, 25 base points were added, resulting in scores ranging from 
zero to 30 for each governance item.  Each firm’s final CGR consists of the unweighted 
sum of all base points across all governance items.  Higher values of CGR represent 
better company specific corporate governance. 
Alves and Mendes (2004) develop a CG index incorporating items included in the code 
of best practice issued by the Portuguese Securities Market Commission (CMVM).  
CMVM issued 17 non-mandatory recommendations on corporate governance, 
classified into the following groups: disclosure of information, voting and shareholder 
representation, the adoption of certain corporate internal rules of best practice, the 
structure and functioning of the board of directors.  CMVM sent out three 
questionnaires to firms listed on the Lisbon Stock Exchange (BVLP) to enquire which 
firms comply with the code of best practice.  Alves and Mendes (2004) use the 
responses to the questionnaires sent by CMVM to create their CG index.  In calculating 
their index, a dummy variable was created taking the value of one if the company 
complied with a recommendation and zero otherwise.  A score is then calculated by 
adding each item and assigning equal weights for each recommendation that was 
implemented in the study and then dividing this score by the total recommendations, 
thus resulting in an index in percentage form.   
DeFond et al. (2005) create a CG index based on six attributes of a firm’s governance: 
board size, board independence, audit committee size, audit committee independence, 
shareholders’ rights and institutional ownership. They combine the six attributes into a 
dichotomous variable.   For each governance characteristic a value of one is assigned 
to indicate strong governance and a value of zero indicates weak governance.  For board 
size, firms are assigned a value of one if the board size is less than the sample median 
and zero otherwise.  For board independence, firms are assigned a value of one if 60% 
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or more of board members are independent and zero otherwise.  For audit committee 
size, firms are assigned a value of one if the proportion of audit committee size to board 
size is greater than the sample median and zero otherwise.  For audit committee 
independence, firms are assigned a value of one if the audit committee is solely 
comprised of independent members and zero otherwise.  For shareholders’ rights, firms 
are assigned a value of one if the G-index32 is less than the sample median and zero 
otherwise.  For institutional ownership, firms are assigned a value of one if the 
percentage of institutional ownership is greater than the sample median and zero 
otherwise.  All six dichotomous variables are then added, and a new dichotomous 
variable is created based on the median of the summed values.  Firms are assigned one 
(indicating strong governance) if their summed values are greater than the median of 
the summed values and zero (indicating weak governance) otherwise.    
Brown and Caylor (2006) create the Gov-score.  This is an index based on 51 firm-
specific provisions obtained from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), representing 
both internal and external governance.  The 51 provisions are classified into eight 
categories: audit, board of directors, charter/bylaws, director education, executive and 
director compensation, ownership, progressive practices and state of incorporation.  
Each of the 51 factors is coded as either one or zero depending on whether or not ISS 
considers the firm’s governance to be minimally acceptable, based on information in 
ISS Corporate Governance: Best Practices User Guide and Glossary (2003).  Similar 
to Gompers et al. (2003), this index is measured as the sum of each firm’s binary 
variables to create a firm-specific summary measure.   
Black et al. (2006c) construct a Korean CG index (KCGI) based on a survey of CG 
practices by the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) sent to all Korean listed firms, as well as 
corporate governance data that was hand collected by the researchers.  This index used 
38 variables extracted from the survey classified into four categories: Shareholder 
Rights, Board Structure, Board Procedure, and Disclosure, as well as a fifth category, 
ownership parity.  The index is constructed using a 0-1 dummy variable that shows 
whether a governance element exists. Due to the lack of a theoretical basis to use for 
                                                 
32 Shareholders’ rights as captured by the Gompers et al. (2003) G-index. 
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assigning different weights, equal weighting is given to the variables of the categories 
in the computation of KCGI.   
Bebchuk et al. (2009) develop an entrenchment index (i.e. the E-Index) based on six of 
the 24 IRRC provisions included in the G-index that Gompers et al. (2003) developed 
The six provisions they chose are considered to contribute the most to managerial 
entrenchment and consist of the following: staggered boards; limits to shareholder 
amendments of the bylaws; supermajority requirements for mergers; supermajority 
requirements for charter amendments; poisons pills; and golden parachutes 
arrangements.  In creating their index, each company is given a score from zero to six, 
based on the number of provisions the firm has in a given year and applied a “standard” 
equal weight for each provision.  
Aggarwal et al. (2009) use the ISS governance attributes to form their own CG index, 
also named the GOV index.33  Their index includes 44 attributes that cover four broad 
subcategories: the board; audit; anti-takeover provisions; and compensation and 
ownership.  The GOV index is created by assigning a value of one if the firm meets the 
attribute or zero otherwise.34  If a value is missing, the attribute is disregarded, and the 
index includes the percentage of non-missing attributes the company has. As in the 
work of Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009), the GOV index is created by 
adding all the attributes and it is expressed as a percentage, by dividing by the total non-
missing attributes.   
Ammann et al. (2011) create two alternative additive CG indices using data from 
Governance Metrics International (GMI).35  Their indices include 64 governance 
attributes which are sub-categorized by GMI into six categories: board accountability; 
financial disclosure and internal control; shareholder rights; remuneration; the market 
for corporate control; and corporate behaviour.  Similar to the research of Gompers et 
al. (2003), Bebchuk et al. (2009), and Aggarwal et al. (2009), the indices developed by 
                                                 
33 ISS included governance items that increase the power of minority shareholders.  ISS was acquired by 
RiskMetrics Group in 2007.   
34 This is a similar approach to the construction of the index of Brown and Caylor (2006) who also use 
ISS governance data for US firms. 
35 Ammann et al. (2011) constructed an additional CG index derived from principal component analysis.           
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Ammann et al. (2011) are additive, with equal weights given to the governance 
attributes.  For the first index, as in the research of Aggarwal et al. (2009), a value of 
one is assigned if the company adopts a governance attribute, while the item is deleted 
from the computation of the index if the company does not provide information on an 
attribute.  The second index is prepared the same way as the first.  However, missing 
values are assigned a value of zero and are not deleted from the computation of the 
index.  Both indices are presented in percentage forms.   
Black et al. (2012) develop a Brazilian Corporate Governance Index (BCGI).  The 
BCGI consists of 41 firm-specific governance attributes, categorized into six 
categories: board structure; ownership structure; board procedure; disclosure; related 
party transactions; and minority shareholder rights.  The BCGI is computed by 
assigning the value of one if an attribute exists and zero otherwise.  If a firm has a 
missing value for a specific element, the average score of the non-missing values are 
used to compute each index.36   
Black and Kim (2012) create a Korean CG index (KCGI) based on the work of Black 
et al. (2006c).  Their index consists of five equally weighted categories: board structure, 
disclosure, shareholders’ rights; board procedures; and ownership parity.  
Gupta et al. (2013) create a firm level governance index using 41 governance attributes 
available from RiskMetrics, based on the work of Aggarwal et al. (2011).  Their index 
is broken into four sub-categories: board, audit, anti-takeover provisions and 
compensation  ownership.  Their CG index is computed by assigning the value of one, 
if the firm minimally meets the governance attribute, and zero otherwise.  The scores 
of all 41 governance attributes are added and divided by 41 to construct the governance 
index.   
Black et al. (2015) construct a Korean corporate governance index (KCGI) for all public 
firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange, based on the work of Black and Kim (2012).  
                                                 
36 More specifically, the missing values of elements of the index are calculated by the sum of the non-
missing elements, which is then multiplied by the total number of items in the index divided by the 
number of non-missing items. 
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KCGI consists of five equally weighted categories: board structure, disclosure, 
shareholders’ rights; board procedures; and ownership parity.   
Shan (2015) develop a CG index based on eight corporate governance mechanisms: 
state and foreign ownership concentration, board size, board independence, supervisory 
board, professional supervisor, audit committee independence and Big 4 auditor.  His 
index is computed by assigning a value of one if an attribute exists and zero otherwise, 
and a score from zero to eight is given to each firm.     
CG indices in the Greek context 
The first study examining governance quality of Greek firms, using a CG index, is that 
of Tsipouri and Xanthakis (2004).  Their effort aims at creating a rating scheme for 
Greek listed firms in an effort to quantify the compliance of Greek firms with 
international best practice standards, the so called Blue Book37 based on the OECD 
principles of corporate governance (Governance, 1999).  Their methodological 
approach is heavily influenced by the Deminor Corporate Governance Rating Service, 
the Davis Global Advisors, the OECD and the Greek Codes.  In this effort, a 
questionnaire including 54 questions reflecting the five chapters of the Blue Book is 
sent to Greek listed firms.  The data is sorted into five categories including: rights and 
obligations of shareholders; transparency, disclosure of information and auditing; the 
board of directors; executive management; and corporate governance commitment, the 
role of stakeholders and social responsibility.  Of the 54 questions in the questionnaire, 
some are appropriate for CG rating, while others are used for control and clarification 
and are not for CG rating.  Thus 37 questions38 are used for CG rating, of which six 
relate to the rights and obligations of shareholders, nine to transparency, disclosure of 
information and auditing, 12 to the board of directors, five to executive management 
and five to corporate governance commitment, the role of stakeholders and social 
responsibility.  The weighting of the various governance items is a difficult task, since 
it involved subjectivity. The weighting of the index is first constructed by having each 
                                                 
37 For more information consult Chapter 2, section 2.5. 
38 Five questions referring to mandatory governance issues in the regulatory framework of the time, 
received ‘perfect scores’ by all Greek firms, and are included in the questionnaire to show potential 
international investors that Greek listed firms comply with minimum standards. 
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of the senior members of the research team individually assign weights among and 
within each category.  The weights of the members of the research team coincided in 
most cases, and otherwise mutual agreement was reached, after discussion, in cases 
where differences existed.  These weights are presented to the Advisory Committee and 
are adjusted to reflect the priorities of the participants in the market.  The results for 
each individual firm is discussed and analyzed by the researchers so as to compare their 
results with the average scores and use it as a benchmark for future improvements. 
A multi-level and comprehensive governance index in the Greek context is also 
constructed by Florou and Galarniotis (2007).  Their index contains variables at three 
levels: the minimum requirements under Greek law (No.3016/2002), which obliges 
Greek firms to apply a set of governance guidelines; the incremental recommendations 
of the voluntary Greek Corporate Governance Code, entitled Principles of Corporate 
Governance (1999) developed by the Committee on Corporate Governance in 
collaboration with market experts which includes some of the recommendations of the 
OECD (1999); and additional international best practices, as prescribed by the UK 
Corporate Governance Code.  This approach is consistent with prior work that also used 
national governance regulations, such as Alves and Mendes (2004) and Drobetz et al. 
(2004).  As there is limited theory on which items to include in a CG index, Florou and 
Galarniotis (2007), include items that could be verified through annual reports and/or 
company web sites.  Therefore, non-observable items, such as “board of directors 
should cooperate with internal auditors”, are not included in their research.  As such, 
only clearly identifiable governance items are included in the index.  Additionally, since 
no theory exists in helping one construct a CG index, a diverse set of governance items 
in terms of both their number and nature are included by Florou and Galarniotis (2007)  
in their index.  They construct their index by manually collecting data on 47 items, 
comprising of 14 from the Greek law, 21 from the Greek CG code and 12 from 
international best practices, and these are categorized into seven main categories.  
Consistent with the work of Tsipouri and Xanthakis (2004), these categories are: board 
of directors; board composition; internal audit and financial reporting; external audit; 
corporate services; investor rights; and disclosures and transparencies.  As 
acknowledged by Florou and Galarniotis (2007) there were cases whereby ambiguity 
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existed in assigning items to specific categories.  For example, items could potentially 
be placed in two categories and so a choice of placement had to be made by the 
researchers.  This issue did not distort the main empirical findings, because the essential 
focus of the study was evaluating the governance quality of Greek listed firms against 
the three quality standards and not against the various governance categories.  If items 
could be included in more than one source, the researchers included only the extra items 
as they moved from lower to middle and finally to a higher governance benchmark. The 
index is constructed by applying a binary classification of one where the presence of 
the item was met and zero otherwise. Missing observations led to the creation of two 
versions of the index whereby in the first version missing items where considered non-
existing items (that is, coded as zero), and in the second version missing items are 
excluded from the study.  Consistent with other studies, such as Alves and Mendes 
(2004), Drobetz et al. (2004), and  Black et al. (2006c) equal weights are applied to all 
items.  Although applying equal weights does not reflect the relative significance of 
each governance item, it is used in this study as well as in others because it is transparent 
and objective.  Additionally, there is a limited theoretical background on which 
governance items or categories are important for the evaluation of governance quality, 
and so applying uneven weights can lead to subjective results (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2003).  
Additional research in the Greek context has also been conducted by Bekiris and 
Doukakis (2011).  They examine the association between CG and EM, using a CG 
index, in a Greek, Italian, and Spanish setting.  Their study examines all firms (small, 
medium, and large capitalization firms) listed on the three stock exchanges of Greece, 
Italy and Spain; therefore, the CG items chosen are applicable to all sizes of 
capitalization.  Their CG index is broad in scope due to the fact that Bekiris and 
Doukakis (2011) examine countries with different CG codes and different legal 
regulations.  For this reason their CG index is based on international best practices, 
mainly focusing on the then UK Combined Code.39   Additionally, the items included 
in their CG index are also taken from the two basic corporate governance rating firms, 
                                                 
39 The UK Corporate Governance Code is formerly the Combined Code. 
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which offer data to most researchers, namely Risk Metrics (formerly ISS) and GMI 
Ratings, as in the research of Brown and Caylor (2006), Aggarwal et al. (2009), and 
Ammann et al. (2011).  Bekiris and Doukakis (2011) also incorporate in their index 
items taken from Standard & Poor’s Disclosure and Transparency Index.40  Finally, the 
items chosen for their index also came from the existing literature, which examines 
corporate governance ratings in a specific market, such as in the research of Florou and 
Galarniotis (2007).  Bekiris and Doukakis (2011) include 55 individual items in their 
CG index, categorized into five categories of corporate governance: board of directors; 
audit; remuneration; shareholder rights; and transparency.  They create their index by 
collecting data from publicly available information, such as annual reports and 
companies’ websites.  Their decision not to use questionnaires is taken to avoid the 
possibility that the data collected is biased and subjective, a common criticism of 
questionnaires, as per Drobetz et al. (2004).  Their corporate governance index is 
calculated by assigning a value of one if the CG item exists or zero otherwise, a common 
practice for calculating CG indices.  Ratings are calculated in two ways, following the 
work of Florou and Galarniotis (2007) and Ammann et al. (2011), whereby in the first, 
missing values are considered as absent and are assigned a value of zero, and in the 
second, missing elements are excluded from the analysis.  Following previous studies, 
equal weights are assigned to each CG item, therefore the CG index is calculated by 
adding all existing items and a percentage value is calculated for each firm. 
Another Greek corporate governance index is created by Nerantzidis (2015).  This 
index is created to evaluate the quality of Greek listed firms’ compliance or non-
compliance with corporate governance items included in the Greek Corporate 
Governance Code created by the Hellenic Federation of Industries in 2010.  His CG 
index consists of 52 variables classified into five categories: board and its members; 
internal control; shareholders relation and communication; information disclosure; and 
board remuneration.  The items of the CG index are found on either the firms’ annual 
reports or their websites.  The coding scheme of this index is achieved through a two-
                                                 
40 The Transparency Index was mainly utilized in selecting CG variables for the Transparency category, 
incorporating items such as “Is there a discussion of corporate strategy?” and “Does the company disclose 
its plans in the coming years?” 
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level analysis by two coders.  At the first level, compliance to the Greek code results in 
the value of one if the company complied with a recommendation and zero otherwise.  
This process is the most objective, since the coders identify the section the corporate 
governance item is found in the annual report or website and a decision of whether a 
firm complies or not is reached.  At the second level, the two coders evaluate the 
reasoning for non-compliance.  This is a subjective process, whereby a decision has to 
be made for the narrative part of the CG statement between a missing explanation, a 
non-adequate explanation and an adequate explanation for non-compliance.  The 
following coding scheme is used to record non-compliance: a value of one is given for 
no explanation, a value of two for an inadequate explanation and a value of three for an 
adequate explanation.  Thus, the non-compliance explanations are evaluated and the 
effectiveness of the ‘comply or explain’ principle is illustrated.  In order to ensure 
reliability and validity in the scoring process used by both coders in deciding between 
a non-adequate and an adequate explanation, a ten-point Likert scale is implemented to 
evaluate the adequacy of the explanations given for non-compliance.  If the average 
score is above five, it is considered as an adequate response (coded as three) of non-
compliance or else it is considered as a non-adequate response (coded as two).  This 
process results in a consensus between the two coders for each attributed code (either 
coded as two or three) for each provision of each firm, establishing validity and 
reliability in the content analysis (Nerantzidis, 2015).   
Nerantzidis and Tsamis (2017) construct a CG index in a Greek setting based on the 
index created by Nerantzidis (2015).  They evaluate key elements, such as structure-
related, performance-related, market-related, and governance-related variables, that 
lead firms to higher levels of CG disclosure, proxied by their CG index.  Their index 
includes the same items and categories as Nerantzidis (2015), however they include 
only the objective part of the Nerantzidis (2015) index.  They create two indices, 
according to the scoring method applied.  In their first CG index, the Scoring by item 
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method is applied, while in their second CG index the Scoring by category method is 
applied.41  
4.4 Weighting methods used to estimate CG indices 
CG indices can be estimated using a Scoring by item method, a Scoring by category 
method or a Scoring by expert method (Nerantzidis, 2017).    
The most commonly used approach in studies employing CG indices is the Scoring by 
item method (e.g. Gompers et al. (2003), Alves and Mendes (2004) and Ammann et al. 
(2011)) (Nerantzidis, 2017). The researcher initially needs to score each firm against 
the items included in the CG index.  This is performed as follows:  if an item is disclosed 
it is given a score of one, if it is not disclosed it is given a score of zero.42  If an item is 
not applicable to a specific firm, it is scored as non-applicable (n/a) and not included in 
the calculation of the CG indices (Cooke, 1992).  In the Scoring by item method the 
index is calculated for each firm by adding all scores for each individual item and 
dividing this score by the maximum possible score applicable for that firm.  Each item 
in the index is scored equally, irrespective of the number of items in each category or 
the number of categories in the index.  The central focus of the CG indices using this 
method is on the items included in the indices and not on the categories that the items 
are part of.   
Another scoring procedure for CG indices used in the relevant literature is the Scoring 
by category method.  This method focuses on each category, not on each item, 
irrespective of the number of items each category includes.  This method treats each 
category equally, indirectly giving unequal weights to the items of each category.  The 
Scoring by category method first applies the Scoring by item method for each category 
                                                 
41 Nerantzidis and Tsamis (2017) name the Scoring by item method the ‘dichotomous method’ and the 
Scoring by category method the ‘PC unweighted method’.  For further analysis of the Scoring by item 
and Scoring by category methods, see section 4.4.   
42 There are also studies where a point of zero is given only if an item is specifically stated as non-
existent.  If an item is missing or non-disclosed then it is not included in the calculation of the CG index 
(e.g. Florou and Galarniotis (2007), Ammann et al. (2011) and Bekiris and Doukakis (2011)). 
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separately.  Then, the CG score for each firm is measured by adding the scores of each 
category and dividing the sum by the number of categories that comprise the CG index.    
The following simplified example illustrates how the CG index is calculated using the 
Scoring by item method and the Scoring by category method.  Assume the CG index 
includes two categories, ‘board of directors’ which has 14 items and ‘transparency and 
disclosure’ which has 4 items and the firm complies with 12 items of the first category 
and 1 item of the second category.  The CG index of the firm applying the Scoring by 
item method is 72% (13/18), while under the Scoring by category method is 55% 
[(12/14)*0.5+(1/4)*0.5].  This hypothetical example reveals that very different CG 
scores are calculated if one follows the Scoring by item method and/or the Scoring by 
category method.  Weighting all items equally is the basic difference for CG indices 
based on the Scoring by item method, as opposed to the Scoring by category method.  
As depicted in the example, the CG index created using the Scoring by item method 
does not show the low performance in one key aspect of CG, i.e. disclosure and 
transparency.  Thus, categories with more items, indirectly, and unintentionally, are not 
treated equally with categories that include fewer variables in the Scoring by item 
method.  Therefore, the governance quality of firms can be either substantially biased, 
positively or negatively, based on the weighting method employed.  Additionally, the 
different CG scores based on the rating method implemented can result in different 
statistical relationships when these scores are included in econometric analysis due to 
different overall and relative (ranking order) CG results (Nerantzidis, 2017).   
A scoring procedure for CG indices also used in the relevant literature is the Scoring by 
expert method.  In this scoring procedure, knowledgeable and experienced views of 
academics or professionals on corporate governance issues are utilized to assign 
weights for CG items and/or categories in the scoring process of the CG index.  The 
weights reflect current market trends, ranking the importance of each individual item 
and/or category, aimed at measuring the perceived substance of each CG item and/or 
category, rather than only its form (Florou and Galarniotis, 2007; Bhagat and Bolton, 
2008; Bozec and Bozec, 2012).  This scoring procedure needs particular attention.  
Concerns arise as to how academics and professionals, the so-called ‘experts’, prioritize 
the items and/or categories of the CG index.  In many instances, the way the weights 
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are assigned to the various CG items and/or variables is not explicit and may seem 
somewhat arbitrary.  Additionally, the experience and knowledge of the so-called 
‘experts’ is not so transparent.  Although in the literature there are general references 
to the so-called ‘experts’ as practitioners (i.e. auditors), institutional investors, analysts 
and academics, there is no clear evidence of their experience (Tsipouri and Xanthakis, 
2004; Cheung et al., 2007).  Thus, a trade-off exists between validity and reliability.  
Although validity can be assessed based on the CG categories, there is an issue with 
reliability.  No consistency in terms of criteria for weighting exists in prior literature, 
and thus a great deal of subjectivity is applied (Nerantzidis, 2017).  Additionally, 
limited theoretical background exists on which items and/or categories are more 
important in evaluating corporate governance quality and thus an issue can arise when 
assigning the appropriate weights (Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003).  Although some 
variables could deserve more weight than others could, assigning appropriate weights 
might depend on the presence or absence of other variables, and thus this approach 
lacks objectivity and consistency (Florou and Galarniotis, 2007; Bebchuk et al., 2009).  
Van den Berghe and Levrau (2003) who review and analyze corporate governance 
ratings systems, state that the application of research methodologies such as 
questionnaires and interviews of key company representatives, as opposed to simply 
relying on annual reports, is necessary for the weighting of corporate governance 
criteria. However, studies based on questionnaires may suffer from self-selection and 
self-reporting biases.  A potential self-selection bias exists when firms that have poor 
governance mechanisms may choose not to answer the questionnaire, while the data 
collected from respondents of the questionnaire may also suffer from self-reporting bias 
where respondents answer the questionnaire based on how they would like their 
governance mechanisms to be and not on how they actually are.  Table 4-2 describes 
the features of the CG indices found in the literature.   
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Table 4-2 Summary of CG indices employed in prior literature 
Corporate 
Governance 
Index 
Components 
Source of 
information 
Sample Results 
Weighting 
Method 
CG Indices in different countries 
 
Gompers et al. 
(2003) – G-
Index 
24 CG provisions classified into five groups : tactics for delaying 
hostile takeovers; voting rights; Director/officer protection; other 
takeover defenses; state laws 
IRRC data 1500 US firms during 1990, 
1993, 1995 and 1998 
Higher quality governance resulted in 
improved future stock performance. 
Scoring by item 
Drobetz et al. 
(2004) - CGR 
Objective survey questions including 30 governance items divided into 
five categories: corporate governance commitment; shareholder rights; 
transparency; management & supervisory matters; auditing 
Survey questions  91 German firms in 2002 Positive relationship between 
governance practices and firm value. 
Scoring by item 
Alves and 
Mendes (2004) 
13 non-mandatory recommendations on corporate governance 
included in the code of best practice issued by CMVM classified into 
four groups: recommendations regarding disclosure of information; 
recommendations regarding voting and shareholder representation; a 
set of recommendations on the adoption of certain corporate internal 
rules of best practice; recommendations on the structure and 
functioning of the board of directors. 
Multiple-choice 
questionnaires 
82 firms on the Lisbon 
Stock Exchange in 1999-
2001 
The CG quality of Portuguese firms was 
found to be correlated with company 
performance. 
Scoring by item 
DeFond et al. 
(2005) 
Six governance characteristics: board size, board independence, audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, shareholders’ rights 
and institutional ownership are combined into a single dichotomous 
variable.  
Annual reports 
& websites & G-
index 
Announcement of 702 
newly appointed outside 
directors on audit 
committees of US firms 
A positive market reaction to the 
appointment of financial experts on 
audit committees 
Scoring by item 
Brown and 
Caylor (2006) – 
Gov score 
51 firm specific provisions classified into eight categories: audit; board 
of directors; charter/bylaws; director education; executive and director 
compensation; ownership; progressive practices; state of incorporation 
ISS 1868 US listed firms for 
2003 
Measures corporate governance quality Scoring by item 
Black et al. 
(2006c) -KCGI 
38 variables classified into five categories: shareholder rights; board 
structure; board procedure; disclosure; ownership parity 
survey 515 Korean listed firms in 
2001 
A relationship exists between the CG 
index and the market value of Korean 
public firms. 
Scoring by 
category 
Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) – E-index 
6 out of the 24 IRRC provisions included in the G-index consisting of 
staggered boards; limits to shareholder amendments of bylaws; 
supermajority requirements for mergers; supermajority requirements 
for charter amendments; poison pills; golden parachute arrangements 
IRRC Between 1,400-1,800 US 
firms from 1990-2003 
Their index is negatively correlated 
with firm valuation. 
Scoring by item 
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Corporate 
Governance 
Index 
Components 
Source of 
information 
Sample Results 
Weighting 
Method 
Aggarwal et al. 
(2009) – GOV 
index 
44 attributes compiled by ISS covering four categories: board; audit; 
antitakeover provision; compensation and ownership 
ISS  2,234 foreign firms and 
5,296 US firms for 2005 
The governance of foreign firms is 
compared to the governance of US 
firms and both are related to firm value.   
Scoring by item 
Amman et al. 
(2011) 
64 governance attributes cover six categories: board accountability; 
financial disclosure and internal control; shareholder rights; 
remuneration; the market for corporate control ; corporate behaviour 
GMI 6.663 firm-year observations 
from 22 developed 
countries, such as Japan, the 
UK and Canada from 2003-
2007 
The relationship between firm-level 
corporate governance and firm value is 
examined. 
Scoring by item 
Black et al. 
(2012) - BCGI 
41 firm-specific governance attributes in six categories: board 
structure; ownership structure; board procedure; disclosure; related 
party transactions; minority shareholder rights. 
survey 66 Brazilian firms for 2004 Assess similarities and differences 
across four emerging markets: Brazil, 
India, Korea and Russia. 
Scoring by item 
Black and Kim 
(2012) 
Rely on the work of Black et al. (2006) – KCGI; consists of five equally 
weighted indices: board structure; board procedure; shareholder rights; 
disclosure; ownership parity 
survey 428 Korean firms from 
1998-2004 
They examine how a 1999 Korean CG 
law for large public firms affects market 
value; a positive relationship between 
board structure reforms and firm market 
value is found. 
Scoring by 
category 
Gupta et al. 
(2013) 
Rely on the work of Aggarwal et al. (2011); 41 firm-level governance 
attributes in four categories: board; audit; anti-takeover provisions; 
compensation & ownership 
RiskMetrics 4,046 publicly traded non-
financial firms from 23 
countries. 
They examine the effect of CG on firm 
performance during the financial crisis. 
Scoring by item 
Black et al. 
(2015) 
Rely on the work of Black and Kim (2012) – KCGI; consists of five 
equally weighted indices: board structure; disclosure; shareholder 
rights; board procedures; ownership parity 
survey 509 Korean firms from 
1998-2004 
A positive relationship with firm value 
is observed; additionally, better 
governed firms are more able to 
moderate the negative effects of related 
party transactions on market value.   
Scoring by 
category 
Shan (2015) 8 corporate governance mechanisms:  
state & foreign ownership concentration; board size; board 
independence; supervisory board; professional supervisor;  
audit committee independence; Big 4 auditor. 
Annual reports 
& websites 
1012 firm-year observations 
for Chinese listed firms for 
2001-2005 
Firms with good governance practices 
constrain EM 
Scoring by item 
CG Indices in the Greek context 
 
Tsipouri and 
Xanthakis (2004) 
The questionnaire consisted of 54 questions sorted into five categories: 
rights and obligations of shareholders; transparency, disclosure of 
information and auditing; the board of directors; executive 
questionnaire 120 Greek listed firms in 
2001 
Created a rating scheme to quantify the 
compliance of Greek firms with the so-
called Blue Book 
Scoring by 
expert 
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Corporate 
Governance 
Index 
Components 
Source of 
information 
Sample Results 
Weighting 
Method 
management; corporate governance commitment, the role of 
stakeholders and social responsibility 
Florou and 
Galarniotis 
(2007)  
47 variables in seven dimensions: board of directors; board 
composition; internal audit and financial reporting; external audit; 
corporate services; investor rights and disclosures and transparencies 
Annual reports 
& websites 
274 Greek listed firms in 
2003 
Evaluation of governance quality Scoring by item 
Bekiris and 
Doukakis (2011) 
55 items categorized into five dimensions: board of directors; audit; 
remuneration; shareholder rights; and transparency 
Annual reports 
& websites 
185 Greek listed firms, 155 
Italian listed firms and 87 
Spanish listed firms 
resulting in a total sample of 
427 firms for 2008 
The association between CG and EM is 
examined in a Greek, Italian and 
Spanish setting. 
Scoring by item 
Nerantzidis 
(2015) 
52 variables in five categories: board and its members; internal 
control; shareholders relation & communication; information 
disclosure; and board remuneration 
Annual reports 
& websites 
144 Greek listed firms for 
2011 
This study examines the level of 
compliance of Greek firms to the Greek 
code, as well as rating the explanations 
for non-compliance.   
Scoring by item /  
Scoring by 
expert 
Nerantzidis and 
Tsamis (2017) 
52 variables in five categories: board and its members; internal 
control; shareholders relation & communication; information 
disclosure; and board remuneration 
Annual reports 
& websites 
156 Greek listed firms for 
2011 
This study examines key elements, such 
as structure-related, performance-
related, market-related, and 
governance-related variables, that lead a 
firm to higher levels of CG disclosure, 
proxied by a CG index, in a Greek 
setting 
Scoring by item /  
Scoring by 
category 
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Empirical models used in this study 
The aim of this research is to examine the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on EM before and after the implementation of Law 3693/2008 requiring 
Greek listed firms to have an audit committee and complete disclosure of the firm’s 
relationship with the external auditor.  The following regression model will be used: 
𝐸𝑀 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
This regression is tested for periods before and after the implementation of Law 
3693/2008.43   
4.5 Earnings management models applied in this study 
Measurement of the discretionary accruals models used in the study are the cross-
sectional version of the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995)  and the DeFond 
and Park (2001) model.  Absolute values are used to measure EM, regardless of whether 
EM is used to increase or decrease income, thus capturing the combined effect of both 
types of EM (Ianniello, 2015; Maijoor and Vanstraelen, 2006; Katmon and Farooque, 
2017).  This approach is also used in previous studies and is deemed appropriate in 
countries where managers are motivated to manage their earnings in both directions 
(Prencipe and Bar-Yosef, 2011; Klein, 2002a).  Baralexis (2004) states that Greek firms 
engage in both income-increasing and income-decreasing EM due to different motives 
directly related to their size.  Large Greek firms tend to engage in income-increasing 
EM since their primary motive is external financing, while small firms understate profit 
since their primary incentive is the reduction of income taxes (Baralexis, 2004).44   
Therefore, this study examines the magnitude of EM and not its direction.   
 
 
                                                 
43 For more details consult section 4.8. 
44 Although financial reporting and tax accounting are measured by different measurement rules for 
consolidated financial statements of listed firms after the implementation of IFRS in 2005, accruals can 
have tax effects since taxable income calculation depends on financial reporting income.   
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4.5.1 Modified Jones model 
This study uses the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model as the first EM 
accruals-based method by Dechow et al. (1995).  Research conducted by Dechow et al. 
(1995) concludes that the modified Jones model performs the best in detecting sales-
based abnormal accruals. Guay et al. (1996) also state that this model is the most 
powerful in detecting EM in cases where managers use their discretion in revenue 
recognition, thus increasing the precision of the model compared to the original Jones 
model (Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2014).  Additionally, the cross-sectional modified 
Jones model is also chosen so that changes in economic conditions in specific years 
affecting specific accruals will be filtered out since the model is re-estimated every year 
(Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2012).  Finally, in similar research such as Cornett et al. 
(2008), Jiang et al (2008), and Jaggi and Leung (2007), all of which examine the effect 
of CG on EM, the use of the modified Jones model is also implemented for determining 
discretionary accruals.   
In contrast to previous studies that have used total operating accruals to measure EM, 
this study focuses on the working capital component, since current accruals are easier 
for managers to manipulate (Xie et al., 2003).  Total operating accruals in previous 
studies has been defined as working capital accruals plus an important long-term 
accrual, depreciation (Peasnell et al., 2005).  As per Beneish (1998), this long-term 
component provides a limited way to detect EM, since changes in depreciation methods 
are not easily accomplished and attract attention from auditors and investors (Peasnell 
et al., 2005).  Other long-term accruals, such as defined benefit pension obligations and 
certain environmental liabilities are suitable for detecting EM, but due to their 
complexity are not used as a proxy for EM by previous studies (Peasnell et al., 2005).  
Due to the absence of a model describing what drives these other long-term accruals, it 
is difficult to distinguish between discretionary and non-discretionary accruals when 
total accruals are used, and the power of the tests will be negatively affected if these 
components are not used (Peasnell et al., 2005).  Therefore, the focus in this study is on 
discretionary current accruals to measure EM.   
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Current accruals are defined as the change in non-cash current assets (non-cash current 
assets = current assets - cash & short-term investments) less the change in non-debt 
current liabilities (non-debt current liabilities = current liabilities - short-term debt & 
current portion of long-term debt).  Total current accruals are assumed to be the sum of 
both discretionary and non-discretionary accruals.  To find the non-discretionary 
component of accruals for a given firm-year observation, current accruals are first 
regressed on the change in sales from the previous year for all non-sample companies 
in the same industry.  The industry classification is based on the Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB), which is used globally to divide the market into specific categories, 
allowing investors to compare industry trends between well-defined subsectors.45  In 
order to avoid heteroskedasticity, consistent with Teoh et al. (1998a), each variable is 
deflated by lagged total assets: 
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
= 𝛼 (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) +  𝛽1 (
𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
)                                                        𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟏𝟏 
 
where 
CAit=total current accruals of firm i in year t (WC02201; WC02001; WC03101; WC03051) 
TAit-1=book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1 (WC02999) 
ΔREVit/ TAit-1=the change of sales of firm i in year t scaled by TAit-1 (WC01001; WC02999) 
 
The estimation of regression coefficients is carried out for each industry year and for 
each Greek firm in the sample.  A separate regression is run for each firm, including all 
firms in the same industry, but excluding the sample firm each time from the regression.  
As per Klein (2002a), industries with less than eight observations should be excluded 
from the analysis, so as to control for industry-wide changes in economic conditions 
that influence the accrual process.  Having followed this approach in this study, the 
industries that should have been excluded would include firms with large capitalization, 
whose data are important for this study.  For this reason, all firms were incorporated in 
the study and similar industries were combined.46  The regression coefficients of the 
                                                 
45 The Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB) is a definitive system categorizing over 70,000 
companies and 75,000 securities worldwide, enabling the comparison of companies across four levels of 
classification and national boundaries. The ICB system is supported by the ICB Database, a data source 
for global sector analysis, which is maintained by FTSE Group.  For further information, see 
http://www.icbenchmark.com/. 
46 See the sample selection procedure section for more details in section 4.10. 
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previous equation are the parameters of interest in estimating changes in non-
discretionary accruals. Using these coefficients, each sample firm’s non-discretionary 
current accruals are calculated.  It should also be noted that the change in accounts 
receivable is not included in estimating the coefficients, although it is used in the 
estimation of non-discretionary accruals (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Jaggi and Leung, 
2007).   The non-discretionary current accruals are the portion of current accruals that 
are considered independent of managerial control and are created due to the company’s 
sales growth (Xie et al., 2003).   
Non-discretionary current accruals (NDCAit) are estimated as follows:  
𝑁𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = ?̂? (
1
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) + 𝛽1̂ (
(𝛥𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡 −  𝛥𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖𝑡) 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
)                              𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟏𝟐 
 
where 
NDCAit=non-discretionary current accruals of firm i in year t 
TAit-1=book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1(WC02999) 
ΔREVit - ΔRECit / TAit-1=the change of sales of firm i in year t less the change of 
receivables scaled by TAt-1 (WC01001; WC02051) 
 
Discretionary current accruals, DCAit are then defined as the remaining portion of the 
current accruals: 
𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 = (
𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 1
) −  𝑁𝐷𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡                                                 𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟏𝟑 
 
where 
DCAit=discretionary current accruals of firm i in year t 
CAit=total current accruals of firm i in year t (WC02201; WC02001; WC03101; WC03051) 
TAit-1=book value of total assets of firm i at the end of year t-1 (WC02999) 
NDCAit=non-discretionary current accruals of firm i in year t 
 
4.5.2 DeFond and Park (2001) model 
This research also uses the DeFond and Park (2001) model to measure EM.  As 
observed in the research of Peek et al. (2013), for studies that include a limited number 
of observations per year/industry, the estimation of discretionary accruals based on 
Jones type models can result in estimations that may be unrealistic (Wysocki, 2004; 
Marra and Mazzola, 2014). Therefore, given the sample size and the number of firms 
listed on ASE and included in this study, the DeFond and Park (2001) model is also 
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implemented.  This model is also used in the research of Marra et al. (2011) and 
Prencipe and Bar-Yosef (2011), whose samples are also similar in size and who also 
examine the effect of CG on EM.47   
For similar reasons to those proposed for the modified Jones model, working capital 
accruals are used as the second proxy for EM, instead of total accruals.  In the DeFond 
and Park (2001) model AWCA is estimated separately for each company, as follows: 
   
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑡 = 𝑊𝐶𝑡 −   ((
𝑊𝐶𝑡 − 1 
𝑆𝑡 − 1
) ∗ 𝑆𝑡)                                                             𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟏𝟒 
 
where 
AWCAt=abnormal working capital accrual in year t; 
WCt=non-cash working capital accruals in year t;(WC02201; WC02001; WC03101; WC03051) 
WCt-1=non-cash working capital at year t-1;(WC02201; WC02001; WC03101; WC03051) 
St=sales in year t;  (WC01001) and 
St-1=sales in year t-1 (WC01001). 
 
Non-cash working capital accruals are computed as non-cash current assets (current 
assets-cash and short-term investments) - non-cash current liabilities (current liabilities-
short-term debt).   
Working capital accruals are calculated by scaling by sales instead of total assets, as is 
the case in the modified Jones model, since sales is considered a more appropriate scalar 
because it is directly related to earnings (Ianniello, 2015).   
The positive element of the DeFond and Park (2001) model compared to the modified 
Jones model is that normal accruals are measured for each firm separately, and so are 
tailored to each observation of the sample.  The modified Jones model measures normal 
accruals based on a coefficient from a pooled cross-sectional regression, including firms 
that are in the same industry.  Therefore, the modified Jones model uses industry-wide 
estimates, while the DeFond and Park (2001) model uses firm-specific measures.  For 
example, although within an industry each firm’s specific characteristics affect normal 
                                                 
47 Marra et al. (2011) have a sample of 222 firms per year from 2003-2006, while Prencipe and Bar-
Yosef (2011) have a sample of 122 firms in 2003 and 127 firms in 2004.  This study’s sample is 204 in 
2006, 205 in 2008, 192 in 2010 and 187 in 2012. 
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capital accruals, this is only truly captured through the DeFond and Park (2001) model, 
since the modified Jones model uses the average effects of firms in the same industry 
to measure normal accruals (Defond and Park, 2001). Thus, it is important to use this 
model, since it complements the Modified Jones model. 
4.6 Governance quality measures applied in this study 
Two models of governance quality are employed in this study: one with audit 
committee variables and one with a CG index.  Both models also include control 
variables that could potentially affect EM.    
4.6.1 Audit Committee Effectiveness (Weighted ACE) 
Governance quality is proxied through a composite measure of audit committee 
effectiveness (ace) consisting of the independence of audit committee members; the 
financial expertise of audit committee members; the size of audit committees; and the 
frequency of meetings of audit committees, in line with Kent et al. (2010) and Zaman 
et al. (2011).   
More specifically, audit committee independence is a dichotomous variable, which 
takes the value of one if the majority of the members of the audit committee are 
independent, non-executive members (>50%) and zero otherwise.  Similarly, audit 
committee expertise is also a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one when at 
least one member of the audit committee has financial expertise and zero otherwise.  
Although audit committee meetings and audit committee size are continuous variables, 
for the purpose of inclusion in the composite measure, a cut-off point of four meetings 
or more per year for audit committee meetings and three or more members for audit 
committee size is used. 48  Therefore, audit committee meetings is denoted as one when 
there are four or more meetings per annum and zero otherwise and audit committee size 
                                                 
48 Although Greek law does not mandate a minimum of audit committee meetings, a diligent committee 
should meet at least four times a year, as recommended by the Greek CG Code, as it coincides with the 
required quarterly audit review.  Thus, a cut-off point of four or more meetings is set.  Accordingly, 
Greek law does not require a minimum committee size, however, the Greek CG Code recommends a 
minimum of three board members to ensure that the board functions effectively.  Thus, a cut-off point of 
three members is set. 
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is denoted as one when the number of members are three or more and zero otherwise. 
In order to construct the composite ace measure, the combination of all four 
characteristics is required. Ace is also a dichotomous variable, whereby if all four 
variables are denoted as one individually, then ace is also one, and otherwise it is zero.   
However, due to the fact that ace is a very strict measure, an alternative measure, a 
weighted ace measure (weighace) is used in this study.  Instead of using a dichotomous 
variable, whereby if only one element of audit committee effectiveness is missing, ace 
is zero, weighted ace is constructed taking values ranging from zero to four depending 
on the number of audit committee effectiveness criteria that are present.  This weighted 
measure allows for an evaluation of audit committee effectiveness based on how many 
audit committee attributes are present.  It avoids the pitfalls of the ace measure where 
a firm could be considered to have an effective audit committee if it has all of the 
attributes or it can be considered to have an ineffective audit committee if even one 
attribute is missing. 
4.6.2 Corporate Governance Index 
This study also develops a corporate governance index based on Greek CG laws, as 
well as particular features of the Greek CG code created by the Hellenic Federation of 
Industries in 2010, and examines its relationship to EM.   
Construction of CG index: validity and reliability 
The CG index draws upon three sets of regulations/best practice guidance and thus is 
separated into: (a) requirements drawn from Greek law (No.3016/2002), which obliges 
Greek firms to apply a set of governance standards, such as the participation of non-
executives and independent non-executives on Greek companies’ boards, the 
establishment of an internal control function and the adoption of internal charters; (b) 
the Greek law on audit committees (No.3693/2008, Article 37), which requires the 
creation of audit committees; and (c) voluntary best practice items that are included in 
the Greek CG Code created by the Hellenic Federation of Industries in 2010, as an effort 
to promote the continuous enhancement of the Greek corporate institutional framework 
and the broader business environment. This approach is in accordance with other 
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studies that also use national corporate governance regulations and codes (e.g. Alves 
and Mendes (2004), Drobetz et al. (2004), and Florou and Galarniotis (2007)).49   
Content Validity 
Content validity shows whether an instrument, in this case the CG index, measures 
effectively what the researcher wants it to measure.  A necessary procedure is for a 
group of experts to evaluate the process of construction of a CG index so as to verify 
its validity (Tsalavoutas et al., 2010).  This issue was considered here in the following 
way. 
The process began by the researcher deciding on which items to include in the CG 
index. Initially, the items considered as part of the researcher’s CG index included CG 
items from the research of  Tsipouri and Xanthakis (2004) and Florou and Galarniotis 
(2007) in combination with the recommendations of the Hellenic Federation of 
Industries in 2010, the Greek CG Code.  The initial CG index created consisted of 44 
items, of which 15 were based on the first Greek Law of Corporate Governance 
(No.3016/2002), three were based on the Greek Law concerning audit committees 
(No.3693/2008, Article 37) and 26 were based on the Hellenic Federation of Industries’ 
suggestions (the Greek CG code).  The items were first sorted by source (that is, the 
Greek law on corporate governance, the Greek law on audit committees and then the 
Greek Code) and then by governance variables (that is, board of directors, internal 
auditing).  Additionally, although there is no theory that provides guidance on what 
exact items to include in an index, it is essential that all items be verifiable through 
annual reports.  CG items included in indices need to be quantifiable and as inclusive 
as possible in terms of diversity in the number and nature of governance items.   
Following this initial screening process, the items comprising the CG index were 
examined independently by two experts, a financial analyst and an accounting professor 
                                                 
49 Florou and Galarniotis (2007) incorporate in their index the Greek Corporate Governance Code 
developed by the Committee on Corporate Governance in 1999, as well as additional international best 
practices.  Therefore, some items included in the Florou and Galarniotis (2007) index are optional and 
considered best practice, whereby in the CG index constructed for this study they are compulsory. 
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whose expertise lies in the area of CG.  Based on their suggestions, two items50 were 
excluded from the original CG index due to vagueness and ambiguity, and thus an 
updated version with 42 items was created whereby 13 items were based on the Greek 
CG Law (Law 3016/2002), three based on the Greek Law concerning audit committees 
(Law 3693/2008, Article 37) and 26 voluntary items based on recommendations of the 
Greek CG Code. 
This instrument, consisting of 42 items, was used to record the CG index for 2006, 2008 
and 2010.  After constructing the CG index, it became evident that it was not possible 
to consistently record two voluntary items.  Thus, they were deleted from the final CG 
index.  Therefore, the final CG index consists of 40 items51 of which 13 items are based 
on the first Greek CG Law (Law 3016/2002), three are based on the CG law requiring 
the existence of an audit committee (Law 3693/2008, Article 37) and 24 are based on 
the voluntary items based on the Greek CG Code.  Consequently, the CG index consists 
of 16 “compliance” items that are mandatory because of the CG laws and 24 
“voluntary” items that are optional and are based on best practices.52  The 40 items of 
the CG index are placed in the following four broad CG categories: (i) Board of 
directors, (ii) Internal Auditing and Corporate Services, (iii) Board Committees, and 
(iv) Disclosure and Transparency.  Each category includes items based on Greek CG 
Laws and voluntary items based on the recommendations of the Greek CG Code.  More 
specifically, ‘Board of directors’ includes three items from the first Greek CG Law 
(Law 3016/2002) and seven items from the recommendations of the Greek CG Code; 
‘Internal Auditing & Corporate Services’ includes eight items from the first Greek CG 
Law (Law 3016/2002);  ‘Board Committees’ includes three items from the Greek CG 
                                                 
50 The two items that were excluded are from the board of directors’ dimension of the Greek law and are 
the following: Independent non-executive directors own ≤ 0.5% of the company shares and Independent 
non-executive directors do not have any “dependency” relationship with the company or with affiliated 
members. 
51 The two items that were excluded are from the disclosure and transparency dimension of the Greek 
Code and are the following: Disclosure of quantitative and qualitative matters concerning employees 
and A corporate governance statement included in the annual report provides information on the board’s 
composition and includes the names of the chairman, the vice-chairman, the chief executive, as well as 
the heads and members of all board committees.  It also names the non-executive members considered 
as independent. 
52 The three items concerning the audit committee law are also considered as voluntary items for the data 
collected for 2006, therefore there are 13 “mandatory” items and 27 “voluntary” items for 2006. 
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Law concerning audit committees (Law 3693/2008, Article 37) and 11 items from the 
recommendations of the Greek CG Code; ‘Disclosures and Transparency’ includes two 
items from the first Greek CG Law (Law 3016/2002) and six items from the 
recommendations of the Greek CG Code.  Table 4-3 lists the items in each category of 
the CG index. 
 
 
Chapter 4- Research Design (CG & EM) 
 
111 
 
Table 4-3 Items in each category of the CG index 
 
  
Board of Directors
1.       Board of di rectors  cons is ts  of both executives  and non-executives  (mandatory item)
2.       Non-executive directors  are ≥ 1/3 of the total  board s ize   (mandatory item)
3.       Board of di rectors  includes  at least two independent non-executives  (mandatory item)
4.       Board s ize should be between 7 and 15 (best practice / optional)
5.       Board should cons is t of a  majori ty of non-executives   (best practice / optional)
6.       Board should cons is t of at least 2 executive members   (best practice / optional)
7.       Independent members  are at least 1/3 of the members  of the board  (best practice / optional)
8.       Spl i t between the chairman and the CEO roles   (best practice / optional)
9.       If CEO dual i ty exis ts , an independent vice-chairman exis ts   (best practice / optional)
10.     A financia l  chief executive officer i s  appointed to the management team  (best practice / optional)
Internal Auditing and Corporate Services
11.     Internal  auditors  are independent  (mandatory item)
12.     Internal  auditors  are supervised by the board (mandatory item) 
13.     Internal  auditors  are appointed by the board  (mandatory item)
14.     Internal  auditors  are ful l -time employees  of the company (mandatory item)
15.     Internal  auditors  are not members  of the board  (mandatory item)
16.     The company has  an internal  audit function (mandatory item)
17.     The company has  an investor relations  function (mandatory item)
18.     The company has  a  corporate announcements  function (mandatory item)
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Board Committees
19.     Exis tence of an audit committee (mandatory item after 2006)
20.     Audit committee cons is ts  of 3 non-executives , of which 1 i s  an independent non-executive  (mandatory item after 2006)
21.     The independent non-executive member of the audit committee has  financia l/accounting expertise (mandatory item after 2006)
22.     The company has  a  nomination committee  (best practice / optional)
23.     The nomination committee has  at least 3 members   (best practice / optional)  
24.     The majori ty of the nomination committee should be non-executive  (best practice / optional)
25.     The nomination committee should be chaired by an independent non-executive member  (best practice / optional)
26.     The audit committee should be composed exclus ively of non-executive board members   (best practice / optional)
27.     The audit committee is  chaired by an independent non-executive member  (best practice / optional)
28.     The company has  a  remuneration committee  (best practice / optional)
29.     The remuneration committee should be composed of entirely non-executive members .  (best practice / optional)
30.     The majori ty of the remuneration committee should be independent.  (best practice / optional)
31.     The members  of the remuneration committee should be at least 3.  (best practice / optional)
32.     The chair of the remuneration committee should be an independent- non-executive member  (best practice / optional)
Disclosures and Transparency
33.     Separate disclosure of the remuneration of non-executive directors  in the account notes  (mandatory item)
34.     Disclosure of the ownership s tructure (from Law2190/1920)  (mandatory item)
35.     Disclosure of corporate targets  and prospects   (best practice / optional)
36.     The corporate governance s tatement discloses  the term of appointment of each board member and contains  their brief biographies . (best practice / optional)
37.     The work of the nomination committee and the number of meeting is  described in the corporate governance s tatement.  (best practice / optional)
38.     The annual  corporate governance s tatement i l lustrates  how the performance evaluation of the board and i ts  committees  has  been conducted. (best practice / optional)
39.     The annual  corporate governance s tatement describes  the work of the audit committee   and the number of meetings  held during the year. (best practice / optional)
40.     The annual  corporate governance s tatement summarizes  the work of the remuneration committee and the number of meetings  held during the year. (best practice / optional)   
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Scoring Approach 
This study estimates the CG indices using the Scoring by item method. 53  The Scoring 
by expert method was not chosen so as to avoid inconsistency and subjectivity when 
weights are applied, as discussed earlier.  Although the disadvantage of not reflecting 
the relative importance of each governance item or category exists, the advantage of 
being transparent and relatively objective outweighs the disadvantage of not reflecting 
accurately the relative importance of each governance item or category (Florou and 
Galarniotis, 2007; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2003; Jiang et al., 2008; Bekiris and 
Doukakis, 2011; Alves and Mendes, 2004). 
The CG index for this study is constructed by manually recording each CG item as 
disclosed in the annual reports of Greek listed firms.  The rating procedure is consistent 
with previous work on CG indices.  The recording process applied a binary 
classification to all items, whereby a point of one is awarded when the governance item 
is present and zero otherwise.  Non-disclosed or missing items are documented as n/d 
and non-applicable variables are disclosed as n/a.  This led to the creation of two ratings 
for the CG index.  In the first rating approach (cg_pen index), non-disclosed or missing 
values are considered to be absent from the annual reports of the companies analyzed.  
Therefore, firms are penalized during the rating procedure. In the second rating 
approach, (cg_nonpen index), the missing values are excluded from the analysis.  In 
both ratings, non-applicable items are excluded from the analysis.  This dual rating 
procedure is consistent with previous work of Florou and Galarniotis (2007) and 
Ammann et al. (2011).   
Some items that comprise the CG index are recorded differently.  Items concerning the 
nomination54 and remuneration committees in the CG index due to their dependency on 
previous items in the category were recorded as zero only in the first item in the 
category and not applicable (n/a) in all the remaining dependent items.  This was 
applied because of the “comply or explain” principle underlying the CG Code.  If the 
                                                 
53 The Scoring by category method is used in the next study, as discussed in chapter 7. 
54 The nomination committee items are 22, 23, 24, 25, 37, the remuneration items are 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 
40, and the audit committee items are 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, and 39. 
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first item was recorded as not disclosed (n/d), all others were also classified as not 
disclosed (n/d),55 while in cases where the first item was classified as one (i.e. the 
governance variable was met), all other items were either classified as non-disclosed 
(n/d) or non-existing (zero).  The same reasoning is applied to the items concerning the 
audit committee for the year 2006, since there was no law at that time for the mandatory 
existence of an audit committee.  However, after 2006 all items were recorded as zero, 
where applicable, since the existence of an audit committee was mandatory.  
When applying the Scoring by item scoring procedure, under both rating schemes 
(penalized and non-penalized), apart from calculating the total index which 
incorporates all CG items, there was an index created for each rating that included 
mandatory and voluntary variables separately.  Therefore, six indices are constructed, 
where either non-disclosed and or missing items are recorded as zero and the sum 
divided by the total governance items, or non-disclosed items are excluded from the 
analysis, and the sum divided by the maximum expected.  More specifically, the 
following indices are constructed when applying the Scoring by item method: (1) cg-
_pen_total, all items are included in the calculation of the index (2) cg_pen_mand, only 
mandatory items are included in the calculation of the index (3) cg_pen_bp, 
optional/best practice items are included in the calculation of the index (4) 
cg_non_total, all items are included in the calculation of the index (5) cg_non_mand, 
only mandatory items are included in the calculation of the index and (6) cg_non_bp, 
optional/best practice items are included in the calculation of the index.   
Reliability of the research instrument 
In addition to validity, ensuring reliability is also necessary.  Reliability looks at how 
accurately and consistently the instrument, in this case the CG index, is measured.  A 
problem concerning reliability can occur due to the fact that there is subjective 
judgment exercised in scoring the items of the CG index (Tsalavoutas et al., 2010). 
                                                 
55 If an item is n/d in “disclosures and transparency” (36, 37, 38, 39, 40) and no dependency exists it is 
recorded as zero not n/d. 
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To ensure the reliability of the CG index, the CG index is scored independently for a 
pilot sample of 10 firms56 for 2010 by the researcher, a financial analyst and an 
accounting professor - the three that took part in the content validity discussed earlier.  
It was decided that both methods in calculating the CG index (the Scoring by item and 
the Scoring by category method) should be employed so as to establish whether the two 
methods produce significantly different scores among the three researchers.    
To test the reliability of the research instrument, the “Kruskal- Wallis test’ is used so as 
to examine if a statistically significant difference exists in the scores between the three 
researchers.  Given that the three researchers were involved in the content validity 
process, the potential differences in scoring the CG indices are reduced, thus no 
significant differences are expected for both the penalized and non-penalized indices. 
Table 4-4 shows the CG index scores calculated under both weighting procedures by 
all three researchers individually.  Based on the Kruskal-Wallis Test in both weighting 
procedures, the CG index scores for both the penalized and non-penalized indices for 
all three researchers is not significantly different, indicating that the research instrument 
is reliable. 
  
                                                 
56 The 10 sample firms chosen come from all nine industries of the Greek market according to the ICB 
classification scheme.   
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Table 4-4 Testing the reliability of the research instrument 
Company Researcher Financial Analyst Accounting Professor 
 Scoring by item method1 
Scoring by category 
method2 
Scoring by item  
method1 
Scoring by category 
method2 
Scoring by item  
method1 
Scoring by category 
method2 
 Penalized 
index 
Non-
penalized 
index 
Penalized 
index 
Non-
penalized 
index 
Penalized 
index 
Non-
penalized 
index 
Penalized 
index 
Non-
penalized 
index 
Penalized 
index 
Non-
penalized 
index 
Penalized 
index 
Non-
penalized 
index 
1 0.83 0.86 0.71 0.88 0.80 0.83 0.78 0.81 0.77 0.79 0.75 0.78 
2 0.83 0.92 0.60 0.76 0.93 0.95 0.91 0.94 0.80 0.91 0.80 0.91 
3 0.67 0.87 0.82 0.85 0.77 0.82 0.74 0.79 0.74 0.90 0.76 0.88 
4 0.84 0.87 0.55 0.76 0.68 0.72 0.66 0.72 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.82 
5 0.58 0.74 0.83 0.85 0.77 0.80 0.75 0.78 0.63 0.73 0.62 0.71 
6 0.74 0.91 0.66 0.84 0.74 0.94 0.77 0.94 0.72 0.88 0.75 0.88 
7 0.60 0.80 0.84 0.91 0.74 0.77 0.75 0.78 0.64 0.77 0.67 0.78 
8 0.76 0.78 0.77 0.91 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.81 0.83 0.82 0.85 
9 0.58 0.66 0.59 0.66 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.55 0.65 0.56 0.64 
10 0.50 0.71 0.77 0.79 0.61 0.70 0.59 0.68 0.50 0.74 0.55 0.77 
             
             
Mean 0.69 0.81 0.71 0.82 0.75 0.80 0.74 0.79 0.69 0.80 0.71 0.80 
Median 0.71 0.83 0.74 0.84 0.76 0.81 0.75 0.79 0.73 0.80 0.75 0.80 
 
Penalized CG index  Non-penalized CG index 
Scoring by  
item1 
 Anova F-test : 0.99 / Kruskal-Wallis test 1.32  Anova F-test : 0.05 / Kruskal-Wallis test 0.14  
Scoring by 
category2 
 Anova F-test : 0.40 / Kruskal-Wallis test 0.44 Anova F-test : 0.25 / Kruskal-Wallis test 0.51 
1CG indices calculated with the Scoring by item method.  2CG indices calculated with the Scoring by category method. 
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4.7 Measurement of control variables 
In addition to the main variables tested in the study, the use of variables that prior 
studies have found to be associated with EM are also controlled for so as to avoid the 
effect of possible puzzling factors (Bartov et al., 2001).  This study examines the effect 
of corporate governance on EM, therefore it is necessary to control for other factors 
that influence EM, so as to achieve this goal. 
The study uses five control variables consistent with previous studies, namely: 
concentrated ownership, leverage, firm performance, firm size and growth 
opportunities (Marra et al., 2011; Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005; Park and 
Shin, 2004; Klein, 2002a).   
Concentrated ownership 
The first control variable used is ownership concentration (ownconc) which is measured 
as the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder of the firm. Studies show 
that in firms with concentrated ownership, major shareholders may have the interest 
and the ability to persuade managers to influence EM so as to achieve gains at the 
expense of minority shareholders (Marra et al., 2011).  On the other hand, studies 
indicate that concentrated shareholders might improve the monitoring process and 
therefore minimize EM (Davidson et al., 2005; Peasnell et al., 2005; Agrawal and 
Knoeber, 1996).  Therefore, although ownership concentration appears frequently to 
have an effect on EM, the sign of this effect is not consistent.57 
Leverage 
Another control variable used is leverage (lev), measured as total debt over total assets 
(Davidson et al., 2005; Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Klein, 2002a).    
Leveraged firms are likely to increase EM when they are close to the violation of 
binding debt agreements (Marra et al., 2011; Park and Shin, 2004; Davidson et al., 
                                                 
57 Concentrated ownership is also a proxy for family ownership, since on average the pooled sample 
(2006-2012) has  52% family firms, of which 86% has a family member being the largest shareholder of 
the firm (the variable concentrated ownership).  See Appendix VI for more information. 
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2005).  Therefore, highly leveraged firms may be highly motivated to manage their 
earnings.  However on the other hand, the opposite might also exist, whereby highly 
leveraged companies might be less able to perform EM because of close scrutiny by 
creditors (Park and Shin, 2004).  Therefore, the overall effect of leverage on EM is not 
consistent.    
Firm performance 
Previous research shows that it is necessary to control for firm performance.  Similar to 
the research of Klein (2002a) and Davidson et al. (2005), two measures are used.  The 
first control variable is the absolute change in net income (absearn), calculated as the 
absolute change in net income between the current and prior periods scaled by total 
assets.  Additionally, absolute earnings (absni), calculated as the absolute value of net 
income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets, is also another control variable 
included in the study.58  Absolute values are used since the use of these variables is to 
control for the firm’s inherent accruals or earnings process, not its direction.  This is 
consistent with the approach of Kothari et al. (2005) that the period’s abnormal accruals 
are associated with the company’s earnings process (Klein, 2002a).  For both indicators 
of firm performance, a positive relationship with EM is expected.  
Firm size 
Firms have the ability to choose among various corporate governance practices so as to 
implement structures that are more suitable for their business.  The effect of firm size 
is controlled for through the use of the log of total assets (ta) (Bartov et al., 2001; 
Davidson et al., 2005). 
Different sized firms need different corporate governance structures to meet their 
different needs (Peasnell et al., 2005).  As firms change in size, diversity, and 
                                                 
58 Klein (2002a) also tests her model using signed earnings because EM is related to firm performance, 
a measure used extensively as a control variable in many studies.  This is similar to Bekiris and Doukakis 
(2011), who also examine Greek data, whereby the relationship between EM and the level of profitability 
is controlled for through return on assets (ROA), which is the same control variable.  The regressions are 
also repeated using signed current earnings and change of current earnings to ascertain the results for 
robustness, as seen in Appendix III, IV and V. 
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complexity, research shows that these changes influence corporate governance 
variables and EM.  It is expected that larger firms have more difficulty in conducting 
EM, due to the fact that they are monitored more carefully by the market and other 
stakeholders (Bedard et al., 2004; Klein, 2002a; Park and Shin, 2004; Marra et al., 
2011).  On the other hand, Lobo and Zhou (2006) argue that larger firms find it easier 
to conduct EM due to the fact that the complexity of their operations makes it difficult 
to detect EM (Bekiris and Doukakis, 2011).  Therefore, the relationship between firm 
size and EM is not consistent. 
Firm growth  
Prior studies indicate that it is necessary to control for a firm’s growth by using sales 
growth (salesgrowth) measured as the change in sales compared to sales of the previous 
year, as in the research of Saenz Gonzalez and Garcia-Meca (2014). 
Companies might be pressured to increase, maintain or exceed anticipated growth rates.  
This need creates an incentive to conduct EM (McNichols, 2000; Klein, 2002a).  Firms 
with high growth opportunities may increase their current assets temporarily due to the 
anticipation of future sales growth.  This practice might lead to a positive relationship 
between growth opportunities and EM (Park and Shin, 2004).  In addition to this, fast-
growing firms can conduct EM easier than slow-growing or stagnant firms, due to the 
fact that it is more difficult to trace EM in fast-growing firms and see through their 
business activities (Park and Shin, 2004).  It is expected that there is a positive 
relationship between the extent of EM and a company’s growth opportunities. 
4.8 Empirical research models 
This study examines the effect of governance on earnings management before and after 
the implementation of the 2008 governance law concerning the mandatory existence of 
audit committees for all Greek listed firms.  The audit committee is responsible for all 
financial reporting processes of the firm and supervises the work of the external 
auditors.  All processes and relationships with the external auditors need to be disclosed 
so as to ensure an objective and independent audit.  These mandatory disclosures oblige 
firms to explicitly discuss corporate governance issues and thus are forced to examine 
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and improve key CG issues.  As such, corporate governance as a whole is influenced 
and positive changes are expected.  Changes in CG mechanisms as a result of this law 
are examined through holistic governance scores, weighted ACE and CG indices.   
The data is broken down into two periods:  the pre-law sample period (2006 and 2008)59 
and the post-law sample period (2010 and 2012).  In a multivariate analysis setting, a 
dummy year variable equaling one is assigned to the post-law sample period and zero 
to the pre-law sample period.  Interaction variables between corporate governance 
variables and the dummy year variable are used in the regressions.   The coefficient of 
such interaction variables shows the marginal effect of corporate governance variables 
on EM, before and after the implementation of the 2008 governance law.  It is expected 
that the effect of corporate governance variables on EM will be stronger after the 
implementation of the governance laws. 
Audit committee variables and a CG index are used to capture governance quality, 
therefore the research applies two models, each utilizing different variables to proxy 
for corporate governance so as to test the research hypotheses.  The first model 
examines audit committee effectiveness, similar to the work of Baxter and Cotter 
(2009), while the second model studies many governance attributes incorporated in a 
CG index, similar to Ammann et al. (2011) and Bekiris and Doukakis (2011).   
It should be noted that all regressions are run twice: once with EM captured with the 
modified Jones model and once with the DeFond and Park (2001) model. 
4.9 Statistical properties and econometric issues 
4.9.1 Univariate analysis 
Statistical methods for analyzing data can be classified as either parametric or non-
parametric.  Parametric tests are employed when the data conform to normal 
                                                 
59 Although 2008 is the first year of implementation of Law 3693/2008, it is considered as a pre-law 
period for this study since the law became effective as of August 2008.  Since the firms’ year end is 
December 2008, many firms CG mechanisms, such as the existence of an audit committee might have 
been implemented after August 2008, whereby four quarterly meetings of the audit committee might not 
be possible in 2008.  Thus, the first full year of implementation of the Law is considered the financial 
period starting after January 1, 2009. 
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distributions, while no such assumption is needed for non-parametric tests.  Normality 
is tested using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for all variables.  For some variables 
the null hypothesis of normality is rejected, but other variables are considered normal, 
and therefore both parametric tests, focusing on mean values, and non-parametric tests, 
focusing on median values, are applied.   
To examine the differences between years, t-tests, focusing on mean values, and Mann 
Whitney tests, focusing on median values, are applied, while for other subsamples, such 
as CG indices, mean and median differences are examined using the ANOVA F-test / 
Welch F-test60 and the Kruskal-Wallis test.   
4.9.2 Multivariate analysis 
Panel data estimation is used in this study to analyze the data so as to allow for 
examination of a time series for each cross-sectional variable in the data. Panel data 
allows for individual and time effects in the panel data regressions (Ducassy and Guyot, 
2017).       
To reduce the impact of extreme values on the results, all continuous variables are 
winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution (Chung et al., 2002; 
Tsipouridou and Spathis, 2012; Cheng et al., 2016)  
The relationship between earnings management and governance is tested applying the 
following model: 
                                                 
60 Before finding the ANOVA F-test/Welch F-Test, Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances is 
employed.  If the assumption of homogeneity of variance is not violated, the ANOVA F-test is suitable 
to examine the mean differences among the subsamples, otherwise the Welch F-test is preferable when 
the assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated. 
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𝐸𝑀 = 𝑐(1) + 𝑐(2) ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑐(3) ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 + 𝑐(4) ∗ 𝑡𝑎 + 𝑐(5) ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣 + 𝑐(6)
∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑛𝑖 + 𝑐(7) ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 𝑐(8) ∗ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝑐(9) ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +   𝑐(10)
∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
+  𝜀                                                                                                           𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟏𝟓 
Governance quality is tested through different proxies, i.e. audit committee 
effectiveness and a CG index.  The use of the different proxies for corporate governance 
helps resolve the issue of multicollinearity.  The high correlation among corporate 
governance variables is evident in many corporate governance studies such as Klein 
(2002b) and Xie et al. (2003).  One way to deal with this issue is to exclude collinear 
variables from the regression.  For this reason, two models are created in this study, one 
with a CG index and one with audit committee variables.   
Multicollinearity diagnostics are conducted in two ways.  Firstly, bivariate correlations 
using Pearson and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients are examined.  All values 
of any pairs of independent variables should be well below the critical range of 0.8, 
above which multicollinearity could cause a threat to the regression results (Gujarati, 
2003: 359). Second, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests are also used to test for 
multicollinearity, since it may still exist even if the correlation value is low.  In order 
to ascertain that the regression model has no evidence of multicollinearity, VIF’s of all 
independent variables should be below the critical value of 10 (Asteriou and Hall, 2007: 
91). 
Another important issue considered in the analysis is that of controlling for the possible 
endogeneity of the variables that could bias the results obtained (Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008).  According to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Carcello et al. 
(2011), an OLS regression analysis in governance research can lead to endogeneity 
between corporate governance variables and other variables of interest, in this case 
earnings management.  The existence of at least one source of endogeneity will cause 
the estimates to be biased and could potentially lead to spurious results (Schultz et al., 
2010). 
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According to Wintoki et al. (2012), three sources of endogeneity are possible in 
corporate governance research: dynamic endogeneity, simultaneous endogeneity and 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Dynamic endogeneity exists if current governance characteristics, control variables and 
performance are determined by previous performance of the variables.  For example, 
poor previous performance could potentially lead firms to replace the current BOD with 
more independent board members, thus applying stricter governance controls, and 
therefore a negative relationship could exist between past performance and board 
independence.   
Another source of potential endogeneity is simultaneous endogeneity.  For example, 
while it is possible that well governed firms have higher performance, it is also possible 
that firm performance affects governance structures.  In such a case governance and 
firm performance are simultaneously determined, whereby causality runs in both 
directions (Brown et al., 2011).  If this is so, the relationship between firm performance 
and corporate governance could be endogenous.  A possible solution to this problem is 
the use of the instrumental variables approach through the use of simultaneous 
equations, where one equation examines the effect of corporate governance and control 
variables on firm performance and, in the other equations, the effect of performance 
and control variables on corporate governance, is examined.  The difficulty faced in 
this solution is the identification and justification of exogenous instrumental variables 
(Wintoki et al., 2012).  An ideal instrument that deals with the potential endogeneity 
between governance and performance is a variable that does not directly affect 
performance, but affects performance indirectly through its impact on governance 
(Love, 2011).  Thus, for this study it is necessary to use an instrument that does not 
directly affect earnings management but affects earnings management indirectly 
through its impact on governance.   
Various studies use different instruments to deal with the endogeneity issue. The choice 
of instrumental variables is essential since almost any instrument identified for a 
specific endogenous variable can plausibly be related to one or more endogenous 
variables based on the existing literature.  Thus, careful consideration when choosing 
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instruments is necessary (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008).  
Durnev and Kim (2005) for example, apply a 3SLS model where they omit industry 
variables, two parameters of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (alpha and beta) and firm 
size from Tobin’s Q, when testing governance on firm performance.  They assume that 
governance does not vary according to the industry it belongs to.  However, these 
exclusions are considered arbitrary.  According to the work of Black et al. (2006b) and 
Black et al. (2006c), industry participation does affect governance, thus industry 
dummies are not accurate instrumental variables.   
Another approach that deals with this issue of endogeneity is the use of lagged values 
of governance as instruments for current governance, as in the work of Coles et al. 
(2008) and Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009).  The idea behind this is that current 
governance might be influenced by current firm performance, but previous year’s 
governance has already been predetermined, and thus is not affected by current firm 
performance.  However, this method also has drawbacks since governance variables are 
considered slow-moving and thus it is difficult to predict firm performance with past 
governance data. Additionally, long time-series data is needed for such studies, which 
have the potential to be affected by weak instruments (Love, 2011).  The use of lagged 
variables as instruments is common in the literature. However, as the number of lags 
increases, the potential problems of ‘weak’ instruments also increase.  Thus, a trade-off 
exists between larger lags, which make the instruments more exogenous, and the 
possibility of ‘weaker’ instruments due to the longer lags (Wintoki et al., 2012).61 
The last source of endogeneity is unobserved heterogeneity.  This type of endogeneity 
exists if unobservable factors exist in the governance-earnings management context.  
For example, the competence and risk level of a CEO could potentially affect earnings 
management, but cannot be quantified, and thus is not included in the regression.  If the 
unobserved variables are constant over time for each firm, a potential solution to this 
type of endogeneity is the use of the fixed-effects panel model (Love, 2011).  This 
model can produce consistent parameter estimates that are robust to unobservable 
                                                 
61 The effectiveness of the instrumental variable approach remains disputed.  Many times it is considered 
a complement to OLS regressions, which are often preferred to the instrumental variable approach in 
cases of ‘weak’ instrument selection (Larcker and Rusticus, 2010). 
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heterogeneity if the panel dataset includes a small time series and a large cross section, 
since unobserved variables are unlikely to change over a small period of time (Petersen, 
2009).  This methodology has been used by Erickson et al. (2005), Black et al. (2006a), 
Black and Kim (2012) and Black et al. (2015).  
To deal with potential endogeneity, a system of simultaneous equations is used in this 
study to examine the hypotheses.  Two equations are chosen so as to account for the 
effect of governance on earnings management, as well as the reverse effect.   
The Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) specification is utilized in this study 
which accounts for dynamic endogeneity, simultaneous endogeneity and unobserved 
heterogeneity in panel data models (Duru et al., 2016; Wintoki et al., 2012).  GMM 
includes fixed effects so as to account for unobservable firm heterogeneity and thus is 
considered a better choice than traditional OLS estimation.  Additionally, GMM is 
robust to firm-specific patterns of heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and gaps in the 
sample of unbalanced panels (Duru et al., 2016).   
Some researchers have chosen the instrumental variable approach, instead of GMM, 
which removes the fixed effects through the first difference transformation.  This 
method used lagged values as the only instrument.  However, a major limitation of this 
method is failure to consider additional valid instruments, resulting in lack of 
efficiency.  To deal with this issue, researchers have considered using longer lagged 
dependent variables as additional instruments.  However, this process can lead to an 
over-identification problem as a result of the use of additional instruments (Dang et al., 
2015).  Additionally, using lagged values as instruments can cause inconsistency if the 
relationship between the lagged and current values is weak (Akbar et al., 2016).  
Utilization of GMM is needed to deal with this issue (Dang et al., 2015).  GMM is 
chosen over simple IV since it is more efficient in cases of heteroskedasticity than the 
simple IV estimate, without producing inferior results in the absence of 
heteroskedasticity (Andrikopoulos et al., 2013).   
Research, such as Durnev and Kim (2005) and Aggarwal et al. (2009), has also shown 
that the selection of instruments based on unrealistic assumptions about data can lead 
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to instruments that are not totally exogenous, thus providing unrealistic results (Akbar 
et al., 2016).  The basic concern is to be certain that a given variable is a proper 
instrument.  Such an instrument is a variable that is correlated with the regressors and 
uncorrelated with the error terms (Tsionas et al., 2012).  The exogenous variables 
chosen are prior year performance, powerful CEO and audit firm.   
A major advancement in GMM is provided by Lewbel (1997), who illustrated that valid 
instruments are not only predetermined instruments, but also the cross-products of each 
instrument with the dependent variables.  The cross-products of such variables can be 
considered valid instruments so as to at least satisfy the order condition for 
identification (Tsionas et al., 2012).  Lewbel (1997) development is based on the 
assumption that all variables are ‘potentially’ endogenous and no ‘outside’ variables 
can be determined to act as an instrument (Tsionas et al., 2012).   As such, the entire 
set of instruments consists of the predetermined variables and the cross-products of all 
with the dependent variables.  Additionally, all instruments implemented in this study 
will be deviations from their means. 
It is also essential to examine if the instruments are ‘weak’, leading to biased results 
under GMM, even in large samples, where the distribution can be far from normal.  This 
issue has been examined by Stock et al. (2002), who propose various tests to examine 
the issue of ‘relevant’ instruments (Tsionas et al., 2012).  More specifically, Stock and 
Watson (2003: 350) state that running a first-stage regression and examining the F-
statistic, is a perfect guide to determining if instruments are weak.  If F is greater than 
10, the choice of instrument is fine and GMM results are accurate (as also stated in 
Verbeek, 2008: 157).   
The analysis is carried out using GMM62 as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
62The analysis originally is carried using OLS, however due to endogeneity issues GMM is utilized. 
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𝑬𝑴 = 𝑐(1) + 𝑐(2) ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑐(3) ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 + 𝑐(4) ∗ 𝑡𝑎 + 𝑐(5) ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣 + 𝑐(6) ∗
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑛𝑖 + 𝑐(7) ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 𝑐(8) ∗ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝒄(𝟗) ∗ 𝒂𝒖𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒇𝒊𝒓𝒎 + 𝒄(𝟏𝟎) ∗ 𝒏𝒊𝒑 + 𝑐(11) ∗
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +   𝑐(12) ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
 𝜀                                                                                                                                                 𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟏𝟔  
𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 = 𝑐(1) + 𝑐(2) ∗ 𝑒𝑚 + 𝑐(3) ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 + 𝑐(4) ∗ 𝑡𝑎 + 𝑐(5) ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣 + 𝑐(6) ∗
𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑛𝑖 + 𝑐(7) ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛 + 𝑐(8) ∗ 𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝒄(𝟗) ∗  𝒑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆 + 𝑐(10) ∗  𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
  𝜀                                                                                                                                               𝐞𝐪 𝟒 − 𝟏𝟕  
Table 4-5 presents the measurement of the variables used in the analysis of this project.  
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Table 4-5 Measurement of the variables used in the analysis 
  
WorldScope identifiers
WC02201; WC02001; 
WC03101; WC03051
WC01001; WC02999
WC02051
WC02201; WC02001; 
WC03101; WC03051; 
WC01001
weighace
cg_pen_total
cg-_pen-_mand 
cg_pen_bp
cg_non_total
cg-_non-_mand 
cg_non_bp
ta Datastream WC02999
lev Datastream WC03255; WC02999
absni Datastream WC01551; WC02999
absearn Datastream WC01551; WC02999
salesgrowth Datastream WC01001
pshare
auditfirm
year
powerful CEO, measured as the percentage of ownership held by the CEO Data hand-collected from annual reports
external auditor is one of the Big Four audit firms Data hand-collected from annual reports
Dummy Variable
an indicator variable taking the value of 0 for 2006 and 2008 and 1 for 2010 and 2012
absolute current earnings, calculated as the absolute value of net income before 
extraordinary items scaled by total assets
absolute change in earnings, calculated as the absolute change in net income before 
extraordinary items between current and prior periods, scaled by total assets
change in sales from the prior year
Exogenous Variables
nip prior year performance calculated as the prior year’s return on assets Datastream WC01551; WC02999
Control Variables
ownconc the percentage owned by the largest shareholder of the firm Data hand-collected from annual reports
natural log of total assets
total debt over total assets
CG index (all items included in calculation of index), whereby the non-disclosed values 
were excluded in the rating procedure.  The Scoring by item rating approach is 
utilized. 
Data hand-collected from annual reports
CG index (mandatory CG items included in calculation of index), whereby the non-
disclosed values were excluded in the rating procedure.  The Scoring by item rating 
approach is utilized. 
Data hand-collected from annual reports
CG index (best practice CG items included in calculation of index), whereby the non-
disclosed values were excluded in the rating procedure.  The Scoring by item rating 
approach is utilized. 
Data hand-collected from annual reports
CG index (all items included in calculation of index), whereby the non-disclosed values 
were considered as non-existent, therefore firms were penalized in the rating 
procedure. The Scoring by item rating approach is utilized. 
Data hand-collected from annual reports
CG index (mandatory CG items included in calculation of index), whereby the non-
disclosed values were considered as non-existent, therefore firms were penalized in 
the rating procedure.  The Scoring by item rating approach is utilized. 
Data hand-collected from annual reports
CG index (best practice CG items included in calculation of index), whereby the non-
disclosed values were considered as non-existent, therefore firms were penalized in 
the rating procedure.  The Scoring by item rating approach is utilized.
Data hand-collected from annual reports
DeFond and Park (2001) model 
(AWCA)
Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals using the 
DeFond and Park (2001) model
Datastream
Governance Q uality
A variable taking the value of 0 to 4, depending on the number of ace criteria met.  Data hand-collected from annual reports
Earnings Management
Modified Jones model  (EM)
discretionary accruals using the modified Jones model (Dechow et 
al. 2005)
Datastream
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The primary variables examined in this analysis are CG and EM before and after the 
2008 governance law relating to the mandatory existence of audit committees for all 
Greek listed firms.  Governance quality is examined in model #1 through audit 
committee effectiveness and in model #2 through CG indices.  Initially the relationship 
between CG and EM is tested, where a negative relationship between the two variables 
is expected.  In order to highlight the role of corporate governance after the 
implementation of the 2008 CG law, the governance-earnings management relationship 
is tested through the use of a dummy year variable.  The data is broken into two sub-
samples, the pre-law sample before the implementation of the 2008 CG law (2006 and 
2008) and the post-sample after the implementation of the 2008 CG law (2010 and 
2012) through the use of a dummy year variable equaling one if the sample is in 2010 
and 2012, or zero otherwise.  It is expected that firms with stronger CG are able to better 
restrain EM.  Each regression is run separately for the pre-law period, the post-law 
period and the pooled sample.  The potential change in the coefficients between the pre-
law and post-law period tests whether there is a difference (structural change) in the 
model between the two periods.  This is tested by using pre-law and post-law data for 
each sample firm and utilizing a dummy year variable in the regression of the pooled 
sample. 
4.10 Sample selection and data collection procedures 
This study covers all non-financial Greek listed companies for the fiscal years 2006, 
2008, 2010 and 2012.  Financial, real estate and insurance firms are excluded from the 
sample since their accrual processes are fundamentally different from firms in other 
industries and the incentives and opportunities for EM are therefore altered.  
Additionally, according to Davidson et al. (2005), the exclusion of financial firms is 
required because they have unique working capital structures, as well as an additional 
layer of governance regulations compared to non-financial firms.  This is consistent 
with the work of Peasnell et al. (2000b), Klein (2002a) and Bekiris and Doukakis 
(2011).   
These specific years are intentionally chosen so that all firms used in the study apply 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), since IFRS became mandatory for 
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all Greek listed firms in 2005 and research indicates that significant changes in 
companies’ statements were introduced as a result (Tsalavoutas and Evans, 2010).  
Furthermore, the choice of these four years allows all firms included in the study to 
comply with the first law concerning corporate governance, Law 3016/2002 “On 
Corporate Governance, board remuneration and other issues”, which was implemented 
in 2002.  Additionally, as of 2008, following the introduction of Law 3693/2008, 
“Mandatory audit of annual and consolidated financial reports”, all Greek listed firms 
are required to have an audit committee responsible for the monitoring process of 
financial reporting.  This law concerning the mandatory existence of audit committees 
is of utmost importance in effecting the quality of financial reporting, whereby one 
would assume that firms’ financial reporting has improved after its implementation. 
Finally, 2010 is the year the Hellenic Federation of Industries prepared an updated CG 
code for Greek listed firms.  The main objective of this Code is to inform and guide 
firms on governance best practice, as well as to improve shareholder information.  For 
this reason, the years 2006 (two years before the implementation of the audit committee 
law), 2008 (the year the law was created), 2010 (two years after the implementation of 
the law) and 2012 (four years after the implementation of the law) are chosen.  The 
study examines the change of any potential effect of CG on EM before and after the 
implementation of Law 3693/2008.  Finally, due to the fact that a large amount of data 
had to be hand-collected for the corporate governance variables, limiting the study to 
four years makes the task feasible within the time available. 
Data for corporate governance characteristics is hand-collected from annual reports 
found on the ASE website, while EM is calculated based on data sourced from 
DataStream.  Firms’ websites are not used to collect corporate governance data because 
the sample includes data from 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012, while the firms’ websites 
includes contemporary corporate governance information of the current year.  
Companies for which no financial data and no annual reports are available for the 
collection of corporate governance data are also excluded.  Moreover, firms for which 
data is not available in all four years are included in the analysis, resulting in a different 
number of observations for each of the four years (i.e. unbalanced panel).  This 
procedure resulted in a final sample of 788 firm year observations with complete data, 
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ranging from 65% (204/316) of ASE firms in 2006 to 73% (187/256) of ASE firms in 
2012.  Table 4-6 illustrates the sample selection procedure. 
Table 4-6 Sample Selection Procedure 
 2006 2008 2010 2012 Total 
No. of firms listed on the ASE 316 290 273 256 1,135 
Firms in financial, real estate and 
insurance industries 
(47) (42) (41) (34) (164) 
Firms with missing values (financial 
or corporate governance) 
(65) (43) (40) (35) (183) 
Total 204 205 192 187 788 
 
The final sample is disaggregated across industries based on the ICB classification 
scheme.  More specifically, firms in the sample are classified as belonging to: Basic 
Materials (12% of the sample); Consumer Goods (32% of the sample); Consumer 
Services (18% of the sample); Healthcare (5% of the sample); Industrials (26% of the 
sample); Oil & Gas (1% of the sample); Technology (4% of the sample); 
Telecommunications (1% of the sample); and Utilities (2% of the sample) as shown in 
Table 4-6.  However, when estimating EM using the Jones-type models, according to 
Klein (2002a),  industries with less than eight observations should be excluded from 
analysis.  Therefore, firms in the Healthcare, Utilities, Oil and Gas, and 
Telecommunications industries should be excluded from the study.  However, the 
industries that should have been excluded contain firms with large market capitalization 
that are important in the Greek economy and, if excluded, would likely alter the results.  
In order to incorporate all firms in the sample and avoid having industries with less than 
eight firms, some industries are combined.  More specifically, Oil and Gas is combined 
with Industrials.  Utilities and Telecommunications is combined with Consumer 
Services.  Finally, Healthcare is combined with Consumer Services and Consumer 
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Goods.63  This created the Combined Industries classification, as shown in Table 4-7, 
whereby Basic Materials now comprise 11%, Consumer Goods 31%, Consumer 
Services 22%, and Industrials 26% and Technology 10%.    
Table 4-7 Distribution of sample firms across industries    
Industry Classification  Based on ICB  Combined Industries  
  2006 2008 2010 2012 Total 2006 2008 2010 2012 Total 
Basic materials (6)  22 22 23 22 89 22 22 23 22 89 
Consumer goods (4)  61 63 58 52 234 63 65 60 53 241 
Consumer services (2)  34 37 32 29 132 46 49 42 40 177 
Healthcare (3)  9 9 7 7 32 - - - -  
Industrials (1)  52 48 46 50 196 54 50 48 52 204 
Oil & Gas (7)  2 2 2 2 8 - - - -  
Technology (8)  19 19 19 20 77 19 19 19 20 77 
Telecommunications (9)  2 1 1 1 5 - - - -  
Utilities (5)  3 4 4 4 15 - - - -  
Total  204 205 192 187 788 204 205 192 187 788 
Industry classification was initially based on DataStream & ICB.  However, in order to incorporate all firms in the sample, 
each firm classified in an industry that did not include at least eight firms was examined separately and was placed in the 
another appropriate industry. 
 
4.11 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the earnings management models applied in the relevant 
research so as to determine which EM models to apply in this study.  Additionally, a 
review of the CG indices created in an international and Greek setting is discussed so 
as to establish the creation of the current CG index for the purpose of this study. 
The study examines the relationship between governance quality and EM for all Greek 
listed firms for 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2012.  This relationship is examined before and 
after the implementation of the 2008 governance law for all Greek listed firms 
concerning the mandatory existence of an audit committee.  The data is broken down 
into two periods, the pre-law period sample (2006/2008) and the post-law period sample 
                                                 
63 In order to incorporate all firms in the sample, each firm was examined separately and according to its 
specific product or service characteristic it was decided where it should be placed.  More specifically, in 
2006 out of the nine healthcare firms, seven were combined with consumer services and two with 
consumer goods, in 2008 out of the nine healthcare firms, seven were combined with consumer services 
and two with consumer goods, in 2010 out of the seven healthcare firms, five were combined with 
consumer services and two with consumer goods and in 2012 out of the seven healthcare firms, six were 
combined with consumer services and one with consumer goods.  See Appendix II with the names of 
firms that are classified in different industries, where they are classified and why. 
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(2010/2012).  It is expected that the effect of corporate governance variables on EM 
will be stronger after the implementation of the governance law.   
Governance quality is measured through audit committee attributes, as well as a holistic 
governance measure in the form of a CG index.  EM is measured through the Modified 
Jones model and the DeFond and Park (2001) model.  Both EM measures are employed 
in this study since the former uses industry-wide estimates, while the latter uses firm-
specific measures.  The use of both is deemed necessary so as to include both industry 
and firm specific measures.   
An important issue considered in the analysis is that of controlling for the possible 
endogeneity of the variables that could bias the results obtained.  According to 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) and Carcello et al. (2011) an OLS regression analysis 
in governance research can lead to endogeneity between corporate governance 
variables and other variables of interest, in this case earnings management.  For this 
reason, a system of simultaneous equations is used in this study to examine the 
hypotheses. The analysis is carried out using GMM.   
Data for corporate governance characteristics is hand-collected from annual reports 
found on the ASE website, while earnings management is calculated based on data 
obtained from DataStream.  The sample consists of all firms listed on the ASE for the 
years 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012, excluding only firms in financial, real estate and 
insurance industries since they require additional governance regulations.
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Chapter 5 – Data Analysis and Discussion (CG & EM) 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis and discussion of the data pertaining to the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms in Greece on EM before and after the 2008 CG law 
concerning the mandatory existence of an audit committee for all Greek listed firms.  
In this chapter, the hypotheses formulated in chapter 3 are tested whereby corporate 
governance mechanisms are measured using audit committee characteristics and a 
multi-dimensional governance mechanism in the form of a corporate governance index.  
EM is measured using the Modified Jones Model and the DeFond and Park model.  The 
statistical analysis begins with descriptive statistics in section 5.2 and continues with 
bivariate tests in section 5.3 and multivariate tests in section 5.4. Discussion of the 
findings is presented in section 5.5 and section 5.6 concludes the chapter. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
The univariate analysis begins with descriptive statistics for each variable for the pre-
and post-law periods, as well as for the pooled sample.  The pooled sample consists of 
763 firm-year observations, with 392 firm-year observations for the pre-law period 
(2006/2008) and 371 firm-year observations for the post-law period (2010/2012).  The 
descriptive statistics for each variable are presented in Table 5-1.  
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Table 5-1 Descriptive Statistics  
 Pooled sample  
 
Pre-law period (2006 / 2008 ) 
 
Post-law period (2010 / 2012) 
 
Comparisons across  
the periods 
 mean median min max sd mean median min max sd mean median min max sd t-test Mann- 
Whitney 
EM  0.07 0.04 0.00 0.50 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.00 0.47 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.61 0.09 1.44 1.95* 
AWCA  0.07 0.04 0.00 0.45 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.46 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.45 0.08 032 0.67 
ace 0.07 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.36 -8.50*** 3.65*** 
weighace 1.22 0.00 0.00 4.00 1.40 0.12 0.00 0.00 3.00 0.44 2.37 2.00 0.00 4.00 1.11 -37.31*** 21.59*** 
cgpentotal 0.49 0.48 0.00 0.91 0.23 0.31 0.25 0.00 0.62 0.13 0.67 0.69 0.00 0.95 0.15 -35.37*** 22.01*** 
cgpenmand 0.65 0.81 0.00 0.94 0.29 0.51 0.44 0.00 0.92 0.26 0.80 0.88 0.00 0.94 0.20 -17.52*** 14.35*** 
cgpenbp 0.35 0.27 0.04 0.86 0.23 0.18 0.17 0.00 0.50 0.08 0.53 0.53 0.00 0.95 0.19 -32.32*** 21.62*** 
cgnontotal 0..66 0.69 0.29 0.94 0.15 0.56 0.57 0.29 0.81 0.12 0.77 0.78 0.00 0.95 0.11 -26.26*** 20.05*** 
cgnonmand 0.76 0.88 0.00 0.94 0.28 0.69 0.78 0.00 0.93 0.31 0.84 0.93 0.00 0.94 0.23 -7.63*** 14.72*** 
cgnonbp 0.50 0.50 0.11 0.90 0.19 0.38 0.38 0.11 0.72 0.13 0.62 0.64 0.00 0.95 0.16 -25.03*** 19.13*** 
ownconc 0.40 0.36 0.00 0.89 0.19 0.40 0.36 0.08 0.89 0.18 0.41 0.36 0.00 0.90 0.19 -0.53 0.26 
ta 11.75 11.66 8.48 15.88 1.47 11.80 11.71 8.98 16.00 1.42 11.71 11.60 8.35 15.88 1.51 0.28 0.39 
lev 0.36 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.21 0.31 0.32 0.00 0.68    0.16 0.40 0.40 0.00 1.54 0.25 -5.43*** 4.58*** 
ni -0.02 0.00 -0.56 0.17 0.10 0.01 0.02 -0.39 0.38 0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.62 0.13 0.11 8.70*** 10.57*** 
absni 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.61 0.10 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.61 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.00 0.62 0.10 -3.45*** 3.18*** 
earn -0.01 -0.00 -0.38 0.25 0.07 -0.01 -0.00 -0.26 0.22 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.43 0.30 0.08 1.69* 2.57** 
absearn 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.60 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.59 0.07 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.60 0.08 -2.26** 3.00*** 
salesgrowth 0.01 0.01 -0.73 1.06 0.28 0.12 0.08 -0.63 1.34 0.28 -0.08 -0.08 -0.81 0.66 0.24 10.12*** 11.46*** 
nip -0.01 0.01   -0.26 0.17 0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.16 0.18 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.32 0.14 0.08 10.24*** 9.94*** 
pshare 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.77 0.21 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.72 0.20 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.78 0.21 -0.40 0.26 
auditfirm 0.21 0.00   0.00 1.00 0.41 0.20 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.22 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.42 -1.32 0.92 
Variables: EM discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model; AWCA abnormal working capital accruals using the DeFond and Park (2001) model; ace audit committee effectiveness; weighace weighted audit 
committee effectiveness;  cgpentotal penalized total CG index; cgpenmand penalized mandatory CG index; cgpenbp penalized best practice CG index; cgnontotal non-penalized total CG index; cgnonmand non-penalized 
mandatory CG index; cgnonbp non-penalized best practice CG index; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; absni absolute value of current earnings; absearn absolute value of changes in earnings; 
salesgrowth changes in sales from prior year; nip prior year’s net income; pshare powerful CEO; auditfirm external auditor is one of the Big Four audit firms 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. 
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
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5.2.1 Descriptive statistics for Audit Committee Effectiveness 
The first proxy for governance quality is audit committee effectiveness.  Audit 
committee effectiveness is observed through two composite measures, ace and 
weighace.  Both measures capture audit committee independence, financial expertise, 
size and the frequency of meetings of audit committees.   
The data collected on audit committee variables is somewhat limited, because not all 
firms were disclosing audit committee information, in both the pre-law and post-law 
periods.  For the pre-law period (2006/2008), one reason for this is that, in 2006, the 
existence of audit committees was not mandatory.  Additionally, according to Law 
3556/2007, Greek listed firms had to submit to the ASE only annual and semiannual 
financial statements and were obliged to report figures and information instead of a 
comprehensive annual report, and thus were disclosing less information.  For the 
sample years 2010 and 2012 (post-law period), Greek firms were following Law 
3873/2010 which obliged listed firms to disclose a corporate governance statement in 
a clear and distinguishable section of their annual report.  Additionally, although firms 
where disclosing the existence of audit committees, they still were not disclosing 
detailed information about their audit committees, such as meeting frequency and the 
financial expertise of members.   
Audit Committee Existence 
In the pre-law period, only a few firms were disclosing the existence of an audit 
committee compared to the post-law period.  Only one firm in the pre-law period and 
two in the post law period actually stated that they did not have an audit committee.  
More specifically, out of the 392 firms in the pre-law period, only 55 firms (14%) stated 
they had an audit committee in the pre-law period, while in the post-law period, as a 
result of implementation of Law 3693/2008, out of the 371 firms, 360 firms (97%) 
disclosed that they had an audit committee.   
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Audit Committee Independence 
Out of the 392 firms in the pre-law period sample, only 33 firms (8.4%) disclosed their 
audit committee’s composition, i.e., if their audit committee is comprised of 
independent members.  Those 33 firms have an average of 66% of audit committee 
members who are independent.  However, out of the 371 firms in the post-law sample, 
the firms that disclosed their audit committee’s composition rose drastically to 342 
firms (92.18%).  For those 342 firms, audit committee independence is on average 45% 
of members.64  As seen in the post-law period sample, firms on average adhered to Law 
3693/2008, whereby at least one member of the audit committee is an independent 
member, while they did adhere to the 2010 Greek CG Code which recommends that 
the majority of members to be independent.   
Audit Committee Expertise 
Out of the 392 firms in the pre-law period sample, only 15 firms (3.8%) disclosed that 
their audit committee had a member with financial expertise, while in the post-law 
sample 245 firms (66.04%) disclosed that their audit committee had a member with 
financial expertise.  As seen in the post-law period sample, firms on average adhered 
to Law 3693/2008 and the recommendations of the 2010 Greek CG Code, whereby at 
least one member of the audit committee has financial expertise.   
Audit Committee Size 
For the pre-law period sample, out of the 392 firms, 31 firms (7.9%) disclosed their 
audit committee size, while in the post-law period sample, out of the 371 firms, 344 
firms (92.7%) disclosed their audit committee size.   For the pre-law period the average 
audit committee size is 2.71, where out of those 31 firms, 20 firms had an audit 
committee size of three or more members, while for the post-law period sample the 
average audit committee size is 3.09, where out of the 344 firms, 338 firms had an audit 
committee size of three or more members. As seen in the post-law period sample, firms 
                                                 
64 These findings are in line with Zhou et al. (2018).   
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on average adhered to the 2010 Greek CG Code, which recommends a minimum audit 
committee size of three members.   
Audit Committee Meetings 
In the pre-law period sample, no firms (0%) disclosed the number of audit committee 
meetings, while in the post-law period sample, out of the 371 firms, 247 firms (66.6%) 
disclosed the number of audit committee meetings.  Out of the 247 firms, 161 firms had 
4 or more meetings per year.  As seen in the post-law period sample, firms on average 
adhered to the 2010 Greek CG Code, which recommends a minimum of four meetings 
per year.   
Audit Committee Effectiveness (ACE) – (Weighted ACE) 
Ace is an indicator variable taking the value of one if all members of the audit committee 
are independent and the size of the audit committee is three or above and the audit 
committee conducted four or more meetings per year and at least one audit committee 
member has financial expertise, or zero otherwise.  Weighace is a variable taking the 
value of zero to four, depending on the number of ace criteria met. 
In the pre-law period, no firms had ace, mainly due to non-disclosure of information 
concerning audit committees, while in the post-law period, the mean (median) score is 
0.15 (0.00).  Thus, few firms scored positively in terms of ace even in the post-law 
period.  As expected, significant differences at the 1% level exist in the mean and 
median scores between the two periods. 
As for weighted audit committee effectiveness (weighace), the rates are higher than 
ace.  The pooled sample shows a mean (median) for weighace of 1.22 (0.00), with a 
minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 4.00.  More specifically, the pre-law 
period illustrates a mean (median) value of 0.12 (0.00), while in the post-law period, a 
large increase in the mean (median) values to 2.37 (2.00) is seen.   
It is clear that more firms in the post-law period (2010/2012) compared to the pre-law 
period (2006/2008) disclosed more audit committee information and implemented 
elements of the 2008 audit committee law and 2010 Greek CG Code, so as to have 
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higher audit committee effectiveness.  This is also evident in the significant difference 
in the mean and median values at the 1% level between the two periods. 
5.2.2 Descriptive statistics for CG Indices 
The corporate governance quality of Greek listed firms is also measured through a 
corporate governance index.  The corporate governance index is created to incorporate 
various governance attributes together so as to capture the level of governance quality.   
It is examined in its “penalized” and “non-penalized” forms.  More specifically, the 
penalized CG index considers non-disclosed or missing values as non-existing values, 
while in the non-penalized CG index the non-disclosed or missing values are excluded 
from the analysis.  Additionally, in both rating schemes, separate indices are created 
that incorporate mandatory and best practice variables, resulting in a total of six 
indices.65   
Examining the descriptive statistics for the CG indices in Table 5-1, the mean (median) 
of the penalized CG index for the pooled sample is 49% (48%), with a minimum value 
of 0% and a maximum value of 91%.  More specifically the pre-law period has a mean 
(median) of 31% (25%), while the post-law sample has a mean (median) of 67% 
(69%).66   
The non-penalized CG index of the pooled sample ranges from 29% to 94%, with a 
mean (median) of 66% (69%).  The mean (median) of the pre and post-law periods are 
56% (57%) and 77% (78%) respectively.  The trend is for more firms to comply with 
disclosure of corporate governance items, reflected in the value of the CG index in 
2010, for both rating schemes, being much higher than in 2006.  This increase is caused 
by the implementation of CG laws and codes, such as Law 3693/2008, which requires 
all listed firms to have an audit committee, Law 3873/2010 which obliges listed firms 
to disclose annual information about their corporate governance in a statement that is 
in a specific and clearly identifiable section of the annual report, as well as the 2010 
                                                 
65 A description of the exact process of creating the CG indices can be found in chapter 4, section 4.6. 
66 These findings are in line with Bekiris and Doukakis (2011), Nerantzidis (2015) and Nerantzidis and 
Tsamis (2017), who create a similar CG index, in terms of items and rating schemes, for Greek listed 
firms for the same sample periods.  
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Greek CG Code; this resulted in more firms disclosing more CG information, and thus 
higher values for CG indices.  This is also evident from the mandatory CG indices.  
More specifically, the mean (median) of the mandatory penalized CG index rose from 
51% (44%) in the pre-law period to 80% (88%) in the post-law period, while the mean 
(median) of the mandatory non-penalized CG index rose from 69% (78%) in the pre-
law period to 84% (93%) in the post-law period.   
As for the best practice indices, the mean (median) of the best practice penalized CG 
index is 18% (17%) in the pre-law period and 53% (53%) in the post-law period.  The 
best practice non-penalized CG index has a mean (median) of 38% (38%) and 62% 
(64%) in the pre and post-law periods respectively.  More sample firms disclose that 
they comply with best practice corporate governance items in 2010/2012 compared to 
2006/2008 as a result of implementing the voluntary, best practice corporate 
governance items suggested by the Greek CG Code created by the Hellenic Federation 
of Industries in 2010.    
The differences in the scores of the all the CG indices between the pre-law and post-
law periods are reported in Table 5-1.  For all CG index categories, the differences in 
the mean and median scores between the two periods are significantly different at the 
1% level. 
5.2.3 Descriptive statistics for Earnings Management 
Discretionary accruals – Modified Jones Model 
Discretionary accruals estimated using the Modified Jones Model, as seen in Table 5-1 
has a mean (median) of 0.07 (0.04) in the pooled sample, with a minimum value of 0.00 
and a maximum value of 0.50.  More specifically, in the pre-law period the mean 
(median) is 0.08 (0.05) and in the post-law period it is 0.07 (0.04).67   
                                                 
67 These findings are in line with Bekiris and Doukakis (2011), Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012), 
Dimitropoulos et al. (2013) and Tsipouridou and Spathis (2014) for the pre-law period sample. 
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Examining the differences among the pre and post-law periods, there are insignificant 
differences in the mean values between the two periods and a significant difference at 
the 10% level between the median values of the two periods.   
Abnormal working capital accruals – DeFond and Park Model 
The mean (median) values of abnormal working capital accruals, using the DeFond and 
Park model, are 0.07 (0.04) for the pooled sample, ranging from 0.00 to a maximum 
value of 0.45.  The mean (median) values in the pre and post-law periods are 0.07 (0.04) 
and 0.07 (0.04) respectively, indicating almost no changes in abnormal working capital 
accruals between the two periods.  Indeed, there are no significant differences in the 
mean and median values between the years, as seen in Table 5-1. 
5.2.4 Descriptive statistics for Control Variables 
This study employs six control variables consisting of ownership concentration, total 
assets, leverage, the absolute net income, the absolute change in earnings and sales 
growth. 
Ownership concentration 
The mean (median) of ownership concentration is 40% (36%) in the pre-law period and 
41% (36%) in the post-law period. This indicates that the dispersion of ownership has 
not changed significantly between the two periods, which is also evident from the 
insignificant differences observed in the mean and median values of ownership 
concentration between the pre and post law periods.68  The high levels of ownership 
concentration illustrates the fact that a few large shareholders control management and 
competition for control is relatively low (La Porta et al., 1999; Spanos et al., 2008; 
Nerantzidis and Tsamis, 2017). 
 
 
                                                 
68 Results are in line with Nerantzidis and Tsamis (2017). 
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Total assets 
Total assets, as an indicator of size, and measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets, has a mean (median) score of 11.75 (11.66) in the pooled sample. In the pre-law 
period the mean (median) is 11.80 (11.71) and in the post-law period 11.71 (11.60).  No 
significant differences are observed between the mean and median scores of the pre and 
post-law period samples.69   
Leverage 
As for leverage, it greatly increased from a mean (median) of 31% (32%) in the pre-
law period to 40% (40%) in the post-law period, while the pooled sample shows a mean 
(median) of 36% (35%).70  Significant differences are observed in both the mean and 
median, at the 1% level, between the pre and post-law periods.  This is expected due to 
the sovereign debt crisis in Greece during the post-law period.71   
Absolute net income 
The mean (median) absolute net income of the pooled sample is 0.07 (0.04) with a 
minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 0.61.  The pre-law period has a mean 
(median) of 0.06 (0.03) and the post-law period has a mean (median) of 0.08 (0.04), 
with significant differences, at the 1% level, in the mean and median scores between 
the two periods, as expected due to the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.72   
Absolute change in earnings 
The mean (median) score of changes in net income, in absolute terms, for the pooled 
sample is 0.04 (0.02), with a minimum value of 0.00 and a maximum value of 0.60.  In 
the pre-law period the mean (median) is 0.04 (0.02) and in the post-law period it is 0.05 
(0.02).  This is also observed in the significant differences in the mean (at the 5% level) 
                                                 
69 Results are in line with Bekiris and Doukakis (2011), Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012) and 
Dimitropoulos et al. (2013). 
70 These findings are in line with Bekiris and Doukakis (2011), Tsipouridou and Spathis (2012) and 
Nerantzidis and Tsamis (2017). 
71 For more information on the sovereign debt crisis in Greece consult Chapter 6, section 6.2.  
72 These findings are in line with Bekiris and Doukakis (2011) and Bekiris (2013), and Tsipouridou and 
Spathis (2014). 
Chapter 5- Data Analysis and Discussion (CG & EM) 
 
143 
 
and the median (at the 1% level) between the pre and post-law periods.  This indicates 
greater fluctuations of net income between 2009 and 2012 than between 2005 and 2008, 
as expected due to the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.   
Sales growth 
The mean (median) score of sales growth for the pooled sample is 1% (1%), with a 
minimum value of -73% and a maximum value of 106%.  Sales growth decreased 
significantly from a mean (median) of 12% (8%) in the pre-law period to -8% (-8%) in 
the post-law period.  Significant differences, at the 1% level, in the mean and median 
scores are evident between both periods.  This large decrease in sales is the result of the 
sovereign debt crisis in Greece at the time. 73   
5.2.5 Descriptive statistics for Instruments 
Prior year net income 
The mean (median) score of prior year’s net income for the pooled sample is -0.01 
(0.01), ranging from a minimum score of -0.26 to a maximum score of 0.17.  More 
specifically the mean (median) scores for the pre-law period is 0.02 (0.02) and for the 
post-law period is -0.03 (-0.01).  This can also be observed from the significant 
differences in both the mean and median scores, at the 1% level, between the two 
periods.  The decrease in net income between the two periods is the result of the 
sovereign debt crisis in the country during the period under study. 
Powerful CEO 
Powerful CEO is estimated as the percentage share ownership held by the CEO.  The 
percentage of CEO ownership did not change significantly from 2006 to 2012, as is 
evident from the insignificant differences in the mean and median scores across the two 
periods.  More specifically, the mean (median) of CEO share ownership is 17% (8%) 
                                                 
73 Results are in line with Dimitropoulos et al. (2013). 
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and 17% (7%) for the pre and post-law periods respectively, while the mean (median) 
scores for the pooled sample is 17% (7%), as observed in Table 5-1.  
Audit firm 
The proportion of Greek listed firm in the pooled sample employing an auditor from a 
Big Four auditing firm is 21% on average. More specifically in the pre-law period, the 
mean (median) score is 0.20 (0.00), while in the post-law period it is 0.22 (0.00), with 
the differences being insignificant.   
5.3 Correlation coefficients 
In this section, the bivariate correlations among the variables is examined using the 
Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients.74   
Model # 1 (H1) 
Table 5-2 shows the bivariate correlations between audit committee variables and 
discretionary accruals pertaining to H1.  No significant correlations exist between the 
discretionary accruals and audit committee variables and the signs of the correlation 
coefficient between these two variables are both positive and negative, therefore no 
initial conclusion can be reached relating to the effect of audit committee variables on 
discretionary accruals.  No correlation coefficients values are high enough in this model 
to suggest future multicollinearity issues in the regressions that could potentially affect 
the interpretation of the results. 
 
                                                 
74 Both the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients are examined since for some variables 
the null hypothesis of normality is rejected, but other variables are considered normal, and therefore both 
parametric tests, focusing on mean values, and non-parametric tests, focusing on median values, are 
applied. 
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Table 5-2 Pearson product moment correlation coefficient (right) Spearman rank-order correlation (left) – Model 1 
 
EM 
 
AWCA 
 
acexist 
 
ace weighace acindep 
 
ownconc 
 
ta 
 
lev 
 
absni 
 
absearn 
 
salesgrowth 
 
nip pshare auditfirm 
EM  0.652*** n/a 0.015 0.014 0.038 -0.019 -0.237*** 0.028 0.248*** 0.240*** -0.003 -0.147*** 0.036 -0.107** 
AWCA 
 
0.623***  n/a 0.027 0.046 0.025 -0.012 -0.236*** 0.135*** 0.234*** 0.249*** -0.011 -0.189*** 0.060 -0.077 
acexist 
 
n/a n/a  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
ace -0.041 -0.016 n/a  0.665*** -0.053 0.053 0.113** 0.060 -0.045 -0.075 -0.055 0.002 0.018 0.104** 
weighace -0.024 0.004 n/a 0.645***  0.002 0.047 0.128** 0.133*** -0.002 -0.005 -0.010* -0.129** -0.014 0.200*** 
acindep 
 
0.023 0.049 n/a -0.011 0.020  -0.007 -0.135*** -0.012 0.060 0.031 -0.027 -0.063 0.042 -0.078 
ownconc 
 
0.005 0.006 n/a 0.047 0.033 -0.025  0.067 -0.072 -0.031 -0.101* 0.078 0.068 0.117** 0.159*** 
ta 
 
-0.300*** -0.234*** n/a 0.128** 0.117** -0.103** 0.111**  0.010 -0.084 -0.115** 0.211*** 0.328*** -0.331*** 0.411*** 
lev 
 
0.012 0.083 n/a 0.066 0.127** -0.048 -0.076 0.069  0.316*** 0.272*** -0.153*** -0.517*** 0.001 0.039 
absni 
 
 
0.240*** 0.146*** n/a -0.032 -0.032 -0.002 -0.054 -0.069 0.214***  0.595*** -0.218*** -0.339*** -0.048 -0.074 
absearn 0.220*** 0.223*** n/a -0.061 -0.057 -0.020 -0.054 -0.110** 0.173*** 0.475***  -0.198*** -0.384*** -0.054 -0.047 
salesgrowth 
 
-0.079 -0.034 n/a -0.045 -0.085* -0.061 0.104** 0.231*** -0.122** -0.230*** -0.257***  0.300*** -0.090 0.125** 
nip -0.122** -0.148*** n/a 0.010 -0.106** 0.025 0.120** 0.276*** -0..480*** -0.372*** -0.314*** 0.324***  -0.023 0.067 
pshare 0.083 0.065 n/a -0.023 -0.037 0.084 -0.041 -0.388*** -0.016 -0.025 -0.038 -0.107** -0.051  -0.275*** 
auditfirm -0.154*** -0.113** n/a 0.104** 0.199*** -0.086* 0.133*** 0.379*** 0.046 -0.060 -0.037 0.136*** 0.061 -0.319***  
Variables: EM discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model; AWCA abnormal working capital accruals using the DeFond and Park (2001) model; acexist audit committee existence; acindep audit committee independence; ace audit 
committee effectiveness; weighace weighted audit committee effectiveness; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; absni absolute value of current earnings; absearn absolute value of changes in earnings; salesgrowth changes 
in sales from prior year; nip prior year’s net income; pshare powerful CEO; auditfirm external auditor is one of the Big Four audit firms 
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10%  
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Model # 2 (H2) 
Table 5-3 examines the correlation coefficients between discretionary accruals and 
corporate governance indices.  Significant negative correlations exist between 
discretionary accruals and the corporate governance indices using the Modified Jones 
model (EM).  More specifically, as per the Pearson product moment correlation, a 
negative correlation of -6.3%, at the 10% level, is seen with the mandatory non-
penalized CG index.  Additionally, as per the Spearman rank-order correlation a 
negative correlation of approximately -7% is seen with the total penalized CG index, 
the best practice penalized CG index, the total non-penalized CG index and the best 
practice non-penalized CG index, at the 5% and 10% levels respectively.   
These correlations suggest that good CG proxied by governance index levels may 
constrain earnings management, in line with H2.   
Very high correlations, at the 1% significance level, as expected, are evident between 
all of the CG indices (ranging from 33% to 96%), so these independent variables will 
not be used simultaneously in the same regression but will be implemented in separate 
regressions, so as to avoid multicollinearity issues that may affect the interpretation of 
the results. 
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Table 5-3 Pearson product moment correlation coefficient (right) Spearman rank-order correlation (left) – Model 2 
 EM 
 
AWCA 
 
cgpentotal cgpenmand cgpenbp cgnontotal cgnonmand cgnonbp ownconc 
 
ta 
 
lev 
 
absni 
 
absearn 
 
salesgrowth 
 
nip 
pshare auditfirm 
EM 
 0.653*** -0.058 -0.003 -0.051 -0.052 -0.063* -0.043 -0.014 -0.226*** 0.042 0.291*** 0.336*** -0.014 -0.104*** 0.043 -0.098*** 
AWCA  
 
0.620***  -0.046 0.002 -0.048 -0.039 0.055 -0.046 0.012 -0.228*** 0.081** 0.305*** 0.377*** -0.034 -0.168*** 0.045 -0.068* 
cgpentotal 
-0.067* -0.041  0.707*** 0.947*** 0.930*** 0.346*** 0.885*** -0.028 0.066* 0.111*** 0.045 -0.011 -0.218*** -0.218*** -0.069* 0.066* 
cgpenmand 
0.011 0.008 0.745***  0.545*** 0.700*** 0.673*** 0.555*** -0.035 -0.039 0.056 0.045 -0.008 -0.166*** -0.158*** -0.008 -0.027 
cgpenbp 
-0.062* -0.041 0.960*** 0.641***  0.855*** 0.257*** 0.909*** -0.021 0.103*** 0.126*** 0.040 -0.011 -0.190*** -0.200*** -0.096*** 0.108*** 
cgnontotal 
-0.076** -0.053 0.942*** 0.702*** 0.921***  0.330*** 0.934*** -0.025 0.096*** 0.089** 0.023 -0.036 -0.163*** -0.189*** -0.119*** 0.102*** 
cgnonmand 
0.010 0.031 0.668*** 0.835*** 0.591*** 0.633***  0.262*** -0.028 -0.061* 0.029 0.072** 0.021 -0.087** -0.089** -0.024 -0.016 
cgnonbp 
-0.068* -0.055 0.890*** 0.602*** 0.943*** 0.951*** 0.534***  -0.035 0.150*** 0.101*** 0.027 -0.020 -0.145*** -0.150*** -0.167*** 0.147*** 
ownconc 
 
-0.006 0.035 -0.021 -0.035 -0.003 -0.036 -0.026 -0.033  0.080** -0.042 -0.012 -0.011 0.068* 0.046 0.131*** 0.174*** 
ta 
 
-0.277*** -0.188*** 0.061* -0.004 0.105*** 0.089** -0.020 0.144*** 0.104***  0.091** -0.088** -0.103*** 0.189*** 0.275*** -0.326*** 0.436*** 
lev 
 
-0.001 0.043 0.105*** 0.033 0.124*** 0.096*** 0.064* 0.104*** -0.041 0.155***  0.225*** 0.161*** -0.111*** -0.421*** -0.037 0.040 
absni 
 
 
0.148*** 0.124*** 0.047 0.020 0.046 0.043 0.060* 0.033 -0.14 -0.048 0.075**  0.705*** -0.295*** -0.296*** -0.025 -0.043 
absearn 
 
0.207*** 0.221*** 0.054 0.042 0.053 0.041 0.056 0.040 -0.007 -0.033 0.115*** 0.427***  -0.270*** -0.309*** -0.051 -0.022 
salesgrowth -0.032 -0.025 -0.256*** -0.185*** -0.237*** -0.219*** -0.217*** -0.193*** 0.077** 0.185*** -0.102*** -0.230*** -0.254***  0.298*** -0.040 0.073** 
nip -0.042 -0.078** -0.251*** -0.161*** -0.229*** -0.241*** -0.207*** -0.196*** 0.094** 0.227*** -0.349*** -0.168*** -0.226*** 0.346***  0.017 0.087** 
pshare 0.086** 0.059 -0.078** -0.008 -0.114*** -0.116*** -0.023 -0.159*** 0.007 -0.370*** -0.064* -0.028 -0.082** -0.032 -0.000  -0.257*** 
auditfirm -0.129*** -0.083** 0.070* -0.002 0.111*** 0.100*** 0.025 0.146*** 0.155*** 0.399*** 0.056 0.006 0.041 0.067* 0.079** -0.287***  
Variables: EM discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model; AWCA abnormal working capital accruals using the DeFond and Park (2001) model; cgpentotal penalized total CG index; cgpenmand penalized mandatory CG index; cgpenbp penalized 
best practice CG index; cgnontotal non-penalized total CG index; cgnonmand non-penalized mandatory CG index; cgnonbp non-penalized best practice CG index; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; absni absolute value of 
current earnings; absearn absolute value of changes in earnings; salesgrowth changes in sales from prior year; nip prior year’s net income; pshare powerful CEO; auditfirm external auditor is one of the Big Four audit firms 
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10%;  
Chapter 5- Data Analysis and Discussion (CG & EM) 
 
148 
 
5.4 Multivariate analysis 
5.4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the research design section of Chapter 4, GMM is utilized in this study.  
Various instruments are included in the regressions to deal with endogeneity issues.  
Discussion of results are specified for each model separately.   
5.4.2 Results – H1  
This section provides analysis and discussion of H1 examining the effect of audit 
committee effectiveness on EM, before and after the implementation of the governance 
law pertaining to the mandatory existence of an audit committee for all Greek listed 
firms.  Audit committee effectiveness (ace) incorporates the synergies of audit 
committees created from the simultaneous use of various audit committee 
characteristics, such as audit committee size, audit committee independence, audit 
committee meetings and audit committee expertise.  This study, as discussed in chapter 
4, utilizes weighted ace (weighace) since no firms had an ace of 1 in 2006 and 2008.  
Additionally, in order to investigate how the audit committee law of 2008 influenced 
audit committee effectiveness and earnings management, a year dummy variable is 
used in the analysis.  It is expected that firms that have greater levels of weighace 
engage in less EM, a relationship that is expected to intensify after the implementation 
of the 2008 governance law. 
Discretionary accruals – Modified Jones model 
Table 5-4 reports the results of the regression model, which examines the impact of the 
composite measure of audit committee effectiveness, weighace, on EM, and therefore 
tests H1.  The p-value of the J statistic ranges from 0.0682 in the pre-law period sample 
to 0.1385 in the pooled sample, indicating that the residuals are uncorrelated with the 
chosen instruments.75 
                                                 
75 The assumption that the instruments are not correlated with the error term in the equation of interest 
is testable through the J-Statistic. It is based on the observation that the residuals should be 
uncorrelated with the set of exogenous variables if the instruments are truly exogenous. This statistic 
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Although a significant positive relationship, at the 1% level, between weighace and EM 
exists in the post-law period sample (+0.071), a significant negative relationship, at the 
1% level, is observed in the pooled sample (-0.349), in line with H1.  However, when 
examining weighace with the interaction year dummy variable and its effect on EM 
(+0.292), a significant positive relationship at the 5% level is observed.  This result is 
contrary to H1. 
Control Variables 
A significant negative relationship, at the 1% level, is seen between EM and firm size 
for the pre-law (-0.011) and post-law periods (-0.019), indicating that larger firms 
conduct less EM.   
Turning to the effect of leverage on EM, different results are observed between the pre-
law and post-law periods.  For the pre-law period, a significant positive relationship 
(+0.036), at the 10% level, exists between the two variables, while in the post-law 
period sample a significant negative relationship (-0.068), at the 1% level, exists 
between EM and leverage.   Thus, in the period before the implementation of the 2008 
governance law, highly leveraged firms conduct more EM, while after the 2008 
governance law, highly leveraged firms conduct less EM. 
A significant positive relationship at the 1% level is evident between both the absolute 
level of earnings and the absolute value of changes in earnings and EM, for the pre-law 
period (+0.454), for the post-law period (+0.241/+0.239) and for the pooled sample 
(0.341).  Hence, firms that have higher absolute values of earnings or higher absolute 
values of changes in earnings perform more EM.76  
Finally, a significant positive relationship at the 1% and 10% levels is evident between 
sales growth and EM, for the pre-law period (+0.040), for the post-law period (+0.034) 
                                                 
will be asymptotically chi-squared with m − k degrees of freedom under the null that the error term is 
uncorrelated with the instruments (Hayashi, 2000: p217-221).  If the p-value of the J statistic is greater 
than 0.05 we cannot reject the null hypothesis that residuals are uncorrelated with the chosen 
instruments. 
76 When running the regressions with signed values for earnings (ni) and changes in earnings (earn), 
there is a significant negative effect of earnings and changes in earnings on EM (see Appendix III).  
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and for the pooled sample (+0.028), indicating that firms that have higher sales growth 
engage in higher levels of EM. 
Insignificant results are observed between ownership concentration and EM. 
In summary, using the Modified Jones model to measure EM, a statistically significant 
positive relationship is seen between EM and the absolute level of earnings, the absolute 
value of changes in earnings and sales growth, while a statistically significant negative 
relationship is seen between EM and weighace and firm size.77  
Abnormal working capital accruals – DeFond and Park (2001) model 
Table 5-4 reports the results of the regression model, which examines the impact of the 
composite measure of audit committee effectiveness, weighace, on AWCA, which tests 
H1.  The p-value of the J statistic ranges from 0.0828 in the post-law period sample to 
0.1386 in the pooled sample, indicating that the residuals are uncorrelated with the 
chosen instruments.  
A significant positive relationship, at the 1% level, between weighace and AWCA 
exists in the post-law period sample (+0.032).  This result is contrary to H1.  However, 
a significant negative relationship, at the 5% level, is observed in the pooled sample (-
0.323), in line with H1.  When looking at weighace with the interaction year dummy 
variable and its effect on AWCA, a significant positive relationship at the 5% level is 
observed (+0.296), a result that again is contrary to H1. 
Control Variables 
A significantly negative relationship, at the 1% level, is seen between AWCA and firm 
size for the pre-law (-0.012) and the post-law periods (-0.012), indicating that larger 
firms have less AWCA.   
                                                 
77 Similar results for all variables are observed when performing regressions using signed earnings (ni) 
and change in earnings (earn), instead of absolute values (see Appendix III). 
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Looking at the effect of leverage on AWCA, a significantly positive relationship, at the 
1% level, exists between the two variables for the pre-law period (+0.059), indicating 
that highly leveraged firms have more AWCA in that period.   
A significant positive relationship at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is evident between 
both the absolute level of earnings and the absolute value of changes in earnings and 
AWCA, for the pre-law period (+0.082/+0.040), for the post-law period 
(+0.066/+0.239) and for the pooled sample (+0.246/+0.150).  Therefore, firms that have 
higher absolute values of earnings or higher absolute values of changes in earnings have 
more AWCA.78  
Finally, a significant positive relationship at the 1% and 5% levels is evident between 
sales growth and AWCA, for the pre-law period (+0.042), the post-law period (+0.024) 
and the pooled sample (+0.028).  This indicates that firms that have higher sales growth 
have higher levels of AWCA. 
Insignificant results are observed between ownership concentration and AWCA. 
In summary, using the DeFond and Park (2001) model to measure AWCA, a 
statistically significant positive relationship is seen between AWCA and leverage, the 
absolute level of earnings, the absolute value of changes in earnings and sales growth, 
while a statistically significant negative relationship is seen between AWCA and 
weighace and firm size.79   
                                                 
78 Similar to the Modified Jones model, in this model when signed values for earnings (ni) and changes 
in earnings (earn) is used, there is a significant negative effect of earnings and changes in earnings on 
AWCA (see Appendix III).   
79 Similar results for all variables are observed when performing regressions using signed earnings (ni) 
and change in earnings (earn), instead of absolute values (see Appendix III). 
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Table 5-4 Audit Committee Effectiveness and Earnings Management – Model 1 
 Modified Jones model DeFond and Park (2001) model 
 Pre-Law Period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law Period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled Sample Pre-Law Period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law Period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled Sample 
Variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
weighase -0.001 
(-0.185) 
0.071 
(9.754)*** 
-0.349 
(-2.600)*** 
0.005 
(1.048) 
0.032 
(6.195)*** 
-0.323 
(-2.402)** 
ownconc -0.007 
(-0.507) 
-0.009 
(-0.479) 
-0.022 
(-0.811) 
0.006 
(0.559) 
0.006 
(0.443) 
-0.004 
(-0.199) 
ta -0.011 
(-5.855)*** 
-0.019 
(-6.394)*** 
0.000 
(0.047) 
-0.012 
(-7.265)*** 
-0.012 
(-5.359)*** 
-0.002 
(-0.577) 
lev 0.036 
(1.9112)* 
-0.068 
(-4.516)*** 
-0.008 
(-0.226) 
0.059 
(3.833)*** 
-0.009 
(-0.752) 
-0.015 
(-0.728) 
absni 0.017 
(0.640) 
0.241 
(5.968)*** 
0.341 
(4.354)*** 
0.082 
(2.032)** 
0.066 
(1.828)* 
0.246 
(3.456)*** 
absearn 0.454 
(7.914)*** 
0.239 
(4.118)*** 
0.049 
(0.614) 
0.040 
(5.111)*** 
0.239 
(3.534)*** 
0.150 
(1.665)* 
salesgrowth 0.040 
(3.854)*** 
0.034 
(1.876)* 
0.028 
(1.660)* 
0.042 
(4.116)*** 
0.024 
(2.210)** 
0.028 
(2.174)** 
dummy   0.061 
(1.906)* 
  0.011 
(0.311) 
dummy*weighase   0.292 
(2.356)** 
  0.296 
(2.491)** 
J-statistic 0.0682 0.0734 0.1385 0.1058 0.0828 0.1386 
N 392 371 763 392 371 763 
Variables: EM discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model; AWCA abnormal working capital accruals using the DeFond and Park (2001) model; weighace weighted audit committee 
effectiveness; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; absni absolute value of current earnings; absearn absolute value of changes in earnings; salesgrowth changes in sales 
from prior year; dummy an indicator variable where 1 is for 2010/2012 and 0 for 2006/2008. 
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
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5.4.3 Results – H2 
This section presents the findings relating to H2, about the effect of the corporate 
governance index on EM before and after the implementation of the 2008 governance 
law concerning the mandatory existence of audit committees for Greek listed firms.  It 
is expected that firms with higher levels of CG indices will have less EM.  The CG 
index is examined with all items included in the index and it is also examined including 
only mandatory items included in Greek law, as well as the best practice items 
suggested by the Hellenic Federation of Industries in 2010.  Hence eight regressions 
are run, four for the penalized CG index and four for the non-penalized index.  All 
results are reported in Table 5-5 and Table 5-6.  
Discretionary accruals – Modified Jones model 
Penalized CG indices 
The p-value of the J statistic ranges from 0.0719 in the post-law period sample of total 
CG index to 0.1426 in the post-law period sample of mandatory/best practice CG 
indices, indicating that the residuals are uncorrelated with the chosen instruments. 
Examining the effect of the total CG index on EM, a significant negative relationship, 
at the 1% level is seen in the pre-law period (-0.194)80 and pooled sample (-0.523), in 
line with H2, whereby higher CG index scores result in less EM.  However, in the post-
law sample, a significant positive relationship (+0.285), at the 1% level, exists between 
the total CG index and EM.  This is contrary to H2.  This contradictory result is also 
seen when examining the total CG index with the interaction year dummy variable and 
its effect on EM.  These two variables have a significant positive relationship (+0.325), 
at the 10% level.   
When examining the CG indices that include mandatory and best practice items, the 
following results are observed.  When examining the effect of the mandatory CG index, 
                                                 
80 As seen in Appendix IV, when running the regressions using signed values for earnings (ni) and change 
in earnings (earn), in the pre-law sample a significant positive relationship between the total penalized 
CG index and EM is observed.  All other tests examining CG and EM have similar results with tests run 
that use absolute values for earnings (absni) and change of earnings (absearn).   
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similar results are seen as those with the CG total index.  More specifically, a significant 
negative relationship, at the 1% level, is seen in the pre-law period (-0.146) and pooled 
sample (-0.127), in line with H2, whereby higher mandatory CG index scores result in 
less EM.  However, in the post-law sample, a significant positive relationship (+0.085), 
at the 1% level, exists between the mandatory CG index and EM.  This is contrary to 
H2.  This positive relationship also exists when examining the effect of the mandatory 
CG index with the interaction year dummy variable on EM (+0.187).   
As for the best practice CG index and its effect on EM, a positive relationship at the 1% 
and 5% levels is seen in the pre-law period (+0.102), the post-law period (+0.049) and 
pooled sample (+0.663).   Conversely, when examining the best practice CG index with 
the interaction year dummy variable and its effect on EM, a significant negative 
relationship (-0.682), at the 1% level, is observed.  This result is in line with H2, 
whereby firms, in the years after the implementation of the 2008 governance law, that 
have higher CG scores concerning best practice governance items have less EM.   
Control Variables 
A significant positive relationship, at the 5% level, in the post-law period sample 
(+0.036) is observed between ownership concentration and EM, in the regression with 
the total CG index.  This result suggests that firms that have higher ownership 
concentration conduct higher levels of EM.   
A significant negative relationship, at the 1% level, is seen between EM and firm size 
for the pre-law (-0.010 / -0.015), post-law (-0.014 / -0.012) and pooled samples (-0.008 
/ -0.016), in both regressions involving penalized indices (the total CG index and the 
mandatory/best practice CG indices), thus suggesting that larger firms have less EM. 
A significant positive relationship, at the 10% level, exists between the leverage and 
EM in the pre-law period sample (+0.025) in the regression with the mandatory/best 
practice CG indices.     
A significant positive relationship at the 1% and 10% levels, is evident between both 
the absolute level of earnings and the absolute value of changes in earnings and EM, 
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for the pre-law (+0.072/+0.101), post-law (+0.244/+0.067) and pooled samples 
(+0.167/+0.102), in both regressions involving penalized CG indices.81   
Finally, a significant positive relationship at the 1% and 5% levels is evident between 
sales growth and EM, for the pre-law period (+0.048 / +0.047), the post-law period 
(+0.027) and pooled samples (+0.032 / +0.026), in both regressions involving penalized 
CG indices.   
In summary, using the Modified Jones model to measure EM, a statistically significant 
positive relationship is seen between EM and the total CG index, the mandatory CG 
index, ownership concentration, leverage, the absolute level of earnings, the absolute 
value of changes in earnings and sales growth, while a statistically significant negative 
relationship is seen between EM and the best practice CG index and firm size.   
Non-penalized CG indices 
Table 5-6 reports the results of the regression model which examines the impact of non-
penalized CG indices on EM, and therefore tests H2.  The p-value of the J statistic 
ranges from 0.0850 in the pre-law period sample for the total CG index to 0.1374 in the 
post-law period sample for the mandatory/best practice CG indices, indicating that the 
residuals are uncorrelated with the chosen instruments. 
Examining the effect of the total CG index on EM, a significantly positive relationship, 
at the 1% level, is seen in the post-law sample (+0.220).  This result is contrary to H2, 
since higher CG scores are expected to result in lower EM.   
Similar positive results also exist between the CG scores of the mandatory CG index 
and the best practice CG index and EM, in the post-law period (+0.036 /+0.129) and 
for the pooled samples (+0.230).  However, when examining the best practice CG index 
                                                 
81 When using CG indices to proxy governance quality, as seen in the previous proxies of governance 
quality, when signed values for earnings (ni) and changes in earnings (earn) are used, there is a significant 
negative effect of earnings and changes in earnings on EM (see Appendix IV). 
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with the interaction year dummy variable and its effect on EM, a significant negative 
relationship, at the 10% level, is observed (-0.161).  This result is in line with H2 
whereby firms, in the years after the implementation of the 2008 governance law, that 
have higher CG scores concerning best practice governance items perform less EM.   
Control Variables 
A significant negative relationship, at the 1% level, is seen between EM and firm size 
for the pre-law (-0.013/-0.014), post-law (-0.011/-0.014) and pooled samples (-0.013/-
0.015), in both regressions involving non-penalized indices (the total CG index and the 
mandatory/best practice CG indices), thus suggesting that larger firms have less EM.   
A significant positive relationship, at the 1% and 5% levels, exists between leverage 
and EM in the pre-law period sample (+0.037/+0.041) in all regressions involving non-
penalized CG indices. 
A significant positive relationship, at the 1% level, is observed between both the 
absolute level of earnings and the absolute value of changes in earnings and EM, for 
the pre-law (+0.402 / +0.035 / +0.091 / +0.324), post-law (+0.242 / +0.137 / +0.058 / 
+0.223) and pooled samples (+0.122 / +0.287 / +0.110 / +0.306), in all non-penalized 
CG index regressions.82   
Finally, a significant positive relationship at the 1% level is evident between sales 
growth and EM, for the pre-law period (+0.035/+0.036), the post-law period (+0.028) 
and the pooled samples (+0.029/+0.036), in both regressions. 
Insignificant results are observed between ownership concentration and EM. 
In summary, using the Modified Jones model to measure EM and non-penalized CG 
indices, as a proxy for governance quality, a statistically significant positive 
relationship is seen between EM and the total CG index, the mandatory CG index, 
                                                 
82 Similar to the case of penalized CG indices, when signed values for earnings (ni) and changes in 
earnings (earn) are used, there is a significant negative effect of earnings and changes in earnings on EM 
(see Appendix V). 
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leverage, the absolute level of earnings, the absolute value of changes in earnings and 
sales growth.   However, a statistically significant negative relationship is seen between 
EM and the best practice CG index and firm size.   
Abnormal working capital accruals – DeFond and Park (2001) model 
Penalized CG index 
Table 5-5 reports the results of the regression model which examines the impact of 
penalized CG indices on AWCA, and therefore tests H2.  The p-value of the J statistic 
ranges from 0.0674 in the post-law period sample of the total CG index to 0.1447 in the 
pooled sample of mandatory/best practice CG indices, indicating that the residuals are 
uncorrelated with the chosen instruments. 
In the pre-law period (-0.124) and for the pooled sample (-0.436) a significant negative 
relationship, at the 1% level, exists between the total CG index and AWCA, in line with 
H2, whereby higher CG index scores result in less AWCA.  However, when examining 
the total CG index with the interaction year dummy variable and its effect on AWCA, 
a significant positive relationship (+0.339), at the 5% level, is observed between the 
two variables. 
CG indices that include mandatory and best practice items have a similar effect on 
AWCA as the CG total index.  More specifically, a significant negative relationship, at 
the 1% level, is seen in the pre-law period (-0.017), post-law period (-0.053) and pooled 
samples (-0.111), between the mandatory CG index and AWCA, in line with H2, 
whereby higher mandatory CG index scores are expected to result in less AWCA.  
Similarly, in the post-law period sample (-0.120), the best practice CG index and 
AWCA display a negative relationship, significant at the 1% level.  However, as in the 
total CG index, when examining the effect of the mandatory CG index with the 
interaction dummy year variable on AWCA, a significant positive relationship 
(+0.137), at the 1% level, is seen.83   
                                                 
83 Similar to the Modified Jones model, when running the regressions using signed values for earnings 
(ni) and changes in earnings (earn), in the pre-law sample a significant positive relationship between the 
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Control Variables 
A significant negative relationship, at the 1% level, is seen between AWCA and firm 
size for the pre-law (-0.009/-0.011) and post-law periods (-0.008/-0.008) and for the 
pooled sample (-0.008/-0.011), in both regressions involving penalized indices (the 
total CG index and the mandatory/best practice CG indices), thus suggesting that larger 
firms have less AWCA. 
A significant positive relationship, at the 1% level, exists between leverage and AWCA 
in the pre-law (+0.036) and post-law periods (+0.021) in the regression with the 
mandatory/best practice CG indices.  In the total CG index regression, leverage and 
AWCA have a significant positive relationship, at the 5% level, in the pre-law period 
(+0.038).     
A significant positive relationship, at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, is evident between 
both the absolute level of earnings and the absolute value of changes in earnings and 
AWCA, for the pre-law period (+0.093 / +0.311 / +0.181 / +0.237), the post-law period 
(+0.058 / +0.149 / +0.302) and the pooled samples (+0.105 / +0.253 / 0.070 / +0.308), 
in both regressions involving penalized CG indices.84   
Finally, a significant positive relationship at the 1% and 5% levels is evident between 
sales growth and AWCA, for the pre-law period (+0.048/+0.049), the post-law period 
(+0.015) and the pooled samples (+0.028/+0.030), in both regressions involving 
penalized CG indices.   
Insignificant results are observed between ownership concentration and AWCA. 
In summary, using the DeFond and Park (2001) model to calculate AWCA, a 
statistically significant negative relationship is seen between AWCA and the total CG 
index, the mandatory CG index, the best practice CG index and firm size.  On the other 
                                                 
total penalized CG index and the penalized mandatory CG index and AWCA is observed.  All other tests 
examining CG and AWCA have similar results with tests run that use absolute values for earnings (absni) 
and change of earnings (absearn) (see Appendix IV). 
84 Similar to the Modified Jones model, when signed values for earnings (ni) and changes in earnings 
(earn) are used, there is a significant negative effect of earnings and changes in earnings on AWCA. 
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hand, a statistically significant positive relationship is seen between AWCA and 
leverage, the absolute level of earnings, the absolute value of changes in earnings and 
sales growth.  
Non-penalized CG index 
Table 5-6 reports the results of the regression model which examines the impact of non-
penalized CG indices on AWCA, and therefore tests H2.  The p-value of the J statistic 
ranges from 0.0792 in the pre-law period sample for the total CG index to 0.1395 in the 
post-law period sample for the mandatory/best practice CG indices, indicating that the 
residuals are uncorrelated with the chosen instruments. 
Examining the effect of the total CG index on AWCA, a significant positive 
relationship, at the 5% level, is seen in the post-law sample (+0.053).  This result is 
contrary to H2, since higher CG scores are expected to result in lower AWCA.  
Similarly, when examining the effect of the total CG index with the interaction year 
dummy variable on AWCA, a statistically significant positive relationship (+0.370) at 
the 1% level is seen. 
Similar positive results also exist between the CG scores of the mandatory CG index 
and the best practice CG index and AWCA, in the pre-law period (+0.016) and pooled 
samples (+0.216) respectively.  However, when examining the best practice CG index 
with AWCA in the post-law period, a significant negative relationship (-0.030), at the 
5% level, is observed.  This result is in line with H2, whereby firms in the years after 
the implementation of the 2008 governance law, that have higher CG scores concerning 
best practice governance items are expected to have less AWCA.  This statistically 
significant negative relationship is also seen when examining the effect of the best 
practice CG index with the interaction year dummy variable on AWCA (-0.161), in line 
with H2.   
Control Variables 
For both regressions involving non-penalized CG indices (the total and the 
mandatory/best practice indices), there is a significant positive relationship, at the 1% 
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and 5% levels, between ownership concentration and AWCA, in the pre-law period 
(+0.024) and pooled samples (+0.032/+0.020). 
A significant negative relationship, at the 1% level, is seen between AWCA and firm 
size for the pre-law (-0.011/-0.010), the post-law (-0.009 /-0.010) and the pooled 
samples (-0.014/-0.013), in both regressions involving non-penalized indices (the total 
CG index and the mandatory/best practice CG indices), thus suggesting that larger firms 
have less AWCA.   
A significant positive relationship, at the 1% level, exists between leverage and AWCA 
in the pre-law period sample (+0.055/+0.051) in both regressions involving the non-
penalized CG indices, and in the post-law period sample (+0.024) in the regressions 
involving the mandatory/best practice CG indices. 
A significant positive relationship, at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, is observed between 
both the absolute level of earnings and the absolute value of changes in earnings and 
AWCA, for the pre-law period (+0.076 / +0.314 / +0.164 / +0.247), the post-law period 
(+0.069 / +0.132 / +0.369) and the pooled samples (+0.060 / +0.377 / +0.063 / +0.343), 
in both non-penalized CG index regressions.85   
Finally, a significant positive relationship, at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, is evident 
between sales growth and AWCA, for the pre-law period (+0.033 / +0.035), the post-
law period (+0.015) and the pooled samples (+0.027 / +0.029), in both regressions. 
In summary, using the DeFond and Park model (2001) to measure AWCA and non-
penalized CG indices, a statistically significant positive relationship is seen between 
AWCA and the total CG index, the mandatory CG index, ownership concentration, 
leverage, the absolute level of earnings, the absolute value of changes in earnings and 
sales growth.  However, a statistically significant negative relationship is seen between 
AWCA and the best practice CG index and firm size.  
                                                 
85 Similar to the penalized-CG indices, when signed values for earnings (ni) and changes in earnings 
(earn) are used, there is a significant negative effect of earnings and changes in earnings on AWCA (see 
Appendix V). 
. 
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Table 5-5 Penalized CG Indices and Earnings Management – Model 2 
 Modified Jones model DeFond and Park (2001) model  Modified Jones model DeFond and Park (2001) model 
 Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
 Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
Pre-Law period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
cgpentotal -0.194 
(-4.117)*** 
0.285 
(4.944)*** 
-0.523 
(-2.757)*** 
-0.124 
(-2.491)** 
-0.039 
(-0.813) 
-0.436 
(-2.239)** 
cgpenmand -0.146 
(-7.139)*** 
0.085 
(10.414)*** 
-0.127 
(-3.875)*** 
-0.071 
(-2.962)*** 
-0.053 
(-5.417)*** 
-0.111 
(-4.577)*** 
       cgpenbp 0.102 
(2.065)** 
0.049 
(3.492)*** 
0.663 
(2.482)** 
-0.025 
(-0.407) 
-0.120 
(-8.872)*** 
0.146 
(0.830) 
ownconc -0.015 
(-1.123) 
0.036 
(2.231)** 
-0.021 
(-1.209) 
0.003 
(0.238) 
0.010 
(0.823) 
-0.005 
(-0.322) 
ownconc -0.013 
(-1.162) 
0.004 
(0.428) 
0.001 
(0.076) 
0.004 
(0.451) 
0.003 
(0.322) 
0.006 
(0.709) 
ta -0.010 
(-5.139)*** 
-0.014 
(-6.575)*** 
-0.008 
(-3.699)*** 
-0.009 
(-5.197)*** 
-0.008 
(-4.981)*** 
-0.008 
(-3.905)*** 
ta -0.015 
(-9.082)*** 
-0.012 
(-9.970)*** 
-0.016 
(-7.313)*** 
-0.011 
(-7.300)*** 
-0.008 
(-5.739)*** 
-0.011 
(-6.873)*** 
lev 0.016 
(0.881) 
-0.011 
(-0.842) 
-0.003 
(-0.148) 
0.038 
(2.054)** 
0.012 
(1.213) 
0.003 
(0.209) 
lev 0.025 
(1.789)* 
-0.011 
(-1.333) 
-0.002 
(-0.140) 
0.036 
(2.746)*** 
0.021 
(2.608)*** 
0.007 
(0.706) 
absni 0.072 
(1.675)* 
0.244 
(6.888)*** 
0.167 
(3.775)*** 
0.093 
(2.419)** 
0.058 
(1.804)* 
0.105 
(2.221)** 
absni 0.101 
(3.331)*** 
0.067 
(9.123)*** 
0.102 
(2.924)*** 
0.181 
(7.128)*** 
-0.042 
(-9.159)*** 
0.070 
(2.468)** 
absearn 0.412 
(6.576)*** 
0.138 
(2.971)*** 
0.202 
(3.335)*** 
0.311 
(4.660)*** 
0.149 
(2.402)** 
0.253 
(3.842)*** 
absearn 0.340 
(6.371)*** 
0.241 
(8.556)*** 
0.306 
(6.098)*** 
0.237 
(4.711)*** 
0.302 
(8.147)*** 
0.308 
(6.681)*** 
salesgrowth 0.048 
(4.813)*** 
0.010 
(0.684) 
0.032 
(2.224)** 
0.048 
(4.901)*** 
0.014 
(1.274) 
0.028 
(2.229)** 
salesgrowth 0.047 
(5.970)*** 
0.027 
(3.347)*** 
0.026 
(2.850)*** 
0.049 
(6.919)*** 
0.015 
(1.989)** 
0.030 
(3.808)*** 
dummy   -0.056 
(-0.860) 
  -0.082 
(-1.376) 
dummy   0.006 
(0.135) 
  -0.037 
(-1.155) 
cgpentotal*
dummy 
  0.325 
(1.842)* 
  0.339 
(2.139)** 
cgpenmand*
dummy 
  0.187 
(3.659)*** 
  0.137 
(3.628)*** 
       cgpenbp*du
mmy 
  -0.682 
(-2.654)*** 
  -0.182 
(-1.073) 
J-statistic 0.0800 0.0719 0.1346 0.0776 0.0674 0.1364 J-statistic 0.1299 0.1426 0.1423 0.1346 0.1221 0.1447 
N 392 371 763 392 371 763 N 392 371 763 392 371 763 
Variables: EM discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model; AWCA abnormal working capital accruals using the DeFond and Park (2001) model; cgpentotal penalized total CG index; cgpenmand penalized mandatory CG index; cgpenbp 
penalized best practice CG index; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; absni absolute value of current earnings; absearn absolute value of changes in earnings; salesgrowth changes in sales from prior year; dummy an indicator 
variable where 1 is for 2010/2012 and 0 for 2006/2008. 
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
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Table 5-6 Non-penalized CG Indices and Earnings Management – Model 2 
 Modified Jones model DeFond and Park (2001) model  Modified Jones model DeFond and Park (2001) model 
 Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
 Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
Pre-Law period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
cgnontotal 0.018 
(0.296) 
0.220 
(10.162)*** 
0.001 
(0.007) 
0.054 
(0.869) 
0.053 
(2.379)** 
0.184 
(1.403) 
cgnonmand -0.003 
(-0.252) 
0.036 
(4.513)*** 
-0.012 
(-0.731) 
0.016 
(1.964)** 
0.010 
(1.299) 
-0.017 
(1.230) 
       cgnonbp -0.003 
(-0.092) 
0.129 
(10.614)*** 
0.230 
(2.548)** 
-0.043 
(-1.494) 
-0.030 
(-2.097)** 
0.216 
(2.882)*** 
ownconc 0.001 
(0.045) 
0.007 
(0.596) 
0.006 
(0.612) 
0.024 
(1.997)** 
0.011 
(0.920) 
0.032 
(2.701)*** 
ownconc 0.009 
(0.979) 
0.007 
(0.740) 
0.007 
(0.688) 
0.019 
(2.124)** 
0.013 
(1.435) 
0.020 
(2.012)** 
ta -0.013 
(-6.347)*** 
-0.011 
(-6.954)*** 
-0.013 
(-7.996)*** 
-0.011 
(-5.666)*** 
-0.009 
(-6.578)*** 
-0.014 
(-7.098)*** 
ta -0.014 
(-8.748)*** 
-0.014 
(-10.921)*** 
-0.015 
(-8.366)*** 
-0.010 
(-6.893)*** 
-0.010 
(-8.041)*** 
-0.013 
(-7.817)*** 
lev 0.037 
(2.127)** 
-0.017 
(-1.545) 
0.010 
(0.949) 
0.055 
(3.192)*** 
0.010 
(0.969) 
0.011 
(0.898) 
lev 0.041 
(3.001)*** 
-0.005 
(-0.604) 
0.010 
(1.120) 
0.051 
(4.486)*** 
0.024 
(3.090)*** 
0.012 
(1.506) 
absni 0.046 
(1.148) 
0.242 
(6.608)*** 
0.122 
(4.026)*** 
0.076 
(1.888)* 
0.069 
(2.032)** 
0.060 
(1.824)* 
absni 0.091 
(2.969)*** 
0.058 
(8.038)*** 
0.110 
(3.564)*** 
0.164 
(6.761)*** 
-0.055 
(-8.682)*** 
0.063 
(2.304)** 
absearn 0.402 
(6.722)*** 
0.137 
(3.072)*** 
0.287 
(5.693)*** 
0.314 
(4.883)*** 
0.132 
(2.163)** 
0.377 
(7.311)*** 
absearn 0.324 
(6.157)*** 
0.223 
(8.155)*** 
0.306 
(7.513)*** 
0.247 
(5.578)*** 
0.369 
(9.434)*** 
0.343 
(8.067)*** 
salesgrowth 0.035 
(3.301)*** 
0.015 
(1.130) 
0.029 
(2.878)*** 
0.033 
(2.937)*** 
0.006 
(0.522) 
0.027 
(2.447)** 
salesgrowth 0.036 
(4.095)*** 
0.028 
(3.154)*** 
0.036 
(3.354)*** 
0.035 
(4.082)*** 
0.015 
(1.852)* 
0.029 
(3.220)*** 
dummy   -0..160 
(-1.543) 
  -0.319 
(-3.243)*** 
dummy   0.024 
(0.376) 
  0.054 
(1.009) 
cgnontotal*
dummy 
  0.193 
(1.323) 
  0.370 
(2.690)*** 
cgnonmand*
dummy 
  0.018 
(0.404) 
  -0.007 
(-0.195) 
       cgnonbp*du
mmy 
  -0.162 
(-1.837)* 
  -0.161 
(-2.229)** 
J-statistic 0.0850 0.0852 0.1257 0.0792 0.0874 0.1290 J-statistic 0.1311 0.1374 0.1343 0.1323 0.1395 0.1375 
N 392 371 763 392 371 763 N 392 371 763 392 371 763 
Variables: EM discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model; AWCA abnormal working capital accruals using the DeFond and Park (2001) model; cgnontotal non-penalized total CG index; cgnonmand non-penalized mandatory CG index; 
cgnonbp non-penalized best practice CG index; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; absni absolute value of current earnings; absearn absolute value of changes in earnings; salesgrowth changes in sales from prior year; 
dummy an indicator variable where 1 is for 2010/2012 and 0 for 2006/2008. 
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
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5.5 Discussion of results 
5.5.1 H1 –Audit Committee Effectiveness and earnings management 
The relationship between audit committee effectiveness and EM is analyzed in this 
section. The variable audit committee effectiveness incorporates the various attributes 
of audit committees, such as their size and independence, the number of meetings and 
their member’s financial expertise.  Weighted ace is used to indicate the quality of audit 
committees and their ability to constrain EM. 
5.5.1.1– Audit Committee Effectiveness and the Modified Jones model 
A significant negative relationship between weighted ace and EM exists in the pooled 
sample, in line with H1.  Firms that have a higher value of weighted ace, indicating 
higher quality in their audit committees, have lower EM.  This is consistent with Baxter 
and Cotter (2009), Sierra Garcia et al. (2012), Chen and Zhang (2014), Sharma and 
Kuang (2014) and He and Yang (2014). They examine individual audit committee 
attributes and find a negative effect on EM.  Nonetheless, Kent et al. (2010) in addition 
to observing individual audit committee characteristics and their effect on EM, also 
uses a composite measure of audit committee effectiveness and find a negative 
relationship between this variable and EM.   
However, when observing the post-law period sample and weighace with the 
interaction year dummy variable, a positive effect of weighace on EM is seen.  Thus, 
firms that have higher values of weighace conduct more EM.  These results are contrary 
to H1.  This result indicates that firms adhere more to the form of laws, rather than to 
their substance. Audit committees have the appropriate size, independence, number of 
meetings and expertise but are not actually performing their role in constraining EM.     
5.5.1.2– Audit Committee Effectiveness and the DeFond and Park (2001) model 
When measuring AWCA, using the DeFond and Park (2001) model, similar results are 
observed with the Modified Jones model.  More specifically, a negative relationship 
between weighace and AWCA is observed in the pooled sample, in line with H1, 
whereby firms with more attributes in their audit committees, indicating higher levels 
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of audit committee effectiveness, are better equipped to constrain EM.  Yet, in the post-
law period sample and in weighace with the interaction year dummy variable, a positive 
relationship exists between weighace and AWCA.  This reveals that firms with higher 
levels of weighace perform more AWCA, contrary to H1.  Thus, after the 
implementation of the audit committee law regarding the mandatory existence of an 
audit committee for all Greek listed firms, many firms appear to conform to the form 
of the law and not to its actual substance.  Although they have audit committees that 
follow the law and best practice requirements, per the Greek CG Code, in terms of size, 
independence, frequency of meetings and member expertise, they do not appear to be 
effective in constraining AWCA. 
5.5.2 H2 –CG Indices and earnings management 
The relationship between corporate governance indices and EM is analyzed in this 
section. The CG indices represent a multi-dimensional proxy for governance quality 
incorporating a set of governance attributes in an index.  The CG indices are either 
examined in total, where all governance attributes are included in the index, or are 
broken down into their mandatory and best practice components.  In the mandatory CG 
index, only mandatory items as per Greek CG laws are included in the CG index, while 
in the best practice CG index, only best practice items as per the CG Greek Code are 
included in the CG index.  All CG indices are scored using the penalized versions, 
whereby non-disclosed items are considered non-existent and scored as zero, and the 
non-penalized versions, where non-existent items are excluded from the index.   
5.5.2.1– CG indices and the Modified Jones model 
Penalized CG indices 
CG pen_total (H2) 
A significant negative relationship between the total penalized CG index and EM is 
observed in the pre-law and the pooled sample, a result that is in line with H2.  Similar 
results are observed by Shen and Chih (2007), Jiang et al. (2008), Bowen et al. (2008) 
and Shan (2015).  In a Greek setting for 2008, Bekiris and Doukakis (2011), who also 
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use a penalized CG index, also find a negative relationship between their CG index and 
EM.  However, in the post-law period sample, a positive relationship is seen between 
the two variables.  This is also seen when examining the CG index with the interaction 
year dummy variable and its effect on EM.  These results are contrary to H2.  In the 
period when the existence of audit committees is mandatory (2010/2012), firms with 
higher CG scores conducted more EM.  This could imply that firms are more concerned 
with following the letter of the law rather than its spirit.  This is a case where form 
appears to supersede the substance of the law.   
CG pen_mand & CG pen_bp (H2) 
Similar results to the total penalized CG index are also seen for the mandatory penalized 
CG index.  As such, in the pre-law and in the pooled sample, a significant negative 
relationship is observed between the mandatory penalized CG index and EM, a result 
in line with H2.  However, a positive relationship between the two is seen in the post-
law period and when examining the mandatory penalized CG index with the interaction 
year dummy variable and its effect on EM.  This result is contrary to H2, and indicates 
that Greek firms appear to follow the form of the law and not its substance.   
When looking at the best practice penalized CG index and EM, a significant positive 
relationship is seen in the pre-law, post-law and in the pooled sample, results that are 
contrary to H2.  Conversely, when examining the best practice penalized CG index with 
the interaction year dummy variable and its effect on EM, a significant negative 
relationship is seen.  Firms that follow best practice governance attributes, as suggested 
by the Greek CG Code, in the years after the mandatory existence of an audit 
committee, constrain EM.  This indicates that firms that follow optional, best practice 
governance items, in contrast to following mandatory CG items, are more successful in 
mitigating EM.  These attributes play a critical role in mitigating EM, since firms appear 
to voluntarily follow the substance and not the form of the governance attributes.    
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Non-penalized CG indices 
CG non_total (H2) 
Similar to the penalized total CG index, a significant positive relationship between the 
non-penalized total CG index and EM is seen in the post-law sample period.  This result 
is contrary to H2, suggesting that firms are not following the substance of governance 
recommendations.  Insignificant relationships are observed between the non-penalized 
CG index and EM in the pre-law period and in pooled sample and when examining the 
total non-penalized CG index with the interaction year dummy variable and its effect 
on EM.  Similar insignificant results are reported by Bowen et al. (2008).    
CG non_mand & CG non_bp (H2) 
Similar to the penalized CG index, the mandatory non-penalized CG index and EM 
have a significant positive relationship in the post-law period sample.  Firms that are 
forced to follow CG recommendations, appear to be following the form of the law and 
not its substance, and thus firms that have higher CG scores are conducting higher levels 
of EM.  Insignificant relationships between the two variables are seen in the pre-law 
sample and the pooled sample and when examining the mandatory non-penalized CG 
index with the interaction year dummy variable.  
When looking at the best practice non-penalized CG index and EM, a significant 
positive relationship is seen in the post-law period and in the pooled sample, a result is 
contrary to against H2.  However, when examining the best practice non-penalized CG 
index with the interaction year dummy variable and its effect on EM, a significant 
negative relationship is observed, similar to the best practice penalized CG index.  This 
suggests that firms that follow optional, best practice governance recommendations, 
appear to follow the substance and not the form of these governance attributes.    
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5.5.2.2– CG indices and the DeFond and Park (2001) model 
Penalized CG indices 
CG pen_total (H2) 
When looking at the penalized CG index and its effect on AWCA, a significant negative 
relationship is seen in the pre-law and pooled samples, in line with H2.  However, when 
examining the total penalized CG index with the interaction year dummy variable and 
its effect on AWCA, a significant positive relationship is observed.  As such, this result 
is contrary to H2, indicating that firms that have higher CG scores appear to have higher 
levels of AWCA. 
CG pen_mand & CG pen_bp (H2) 
There is a significant negative relationship between the mandatory CG index and 
AWCA in the pre-law, post-law and pooled samples, in line with H2.  However, this 
relationship becomes positive when examining the mandatory penalized CG index with 
the interaction year dummy variable and its effect on AWCA.   Thus, when firms are 
forced to follow mandatory attributes of governance, after the implementation of the 
CG law concerning the mandatory existence of an audit committee, they appear to be 
following the letter and not the spirit of the law.   
A significant negative relationship between the best practice CG index and AWCA is 
seen in the post-law period sample, in line with H2.  Insignificant results are observed 
in the pre-law period and in pooled sample, and when examining the best practice 
penalized CG index with the interaction year dummy variable and its effect on AWCA. 
Non-penalized CG indices 
CG non_total (H2) 
A significant positive relationship is observed between the total non-penalized CG 
index and AWCA in the pooled sample and when examining the total non-penalized 
CG index with the interaction year dummy variable and its effect on AWCA.  Thus, 
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firms with higher CG scores have higher levels of AWCA.  As such, one can conclude 
that the governance items included in the index do not appear to assist firms in 
mitigating AWCA.  They are either not appropriate or they are not applied in substance. 
 CG non_mand & CG non_bp (H2) 
A significant positive relationship is also observed between the mandatory non-
penalized CG index and AWCA in the pre-law period sample.  Insignificant 
relationships are seen between the two variables in the post-law and the pooled sample, 
as well as when examining the mandatory non-penalized CG index with the interaction 
year dummy variable and its effect on AWCA. 
A significant positive relationship between the best practice non-penalized CG index 
and AWCA is also observed in the pooled sample.  However, in the post-law period 
and when examining the best practice non-penalized CG index with the interaction year 
dummy variable and its effect on AWCA, a significant negative relationship is noticed.  
This suggests that when firms voluntarily implement best practice governance 
recommendations, they believe in their value and follow their substance and, as a result, 
these governance items mitigate EM.   
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presents, analyzes and discusses data examining the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms in Greece on EM before and after the implementation of the 
2008 law concerning the mandatory existence of an audit committee for all Greek listed 
firms.  
Corporate governance mechanisms are measured using audit committee characteristics 
and a multi-dimensional governance mechanism in the form of a corporate governance 
index, thus breaking down the analysis into two corporate governance models.  EM is 
measured using the Modified Jones Model and the DeFond and Park model.   
The first model examines the effect of audit committee effectiveness, looking at audit 
committee characteristics such as size, independence, frequency of meetings and the 
financial expertise of members.  The second model examines governance quality 
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through a multi-dimensional, holistic index that incorporates various governance items.  
The results found are mixed, whereby good governance practices do not always 
mitigate EM.  The overall conclusion from the analysis is that firms often follow the 
form of governance items and not their substance.  When forced to implement a 
governance standard, they often do not appear to actually enforce it and thus it’s not 
able to fulfill its true purpose and constrain EM.   
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Chapter 6 – Literature Review and Hypothesis Development (CG & FP) 
6.1 Introduction 
The academic interest in the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance has grown since major corporate failures such as Enron and WorldCom in 
the US.  Improvements to corporate governance have been incorporated in major 
reforms and standards developed both at country level, as well as international level, 
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US, the Combined Code in the UK and the OECD 
Code. 
Examining this relationship becomes even more important in light of the financial crisis 
that began in the US in 2008.  Although this financial crisis is considered by many to 
be comparable to the Great Depression of the 1930s, limited research has been 
conducted examining corporate governance and firm performance in this context.  
Furthermore, most research examining the two variables in a crisis setting has focused 
mainly on banks and financial institutions in the US and the UK.  Limited research 
exists for other developed economies.  The financial crisis greatly affected Greece by 
bringing forth pre-existing structural problems and macroeconomic imbalances of the 
Greek economy and it is therefore of interest to examine this relationship in such a 
context.   
This chapter initially focuses on the theoretical framework that forms the link between 
corporate governance and firm performance in section 6.2.  The empirical literature 
concerning the issue of corporate governance and its effect on firm performance, in a 
non-crisis and crisis setting, is discussed in sections 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5.  Section 6.6 
discusses the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.  Consequently, this contextual 
information and literature review form the basis for the development of the hypotheses 
stated in 6.7.  Finally, section 6.8 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 Theoretical framework for the impact of CG on firm performance 
Corporate governance is a system that sets the foundations of how a firm is directed 
and controlled (Tihanyi et al., 2014).  Many theories influence the development of 
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corporate governance, as analyzed in Chapter 2.  This section provides a discussion of 
the theories affect the relationship between CG and firm performance and how they 
form the link between the two variables.  The relationship between CG and firm 
performance is quite complex and cannot be based on one single CG theory.  Prior 
research employs three CG theories - agency, stewardship and resource-dependency 
theory – that constitute the theoretical framework about the influence of corporate 
governance on firm performance (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007; Jackling and Johl, 2009).      
Agency theory examines the role directors’ play in contributing to firm performance.  
The primary activity of boards is monitoring managers on behalf of shareholders 
whereby agency costs are reduced and firm performance is improved.  Research based 
on agency theory examines the effect of proxies for board incentives, such as board 
dependence and equity compensation, on firm performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003).  Directors’ leadership structure, such as CEO duality and board composition, are 
significant factors in how a firm performs (Rhoades et al., 2001). 
In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory proclaims that managers are stewards 
of the company and can be entrusted with the firm’s resources.  Executive directors 
have a better understanding of the firm, have direct access to crucial information and 
thus can make better decisions.  According to stewardship theory, managers are 
trustworthy and when empowered with the firm’s resources, agency costs are 
minimized, since managers are unlikely to disadvantage shareholders for fear of 
harming their own reputation.  Although the link between board of directors and firm 
performance, based on the stewardship theory, is not very explicit, superior decision 
making that positively affects firm performance is the key element (Nicholson and Kiel, 
2007). 
Resource-dependency theory provides the framework indicating that the board provides 
the resources needed to maximize performance.  This involves board size, board 
committees and board activity.  The board provides resources, either through the 
experience, expertise and reputation or through their network of ties to other firms.  This 
is referred to in the literature as board capital.  Resource-dependency theory studies 
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how board capital provides resources to firms so as to increase firm performance 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).     
Prior literature examining the relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance, either through board of directors’ characteristics, such as board size, board 
independence and CEO duality, as well as corporate governance indices is presented in 
the following sections.  The relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance is examined to develop a research hypothesis for further analysis. 
6.3 Board of directors’ composition and firm performance 
Corporate governance mechanisms’ effect on firm performance is studied using 
individual board of director characteristics.  Various aspects related to boards, such as 
board size (e.g. Raheja (2005), Huang and Wang (2015)), board independence (e.g. 
Guest (2009), Duru et al. (2016)) and board leadership structure (e.g. Jackling and Johl, 
(2009)) have been observed in the literature. 
The literature examining board of directors’ characteristics and firm performance is 
vast, therefore this literature review, for the purpose of this study, focuses on specific 
research papers examining board characteristics such as board size, board 
independence, and CEO duality and their effect on firm performance measured by 
Tobin’s Q and/or Return on Assets (ROA). 
Board size and firm performance 
The role of the size of the board on corporate governance has created a debate in the 
literature, as there are arguments suggesting that board size can have both a positive 
and a negative influence on firm performance (Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). 
Agency theory implies that larger boards are likely to perform better in their monitoring 
and controlling role, compared to smaller boards, since more board members are 
engaged in reviewing management’s actions.  Larger boards have an increased pool of 
expertise and so are likely to have more knowledge and skills (Van den Berghe and 
Levrau, 2004).  It is expected that larger boards include members that have connections 
with the external environment, thus providing resources, such as links to suppliers and 
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customers and other significant stakeholders that improve CG and increase firm 
performance (Jackling and Johl, 2009).  Additionally, larger boards have a greater 
chance of reducing CEO dominance and creating the basis for many perspectives on 
corporate strategy (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004).  
Large boards possess a greater pool of collective information, needed for both the 
advisory and monitoring roles of boards (Lehn et al., 2009). 
Empirical evidence in the literature shows that board size has a positive relationship 
with firm performance.  Pearce and Zahra (1992) for 119 US Fortune 500 firms for the 
period 1983-1989, Kiel and Nicholson (2003) for 348 Australian listed firms for the 
year 1996 and Beiner et al. (2006) for 109 Swiss firms for the year 2002 all find a 
positive relationship between board size and firm performance.  Additionally, Khanchel 
(2007) for 24 listed firms in Tunisia, North Africa for the period 2000-2005, Jackling 
and Johl (2009) for 180 Indian listed firms for the year 2006, and Veprauskaité and 
Adams (2013) for 468 UK publicly listed firms for the period 2003-2008 also find a 
positive relationship between the two variables.  Similar results are seen in Coles et al. 
(2008) for 8,165 US firm-year observations for the period 1992-2001, who find that 
large, high-debt firms have greater advising requirements that are fulfilled by larger 
boards and thus firm performance for complex firms increases as board size increases.  
These results are consistent with Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) and Nicholson and 
Kiel (2007) who state that larger boards are more effective due to an increased pool of 
expertise, knowledge, and skills.  Additionally, Huang and Wang (2015) examine the 
relationship between board size and a firm’s variability on future firm performance 
using a sample of 1,990 Chinese firms over the period 2003-2011.  They find that 
smaller boards face larger variability in future firm performance.   
However, a negative association between these two variables is also seen in the 
literature. Large boards exhibit potential problems due to difficulty in coordination, 
organization and communication among the board members.  Additionally, board 
members of large boards might experience decreased levels of motivation and 
participation, as well as difficulty in reaching a consensus on decisions, thus hindering 
their ability to control management.  Furthermore, board members of large groups may 
suffer from diffusion of responsibility and the occurrence of the ‘free-rider’ problem 
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(Eisenberg et al., 1998; Van den Berghe and Levrau, 2004; Uchida, 2011).  Jensen 
(1993) states that boards that have more than eight members are less effective in 
controlling CEOs due to potential coordination and processing problems.  Yermack 
(1996) with a sample of 452 large US firms between 1984-1991 finds that smaller 
boards are more effective and thus increase firm performance due to their better 
communication and decision-making capabilities compared to larger boards.  A similar 
inverse relationship is observed by Eisenberg et al. (1998) for a sample of 879 small 
Finnish firms for the period 1992-1994, de Andres et al. (2005) for 450 non-financial 
companies from 10 countries in Western Europe and North America for the year 1996 
and Ghosh (2006) for 127 listed manufacturing firms in India for the year 2003.  
Similarly, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) for 230 firms from Singapore and 230 firms from 
Malaysia for the year 2000, Bennedsen et al. (2008) for 7,496 closely held corporations 
with limited liability in Denmark for the year 1999 and Dahya et al. (2008) for 799 
firms with a dominant shareholder across 22 countries for the year 2002, also report a 
negative relationship.  Additionally, Cheng (2008) for 6,869 US firm-year observations 
for the period 1996-2004, Guest (2009) for 2,746 UK firms over 1981-2002, and 
Ujunwa (2012) for 122 quoted Nigerian firms for the period 1991-2008, also find a 
negative relationship between the two variables.   
Some research has also found no association between board size and performance.  
Bozec (2005) for a sample of 25 Canadian state-owned enterprises (SOE’s) for the 
period 1976-2000 and Elsayed (2007) for 92 Egyptian listed firms from 2000-2004 find 
an insignificant relationship between the two variables. 
As seen in the literature, there are differing results for the effect of board size on firm 
performance.  In a Greek setting, Toudas (2009) examines 283 randomly selected firms 
on the ASE for the year 2005 and finds a positive relationship between board size and 
firm performance.  Similarly, Zhou et al. (2018) for a sample of 774 firm-year 
observations for the period 2008-2012 also find a positive relationship between the two 
variables.  However, Drakos and Bekiris (2010) for a sample of 1,490 firm-year 
observations for the period 2000-2006, find a negative relationship between board size 
and firm performance.   
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Board independence and firm performance 
Independent members on the board add value to firms, since their independence helps 
them succeed in their monitoring role as board members, and thus enables them to better 
fulfill their role in mitigating agency costs associated with the separation of ownership 
and control that could potentially lead to conflicts and management expropriation.  For 
example, there is a greater chance that a board with a majority of independent board 
members fire a non-performing CEO, thus enhancing their independence from the CEO 
(Franks et al., 2001).  Their experience and expertise can facilitate the decision making 
process.  Additionally, in crisis times, independent members of the board can also add 
value to firms since they limit excessive risk-taking behaviour.  Independent directors 
see themselves as the balancing figure between the interests of the firm’s shareholders 
and other stakeholders.  Their risk preferences are different from other members of the 
board, often influencing hedging decisions, that can positively affect firm value, 
especially in times of crisis (Yeh et al., 2011). 
Daily and Dalton (1993) examine the relationship between board independence and 
firm performance for 186 small listed firms in the US for the year 1990 and find a 
positive relationship between the two variables.  Similarly, Weir et al. (2002) for a 
sample of 311 non-financial listed UK firms for the period 1994-1996, Cho and Kim 
(2007) for 347 listed firms in Korea for the year 1999, and Lefort and Urzúa (2008) for 
169 Chilean non-financial listed firms for the period 2000-2003 all find a positive 
relationship between board independence and firm performance.  Similar positive 
relationships are also seen in the work of Pearce and Zahra (1992), Mak and Kusnadi 
(2005), Khanchel (2007), Dahya et al. (2008) and Jackling and Johl (2009).   
However, a negative relationship between board independence and firm performance 
is also seen in the literature.  There are cases, as Williamson (2008) reports, where 
independent board members are at a disadvantage, in comparison to insiders, since they 
do not have direct access to crucial information and thus react slower than executive 
board members (Essen et al., 2013).  Moreover, executive directors are in a better 
position to influence managers to invest in profitable projects, since they have access 
to important, specific and relevant information (Jermias, 2007).  A number of studies 
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have also found that pressure on firms to fill board positions with independent directors 
can force them to choose inappropriate candidates, since there are often insufficient 
directors with the necessary qualifications to do the job effectively.  Furthermore, 
according to stewardship theory, managers are good stewards of the firm’s assets and 
have intrinsic non-financial motives, such as the need for achievement, intrinsic 
satisfaction from successful performance and recognition.  Thus, a firm that reallocates 
control to managers from shareholders is a firm that maximizes firm performance (Van 
den Berghe and Levrau, 2004).  Studies such as Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) for 383 
large US firms for the year 1987, Klein (1998) for 485 and 486 US listed firms on the 
S&P 500 for the years 1992 and 1993, Bhagat and Black (2002) for 934 large US firms 
for the year 1991 and Kiel and Nicholson (2003) for 348 Australian listed firms for the 
year 1996 all find a negative relationship between board independence and firm 
performance.  A similar inverse relationship is seen in Bozec (2005) for 25 stated owned 
enterprises selected from the 500 largest firms in Canada for the period 1976-2000, 
Jermias (2007) for 274 Canadian firms for the period 1997-2000, Bhagat and Bolton 
(2008) for a sample ranging from 6,130 to 24,255 US firms for the period 1990-2004 
and Guest (2009) for 2746 UK listed firms over the period 1981-2002.  
Bhagat and Bolton (2013) examine the effect of SOX (2002) for an unbalanced panel 
of 1,000-1,400 US firms per year for the period 1998-2007 and report mixed results 
between board independence and firm performance.  They divide the sample into two 
periods, before and after the SOX regulation, and find a negative relationship between 
the two variables during 1998-2001 (before the regulation), but a positive relationship 
between the two during 2003-2007 (after the regulation). Additionally, Ramdani and 
Van Witteloostuijn (2010) examine the effect of board independence on firm 
performance for Indonesia (66 firms), Malaysia (75 firms), South Korea (111 firms), 
and Thailand (61 firms) for the years 2001 and 2002.  They link the level of firm 
performance with different types of board characteristics and report mixed results.  
They find a positive relationship between the two only in “average-performing firms”, 
while board independence is ineffective in “low and high performing firms”.   
Some studies find no relationship between board independence and firm performance.  
Examples of such studies are Jackling and Johl (2009), who find a positive relationship 
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between the two variables when Tobin’s Q is used to measure firm performance, but 
no relationship is found when ROA is used.  Similarly, no relationship between the two 
is found in the work of de Andres et al. (2005), Ghosh (2006) and Veprauskaité and 
Adams (2013).  Daily and Dalton (1992) for 100 listed firms in Inc. magazine (for 
growing companies) for the year 1989 and  Duru et al. (2016) for a sample of 950 US 
firms for the period 1997-2011, also suggest an insignificant relationship between board 
independence and firm performance.   
The existing literature provides differing results when examining the relationship 
between board independence and firm performance.    Although studies report a positive 
relationship between the two, there are also cases where a negative relationship exists 
between board independence and firm performance, indicating a dynamic relationship 
between the two variables.  In a Greek setting, board independence and firm 
performance have been examined by Toudas (2009) and Drakos and Bekiris (2010) 
where both find no association between the two variables.  However, Zhou et al. (2018) 
find a negative relationship between board independence and firm performance, 
suggesting that independent boards are not always in the best interest of stockholders, 
resulting in inferior performance.   
CEO duality and firm performance 
The research on CEO duality is basically dominated by two contrasting theoretical 
perspectives.  On the one hand, according to agency theory, CEO duality increases CEO 
power, thus impeding the independence between the board and management that is vital 
to deter managerial entrenchment. This results in poorer firm performance.  On the 
other hand, according to stewardship and resource-dependence theory, CEO duality 
produces a more flexible leadership structure that results in organizational effectiveness 
in a dynamic business environment, thus increasing firm performance (Dahya and 
Travlos, 2000).  This is the basic reason for the mixed and inconclusive results found 
in empirical literature (Duru et al., 2016).    
Although boards add value to firms by providing advisory services, there is a consensus 
that the board’s primary function is that of monitoring.  Vigilant governance practices 
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include constraining CEO power, by separating the roles of CEO and board chairman.  
An individual carrying both roles, a phenomenon known as ‘CEO duality’, has the 
opportunity to manipulate the board’s agenda and control the flow of information, 
resulting in a negative effect on firm performance (Essen et al., 2013).  Most studies 
exhibit a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm performance, such as 
Bozec (2005), Mak and Kusnadi (2005), Jermias (2007), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), 
Ujunwa (2012), Veprauskaité and Adams (2013), Bhagat and Bolton (2013) and Duru 
et al. (2016).  Additionally, Bai et al. (2004) for 2,905 publicly listed Chinese firm-year 
observations for the period 1999-2001 also find a negative relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance. 
Conversely, the literature also contains studies that indicate a positive relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance.  CEOs that have both roles can enhance 
firm performance, since a single unified strategy, expressed by one individual, can 
eliminate ambiguity about who is in charge.  This creates a clear-cut leadership role 
that can simplify and accelerate the decision making process, something that is 
especially important in uncertain economic environments, where firms experience 
hardship, and are often forced to restructure their operations (Baliga et al., 1996; Essen 
et al., 2013).  Baliga et al. (1996) for a sample of 375 US Fortune 500 firms examine 
the change in managerial structure for the period 1980-1991 and its effect on firm 
performance.  They found that a subsequent increase in ROA is evident following 
managerial leadership change to a unitary leadership structure, suggesting that under 
certain conditions, firms increase their performance from CEO duality.  Elsayed (2007) 
originally finds no association between CEO duality and firm performance.  However, 
when examining the impact of the industry context he finds both a positive and a 
negative effect of CEO duality on firm performance.  He states that the relationship 
between these two variables is not monotonic, thus it should be viewed as a dynamic 
relationship that varies with corporate characteristics and industry context.  
Additionally, according to Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994), CEO duality can have both 
a positive and a negative effect.  In a positive context where performance is high, the 
absence of CEO duality is preferred since the financial context can enable possible 
entrenchment.  High performance enhances the CEOs power, whereby he/she has the 
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ability to institutionalize his/her power.  Organizational slack can be created in high 
performing firms, where the CEO has the ability to indulge in financial excesses.  In 
poor performing firms CEO duality might be preferred so as to convey to stakeholders 
a sense of unity and strength through a unitary board leadership (Rhoades et al., 2001). 
Ramdani and Van Witteloostuijn (2010) suggest a positive relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance for “average-performing” firms, but an insignificant 
affect in “low and high performing” firms.  They find that the optimal level of CEO 
duality is conditional on initial firm performance.   
Some studies also report no relationship between the two variables, as in Daily and 
Dalton (1992), Daily and Dalton (1993), Weir et al. (2002), Kiel and Nicholson (2003) 
and Jackling and Johl (2009).   
As seen in the literature review examining CEO duality and firm performance, 
inconclusive and mixed results are found in the literature.  In a Greek setting, CEO 
duality and firm performance have been examined by Toudas (2009) and Drakos and 
Bekiris (2010) where the former finds a negative relationship between CEO duality and 
firm performance, while the latter find no association between the two variables. 
6.4 Corporate governance indices and firm performance 
Recent studies have acknowledged that corporate governance quality cannot be 
captured solely using individual governance mechanisms and that a more holistic 
approach is needed in which several governance mechanisms are simultaneously 
examined.  Thus, several studies have either created indices that incorporate several 
elements of corporate governance or use governance measures provided by private 
commercial ratings agencies, such as Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 
Governance Metrics International (GMI), The Corporate Library, Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and The Deminor Corporate Governance 
Ratings, to examine the relationship between a corporate governance score and firm 
performance.   
Chapter 6- Literature Review and Hypothesis Development (CG & FP) 
 
180 
 
More specifically, Gompers et al. (2003) was one of the first to construct an index 
assessing corporate governance quality for a large number of publicly traded US firms. 
They use data from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and create a 
“Governance Index” named G-index for 1,500 large US firms for the period 1990-1998. 
They find that higher quality governance, proxied by their index, results in improved 
future stock performance. Gompers et al. (2003)’s G-index has been used by many 
studies, such as Klock et al. (2005), Villalonga et al. (2006), Perez-Gondalez (2006), 
Dittmar et al. (2007) and Harford et al. (2008) to represent corporate governance 
quality, even though it is considered more a measure of anti-takeover protection index 
rather than a broad index of corporate governance (Cremers and Nair, 2005; Brown and 
Caylor, 2006).   
Callahan et al. (2003) construct an index of management involvement in director 
nominations for a sample of 106 large publicly-traded US firms for the period 1989-
1992 and examine its effect on corporate performance.  They find a positive relationship 
between their index and firm performance.  Drobetz et al. (2004) create a broad 
corporate governance rating (CGR) for 91 German public firms and examine its 
relationship to firm valuation for the year 2002.  A positive relationship between 
governance practices and firm value is found.  Beiner et al. (2006) create a CG index 
for 109 Swiss firms for the year 2002 to evaluate the effect of governance on firm value 
and find a positive relationship between the two variables.  Brown and Caylor (2006) 
create the Gov-score, based on 51 firm-specific provisions obtained from Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS), and examine its effect on firm performance based on 1,868 
US listed firms for the year 2003.  They illustrate that only seven of the 51 provisions 
are the essential drivers of the positive relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. 
Black et al. (2006c) construct a Korean CG index (KCGI) based on a survey of CG 
practices by the Korean Stock Exchange (KSE) sent to 515 Korean listed firms in 
Spring 2001, as well as corporate governance data that was hand collected by the 
researchers.  They examine the relationship between their KCGI and the market value 
of Korean public firms and find a positive relationship between the two variables. 
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Larcker et al. (2007) create 14 multi-indicator CG indices and examine 2,106 firms for 
the year 2003 and find a statistically significant association with operating performance.  
Garay and González (2008) create a CG index consisting of 17 questions and examine 
its relation to firm performance.  Their sample consists of 46 Venezuelan listed firms 
for the year 2004 and they find a significant positive relationship between their CG 
index and firm performance.  Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) create a CG index 
consisting of 17 governance provisions that are included in company bylaws to examine 
the relationship between governance and performance for a sample of over 2,701 firms 
in 23 countries over the period 2003-2005.  They use ISS data to construct their index, 
similar to the work of Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009).  They find a 
positive relationship between the two variables.   
Following the work of Gompers et al. (2003), Bebchuk et al. (2009) investigate the 
importance of the 24 IRRC provisions included in the G-index that Gompers et al. 
(2003) developed.  Bebchuk et al. (2009) develop an entrenchment index (i.e. the E-
Index) based on six of the 24 IRRC provisions and examine its relationship to firm 
value.  Their study includes information for 1,400 to 1,800 US firms for the period 
1990-2003 and they find significant reductions in firm valuation when the index level 
increases. 
Aggarwal et al. (2009) use the ISS86 governance attributes to form their own CG index, 
also named the GOV index.  They calculate the GOV index for 2,234 foreign firms and 
5,296 US firms for the year 2005 and find that both are positively related to firm value.   
Balasubramanian et al. (2010) construct an Indian CG index for 49 private non-financial 
firms for the year 2005.  They examine the relationship between their index and firm 
value and find a positive relationship between the two variables.  Sami et al. (2011) 
investigate the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance in 
China for 1,236 firm-year observations for the period 2001-2003.  They construct and 
                                                 
86 ISS includes governance items that increase the power of minority shareholders.  ISS was acquired by 
RiskMetrics Group in 2007. 
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utilize a composite measure of corporate governance and find that the overall quality 
of corporate governance is positively related to firm performance.   
Ammann et al. (2011) create two alternative, additive CG indices using data from 
Governance Metrics International (GMI).  They examine the relationship between their 
governance indices and firm value, including 6,663 firm-year observations for 22 
developed countries, such as Japan, UK and Canada for the period 2003-2007 and they 
find a strong and positive relationship between their indices and firm value. 
Price et al. (2011) evaluate the compliance to the Code of Best Corporate Practices in 
Mexico by constructing a governance score based on firms’ level of compliance.  They 
examine the relationship between the governance score and firm performance for 107 
non-financial Mexican listed firms for the period 2000-2004.  They find an insignificant 
relationship between the two variables. 
Black and Kim (2012) create a Korean CG index (KCGI) based on the work of Black 
et al. (2006c).  Constructing a CG index for 428 non-financial Korean firms, they 
examine how a 1999 Korean CG law for large public firms affects firm market value 
for the period 1998-2004.  They find a positive relationship between their Korean CG 
index and firm market value.   
Black et al. (2012) develop a Brazilian Corporate Governance Index (BCGI) based on 
a survey distributed in January 2005 to a sample of 66 private Brazilian firms for the 
year 2004 and find an overall positive relationship between their index and firm value.  
They further continue their study by assessing similarities and differences across four 
emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India and Korea (BRIK87 countries), in terms of 
countries and types of firms, so as to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance indices and market value.  For Brazil they use the BCGI they developed, 
for Russia the CG indices described in Black et al. (2006a), for India the CG indices 
described in Balasubramanian et al. (2010) and for Korea they use the CG indices 
described in Black et al. (2006c).  Their analysis indicates both commonalities and 
                                                 
87 BRIK is a play on World Bank’s use of BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries as key 
emerging markets.  Black et al. (2012) study Korea instead of China (Black et al., 2014).  
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differences among BRIK countries and mixed results between governance indices and 
market value.  Tariq and Abbas (2013) evaluate firms’ compliance to the Pakistani CG 
Code by constructing a CG compliance index and examine its impact on firm 
performance.  Using a sample of 119 firms for the period 2003-2010, they find a 
positive relationship between the CG compliance index and firm performance.   
Black et al. (2015) construct a Korean corporate governance index (KCGI) for up to 
509 public firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange, based on the work of Black and 
Kim (2012) from 1998-2004.  A positive relationship with firm value is observed for 
better governed firms.   
Bozec and Dia (2015) create a CG index based on the Report on Business (ROB) index 
for 130 Canadian firm for the period 2002-2005 and find a positive relationship between 
their index and firm value.  Rose (2016) investigates adherence to the Danish Code of 
Corporate Governance for 2010.  He constructs an index comprising of 71 (out of 77) 
recommendations of the Code and creates an index.  He examines the relationship 
between the degree of ‘comply or explain’ disclosure, measured through the index and 
firm performance, for a sample of 155 Danish firms for the year 2010 and finds a 
positive relationship between the two variables.   
Akbar et al. (2016) study the relationship between corporate governance compliance 
and firm performance in the UK.  They develop a CG index for a sample of 435 non-
financial public firms for the period 1999-2009.  Their findings are in contrast to most 
findings on the CG index-performance literature, as compliance with corporate 
governance regulations does not affect firm performance in the UK.      
Ararat et al. (2017) examine Turkish public firms and create a CG index (TCGI).  They 
examine the relationship between their CG index and firm value and profitability for 
1,258 firm-year observations for the period 2006-2012.  They find that higher levels of 
TCGI predict higher levels of market value and profitability.88     
                                                 
88 Research also examines CG indices provided by private commercial rating agencies and firm 
performance such as Bauer et al. (2004), Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Klein et al. 
(2005), Black et al. (2006a), Bhagat and Bolton (2008), Epps and Cereola (2008), Morey et al. (2009), 
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Based on the existing studies that examine CG indices, as a proxy for corporate 
governance quality, most studies support the widespread hypothesis that a positive 
relationship exists between corporate governance and firm performance.  In a Greek 
context, Hermes and Katsigianni (2012) construct a CG index for the year 2007 for 124 
Greek listed firms on the ASE so as to examine the effect of corporate governance on 
firm performance.  They find that better governed firms have higher operating and 
market based performance.    
Table 6-1 illustrates the findings of prior studies found in the literature conducted on 
the relationship between internal corporate governance mechanisms, measured either 
through individual governance attributes such as board size, board independence and 
CEO duality, or through multiple governance items expressed in a CG index, and firm 
performance.  
                                                 
Anderson and Gupta (2009), Daines et al. (2010), Renders et al. (2010), Cremers and Ferrell (2014), and 
Conheady et al. (2015).   
Chapter 6- Literature Review and Hypothesis Development (CG & FP) 
 
185 
 
Table 6-1 Findings of prior studies on corporate governance and firm performance in non-financial firms 
AUTHORS PERIOD SAMPLE SIZE CG VARIABLES FIRM PERFORMANCE COUNTRY 
Pearce and Zahra (1992) 1983-1989 119 Fortune 500 firms board independence (+) board size (+) ROA US 
Daily and Dalton (1992) 1989 100 firm listed in Inc. magazine board independence (0) CEO duality (0) ROA US 
Daily and Dalton (1993) 1990 186 small listed firms board independence (+) CEO duality (0) ROA US 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 1987 383 large US firms board independence (-) Tobin’s Q US 
Yermack (1996) 1984-1991 452 large firms board size (-) Tobin’s Q US 
Baliga et al. (1996) 1980-1991 375 firms from the Fortune 500 
firms 
CEO duality (+) ROA US 
Klein (1998) 1992-1993  485 & 486 listed firms on S&P 500 board independence (-) ROA US 
Eisenberg et al. (1998) 1992-1994 879 small firms board size (-) ROA Finland 
Bhagat and Black (2002) 1991 934 large firms board independence (-) Tobin’s Q US 
Weir et al. (2002) 1994-1996 311 listed non-financial firms board independence (+) Tobin’s Q UK 
Gompers et al. (2003) 1990-1998 1500 large firms CG index (+) Tobin’s Q US 
Kiel and Nicholson (2003) 1996 348 listed firms board independence (-) board size (+)  
CEO duality (0) 
Tobin’s Q / ROA Australia 
Callahan et al. (2003) 1989-1992 106 large publicly traded CG index (+) Tobin’s Q US 
Bauer et al. (2004) 1996-2000 approximately 250 firms per year CG index (+) Tobin’s Q European countries 
Bai et al.(2004) 1999-2001 2905 firm year observations for 
publicly listed firms 
CEO duality (-) Tobin’s Q China 
Drobetz et al. (2004) 2002 91 German firms CG index (+) Tobin’s Q Germany 
Klapper and Love (2004) 1999 374 firms  CLSA CG rating (+) Tobin’s Q / ROA 14 emerging markets 
Durnev and Kim (2005) 199-2001 344 firms CLSA CG rating (+) Tobin’s Q Emerging markets 
Klein et al. (2005) 2002 263 Canadian firms CG index (0) Tobin’s Q Canada 
de Andres et al. (2005) 1996 450 non-financial firms board independence (0) board size (-) Tobin’s Q / ROA 10 countries in Western 
Europe and North 
America 
Bozec (2005) 1976-2000 25 state-owned enterprises board independence (-) board size (0)  
CEO duality (-) 
ROA Canada 
Mak et al. (2005) 2000 460 listed firms (230 firms + 230 
firms) 
board independence (+) board size (-)  
CEO duality (0) 
Tobin’s Q Singapore and Malaysia 
Ghosh (2006) 2003 127 listed manufacturing firms board independence (0) board size (-) Tobin’s Q / ROA India 
Black et al. (2006a) 199-2005 964 firm-year observations combined CG index (+) Tobin’s Q Russia 
Black et al. (2006c) 2001 515 listed firms CG index (+) Tobin’s Q Korea 
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AUTHORS PERIOD SAMPLE SIZE CG VARIABLES FIRM PERFORMANCE COUNTRY 
Beiner et al. (2006) 2002 109 firms board size (+) CG index (+) Tobin’s Q / ROA Switzerland 
Brown and Caylor (2006) 2003 1868 listed firms CG index (+) Tobin’s Q US 
Jermias (2007) 1997-2001 274 firms board independence (-) CEO duality (-) Tobin’s Q / ROA Canada 
Elsayed (2007) 2000-2004 92 public limited firms board size (0) CEO duality (0)(-)(+) Tobin’s Q / ROA Egypt 
Cho and Kim (2007) 1999 347 listed firms board independence (+) ROA Korea 
Khanchel  (2007) 2000-2005 24 listed firms board independence (+) board size (+) Tobin’s Q Tunisia, North Africa 
Larcker et al. (2007) 2002 2,106 listed firms CG indices (+/-) ROA US 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) 1990-2004  a range of 6130 to 24255 firms board independence (-) CEO duality (-) CG 
indices (+) 
Tobin’s Q / ROA US 
Lefort et al. (2008) 2000-2003 160 non-financial listed firms board independence (+) Tobin’s Q / ROA Chile 
Bennedsen et al. (2008) 1999 7496 closely held firms with 
limited liability 
board size (-) ROA Denmark 
Cheng (2008) 1996-2004 6869 firm year observations board size (-) Tobin’s Q / ROA US 
Coles et al. (2008) 1993-2000 8750 firm year observations board size (-)(+) Tobin’s Q US 
Dahya et al. (2008) 2002 799 firms with a dominant 
shareholder 
board independence (+) board size (-) Tobin’s Q 22 countries 
Epps et al. (2008) 2002-2004 256 firms for 2002 ; 269 firms for 
2003; 273 firms for 2004 
ISS CGQ rating (0) ROA US 
Garay and Gonzalez (2008) 2004 46 listed firms CG index (+) Tobin’s Q Venezuela 
Aggarwal et al. (2009) 2005 2234 foreign firms and 5296 US 
firms 
CG index (+) Tobin’s Q US and foreign firms 
Guest (2009) 1981-2002 2746 listed firms board independence (-) board size (-) Tobin’s Q / ROA UK 
Toudas (2009) 2005 283 random selected listed firms board independence (0) board size (+)  
CEO duality (-) 
Tobin’s Q / ROA Greece 
Jackling and Johl (2009) 2006 180 non-financial listed firms board independence (0) (+) board size (+)  
CEO duality (0) 
Tobin’s Q / ROA India 
Anderson and Gupta (2009) 2003-2006 1736 firms from 22 countries CG index (+) Tobin’s Q 22 coutries 
Chhaochharia and Laeven (2009) 2003-2005 over 2701 firms in 23 countries CG indices (+) Tobin’s Q US and foreign firms 
Bebchuk et al. (2009) 1990-2003 1400-1800 firms CG index (-) Tobin’s Q / ROA US 
Morey et al. (2009) 2001-2006 several hundred cases (14,600 
ratings) 
change in CG ratings (+) Tobin’s Q 21 emerging countries 
Drakos and Bekiris (2010) 2003-2006 1490 firm year observations board independence (0) board size (-)  
CEO duality (0) 
Tobin’s Q / ROA Greece 
Renders et al. (2010) 1999-2003 33,667 firm year observations CG index (+) Tobin’s Q / ROA 14 EU countries 
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AUTHORS PERIOD SAMPLE SIZE CG VARIABLES FIRM PERFORMANCE COUNTRY 
Ramdani et al.(2010) 2001-2002 66 firms / 75 firms/ 111 firms / 61 
firms 
board independence (+) CEO duality (+) ROA Indonesia, Malaysia, 
South Korea, and 
Thailand 
Balasubramanian et al. (2010) 2005 49 non-financial private firms Indian CG index (+) Tobin’s Q India 
Daines et al. (2010) 2005-2007 US firms  CG ratings (0) Tobin’s Q US 
Ammann et al. (2011) 2003-2007 6663 firm year observations CG indices (+) Tobin’s Q 22 developed countries 
such as Japan, UK and 
Canada 
Price et al. (2011) 2000-2004 107 non-financial listed firms CG index (0) ROA / Tobin’s Q Mexico 
Sami et al. (2011) 2001-2003 1236 firm year observations CG index (+) Tobin’s Q / ROA China 
Hermes and Katsigianni 
(2012)SSRN 
2007 124 listed firms CG index (+) Tobin’s Q / ROA Greece 
Black and Kim (2012) 1998-2004 428 non-financial public firms CG index (+) Tobin’s Q Korea 
Black et al. (2012) 2004 66 private firms CG index (+) Tobin’s Q Brazil 
Ujunwa (2012) 1991-2008 122 quoted firms bsize (-) CEO duality (-) ROA Nigeria 
Veprauskaite and Adams (2013) 2003-2008 468 publicly listed firms board independence (0) board size (+)  
CEO duality (-) 
Tobin’s Q / ROA UK 
Bhagat and Bolton (2013) 1998-2007 1000-1400 firms per year board independence (-) (+) CEO duality (-) Tobin’s Q / ROA US 
Tariq and Abbas (2013) 2003-2010 119 firms CG compliance index (+) ROA Pakistan 
Cremers and Ferrell (2014) 1978-2006 1000 firms G index (restrictions on shareholders’ rights) (-) Tobin’s Q US 
Black et al. (2015) 1998-2004 Up to 509 firms CG index (+) Tobin’s Q Korea 
Bozec and Dia (2015) 2002-2005 130 firms ROB index (+) Tobin’s Q Canada 
Conheady et al. (2015) 2003-2009 699 firm year observations BSCI index (+) Tobin’s Q Canada 
Rose (2016) 2010 155 firms CG index (+) ROA Denmark 
Akbar et al. (2016)  1999-2009 435 non-financial public firms CG index (0) Tobin’s Q / ROA UK 
Duru et al. (2016) 1997-2011 950 firms board independence (0) CEO duality (-) ROA US 
Ararat et al. (2017) 2006-2012 1258 firm-year observations CG index (+) Tobin’s Q Turkey 
Zhou et al. (2018) 2008-2012 774 firm year observations bsize (+) board independence (-) ROA Greece 
Studies in this table only include research that proxy firm performance using Tobin’s Q & ROA and corporate governance using internal corporate governance mechanisms such as board size & independence, 
CEO duality and CG indices.  Studies are listed in chronological order according to publication date.   
(0):  no relationship between CG variable and firm performance  
(+):  positive relationship between CG variable and firm performance  
(-):  negative relationship between CG variable and firm performance 
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6.5 Literature review: CG and firm performance in a crisis setting 
The global financial crisis that began in September 2007 has been compared by many 
to the Great Depression of the 1930s.  Economists such as Paul Krugman consider it 
milder than the Great Depression, while others, such as Eichengreen and O’Rourke 
consider it similar, if not worse than, the Great Depression (Gupta et al., 2013).  
Although it originated in the financial sector of the US, it affected major stock markets 
around the world, leading many stock markets to lose as much as half of their value.  
This stock market decrease was a great test for market-oriented corporate governance 
models advocated by many advanced economies of the world (Gupta et al., 2013).  
Many suggest that corporate governance failed the test.  Some also state that poor 
corporate governance was a basic reason for the financial crisis (Yeh et al., 2011).  For 
example, Kirkpatrick (2009) in a report commissioned by the OECD steering group on 
corporate governance, states that the financial crisis can be attributed to weaknesses of 
corporate governance in financial service companies.  Understanding the relationship 
between governance mechanisms and firm performance in such difficult times is of 
utmost importance.  It is important to examine whether shareholder equity value is 
protected when there is a great decrease in the value of capital markets.  Do corporate 
governance structures provide the shield necessary to maintain firm performance in 
such turbulent times (Leung and Horwitz, 2010)?   
Markets characterized by weak institutions and poor firm-level governance are key 
reasons for investors to lose confidence.  Johnson et al. (2000) state that this was the 
main reason for the Asian crisis of 1997-1998.  However, the financial crisis of 2007-
2008 originated in the US, a market characterized by institutional strength and good 
governance.  This fact explains why this crisis was predicted by so few.  This raises the 
question of whether and to what extent sound corporate governance practices can be 
considered to be a cause of the financial crisis (Adams, 2012).   
Transparency and accountability are two basic corporate governance principles that 
were violated by investment and commercial banks that led to the financial crisis 
(Bekiaris et al., 2013).  Company boards, through their compensation committees, were 
responsible for the great increase in executive pay during the 2000s, which many 
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believe led to excessive, short-term, risk-taking that set off the financial crisis.  
Additionally, institutional failings in risk management and financial reporting standards 
proved ineffective in signaling pre-existing structural problems that led to the financial 
crisis (Conyon et al., 2011).  Researchers believe that the board of directors was 
incapable of monitoring executives and properly assessing risk (Essen et al., 2013).   
Good corporate governance mechanisms that are beneficial in normal business 
conditions can prove to be harmful in a crisis setting.  Decisive leadership in uncertain 
times is critical, whereby corporate governance mechanisms that stem from agency 
theory, can prove to be overly restrictive and restraining in response to issues arising in 
crisis conditions.  Thus, governance mechanisms may have a different effect on firm 
performance during normal and crisis settings (Essen et al., 2013).   
Independent directors, board committees, CEO duality, transparency and disclosure can 
improve firms’ governance and essentially aid firms in dealing with financial crisis 
problems.  Better governed firms contribute to more effective decision making, thus 
contributing to better firm performance. 
The relationship between firm performance and the board of directors is of utmost 
importance, especially in crisis times, for the following reasons.  Firstly, corporate 
boards are an important, if not the most important, governance mechanism, as they are 
responsible for monitoring and advising management so as to protect shareholders’ 
interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams et al., 2005; 
Francis et al., 2012).  This is especially important in times of crisis.  According to 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) boards are usually reactive in sound financial times, 
since good firm performance increases the CEOs bargaining power and reduces board 
independence.  However, in difficult economic times, boards become more proactive, 
whereby bad firm performance reduces CEOs bargaining power and increases board 
independence.  Secondly, a key function of boards is reviewing and guiding risk 
management strategies.  Research indicates that a major cause of the current financial 
crisis is excessive managerial risk-taking behaviour, where boards failed to properly 
assess risk strategies and monitor managers’ risk-taking behaviour (Kirkpatrick, 2009).  
Therefore, although an ineffective board of directors is not the direct reason for the 
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current financial crisis, boards can be a crucial element that determine the extent to 
which firms are exposed to the financial crisis.  Third, although extensive research has 
examined board of directors’ composition and firm performance, the results are mixed 
and inconclusive.  Researchers have often pointed to endogeneity as a crucial reason 
for these mixed results.  Examining the impact of the board of directors in light of the 
current financial crisis creates an exogenous shock to firms.  Thus, assessing the board 
of directors before the external shock and examining the changes in firm performance, 
mitigates to a large extent the endogeneity issue (Francis et al., 2012) 
Boards’ monitoring and advising role leads to the argument that during the financial 
crisis, firms with high quality boards are likely to have smaller decreases in their firm 
performance in comparison to lower quality boards.  Boards’ effectiveness and firm 
performance has been examined using multiple variables such as board independence, 
board financial expertise, board size, board duality, board diversity and board 
shareholdings (Yermack, 1996; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). 
As stated previously, although the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance has been studied extensively in the literature, the critical element is to 
examine this relationship during a financial crisis setting.  
Prior studies, such as Mitton (2002), Lemmon and Lins (2003), and Leung and Horwitz 
(2010) examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance 
during the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990’s.  More specifically, Mitton (2002) in 
a sample of 398 non-financial firms from Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand89 find that differences in corporate governance attributes have a 
significant impact on firm performance during the East-Asian financial crisis.  Firm 
performance is measured using stock returns over the crisis period from July 1997 to 
August 1998.  Corporate governance attributes used in this study are higher disclosure 
quality (ADRs and auditors from Big Six accounting firms), ownership concentration 
and corporate diversification.  They find that better performance is associated with 
                                                 
89 These five countries were most involved in the East Asian financial crisis, since compared to other 
countries affected by the crisis, their stock market decline and currency depreciation was 
disproportionately higher.  
Chapter 6- Literature Review and Hypothesis Development (CG & FP) 
 
191 
 
higher disclosure quality, higher outside ownership concentration and less firm 
diversification.   
Lemmon and Lins (2003) use a sample of 800 non-financial firms in eight90 East Asian 
countries to assess the effect of ownership structure on firm value during the East Asian 
financial crisis.  The primary valuation measure is a firm’s cumulative stock return over 
the crisis period, from July 1, 1997 to August 1, 1998.  Ownership structure is based on 
Lins (2003) ownership data sources which utilize various analyst and country 
handbooks to measure the ownership structures of emerging market firms.  They find 
that the crisis had a negative impact on firms’ investment opportunities where 
controlling shareholders had more incentives to expropriate minority investors, 
indicating that ownership structure plays an essential role in determining whether 
insiders expropriate minority shareholders.  Their research reports that firms have lower 
performance when their controlling managers had more control rights than ownership 
rights.  Their findings indicate that corporate governance affects firm performance 
during the financial crisis.    
Leung and Horwitz (2010) evaluate the effects of management ownership, equity 
ownership by non-executives, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board, 
and CEO duality on the stock performance of 463 non-financial Hong Kong firms 
during the start of the Asian Financial Crisis, from August 1, 1997 to August 31, 1998.  
Firm performance is measured as the market-adjusted stock returns calculated as the 
compounded monthly, market-adjusted stock returns.  They find that firms with more 
concentrated management ownership, more equity ownership by non-executive 
members of the board and CEO duality, have better market performance during the 
crisis period.  No effect was observed between the proportion of non-executives on the 
board and stock market performance. 
Various studies have examined corporate governance mechanisms and firm 
performance during the 2007-2008 credit crisis, such as Aldamen et al. (2012), Francis 
                                                 
90 The eight East Asian countries included in the study are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand.   
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et al. (2012), Essen et al. (2013), Gupta et al. (2013), Hawas (2014) and Kowaleski 
(2016).91  
Aldamen et al. (2012) study the impact of audit committee characteristics on firm 
performance during the global financial crisis.  Their sample includes 120 US listed 
firms for the year 2008.  Firm performance is measured as the change in stock price 
over one year from the beginning of the impact of the global financial crisis to the first 
recovery of the market.  The dependent variable, performance, is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one for high performers and zero for low performers.  Market 
performance is also examined by using ROA and the percentage price change between 
the years 2008 and 2009.  The independent variable, audit committee characteristics, is 
measured by creating a composite governance index, which includes 15 audit 
committee characteristics employed in previous governance studies, such as size, 
meetings, independence and expertise.  To calculate the index, each of the non-binary 
variables is transformed to a binary form by assigning one if the variable is greater or 
equal than the median for all firms or zero otherwise.92  Additionally the independent 
variable is also measured through 13 out of the 15 individual audit committee 
characteristics obtained from principal component analysis.  They find that smaller 
audit committees, with experience and financial expertise, with block holder 
representation, with board chairs that have external directorships and years of 
managerial experience, have a positive impact on firm performance.  However, a longer 
tenured chair has a negative effect.  The composite audit committee index produced 
similar results, and a positive relationship with firm performance is found.   
Francis et al. (2012) examine the effect of corporate governance on firm performance 
during the financial crisis for 876 observations of non-financial US firms from October 
2007 until March 2009.  This period is chosen so as to examine the impact of the 
                                                 
91 These studies examine corporate governance mechanisms effect on firm performance during the 2007-
2008 credit crisis for non-financial firms, similar to the sample of this study.  There are also studies, such 
as Yeh et al. 2011, Grove et al. 2011, Beltratti and Stulz 2012, Peni and Vahamaa 2012, Aebi et al. 2012, 
Erkens et al. 2012 and Vallaskas et al. 2017 and Switzer et al. 2018 that also examine the relationship 
between these two variables during the 2007-2008 financial crisis but are not included in this literature 
review because they examine financial firms. 
92 The only exception is for the AC variable, GREY directors, which is expected to have a negative 
impact on firm performance.  Thus, for the purpose of creating the AC index, it is coded as one if it is 
less or equal than the median or zero otherwise. 
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external shock (the financial crisis) on firm value.  Firm performance is calculated as 
the cumulative stock returns (buy and hold returns)93 during the crisis period (from 
October 2007 to March 2009) taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP).  Various measures of corporate governance are used, such as ‘traditional’ 
board independence (percentage of independent, non-executive board members), ‘true’ 
board independence94, the financial expertise of directors, the number of board 
meetings, board attendance and director age.  Information for these variables was 
obtained from the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), Compustat 
database and ExecuComp.  They find that ‘traditional’ board independence does not 
significantly affect firm performance, while ‘true’ board independence95, independent 
financial experts on the boards, board meeting frequency, director attendance behaviour 
and director age positively affect firm performance.   
Liu et al. (2012) examine the performance of Chinese state-owned enterprises before 
and after the global financial crisis. Their sample consists of 970 Chinese listed firms 
for the period 2007-2008 and proxies the change in firm value during the financial crisis 
with the use of the change in Tobin’s Q.  They report that state-owned firms that have 
higher levels of bank debt have lower levels of stock price decreases during the crisis 
period, while having poorer performance during the pre-crisis period.  State ownership 
mitigates financial constraints during the crisis period, while creating overinvestment 
problems in non-crisis settings.  They also find that managerial ownership is positively 
associated with firm value changes for state-owned enterprises.  In addition, firms that 
employ Big Four auditing firms experience small reductions in firm value during the 
financial crisis, consistent with the belief that better disclosure is associated with higher 
firm performance.   
Essen et al. (2013) examine the effects of firm and country level governance 
mechanisms on firm performance during the financial crisis from July 2007 to March 
                                                 
93 Cumulative stock returns are also used in the work of Johnson et al. (2000), Mitton (2002) and Lemmon 
and Lins (2003) as the primary measure of firm performance.   
94 ‘True’ board independence is defined as independent, non-executive board members who preceded the 
current CEO.    
95 The positive relationship between ‘true’ board independence and firm performance supports the 
findings that CEO’s try to be actively involved in the selection of independent non-executive board 
members, so as to maintain their power and control. 
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2009, using a sample of 1,197 firms from 26 European countries.  Lagged ownership 
concentration, board composition and executive incentive compensation are used to 
measure governance quality, while firm performance is calculated using cumulative 
adjusted stock returns.  They find that good governance practices prescribed by 
previous research do not apply in periods of crisis.  More specifically, board 
independence, executive incentive compensation and the absence of CEO duality 
negatively affect firm performance in crisis periods, where the emphasis is not on 
maximizing shareholder wealth but on restoring corporate stability.   
Gupta et al. (2013) also examine the impact of internal governance mechanisms on firm 
performance during the 2007-2008 financial crisis, using a comprehensive cross-
country sample of 4,046 non-financial publicly traded firms in 23 countries.  They 
construct a CG index as a proxy of governance quality and examine its relationship 
with firm performance, measured as buy and hold returns, from October 2007 to March 
2009.  They find that well governed firms do not outperform poorly governed firms 
during the financial crisis.   
Hawas (2014) for 139 UK non-financial listed firms for the period 2005-2009 examines 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance before and during 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  He develops a CG index to measure governance quality 
and measures firm performance using Tobin’s Q and ROA.  He finds a positive 
relationship between CG and firm performance in the pre-crisis period, while an 
insignificant relationship exists between the two variables during the crisis period.   
Kowalewski (2016) examines how corporate governance effects firm performance and 
dividend payout during the financial crisis of 2008.  He constructs a CG index, similar 
to the work of Brown and Caylor (2006), Klapper and Love (2004), Black et al. (2006a) 
and Black et al. (2006c) for 298 non-financial firms listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange for the period 2006-2010.  Firm performance is measured using ROA and 
Tobin’s Q, as well as a dividend measure indicating the dividends paid to investors.   
He reports that a positive relationship exists between corporate governance and Tobin’s 
Q, as well as dividend payouts before the financial crisis.  However, during the financial 
crisis, corporate governance is positively related to ROA and negatively related to 
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dividend payouts.  These findings indicate that although good corporate governance 
does not create shareholder value, as indicated by Tobin’s Q, during the financial crisis, 
firms with strong governance exhibit higher profitability, as shown by ROA, during the 
crisis.  Thus, good governance weakens the harmful influence of the crisis on the 
financial performance of firms.  As for the negative relationship between governance 
and dividend payouts, this could potentially indicate that better-governed firms are 
more risk-averse and tend to retain profit and increase their capital during uncertain 
periods, as is the case of a financial crisis.  Table 6-2 illustrates the findings of prior 
studies conducted on corporate governance mechanisms and the performance of non-
financial firms in a crisis setting.
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Table 6-2 Findings of prior studies on corporate governance and firm performance of non-financial firms in a crisis setting 
AUTHORS CRISIS PERIOD SAMPLE SIZE CG VARIABLES FIRM 
PERFORMANCE 
COUNTRY 
Mitton (2002) Asian financial crisis July 1997-August 1998 398 non-financial firms ADR’s and Big Four auditors (disclosure 
quality) (+), ownership concentration (+) 
and corporate diversification (-) 
stock returns Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand 
Lemmon and Lins (2003) Asian financial crisis July 1, 1997-August 1, 1998 800 non-financial firms ownership structure (-) cumulative stock returns Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, South 
Korea, Taiwan and Thailand 
Leung and Horwitz 
(2010) 
Asian financial crisis August 1, 1997-August 31, 
1998 
463 non-financial firms Management ownership (+), equity 
ownership by non-executives (+), board 
independence (0), CEO duality (+) 
market-adjusted stock 
returns 
Hong Kong 
Aldaman et al. (2012) 2007-2008 credit 
crisis 
2008 120 listed firms Audit committee index (+), ac size (-), ac 
expertise (+), ac block holder (+), ac 
chair with external directorships and 
expertise (+) 
change in stock price / 
ROA 
US 
Francis et al. (2012) 2007-2008 credit 
crisis 
October 2007-March 2009 876 firm year observations for 
non-financial firms 
Board independence (0), financial 
expertise (+), number of meetings (+), 
board attendance (+), director age (+) 
cumulative stock returns US 
Liu et al. (2012) 2007-2008 credit 
crisis 
August 2007-December 2008 970 Chinese listed firms state ownership (+), managerial 
ownership (+), Big Four auditors (+)  
change in Tobin’s Q China 
Essen et al. (2013) 2007-2008 credit 
crisis 
July 2007-March 2009 1,197 firms board independence (-), CEO duality (+) 
executive incentive compensation (-) 
cumulative adjusted 
stock returns 
26 European countries 
Gupta et al. (2013) 2007-2008 credit 
crisis 
October 2007-March 2009 4,046 non-financial publicly 
traded firms 
CG index (0) Buy-and-hold returns  / 
market-adjusted stock 
returns / ROA 
23 countries (US and 22 developed 
countries) 
Hawas (2014) 2007-2008 credit 
crisis 
2005-2009 139 non-financial firms CG index (+/0) Tobin’s Q / ROA UK 
Kowaleski (2016) 2007-2008 credit 
crisis 
2006-2010 298 non-financial firms CG index (+) Tobin’s Q / ROA Poland 
(0):  no relationship between CG variable and firm performance  
(+):  positive relationship between CG variable and firm performance  
(-):  negative relationship between CG variable and firm performance 
Studies are listed in chronological order according to publication date.   
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6.6 The financial crisis in Greece 
Eighty years after the financial crisis of 1929 and forty years after the end of the 
dictatorship in Greece, the country encountered, a severe financial crisis that began in 
2008 (Nerantzidis and Filos, 2014).  The 2007-2008 financial crisis, also known as the 
2008 global financial crisis began in the US as a result of a housing bubble bursting.  
This led to the downturn of the US economy, resulting in the 2008-2012 global 
recession.  Simultaneously, the 2008 global financial crisis contributed to the crisis in 
the Eurozone, commonly known as the ‘European Sovereign-Debt Crisis’ (Mantalos, 
2017).  Many Eurozone members, such as Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain 
were unable to refinance their debt without the assistance of third parties, such as the 
European Central Bank (ECB) or the International Monitory Fund (IMF).  The lagged 
impact of the global crisis brought forth pre-existing structural problems and 
macroeconomic imbalances of the Greek economy, leading the country into recession 
(Repousis, 2015; Mantalos, 2017).   
Greece became part of the European Economic Community (EEC) in January 1981 and 
in January 2001 became part of the Eurozone, a group of European countries with a 
common currency, the Euro.  Both events were significant for the country’s history.  
Membership of the EEC, renamed the European Union (EU) in 1992, was seen as a 
safeguard for democratic institutions which were restored after the dictatorship of 1967-
1974.  At the start of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, Greece was the 
only country in the EU that wanted to join the Eurozone but was not allowed to do so, 
as it did not comply with the Maastricht convergence criteria.  However, in June 2000 
the European Council decided that Greece met the criteria (Herz and Kotios, 2000).  
Greek citizens welcomed the common currency as an opportunity to obtain economic 
benefits.  Participating in a such large economic community was also considered a 
political, social and economic opportunity (Oltheten et al., 2013).   
EU development programmes funded by the EU during the 1981-2001 period benefited 
the country, but government policies led the country to run up a substantial deficit.  The 
2004 Olympic Games, the high employment rate in the public sector, a high level of 
corruption and tax evasion were fundamental reasons that resulted in an economic 
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impasse for Greece.  As a result, the country’s debt level substantially increased since 
funding for the aforementioned activities came from bonds issued by the Greek 
government (Samitas and Tsakalos, 2013).   
In 2009, a reported increase in the government debt level led investors to doubt 
Greece’s ability to meet its debt obligations, mirrored in a steep increase in bond yield 
spreads (Repousis, 2015; Kosmidou et al., 2015).  The peak of the crisis was in April 
of 2010 when Greece’s access to international markets was blocked and it was unable 
to service its existing debt.  Financial problems, as a result of high public debt and 
primary deficits, a lack of competitiveness and structural problems due to a 
bureaucratic, inflexible and over-expanded public sector, are factors that led to Greece’s 
crisis (Nerantzidis and Filos, 2014).  As a result, Greece was forced to sign a 
memorandum in May 2010 to obtain the support of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB), known as the 
Troika partners.  The memorandum aimed at restructuring the Greek economy in terms 
of public expenditure and public property (Nerantzidis and Filos, 2014; Repousis, 2015; 
Kosmidou et al., 2015).    
The Greek debt crisis that began in 2009 and is still ongoing has caused significant 
changes in Greece.  The income of Greeks has been reduced, unemployment has 
increased and continuous austerity bills have been approved by consecutive Greek 
parliaments (Chionis et al., 2016)  However, since 2010, the date of the first bill, the 
outcome is not what was expected and many sectors of the Greek economy are in a 
worse condition (Chionis et al., 2016).  
In 1974, the debt-to-GDP ratio was 18%.  In 1986, public debt reached 58% of GDP, 
due to volatile growth performance, high inflation, successive currency devaluations 
and structural weaknesses.  Public debt continued to increase reaching 113% of GDP 
in 1996.  Disproportionate social benefits, high pensions, public enterprises with high 
deficits and unnecessary public appointments are key reasons for this great increase in 
government debt.  Greek governments were arguably buying votes through public 
spending and state borrowing.  As part of the Eurozone, Greece could borrow at lower 
rates than if it were on its own.  Government borrowing accelerated after Greece entered 
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the Euro in 2001, allowing it to borrow at practically zero interest rates.  A decade 
before the crisis, Greece’s average annual real GDP growth was close to 4%, making 
Greece an excellent performer within the EMU countries.  This growth led to high real 
wages, low interest rates, a boom in the housing market, credit expansion and loose 
fiscal policy.  In 2008, the per capita GDP in Greece was such that it corresponded to 
95% of the average EU per capita GDP.  However, the country did not take advantage 
of this favourable setting to decrease its debt to GDP levels to sustainable amounts 
(Baltas, 2013). 
The Greek economy has sustained a period of economic ruin from 2008-2014, 
according to data published by the Hellenic Statistical Authority (ElStat).  Six years of 
falling GDP was experienced, from approximately 230 billion euros in 2008 to 180 
billion euros in 2014.  The consecutive years of negative GDP growth, resulting in a 
26% decrease by the end of 2014 from its peak in 2007, wiped out all of the gains of 
the 2000’s.  An even larger decrease in employment, around 30%, is recorded during 
this period.  From a peak of 4.6 million jobs in 2008, more than one million workers 
(22%) lost their jobs from 2008-2014, making the total unemployed above 1.2 million.  
The active working population is shrinking, not only because of unemployment, but 
also due to workers leaving the country in search of better opportunities abroad 
(increased migration), as well as reduced immigration to Greece. Additionally, 
residents’ disposable income has decreased, due to higher taxes, more part-time work, 
and high unemployment rates (Papadimitriou et al., 2014; Papadimitriou et al., 2015; 
Papadimitriou et al., 2016). Greece’s public debt reached a level of 177.1% of GDP in 
2014, as seen in Graph 6-1 (Eißel, 2015). 
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Graph 6-1 Greece’s debt to GDP 
 
 
As a result, domestic demand dropped dramatically, resulting in about 100,000 firms 
going bankrupt and Greeks losing on average 30% of their income.  The country has 
approximately 500,000 families without any labour income.  The numbers are even 
worse for young people, with the official unemployment rate increasing from 18.1% in 
2007 to 53.2% in 2014 (Eißel, 2015).  This deep and prolonged depression has pushed 
many people into poverty and income inequality has increased, almost tripling between 
2007 and 2013 (OECD, 2016).   
Although Greece has implemented significant reforms, the crisis continues to exist, as 
a result of the country failing to address problems affecting the public sector and the 
policies that resulted in its continuing difficulties.  The depressed economy, lack of 
bank financing and remaining structural weaknesses have been holding the Greek 
economy back (OECD, 2016).  As seen in Graph 6-2 a significant decrease in the ASE 
index occurred during the crisis years.  The crisis has shown that the development 
model followed by the country all these years has led, ultimately, to economic 
deterioration and a loss of creditworthiness, and thus an increase in bond yield spreads, 
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leading to the need for continuous support from the IMF, ECB and the EU (Nerantzidis 
and Filos, 2014). 
Graph 6-2 The ASE Index 
 
 
Greece today is at a crossroad.  As of 2018, the country’s privatizations are essential as 
rescue programmes are due to end in the summer of 2018.  Economic growth has 
returned and is set to continue.  However, hurdles lie ahead for Greece.  Eurozone 
finance ministers warned Greece that the prospect of a new austerity package is likely 
if Greece fails to hit the primary surplus target of 3.5%, a prospect that is possible given 
the fact that there is a huge shortfall in tax revenues.  Additionally, people do not feel 
their prospects will improve in the near future, and with a general election emerging 
soon, turmoil could further be generated (Amaro, 2017; Smith, 2017). 
6.7 Hypothesis development 
In a crisis setting it is important that corporate governance responds in an effective way.  
Management should be clear on strategies to be followed.  The crisis has shown that 
weaknesses in governance exist, and these influence a firm’s effectiveness.  The 
composition of the board of directors and other crucial governance items are critical 
factors to enable firms to perform well in the sovereign debt crisis.  The fundamental 
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role of boards is to provide guidance and control.  The recent global financial crisis 
indicates that boards did not effectively perform this role.  Corporate governance 
significantly impacted firm performance during the crisis by allowing risks and 
financing policies that were ineffective (Erkens et al., 2012; Bekiaris et al., 2013).  
Although the financial crisis has been attributed to external financial and economic 
factors, the failures of internal corporate governance mechanisms also played a role 
(Bekiaris et al., 2013).   
Based on the existing literature that examines the effect of governance attributes on 
firm performance in a crisis setting, the relationship is not clear, a priori.  The distinct 
hypothesis of a positive relationship between board of directors’ composition variables 
and firm performance in a non-crisis setting, is not as distinct in a crisis setting.  The 
universality of good governance recommendations is challenged and the effectiveness 
of governance mechanisms depends on organizational and environmental conditions 
(Essen et al., 2013).   
This study examines the effect of firm and country level “good” governance 
prescriptions on firm performance before and during the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.   
Differing results for the effect of board size on firm performance exist in the literature 
for both non-crisis and crisis settings.  Greek Law No.2190/1920 (Article 18) requires 
a minimum of three board members and does not set an upper limit.  The Greek CG 
code states that the board size should be large enough to reflect a balance between 
executive, non-executive and independent non-executive members, so that no 
individual board member can dictate their views on the decision-making process of the 
firm.  Board size should reflect the firm’s size, its activities and its ownership structure 
and should include a diversity of skills, views, knowledge and experience.  The Greek 
CG Code, Section A, Part II, (2013) suggests that the size of Greek boards contain no 
fewer than seven members and no more than 15.  The Greek CG code’s 
recommendations on board size have not changed in the revised CG Code of 2013, in 
light of the sovereign debt crisis.   
In a Greek setting, Toudas (2009) examines 283 randomly selected firms on the ASE 
for the year 2005 and finds a positive relationship between board size and firm 
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performance and Drakos and Bekiris (2010) for a sample of 1,490 firm-year 
observations for the period 2000-2006 find a negative relationship between board size 
and firm performance.  Both studies differ from this study, since the data sample period 
for this study is 2006-2012, where Greek firms implemented different governance 
structures, compared to the period of study of the other two, due to additional 
governance-related laws, apart from Law 3016/2002, Law 3693/2008, Law 3873/2010 
and Law 3884/2010.96  Additionally, Zhou et al. (2018) study the relationship between 
board size and firm performance,  for a sample of 774 Greek firm-year observations for 
the period 2008-2012, and find a positive  relationship between the two variables.   
Thus, in such a setting the following hypothesis is tested: 
H1a:  A positive relationship between board size and firm performance before and 
during the sovereign debt crisis is expected. 
The literature also reflects contradictory results concerning the relationship between 
board independence and firm performance.  In a Greek context, the adoption of Law 
3016/2002 establishes the corporate governance framework regarding board 
independence.   It requires the participation of at least two independent non-executive 
board members on the boards of Greek listed firms.   Additionally, the Greek CG code, 
Section A, Part II (2013) recommends Greek listed firms to have more than two 
independent non-executive members, with adequate experience and knowledge, to 
ensure board balance and to avoid potential conflicts of interest.97  Thus, it is expected 
that non-executive members on Greek boards will be in a position to improve firm 
performance.  No revisions in the recommendations of the revised CG Code of 2013 
have come forth in light of the sovereign debt crisis. 
In a Greek setting, board independence and firm performance has been examined by 
Toudas (2009), Drakos and Bekiris (2010) and  Zhou et al. (2018).  Toudas (2009) and 
Drakos and Bekiris (2010) find no association between the two variables.  As stated 
                                                 
96 For analysis of these laws, consult Chapter 2. 
97 The 2010 Greek CG Code recognizes the fact that there is a limited pool of potential independent board 
members in the Greek market, thus making it difficult for Greek firms to follow European best practice, 
and so a need for some flexibility in this context is needed. 
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earlier, in these two studies, Greek firms could potentially have different governance 
structures, compared to the Greek firms used in this research, since additional 
governance-related laws, apart from Law 3016/2002, Law 3693/2008, Law 3873/2010 
and Law 3884/2010 have been enacted.98  Furthermore, Zhou et al. (2018) find a 
negative relationship between board independence and firm performance, suggesting 
that independent boards do not always increase firm performance.   
Thus, in a setting such as the Greek one, the following hypothesis is tested: 
  H1b:  A positive relationship between board independence and firm performance 
before and during the sovereign debt crisis is expected.   
Most results found in the literature find a negative relationship between CEO duality 
and firm performance.  A unitary board leadership structure increases agency costs and 
the potential entrenchment of shareholders by a controlling CEO.  However, in 
uncertain times, a unitary board leadership structure, mirrored in CEO duality, 
facilitates firms in making rapid decisions and reflects a sense of unity and strength to 
shareholders.  Although many European codes and corporate governance systems 
mandate the absence of CEO duality, this is not the case in Greece.  The Greek law on 
corporate governance does not require the absence of CEO duality nor does the Greek 
CG code recommend that Greek listed firms separate the roles of the CEO and the 
chairman.  Each Greek listed firm is free to choose the leadership structure that best 
suits its company, considering its cultural identity, industry and commercial practice.  
Nonetheless, to ensure the independence of the board and the adequate flow of 
information needed for board oversight and decision-making, the Greek CG code, 
Section A, Part III, (2013) recommends the appointment of an independent vice 
chairman, in cases of CEO duality.  Although the absence of CEO duality is not part of 
any corporate governance law, and is not an explicit recommendation of the Greek CG 
Code, it is the preferred leadership structure for Greek listed firms included in this 
research for the sample period 2006-2012.  This is reflected in the fact that 59% of 
                                                 
98 For analysis of these laws, consult Chapter 2. 
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Greek listed firms for the aforementioned sample period have separate positions for 
CEO and chairman of the board. 
In a Greek setting, CEO duality and firm performance have been examined by Toudas 
(2009) and Drakos and Bekiris (2010) where the former finds a negative relationship 
between CEO duality and firm performance, while the latter find no association 
between the two variables.  As stated earlier in these studies Greek firms could 
potentially have different governance structures, compared to Greek firms of this study, 
since additional governance-related laws, apart from Law 3016/2002, Law 3693/2008, 
Law 3873/2010 and Law 3884/2010 have been enacted.99   
Although the absence of CEO duality is not part of any Greek CG law or Greek CG 
Code, it is considered to have a positive effect on firm performance.  Thus, based on 
the weight of evidence in the literature the following hypothesis is tested: 
H1c: A positive relationship between the absence of CEO duality and firm performance 
before and during the sovereign debt crisis is expected.   
Examining a comprehensive measure of governance quality, incorporated in a CG 
index, the vast majority of studies have found a positive relationship between CG 
indices and firm performance, both in non-crisis and crisis settings.   
In a Greek context, Hermes and Katsigianni (2012) construct a CG index for the year 
2007 for 124 Greek listed firms on the ASE so as to examine the effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance.  They find that better governed firms have higher 
operating and market based performance.  The difference between this study and 
Hermes and Katsigianni (2012) work is that their sample consists of 124 firms for the 
year 2007, while this sample includes 1,205 firm-year observations for the period 2006-
2012.  Finally, Hermes and Katsigianni (2012) study the year 2007, whereby the only 
governance law that existed was Law 3016/2002, while this study examines the period 
2006-2012, where apart from Law 3016/2002, additional governance-related laws are 
                                                 
99 For analysis of these laws, consult Chapter 2. 
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enacted, such as Law 3016/2008, Law 3873/2010 and Law 3884/2010 that affect the 
governance mechanisms of Greek listed firms.100 
Thus, the following hypothesis is tested: 
H2. A positive relationship between the CG index created for Greek firms and firm 
performance before and during the sovereign debt crisis is expected.  
6.8 Conclusion 
This chapter explores the literature regarding the effect of internal corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance in non-crisis and crisis settings.  Corporate 
governance is examined through individual governance attributes related to the board 
of directors’ composition, as well as CG indices, which incorporate many governance 
attributes in one measure.   
This literature review on the effect of board of directors’ composition - in terms of 
board size, board independence and CEO duality - on firm performance and the 
relationship between CG index scores and firm performance, forms the basis for the 
development of the hypotheses that are tested and discussed in Chapter 8.   
                                                 
100 For analysis of these laws, consult Chapter 2. 
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Chapter 7 – Research Design (CG & FP) 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter examines the relevant literature pertaining to the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance.  This relationship is also 
discussed in the context of crisis situations.  This chapter describes and analyzes how 
the data was collected and prepared to test the relationship between corporate 
governance and the financial performance of Greek listed firms before and during the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis.  This study focuses on the differences in the CG-
performance relationship during a pre-crisis period compared to a crisis-period.  Section 
7.2. discusses the methods used to test the key dependent variable of firm performance 
and how the key independent variable, corporate governance, is examined through both 
individual governance items, such as board size, board independence and the absence 
of CEO duality, as well as a multi-dimensional proxy of governance, a CG index.  
Empirical research models used to test the hypotheses are presented in sections 7.3 and 
7.4.  The sample selection and data collection procedures are discussed in section 7.5 
and section 7.6 concludes the chapter.   
7.2 Variables used in the study 
The aim of this research is to examine the influence of corporate governance 
mechanisms on firm performance before and during the Greek sovereign debt crisis.   
The following regression model is used: 
𝐹𝑃 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                          𝐞𝐪 𝟕 − 𝟏 
A similar research design is used in the previous paper (chapters 3-5) which examines 
the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings management before and 
after the implementation of Law 3693/2008, requiring all Greek listed firms to have an 
audit committee and complete disclosure of the firm’s relationship with the external 
auditor. 
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7.2.1 Firm performance measures (measurement of dependent variable) 
Corporate governance affects many aspects of firm performance, such as operating 
performance, market value and stock returns, as discussed in Chapter 6.  Operating 
performance measures profitability either through ROA (return on assets) and/or ROE 
(return on equity).  Market value measures firm performance by calculating market 
capitalization in relation to the firm’s book value, measured principally through Tobin’s 
Q.  Finally, stock returns, as a measure of firm performance, measure the firm’s change 
in stock prices over time measured through the use of return on investment, controlled 
for various factors, such as risk, that affect stock returns (Love, 2011).   
This study examines the relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance using market-based and operating performance measures.  The commonly 
used performance measure, Tobin’s Q, is utilized in this study as a market-based 
measure of firm performance.  Tobin’s Q is considered a good measure of firm value 
since it reflects the market’s perceptions of the firm’s past, current and future earnings, 
focusing on expectations of future performance (Kaczmarek et al., 2012).  Although 
many studies use only operating performance measures, such as ROA, this is not 
adequate since data used to calculate ROA is based on past events and thus it 
incorporates solely a viewpoint of the past (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001).  
Additionally, the Tobin’s Q calculation has the advantage of not being affected by 
financial reporting misrepresentations due to tax laws and accounting practices, as is 
the case in operating performance measures such as ROA (Campbell and Mínguez-
Vera, 2008).  The value of the Tobin’s Q ratio provides a clear picture of a firm’s 
performance.  A Tobin’s Q ratio of greater than one indicates investors’ expectations 
that the firm is able to effectively utilize resources, while a ratio of less than one, 
indicates the need for more asset utilization (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008).  
Research indicates that Tobin’s Q and ROA should not be considered as substitute 
measures of firm performance but complement each other, and thus both measures 
should be utilized in studies (Elsayed, 2007).   
Following Beiner et al. (2006), Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008), Jackling and Johl 
(2009) and Drakos and Bekiris (2010) Tobin’s Q is defined as follows:  
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𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄 = (
𝑀𝑉𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡101
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)                                                          𝐞𝐪 𝟕 − 𝟐 
 
A number of concerns have been expressed relating to the use of only Tobin’s Q.    
Figures that include firm market value can be undermined and thus produce invalid 
results due to the high noise component of stock price fluctuations.  Additionally, the 
market value of equity may reflect a company’s future growth opportunities that can be 
a result of factors independent of managerial decisions (Bozec et al., 2010).  However, 
for capital markets that are not well-developed, such as the case of the Greek capital 
market during the period of analysis, market-based performance measures, such as 
Tobin’s Q, may not accurately reflect firm performance (Jackling and Johl, 2009).  
Thus, in line with prior relevant research (e.g.  Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Drakos 
and Bekiris (2010)), as a complimentary measure of firm performance, ROA, is also 
used.  
ROA is measured as follows: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 = (
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
)                                          𝐞𝐪 𝟕 − 𝟑                       
 
Operating performance in prior research also utilizes ROE as a performance measure.  
However, investors of firms that are highly leveraged expect a higher return so as to be 
compensated for the increased risk due to the firm’s higher leverage, and thus the 
residual return to equity becomes more variable in such capital markets.  ROA mainly 
reflects operating results, and not capital structure decisions, and therefore is the 
operating performance measure used in the current study (Elsayed, 2007).   
7.2.2 Governance quality measures (measurement of key independent variable) 
Governance quality is measured through the use of individual corporate governance 
items, such as board size, board independence and the absence of CEO duality and 
through the use of CG indices, as in the previous study.  However, this study’s sample 
                                                 
101 Total debt represents all interest-bearing and capitalized lease obligations.  It is the sum of long and 
short-term debt.   
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uses more data since it includes six years and consists of 1,205 firm year observations, 
while the previous study includes four years and has 788 firm year observations.   
7.2.2.1 Board of directors’ composition 
The first measurement of governance quality is board of directors’ composition, studied 
through board size, board independence and the absence of CEO duality.   
 Board size (bsize): the number of members on the board as a measure of board 
size. 
  Board independence (bindep): the percentage of independent board members 
in relation to the total board size.   
 The absence of CEO Duality (ceodual): an indicator variable, taking the value 
of one if the position of CEO and chairman of the board is separated, or zero 
otherwise.   
7.2.2.2 Corporate Governance indices 
Corporate governance is also measured through the use of CG indices, as in the previous 
study (chapter 4-6).  This study estimates the CG indices using both rating schemes, the 
Scoring by item and the Scoring by category method.102  For each rating scheme, two 
indices are created depending on how the non-disclosed items are recorded, and thus 
four indices in total are created: when applying the Scoring by item method, (1) 
cg_pen_total, all items included in calculation of index, whereby the non-disclosed 
values are considered as non-existent, therefore firms are penalized in the rating 
procedure and (2) cg_non_total, all items included in calculation of index, whereby the 
non-disclosed values are excluded in the rating procedure and when applying the 
Scoring by category method (3) cg2_pen_total, all items included in calculation of 
index, whereby the non-disclosed values are considered as non-existent, therefore firms 
are penalized in the rating procedure and (4) cg2_non_total, all items included in 
                                                 
102 This study employs both rating schemes, the Scoring by item and the Scoring by category method, 
while the previous study only employed the Scoring by item rating scheme. 
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calculation of index, whereby the non-disclosed values are excluded in the rating 
procedure.103 
7.2.3 Measurement of control variables  
In addition to the main variables tested in the study, the use of variables that prior 
studies have found to be associated with firm performance and corporate governance 
are also controlled for (Black et al., 2006a; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Dah, 2016).  The 
following control variables are utilized in this study: concentrated ownership, leverage, 
firm size, free cash flows and growth opportunities.  Industry dummy variables are also 
included to control for differences in asset structure, government regulations and 
competitiveness among firms.  Each of these elements could potentially affect firm 
performance and corporate governance (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Beiner et al., 2006).  
Concentrated ownership, leverage and firm size are control variables also used in the 
previous study as stated Chapter 4.   
Firm size 
It is necessary to control for size since it may affect firm performance and the firm’s 
ability to deal with the negative effects of a financial crisis (Mitton, 2002; Leung and 
Horwitz, 2010).  Following the work of Jackling and Johl (2009), Bozec et al. (2010) 
and Ammann et al. (2011) firm size (ta) is controlled for using the logarithm of total 
assets (ta). 
Firm size can affect firm performance both positively and negatively.  Large firms have 
better asset utilization due to economies of scale and synergies across business lines.  
Larger firms are also able to generate higher sales revenue across business segments 
without needing to have additional asset bases for each segment (Singh and Davidson 
Iii, 2003). Thus, a positive relationship would exist between firm size and firm 
performance.  However, it is also possible that large firms have increased agency costs 
due to the greater difficulty involved in monitoring them, and therefore a negative 
relationship could be expected between firm size and firm value (Campbell and 
                                                 
103 For an analytical discussion of how the CG indices are constructed, consult Chapter 4. 
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Mínguez-Vera, 2010).  Therefore, the relationship between firm size and firm 
performance is not consistent. 
Leverage 
Leverage (lev), similar to Ammann et al. (2011) and Akbar et al. (2016), is defined as 
the ratio of total debt over total assets. 
 It can have either a positive or a negative effect on firm performance (Bhagat and 
Bolton, 2008; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2010).  Higher 
levels of debt increase the probability of bankruptcy and credit risk, thus reducing the 
ability of firms to invest in profitable opportunities and ultimately decrease firm value 
(Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2010; Akbar et al., 2016).  Additionally, highly 
leveraged firms have greater difficulty in obtaining equity financing since they stand a 
greater chance of experiencing sharper declines in equity value, also contributing to 
lower firm value (Leung and Horwitz, 2010).  On the other hand, highly leveraged firms 
can improve their performance since they are highly scrutinized by creditors, limiting 
managerial misbehaviour and signaling high quality management (Kowalewski, 2016; 
Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2010).  Higher 
levels of debt financing decrease the firm’s free cash flow, as managers are cautious in 
their investment decisions, thus limiting potential agency costs (Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera, 2010).  Additionally, larger levels of debt force managers to work 
harder so as to create higher levels of cash flow, resulting in increased firm performance 
(Kowalewski, 2016).  Therefore, the overall effect of leverage on firm performance is 
not consistent.    
Concentrated ownership 
Ownership concentration (ownconc) is measured as the percentage of shares owned by 
the largest shareholder of the firm, as in Black et al. (2006b). 
Research has shown that concentrated ownership influences managerial decisions, 
suggesting a reduced ability for managerial expropriation, and therefore a positive 
relationship is expected between ownership concentration and firm performance.  Large 
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shareholders have the motive and ability to monitor and influence managers so as to 
align the interests of managers and shareholders, thus decreasing agency costs by 
alleviating the traditional principal-agent problem and thereby improving firm 
performance (Cheng et al., 2012).  They are the key mechanism that aligns the interests 
of controlling and non-controlling owners (Bennedsen et al., 2008)  These benefits of 
concentrated ownership become more evident in countries that have a relatively weak 
legal system, as is the case of Greece (La Porta et al., 1999; Denis and McConnell, 
2003).104   
Growth opportunities 
Growth opportunities (growth) is measured as capital expenditures scaled by net sales. 
Growth opportunities usually influence the ownership and governance structures of 
firms (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008).  Growth opportunities are included as a control 
variable to control for potential advantages that are a result of economies of scale and 
market opportunities and are expected to positively affect firm performance (Klein et 
al., 2005).  
Firms with opportunities for growth generate more profitable investment opportunities 
and have a greater need for external financing.  These conditions provide an incentive 
for firms to improve their governance practices and firm performance so as to reduce 
their cost of capital (Beiner et al., 2006).  This positive relationship between governance 
practices and growth opportunities is stronger in firms which operate in countries with 
weaker legal frameworks and less investor friendly environments (Durnev and Kim, 
2005).   
Cheng et al. (2012) report that firms with greater growth opportunities tend to demand 
higher quality managers, while Dah (2016) find that a negative relationship exists 
between firms with high growth opportunities and managerial entrenchment. Both 
elements could potentially lead to an increase of firm value.  
                                                 
104 Concentrated ownership is also a proxy for family ownership, since on average the pooled sample 
(2006-2012) has 52% family firms, of which 86% has a family member being the largest shareholder of 
the firm (the variable concentrated ownership).  See Appendix VI for more information. 
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Although growth does not guarantee high returns, continuous innovation is needed to 
realize growth and sustain the firm’s competitive advantage, often leading to increased 
firm value (Essen et al., 2012). 
It is expected that growth opportunities positively affects firm performance, as seen in 
previous studies such as Durnev and Kim (2005), Cheng et al. (2012) and Dah (2016).   
Free cash flows 
Free cash flows (fcf) is another control variables used in this study and it is calculated 
as funds from operations minus capital expenditures and minus cash dividends, scaled 
by total assets 
Firms with free cash flows have the ability to invest in positive net present value that 
lead to higher firm performance.  Thus a positive free cash flow ultimately increases 
firm value (Bozec et al., 2010).  Additionally, firms with high levels of free cash flows 
have fewer liquidity problems, since the internal funding available, assists them in 
avoiding high levels of external financing.  This has a positive effect on firm value 
(Phung and Mishra, 2016).  However, free cash flows could also have the opposite 
effect on firm value.  When firms have free cash flows that are more than the positive 
net present value projects available to them, they could choose to invest in negative net 
present value projects, the so-called over-investment problem (Campbell and Mínguez-
Vera, 2010).  In such cases, free cash flows can have a negative effect on firm value.  
Additionally, agency costs can be created due to free cash flows.  Conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers can arise on how to disgorge free cash flows 
whereby managers can be motivated to invest them in below cost of capital investments 
or waste them on organizational inefficiencies.  This can lead to a reduction in firm 
value (Jensen, 1986).   
Thus, the overall effect of free cash flows on firm performance is not consistent.    
7.3 Empirical research model 
The study examines the role of governance on firm performance before and during the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis.  The data is decomposed into two periods: the pre-crisis 
Chapter 7- Research Design (CG & FP) 
 
215 
 
sample in 2006, 2008, and 2009, and the crisis sample in 2010, 2011 and 2012.105  A 
crisis year dummy variable equaling one is given to the crisis years, and zero to the pre-
crisis years.  The purpose of the use of this dummy variable is to examine the effect of 
corporate governance variables on firm performance before and during the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis, as in the research of Yeh et al. (2011).  For this reason, the use of 
interaction variables between the dummy variable and the corporate governance 
variables is implemented in this study.  The coefficient of such interaction variables 
shows the marginal effects of corporate governance variables, before and during the 
Greek sovereign debt crisis.  It is expected that firms with stronger governance quality 
will have higher firm performance during the crisis years.   
Since both individual governance variables and a CG index are used to capture 
governance quality, the research applies two models to test the research hypotheses.  
The first model examines individual governance variables in terms of board of 
directors’ composition such as in Jackling and Johl (2009) and Veprauskaité and Adams 
(2013), and in the second model governance attributes are incorporated in a CG index, 
as in Ammann et al. (2011) and Rose (2016).  All regressions are run twice: once with 
firm performance captured by Tobin’s Q and once with firm performance captured by 
ROA.     
7.4 Statistical properties and econometric issues 
7.4.1 Univariate analysis 
The data for this study are analyzed through the use of both parametric tests, focusing 
on mean values, and non-parametric tests, focusing on median values, as stated in 
Chapter 4.  Differences in years are examined using t-tests, focusing on mean values, 
and Mann-Whitney tests, focusing on median values.  Differences in subsamples, such 
                                                 
105 For robustness the sample is also decomposed into the following two periods: the pre-crisis period 
sample in 2008 and 2009, and the crisis period sample in 2011 and 2012.  These sensitivity tests are 
presented in Chapter 8. 
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as the CG index rating methods, are tested with the use of both mean and median 
differences, using the ANOVA F-test / Welch F-test106 and the Kruskal-Wallis test.   
7.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Data are analyzed through the use of panel data estimation, which allows for 
examination of a time series for each cross-sectional variable in the data. Panel data 
allows for individual and time effects in the panel data regressions (Ducassy and Guyot, 
2017).       
To reduce the impact of outliers on the results, continuous variables that fall in the top 
and bottom 1% of the empirical distribution are winsorized (Black and Kim, 2012; 
Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012). 
The relationship between firm performance and governance is tested by applying the 
following model: 
𝐹𝑃 = 𝑐(1) + 𝑐(2) ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑐(3) ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 + 𝑐(4) ∗ 𝑡𝑎 + 𝑐(5) ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣 + 𝑐(6)
∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 + 𝑐(7) ∗ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝑐(8) ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑐(9)
∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +   𝑐(10) ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
+  𝜀                                                                                                   𝐞𝐪 𝟕 − 𝟒                       
Governance is captured through the use of board of directors’ composition variables 
and a CG index so as to deal with the issue of multicollinearity.  However, high 
correlation exists among the corporate governance variables and collinear variables 
should be excluded from the regression.  Therefore, two models are created, one with 
board of directors’ variables and one with a CG index.  As in Chapter 4, two 
multicollinearity diagnostics are used: bivariate correlations using Pearson and 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests.   
                                                 
106 Before finding the ANOVA F-test/Welch F-Test, Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances is 
employed.  If the assumption of homogeneity of variance is not violated, the ANOVA F-test is suitable 
to examine the mean differences among the subsamples, otherwise the Welch F-test is preferable when 
the assumption of homogeneity of variance is violated.   
Chapter 7- Research Design (CG & FP) 
 
217 
 
An additional important issue, as discussed in Chapter 4, in all studies pertaining to 
corporate governance is that of controlling for the possible issue of endogeneity 
between the variables that could bias the results.  The existence of at least one source 
of endogeneity could potentially cause estimates to be biased and could lead to 
inaccurate results (Schultz et al., 2010; Carcello et al., 2011). 
Three sources of endogeneity are seen in corporate governance research - dynamic 
endogeneity, simultaneous endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity - as discussed in 
chapter 4 (Wintoki et al., 2012).   
A system of simultaneous equations is used in this study to examine the hypotheses and 
to contend with the issue of endogeneity.  In the spirit of Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and 
Jackling and Johl (2009), the analysis is carried out using three simultaneous equations.  
Three equations are chosen so as to account for not only governance and performance 
but also the relationship between leverage and performance.  Studies have shown that 
the perspectives on the optimal choice of debt could potentially differ among 
shareholders and managers.  Although it is expected that leverage is negatively related 
to firm performance, there are cases where increased levels of debt motivate managers 
to work harder so as to generate additional cash flows and thus increase firm 
performance.  Additionally, managers might choose to increase debt levels so as to 
increase their voting power, thus decreasing the probability of a takeover and/or loss of 
employment.  Therefore, it is necessary to examine not only the inter-relationship 
between governance and firm performance, but also the inter-relationship of these two 
variables with leverage as well (Jackling and Johl, 2009).   
The Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) specification is used in this study to 
deal with all three potential sources of endogeneity in panel data models, namely 
dynamic endogeneity, simultaneous endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity (Duru 
et al., 2016; Wintoki et al., 2012).   
The choice of an appropriate variable as a proper instrument is crucial.  Such a variable 
is one that is correlated with the regressors and uncorrelated with the error terms 
(Tsionas et al., 2012).  Based on the research of  Bhagat and Bolton (2008) and Jackling 
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and Johl (2009) the exogenous variables chosen are prior year performance107, powerful 
CEO and Altman’s z–score.   
Based on the work of Lewbel (1997), the entire set of instruments consists of the 
predetermined variables and the cross-products of all with the dependent variables.  
Moreover, all instruments used for this study will be deviations from their means. 
Finally, a crucial point is to test if the instruments are ‘weak’, leading to biased results 
under GMM, even in large samples, where the distribution can be far from normal.  
Stock et al. (2002) propose various tests to examine the issue of ‘relevant’ instruments 
(Tsionas et al., 2012).  Stock and Watson (2003: 350)  affirm that running a first-stage 
regression and examining the F-statistic is an accurate way to examine if the potential 
instruments are weak.  If F is greater than 10, the choice of instrument is fine and GMM 
results are accurate (Verbeek, 2008:157).  
The analysis is carried out using GMM108 as follows: 
𝑭𝑷 = 𝑐(1) + 𝑐(2) ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑐(3) ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 + 𝑐(4) ∗ 𝑡𝑎 + 𝑐(5) ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣 + 𝑐(6) ∗
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝑐(7) ∗ 𝑓𝑐𝑓 + 𝒄(𝟖) ∗ 𝒑𝒓𝒊𝒐𝒓 + 𝑐(9) ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑐(10) ∗
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +   𝑐(11) ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 +
 𝜀                                                                                                                                         𝐞𝐪 𝟕 − 𝟓  
𝒈𝒐𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒚 𝒒𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚 = 𝑐(1) + 𝑐(2) ∗ 𝑓𝑝 + 𝑐(3) ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 + 𝑐(4) ∗ 𝑡𝑎 + 𝑐(5) ∗ 𝑙𝑒𝑣 + 𝑐(6) ∗
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝒄(𝟕) ∗ 𝒑𝒔𝒉𝒂𝒓𝒆 + 𝑐(8) ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑐(9) ∗  𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +
  𝜀                                                                                                                                        𝐞𝐪 𝟕 − 𝟔                   
                                                 
107 Bhagat and Bolton (2008) use the level of treasury stock to assets as an instrument for performance.  
Jacking and Johl (2009) use lagged performance as an instrumental variable for performance, while 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) use lagged performance only as a sensitivity test. 
108 The analysis originally is carried using OLS, however due to endogeneity issues GMM is utilized. 
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𝒍𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆 = 𝑐(1) + 𝑐(2) ∗ 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑐(3) ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐 + 𝑐(4) ∗ 𝑡𝑎 + 𝑐(5) ∗
𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝑐(6) ∗ 𝑓𝑐𝑓 + 𝒄(𝟕) ∗ 𝒛𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 + 𝑐(8) ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝑐(9) ∗
𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 +   𝜀                                                                                             𝐞𝐪 𝟕 − 𝟕   
 
Table 7-1 presents the measurement of the variables used in the analysis of this project.
Chapter 7- Research Design (CG & FP) 
 
220 
 
Table 7-1 Measurement of the variables used in the analysis  
WorldScope identifiers
Datastream
MV; WC03255; 
WC02999
Datastream WC01551; WC02999
board size (bsize)
board independence (bindep)
absence of CEO duality (ceodual)
cg_pen_total
cg_non_total
cg2_pen_total
cg2_non_total
ta Datastream WC02999
lev Datastream WC03255; WC02999
WC04201; WC04601
MV; WC03255
WC02999; WC01551
pshare
WC02201; WC03101; 
WC02999
R_E; WC01250; MV
WC03351; WC01001
zscore Altman’s Z score (1968), as a proxy for financial distress Datastream
Dummy Variable
crisis year an indicator variable taking the value of 0 for 2006, 2008 and 2009 and 1 for 2010, 2011 and 2012
Exogenous Variables
prior
prior year performance calculated as the prior year’s Tobin’s Q or return 
on assets
Datastream
powerful CEO, measured as the percentage of ownership held by the CEO Data hand-collected from annual reports
growth
growth opportunities calculated as capital expenditures scaled by net 
sales
Datastream WC04601; WC01001
fcf
free cash flow is calculated as funds from operations - capital 
expenditures - cash dividends paid scaled by total assets
Datastream
Control Variables
ownconc the percentage owned by the largest shareholder of the firm Data hand-collected from annual reports
natural log of total assets
total debt over total assets
CG index (all items included in calculation of index), whereby the non-
disclosed values were excluded in the rating procedure.  The Scoring by 
item rating approach is utilized. 
Data hand-collected from annual reports
CG index (all items included in calculation of index), whereby the non-
disclosed values were considered as non-existent, therefore firms were 
penalized in the rating procedure. The Scoring by category rating 
approach is utilized. 
Data hand-collected from annual reports
CG index (all items included in calculation of index), whereby the non-
disclosed values were excluded in the rating procedure.  The Scoring by 
category rating approach is utilized. 
Data hand-collected from annual reports
percentage of independent directors’ on the firm’s board Data hand-collected from annual reports
An indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the position of the CEO and 
chairman of the board is separate, or 0 otherwise
Data hand-collected from annual reports
CG index (all items included in calculation of index), whereby the non-
disclosed values were considered as non-existent, therefore firms were 
penalized in the rating procedure. The Scoring by item rating approach is 
utilized. 
Data hand-collected from annual reports
Firm Performance
Tobin’s Q (Tobin)
Return on Assets  (ROA)
Governance Q uality
total number of board members Data hand-collected from annual reports
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The variables examined in this analysis are governance quality and firm performance 
before and during the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.  Governance quality is examined 
in model #1 through board of directors’ composition (board size, board independence 
and the absence of CEO duality) and in model #2 through CG indices.  The relationship 
between governance quality and firm performance is initially tested and a positive 
relationship between the two is expected.  In order to examine the role of corporate 
governance during the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the governance-performance 
relationship is tested through the use of a crisis year dummy variable.  The data is 
divided into two sub-samples, the pre-crisis period sample (2006, 2008, 2009) and the 
crisis period sample (2010, 2011, 2012) through the use of a dummy variable equaling 
one if the sample is in 2010, 2011, 2012 or zero otherwise.  It is expected that firms 
with stronger corporate governance are able to resolve crisis problems, and thus 
efficiently improve their firm’s financial performance.  Each regression is run 
separately for the pre-crisis, the crisis and the pooled sample.  A structural change in 
the model between the two periods is reflected in the potential change in the coefficient 
between the pre-crisis and crisis periods.  This is tested by using a crisis year dummy 
variable in the regression of the pooled sample. 
7.5 Sample selection and data collection procedures 
This study consists of all Greek listed firms on the ASE for the years 2006, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011 and 2012, excluding only firms in financial, real estate and insurance 
industries. They are excluded from the sample since they are subject to additional 
governance regulations and it is often difficult to calculate Tobin’s Q (Jackling and 
Johl, 2009).  However 
These years are chosen so as to incorporate data for both the pre-crisis (2006, 2008, 
2009) and during the sovereign-debt crisis period (2010, 2011, 2012).109  This study 
                                                 
109 Originally the analysis is conducted with the sample decomposed into two periods: the pre-crisis 
period sample in 2008 and 2009, and the crisis period sample in 2011 and 2012.  However, in order to 
incorporate in the analysis additional data, sample years from the previous paper (CG & EM) is also 
included in the analysis.  Thus, the sample includes the following two periods: the pre-crisis period 
sample in 2006, 2008 and 2009 and the crisis period sample in 2010, 2011 and 2012.  Nonetheless, for 
robustness the sensitivity tests for the original sample (the pre-crisis period sample in 2008 and 2009 and 
the crisis period sample in 2011 and 2012) are also presented in Chapter 8. 
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examines potential changes in the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance before and during the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.   
As indicated in Chapter 4, data for corporate governance items are hand-collected from 
annual reports found on the ASE website, while firm performance is calculated based 
on data obtained from DataStream.  Firms’ websites are not used to collect corporate 
governance data because most firms’ websites only include corporate governance 
information from recent years, while the sample includes data from 2006, 2008, 2009, 
2010, 2011 and 2012.  Due to that fact that CG data is hand collected from firms’ annual 
reports, limiting the study to six years makes it feasible within the time available.  
Additionally, companies for which no financial data is available and for which no 
annual reports are available for the collection of corporate governance data are 
excluded.  Moreover, firms for which data is not available in all six years were included 
in the analysis, resulting in a different number of observations for each of the years (i.e. 
unbalanced panel).  This procedure resulted in a final sample of 1,205 firm year 
observations with complete data, ranging from 65% (206/316) of ASE firms in 2006 to 
73% (187/256) of ASE firms for 2012.  Table 7-2 illustrates the sample selection 
procedure. 
Table 7-2 Sample Selection Procedure 
 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
No. of firms listed on the ASE 316 290 283 273 266 256 1,684 
Firms in financial, real estate and 
insurance industries 
(47) (42) (42) (41) (31) (34) (237) 
Firms with missing values (financial or 
corporate governance) 
(63) (40) (32) (38) (34) (35) (242) 
Total 206 208 209 
 
194 201 187 1,205 
The final sample is disaggregated across industries based on the ICB classification 
scheme.  However, some industries are combined, so as to avoid having industries with 
a small number of firm observations.  Like the process applied in chapter 4, Oil and 
Gas is combined with Industrials; Utilities and Telecommunications is combined with 
Consumer Services; and Healthcare is combined with Consumer Services and 
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Consumer Goods, creating the Combined Industries classification.110 Thus, firms in the 
sample are now classified as Basic Materials 11%, Consumer Goods 31%, Consumer 
Services 22%, Industrials 26% and Technology 10% as shown in Table 7-3. 
Table 7-3 Distribution of sample firms across industries     
Industry Classification Based on ICB  Combined Industries 
 2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012  2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Basic materials (6) 22 23 22 24 22 22  22 23 22 24 22 22 135 
Consumer goods (4) 63 65 62 59 59 52  65 67 64 61 61 53 372 
Consumer services (2) 34 37 35 32 32 29  46 49 46 42 44 40 266 
Healthcare (3) 9 9 8 7 8 7         
Industrials (1) 52 48 54 46 53 50  54 50 56 48 55 52 315 
Oil & Gas (7) 2 2 2 2 2 2         
Technology (8) 19 19 21 19 19 20  19 19 21 19 19 20 117 
Telecommunications (9) 2 1 1 1 2 1         
Utilities (5) 3 4 4 4 4 4         
Total 206 208 209 194 201 187  206 208 209 194 201 187 1,205 
Industry classification is initially based on DataStream and ICB.  However, in order to incorporate all firms in the sample, each firm classified 
in an industry that had few firms is examined separately and is placed in another industry. 
              
7.6 Conclusion 
The study examines the relationship between governance quality and firm performance 
for all Greek listed firms for 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.  This relationship 
is examined before and during the Greek sovereign debt crisis.  The data is broken down 
into two periods, the pre-crisis period sample (2006/2008/2009) and the crisis period 
sample (2010/2011/2012).  It is expected that firms with stronger corporate governance 
quality will have higher firm performance during the crisis years. 
Individual board of directors’ governance items and an all-inclusive governance 
measure in the form of a CG index are used to measure governance quality.  Firm 
                                                 
110 In order to incorporate all firms in the sample, each firm is examined separately and it is decided 
where it should be placed based on its specific product or service characteristics.  More specifically, in 
2006, out of the nine healthcare firms, seven are combined with consumer services and two with 
consumer goods; in 2008, out of the nine healthcare firms, seven are combined with consumer services 
and two with consumer goods; in 2009, out of the eight healthcare firms, seven are combined with 
consumer services and one with consumer goods; in 2010, out of the seven healthcare firms, five are 
combined with consumer services and two with consumer goods; in 2011, out of the eight healthcare 
firms, six are combined with consumer services and two with consumer goods, and in 2012, out of the 
seven healthcare firms, six are combined with consumer services and one with consumer goods.  See 
Appendix II for the names of firms that are classified in different industries, where they are classified 
and why. 
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performance is measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA.  Both firm performance measures are 
employed in this study since the former is a market-based measure, while the latter an 
operating performance measure, and the use of both is considered necessary since they 
should not be considered as substitute measures but complements of each other. 
An important issue considered in the analysis is that of controlling for the possible 
endogeneity of the variables that could bias the results obtained.  For this reason a 
system of simultaneous equations is used in this study to examine the hypotheses. The 
analysis is carried out using GMM. 
Data for firm performance is obtained from DataStream, while data for corporate 
governance items are hand-collected from annual reports found on the ASE website.  
Financial firms are excluded from the sample since they require different governance 
regulations and thus the sample consists of all non-financial firms listed on the ASE for 
the years 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.
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Chapter 8 – Data Analysis and Discussion (CG & FP) 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis and discussion of the data testing the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance before and during the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis for all Greek non-financial listed firms.   
The hypotheses framed in Chapter 6 are tested using individual governance items, such 
as board size, board independence and the absence of CEO duality, as well as a holistic 
governance measure in the form of a corporate governance index, as in the previous 
study for EM.  Firm performance is measured using a market-based performance 
measure, Tobin’s Q, and an operating performance measure, ROA.  The statistical 
analysis begins with descriptive statistics in section 8.2 and bivariate tests in section 
8.3, and continues with multivariate tests in section 8.4. The discussion of the findings 
is presented in section 8.5, and section 8.6 concludes the chapter. 
8.2 Descriptive statistics 
The univariate analysis first examines descriptive statistics for each variable during the 
pre-crisis and crisis year sample, as well as analysis of the data regarding the pooled 
sample. The pooled sample consists of 1,113 firm-year observations, with 575 firm-
year observations for the pre-crisis period (2006/2008/2009) and 538 firm-year 
observations for the crisis (2010/2011/2012) period.111   
For purposes of robustness, the regressions are also run for four years 
(2008/2009/2011/2012), including a pooled sample 738 firm-year observations, with 
386 firm-year observations for the pre-crisis period (2008/2009) and 352 firm-year 
observations for the crisis (2011/2012) period.112   
                                                 
111 It should be noted that when examining individual governance items the pooled sample consists of 
1,008 firm-year observations, with 472 firm-year observations for the pre-crisis period (2006/2008/2009) 
and 536 firm-year observations for the crisis (2010/2011/2012) period. 
112 As mentioned before, when examining individual governance items, the pooled sample consists of 
663 firm-year observations, with 312 firm-year observations for the pre-crisis period (2008/2009) and 
351 firm-year observations for the crisis (2011/2012) period. 
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There are more observations in the crisis year sample (2010/2011/2012) compared to 
the pre-crisis year sample (2006/2008/2009) since there are fewer missing observations 
in that sample.  As of 2010, Law 3873/2010 required listed firms to disclose annual 
information about their corporate governance in a statement placed in a specific and 
clearly identifiable section of the annual report.  This resulted in more firms disclosing 
more corporate governance information and thus, there are fewer missing observations 
in the crisis year period sample. 113  The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 8-1. 
                                                 
113 It should be noted that this project consists of more hand-collected data, in comparison to the previous 
project, since more years are included in the sample.  More specifically, this study includes six years of 
data (2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012) consisting of 1,113 firm-year observations, while the 
previous study includes four years of data (2006, 2008, 2010, 2012) consisting of 763 firm-year 
observations.   
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Table 8-1 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
Pooled sample 
 
Pre-crisis years (2006/2008/2009) 
 
Crisis years (2010/2011/2012) 
 
Comparisons across  
the periods 
 mean media
n 
min max sd mean media
n 
min max sd mean media
n 
min max sd t-test Mann-
Whitney 
Tobin’s Q 0.72 0.62 0.13 3.17 0.43 0.81 0.68 0.17 5.00 0.57 0.65 0.58 0.12 2.76 0.38 4.79*** 6.45*** 
ROA -0.02 -0.00 -0.56 0.16 0.10 0.00 0.01 -0.27 0.21 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 -0.80 0.14 0.12 9.94*** 11.15*** 
bsize 7.68 7.00 4.00 14.00 2.33 7.67 7.00 4.00 14.00 2.37 7.69 7.00 400 14.00 2.30 -0.84 0.73 
bindep 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.60 0.13 0.28 0.29 0.00 0.61 0.14 0.31 0.29 0.00 0.60 0.12 -4.72*** 3.75*** 
ceodual 0.59 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.58 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.59 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 -0.19 0.19 
cgpentotal 0.50 0.49 0.00 0.90 0.21 0.34 0.31 0.10 0.62 0.10 0.65 0.67 0.00 0.95 0.15 -39.4*** 26.26*** 
cgnontotal 0.68 0.70 0.33 0.93 0.12 0.60 0.60 0.33 0.80 0.10 0.76 0.77 0.00 0.95 0.11 -32.28*** 24.66*** 
  
cg2pentotal 0.53 
 
0.53 
 
0.13 
 
0.90 0.19 
 
0.37 
 
0.34 
 
0.12 
 
0.64 
 
0.11 0.66 
 
0.67 
 
0.27 
 
0.94 
 
0.14 -40.76*** 
 
26.53*** 
cg2nontotal 0.66 0.71 0.31 0.92 0.16 0.53 0.50 0.31 0.82 0.13 0.77 0.78 0.44 0.95 0.08 -39.71*** 25.36*** 
ownconc 0.40 0.36 0.00 0.90 0.19 0.40 0.36 0.10 0.89 0.18 0.41 0.36 0.10 0.91 0.20 -0.78 0.40 
ta 11.77 11.67 8.48 15.86 1.47 11.78 11.68 8.99 15.91 1.43 11.77 11.67 8.31 15.88 1.50 0.61 0.76 
lev 0.36 0.36 0.00 1.06 0.21 0.32 0.33 0.00 0.82 0.18 0.39 0.39 0.00 1.27 0.24 -5.76*** 5.01*** 
growth 0.08 0.03 0.00 1.04 0.15 0.09 0.04 0.00 1.16 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.74 0.11 3.56*** 5.22*** 
free cf -0.03 -0.01 -0.36 0.11 0.08 -0.02 -0.01 -0.33 0.13 0.08 -0.03 -0.02 -0.47 0.10 0.08 1.28 1.25 
 
prior Tobin’s Q 0.81 
 
0.70 
 
0.18 
 
2.78 0.44 
 
0.93 
 
0.80 
 
0.22 
 
2.84 
 
0.48 0.70 
 
0.62 
 
0.17 
 
2.68 
 
0.36 8.91*** 
 
10.40*** 
prior ROA -0.01 0.01 -0.31 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.02 -0.24 0.20 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.39 0.14 0.08 10.75*** 11.26*** 
pshare 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.76 0.20 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.72 0.20 0.16 0.06 0.00 0.77 0.20 0.05 0.00 
zscore 0.77 0.57 -0.01 5.90 0.83 0.80 0.61 0.00 5.10 0.77 0.74 0.53 -0.01 6.52 0.90 1.97** 4.57*** 
Variables: Tobin’s Q market based measure of firm performance; ROA operating performance measure of firm performance;  bsize board size; bindep board independence; ceodual absence of duality; cgpentotal penalized total 
CG index using the Scoring by item method; cgnontotal non-penalized total CG index using the Scoring by item method; cg2pentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by category method; cg2nontotal non-penalized 
total CG index using the Scoring by category method; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; growth growth opportunities; free cf free cash flow; prior Tobin’s Q previous year’s Tobin’s Q; prior ROA 
previous year’s ROA; pshare powerful CEO; zscore Altman’s z-score 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. 
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
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8.2.1 Descriptive statistics for Board of Director’ composition  
Board size 
Board size is the first variable examined.  Greek law No.2190/1920 (Article 18) requires 
a minimum of three board members and does not set an upper limit.  All sample firms 
complied with the minimum board requirement of three members, as seen in Table 8-1, 
where the minimum board size of the pooled sample is four.  The Greek CG Code, 
Section A, Part II (2013), suggests that the boards of Greek listed firms should be from 
seven to 15 members.  Most Greek firms adhered to the recommendations of the Greek 
CG Code, since the pooled sample shows a mean (median) of 7.68 (7.00) and a range 
of four to 14 members for Greek firms’ boards, as seen in Table 8-1. The mean (median) 
value of board size in the pre-crisis period (2006/2008/2009) is 7.67 (7.00) and in the 
crisis period (2010/2011/2012) is 7.69 (7.00).  More specifically, 192 firms in the pre-
crisis period (41% of the sample) and 180 firms in the crisis period (34% of the sample) 
have boards with less than 7 members, while no boards have more than 15 members.114   
The board size of Greek firms did not change significantly in the crisis period compared 
to the pre-crisis as seen by the insignificant differences between the mean and median 
values for the pre-crisis and crisis period samples. 
Board independence  
Another governance variable examined is board independence.  The mean (median) 
value of board independence of Greek listed firms during the pre-crisis years is 28% 
(29%) and in the crisis years is 31% (29%).  All firms included in the sample throughout 
the years examined, should comply with Law 3016/2002, which requires that Greek 
listed firms’ boards have at least 1/3 non-executive members, of which at least two are 
independent.  There are firms, however, that do not comply with the CG law, as seen 
in the pooled sample where board independence ranges from 0% to 60% throughout 
the years examined.  Nonetheless, it could be said that on average, Greek firms comply 
with the CG law since they have a mean of 7.68 board members and thus, should have 
                                                 
114 Results are in line with Drakos and Bekiris (2010) and Zhou et al. (2018). 
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on average 26% (2/7.68) board independence.  Since the mean of board independence 
is 29% for the pooled sample, on average they comply with the law.  More specifically, 
442 firms (94% of the sample) in the pre-crisis period and 520 firms in the crisis period 
(97% of the sample) disclose that their boards have at least two independent board 
members.  Furthermore, the Greek CG Code, Section A, Part II (2013), suggests that at 
least 1/3 of the boards of Greek listed firms should be comprised of independent non-
executive members, thus 33% on average should be independent.  However, the mean 
values of board independence ranges from 28% in the pre-crisis period to 31% in the 
crisis period, indicating that the recommendations of the CG Code are not satisfied.115   
Significant differences across the two periods, at the 1% level, for the independence of 
Greek boards is evident in both the mean and median values, as seen in Table 8-1, 
suggesting some improvements over the sample period. 
CEO duality 
The last variable regarding board of directors’ composition is the absence of CEO 
duality.  The pre-crisis period sample has a mean (median) of 0.58 (1.00) and the crisis 
period sample has a mean (median) of 0.59 (1.00), as seen in Table 8-1.  An average of 
59% of Greek listed firms included in the pooled sample have a separate CEO and 
chairman of the board.  More specifically, 75% (356/472) of Greek firms in the pre-
crisis period sample and 63% (340/536) in the crisis period sample do not have CEO 
duality.  Although the absence of CEO duality is not mandated by any governance law 
or by the 2010 Greek CG Code, as is the case in many either codes and governance 
systems in Europe, most Greek listed firms prefer to separate the roles.116   
Table 8-1 indicates that there are no significant differences in the mean (median) score 
concerning the absence of CEO duality between the two periods examined. 
 
 
                                                 
115 Results are in line with Drakos and Bekiris (2010) and Zhou et al. (2018). 
116 Results are in line with Drakos and Bekiris (2010). 
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8.2.2 Descriptive statistics for CG indices 
The model examines the effect of a corporate governance index on firm performance.  
The Greek CG index created for this study is based on CG laws and best practice items 
as per the Greek CG Code.  The non-disclosed items are recorded as either missing 
(penalized CG index) or non-applicable (non-penalized CG index) and thus two 
versions for the CG index are created.  Additionally, the penalized and non-penalized 
CG indices are measured using two rating methods, the Scoring by item and the Scoring 
by category method, thus four different versions of the CG index are generated and 
used to measure governance quality.117 
As seen in Table 8-1, the mean (median) of the penalized CG index, using the Scoring 
by item rating scheme for the pre-crisis period is 34% (31%), while the crisis period 
exhibits a mean (median) of 65% (67%).118  Similar results are seen in the penalized 
CG index, using the Scoring by category rating scheme, whereby in the pre-crisis period 
the mean (median) is 37% (34%), and in the crisis period the mean (median) is 66% 
(67%).119   
As for the non-penalized CG index, using the Scoring by item method, the pre-crisis 
mean (median) is 60% (60%) and the mean (median) of the crisis period is 76% 
(77%).120  The non-penalized index, using the Scoring by category method, has a mean 
(median) of 53% (50%) during the pre-crisis period and a mean (median) of 77% (78%) 
during the crisis period.   
Greater values are evident for the non-penalized indices (for both rating schemes) 
compared to the respective penalized indices.  The reason for this is that in the non-
                                                 
117 A description of the exact process of creating the CG indices can be found in chapter 4. 
118 In the previous study examining CG and EM, the rating score applied is the Scoring by item rating 
scheme and the mean (median) score for the penalized CG index is 31% (25%) in the pre-law period 
(2006/2008) and 67% (69%) in the post-law period (2010/2012).  The pooled sample has a mean 
(median) of 49% (48%).  
119 Results are in line with Hermes and Katsigianni (2012).  Their index is calculated using the Scoring 
by category rating scheme. 
120 In the previous study examining CG and EM, the mean (median) score for the non-penalized CG 
index is 56% (57%) in the pre-law period (2006/2008) and 77% (78%) in the post-law period 
(2010/2012).  The pooled sample has a mean (median) of 66% (69%).  
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penalized indices, non-disclosed items are excluded in the calculation of the index, 
while in the penalized indices, non-disclosed items are considered as non-existent and 
are scored as zero.    
CG index scores in the crisis years (2010, 2011, 2012), for both rating schemes, is much 
higher than in the pre-crisis years (2006, 2008, 2009) due to firms’ greater compliance 
and disclosure of corporate governance items over the years.  One reason for this 
increase in CG scores is the implementation of Law 3693/2008, which requires all listed 
firms to have an audit committee.  Additionally, in 2010, Law 3873/2010 required listed 
firms to disclose annual information about their corporate governance in a statement 
placed in a specific and clearly identifiable section of the annual report.  This resulted 
in more firms disclosing more corporate governance information and having higher 
values for the CG indices after 2010.  Additionally, more sample firms comply with 
best practice corporate governance items after 2010 (crisis years) as a result of 
implementing the voluntary, best practice CG items suggested by the Greek CG Code, 
created by the Hellenic Federation of Industries in 2010.    
The differences in the scores of all CG indices between the pre-crisis and crisis years 
are reported in Table 8-1 where it is evident that the differences in the mean and median 
values are significantly different at the 1% level, for all CG indices.  Additionally, when 
comparing the results of the two rating methods, Scoring by item and Scoring by 
category, significant differences are observed between the two in both the mean and 
median at the 1% significance level, as seen in Table 8-2. 
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Table 8-2 Comparison of results using the two rating methods  
   
Penalized  
CG indices 
 
Non-penalized  
CG indices 
   
cgpentotal / cg2pentotal 
 
cgnontotal / cg2nontotal 
 
Pooled sample 
 
 
Welch F-test 
 
2829.81*** 
 
1340.52*** 
Kruskal-Wallis test 1029.04*** 871.27*** 
 
Pre-crisis years 
 
Welch F-test 
 
1181.64*** 
 
258.16*** 
Kruskal-Wallis test 484.99*** 263.73*** 
 
Crisis years 
 
Welch F-test 
 
902.98*** 
 
179.74*** 
Kruskal-Wallis test 474.85*** 381.71*** 
Variables: cgpentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by item method; cgnontotal non-penalized 
total CG index using the Scoring by item method; cg2pentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by 
category method; cg2nontotal non-penalized total CG index using the Scoring by category method;  
*** significant at level 1%. 
 
8.2.3 Descriptive statistics for Firm Performance 
Firm performance is measured using Tobin’s Q, a market-based performance measure, 
and Return on Assets, an operating performance measure.  Table 8-1 shows the 
descriptive statistics for both performance measures.  Examining the differences among 
the pre-crisis and crisis years, there are significant differences in both the mean and 
median values of both performance measures at the 1% level, as expected. 
Firm performance – Tobin’s Q 
Firm performance estimated using Tobin’s Q has a mean (median) of 0.72 (0.62) in the 
pooled sample, whereby the minimum value is 0.13 and the maximum is 3.17.  More 
specifically, in the pre-crisis years the mean (median) is 0.81 (0.68), while in the crisis 
years it is 0.65 (0.58).121  As expected, smaller values of Tobin’s Q are observed in the 
crisis years due to the lower levels of market value of equity during the crisis years.122 
                                                 
121 Results are in line with Drakos and Bekiris (2010) and Hermes and Katsigianni (2012).   
122 Market value of equity of the pooled sample has a mean (median) of 171 million € (20 million €), 
with a minimum value of 1million € and a maximum value of 4 million €.  The market value of equity 
for the pre-crisis period shows a mean (median) of 225 million € (29 million €), ranging from 2 million 
€ to a maximum value of 5 billion €.  The crisis period exhibits a mean (median) of 123 million € (14 
million €), with a minimum of 716,400 € and a maximum of 3 billion €.  It is evident that there is a 
significant decrease in the market value of equity in the crisis period, as expected.   
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Firm performance - ROA 
Firm performance estimated by ROA shows a mean (median) value of -0.02 (-0.00) for 
the pooled sample, ranging from –0.56 to a maximum value of 0.16.  The mean 
(median) values of the pre-crisis years are 0.00 (0.01), and for the crisis years are -0.05 
(-0.03).123  As expected, ROA decreased during the crisis period due to a decline in the 
net income of the firms included in the sample.124   
8.2.4 Descriptive statistics for Control Variables 
This study employs the following control variables: ownership concentration, leverage, 
firm size, growth opportunities and free cash flow. 
Ownership concentration 
The mean (median) values of ownership concentration of 40% (36%) in the pre-crisis 
and 41% (36%) in the crisis years, while overall ownership in the pooled sample shows 
a mean (median) of 40% (36%).  As expected, no significant differences are observed 
in the mean and median values of ownership concentration between the years, as seen 
in Table 8-1. 
Total Assets 
Total assets, as an indicator of size, and measured as the natural logarithm of total 
assets, has a mean (median) score of 11.78 (11.68) in the pre-crisis years and a mean 
(median) score of 11.77 (11.67) in the crisis years.  No significant differences are 
                                                 
123 Results are in line with Drakos and Bekiris (2010) and Hermes and Katsigianni (2012).   
124 Net Income for the pooled sample has a mean (median) of 7 million € (-78,000€), with a minimum 
of -88 million € and a maximum of 413 million €.  The pre-crisis net income has a mean (median) of 13 
million€ (860,500€), ranging from -73 million€ to 433 million €.  The net income for the crisis period 
has a mean (median) of 495,802€ (-2 million€), with a minimum value of -116 million € and a maximum 
value of 374 million €.  As expected, significant differences, at the 1% level, are observed between the 
mean and median scores of net income for the pre-crisis and crisis year periods.  
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observed between the mean and median scores of total assets during the pre-crisis and 
crisis years, contrary to expectations.125   
Leverage 
Leverage shows a mean (median) score of 36% (36%) for the pooled sample, where 
leverage increased from a mean (median) of 32% (33%) in the pre-crisis years, to 39% 
(39%) in the crisis years, as seen in Table 8-1.  Significant differences in the mean and 
median, at the 1% level, are seen for leverage, as expected.126  
Growth opportunities 
The mean (median) score of growth opportunities decreased from 9% (4%) in the pre-
crisis years to 6% (3%) in the crisis years, with the pooled sample showing a mean 
(median) of 8% (3%), as seen in Table 8-1.  Although the minimum value (0%) of 
growth is the same for the pre-crisis and crisis periods, there is a decrease in the 
maximum value between the pre-crisis (116%) and crisis period (74%).  Significant 
differences, at the 1% level, in the mean and median scores are evident for growth 
opportunities between the two periods, where growth opportunities in the crisis period 
are smaller compared to the pre-crisis period, as expected.127 
Free cash flow 
The mean (median) score of free cash flows in the pre-crisis period are -0.02 (-0.01) 
and -0.03 (-0.02) in the crisis years. The overall free cash flow for the pooled sample 
shows a mean (median) score of -0.03 (-0.01), with a minimum value of -0.36 and a 
maximum value of 0.11.  Although a significant difference for free cash flows is 
expected, no significant differences for free cash flows in the mean and median values 
are evident between the years, as seen in Table 8-1. 
 
                                                 
125 Results are in line with Drakos and Bekiris (2010) and Hermes and Katsigianni (2012).   
126 Results are in line with Drakos and Bekiris (2010) and Hermes and Katsigianni (2012).   
127 Results are in line with Drakos and Bekiris (2010) and Hermes and Katsigianni (2012).   
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8.2.5 Descriptive statistics for Instruments 
Prior year performance – Lag Tobin’s Q 
The mean (median) score of prior year’s Tobin’s Q for the pre-crisis period is 0.93 
(0.80) and for the crisis period it is 0.70 (0.62). These results are similar to Tobin’s Q 
for the current year.  Significant differences, at the 1% level, in the mean and median 
is evident for prior year’s Tobin’s Q between the years, as seen in Table 8-1.  This 
decrease is expected, since it is a result of the sovereign debt crisis in the country.   
Prior year performance – Lag ROA 
The mean (median) score of prior year’s ROA is 0.01 (0.02) and -0.03 (-0.01) for the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods respectively.  The results, as in the case of Tobin’s Q, are 
similar to the current year’s ROA results.  Significant differences, at the 1% level, in 
the mean and median scores for prior year’s ROA are evident between the years.  
Similar to Tobin’s Q this decrease is expected, since it is a result of the sovereign debt 
crisis in the country. 
Powerful CEO 
Powerful CEO is estimated as the percentage of share ownership held by the CEO.  The 
mean (median) of CEO share ownership is 17% (8%) and 16% (6%) for the pre-crisis 
and crisis periods respectively, while the mean (median) scores for the pooled sample 
is 17% (7%), as observed in Table 8-1.  The percentage of CEO ownership did not 
change significantly from 2006 to 2012, as is evident from the insignificant differences 
in the mean and median scores.128   
Z-score 
Altman’s z-score is an indicator of the probability of bankruptcy for a firm.  The mean 
(median) scores for the pre-crisis period are 0.80 (0.61) and for the crisis period are 
0.74 (0.53), while the pooled sample shows a mean (median) of 0.77 (0.57).  Significant 
                                                 
128 Results are in line with Drakos and Bekiris (2010).   
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differences exist between the pre-crisis and crisis periods in the mean scores (at the 5% 
level) and the median scores (at the 1% level).  The decrease in Altman’s z-score during 
the crisis period is as expected, since more firms have a greater probability of 
bankruptcy during the crisis years compared to the pre-crisis ones.    
8.3 Correlation coefficients 
In this section, the bivariate correlations among the variables is examined using the 
Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients as presented in Table 8-3.129   
Model # 1 (H1) 
Looking at the bivariate correlation between firm performance, using Tobin’s Q, and 
board size, included in H1a, there is a significant positive correlation (0.073), at the 5% 
level, between the two variables based on the Spearman correlation coefficient.  The 
correlation coefficient is however only 0.073, signifying a very low correlation.  An 
insignificant relationship is seen between the two variables based on the Pearson 
product moment correlation coefficient.  A similar positive correlation at the 1% level 
is observed when firm performance is measured using ROA, for both the Pearson 
product moment and Spearman rank-order correlations, with values of 0.154 and 0.131 
respectively.  Both coefficients signify a very low correlation.  These findings indicate 
a positive, albeit weak, correlation between board size and firm performance, which 
aligns with H1a.   
A significant negative correlation, at the 10% level, is observed between board 
independence and firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q, based on the Spearman 
rank-order correlation.  However, the coefficient (-0.053) signifies a very low 
correlation.  There is an insignificant correlation based on the Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficient.  As for ROA and board independence, a significant negative 
correlation, at the 5% and 1% levels, is seen between the two, based on both the Pearson 
product moment and Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients, which are -0.066 
                                                 
129 Both the Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients are examined since for some variables 
the null hypothesis of normality is rejected, but other variables are considered normal, and therefore both 
parametric tests, focusing on mean values, and non-parametric tests, focusing on median values, are 
applied. 
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and -0.091 respectively, illustrating a very low correlation.  Concerning the variables 
included in H1b, a negative, albeit weak correlation exists between board independence 
and firm performance, results that are contrary to H1b.   
As for the variables included in H1c, an insignificant correlation between the absence 
of CEO duality and firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA, is evident 
based on both the Pearson product moment and the Spearman rank-order correlation 
coefficients. 
No correlation coefficients values are high enough in this model to suggest future 
multicollinearity issues in the regressions that could potentially affect the interpretation 
of the results. 
Model # 2 (H2) 
Examining the bivariate correlation between firm performance, using Tobin’s Q, and 
the independent governance variable, measured using the CG indices, which are 
included in H2, there are significant negative correlations with both of the penalized 
CG indices, at the 10% level of significance, based on the Pearson product moment 
correlation coefficient, with values of -0.057 for cgpentotal and -0.061 for cg2pentotal, 
indicating very low correlations.  Negative correlations between Tobin’s Q and all CG 
indices are also evident from the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients, with 
significant negative values ranging from -0.088 to -0.118, demonstrating very low 
correlations.  The bivariate correlations between the second proxy for firm 
performance, ROA, and the CG indices, indicate a significant negative correlation 
between the two variables, with values ranging from -0.078 to -0.137, at the 1% 
significance level, for the Pearson product moment correlation coefficients, and ranging 
from -0.142 to -0.182, at the 1% significance level, for the Spearman rank-order 
correlation coefficients.  All coefficients indicate very low correlations.  These initial 
statistics appear to contradict H2, where a positive relationship is proposed between 
corporate governance and firm performance.     
Very high correlations, at the 1% significance level, are evident between all of the CG 
indices (ranging from 79.3% to 95.7%) so these independent variables will not be used 
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simultaneously in the same regression but will be implemented in separate regressions, 
so as to avoid multicollinearity issues that may affect the interpretation of the results. 
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Table 8-3 Pearson product moment correlation coefficient (right) Spearman rank-order correlation (left)  
 
Tobin’s 
Q 
 
ROA 
 
bsize bindep ceodual 
cgpentotal 
 
cgnontotal 
 
cg2pentotal 
 
cg2nontotal 
 
ownconc 
 
ta 
 
lev 
 
growth 
 
free_cf 
 
lagtobin lagroa pshare zscore 
Tobin’s Q 
 
 0.003 0.040 -0.034 -0.004 -0.057* -0.024 -0.061* -0.040 0.042 0.029 0.195*** 0.051 0.001 0.636*** 0.064** -0.042 0.102*** 
ROA 
 
0.108***  0.154*** -0.066** 0.009 -0.104*** -0.078** -0.096*** -0.137*** 0.037 0.231*** -0.434*** 0.031 0.538*** 0.143*** 0.612*** 0.048 0.171*** 
bsize 0.073** 0.131***  -0.289*** 0.241*** 0.082*** 0.167*** 0.092*** 0.098*** 0.015 0.459*** -0.042 0.021 0.069** 0.112*** 0.168*** -0.287*** 0.040 
bindep -0.053* -0.091*** -0.434***  -0.178*** 0.242*** 0.320*** 0.267*** 0.267*** -0.063** -0.141*** 0.082*** -0.046 0.010 -0.068** -0.108*** 0.172*** 0.009 
ceodual 0.013 0.002 0.273*** -0.217***  0.100*** 0.256*** 0.130*** 0.144*** 0.003 0.185*** 0.018 -0.016 -0.048 -0.009 0.046 -0.466*** -0.005 
cgpentotal 
 
-0.102*** -0.158*** 0.109*** 0.188*** 0.108***  0.856*** 0.935*** 0.793*** -0.031 0.094*** 0.111*** -0.097*** 0.062* -0.177*** -0.139*** -0.083*** -0.024 
cgnontotal 
 
-0.088*** -0.142*** 0.185*** 0.209*** 0.250*** 0.893***  0.922*** 0.876*** -0.001 0.126*** 0.098*** -0.092*** 0.075** -0.132*** -0.118*** -0.154*** 0.014 
cg2pentotal 
 
-0.118*** -0.147*** 0.124*** 0.196*** 0.135*** 0.957*** 0.933***  0.838*** -0.024 0.103*** 0.100*** -0.102*** 0.073** -0.191*** -0.125*** -0.090*** -0.001 
cg2nontota
l 
 
-0.101*** -0.182*** 0.135*** 0.201*** 0.195*** 0.812*** 0.908*** 0.847***  0.009 0.090*** 0.126*** -0.098*** 0.052 -0.130*** -0.169*** -0.088*** 0.002 
ownconc 
 
0.053* 0.079** 0.003 -0.071** -0.019 -0.026 -0.019 -0.019 -0.010  0.109*** -0.041 0.067** 0.008 0.045 0.029 0.065** 0.034 
ta 
 
0.071** 0.203*** 0.449*** -0.224*** 0.213*** 0.082*** 0.116*** 0.097*** 0.104*** 0.144***  0.119*** 0.112*** 0.146*** 0.113*** 0.234*** -0.290*** 0.048 
lev 
 
 
0.388*** -0.381*** 0.009 0.048 0.037 0.101*** 0.091*** 0.093*** 0.110*** -0.022 0.178***  -0.008 -0.278*** 0.097*** -0.431*** -0.017 -0.068** 
growth  0.095*** 0.188*** 0.133*** -0.053* 0.008 -0.099*** -0.083*** -0.090*** -0.100*** 0.078** 0.241*** -0.012  -0.372*** 0.093*** 0.059* -0.005 -0.183*** 
free_cf 
 
-0.041 0.572*** 0.069** -0.014 -0.056* 0.054* 0.059* 0.059* 0.048 0.077** 0.122*** -0.296*** -0.145***  0.049 0.354*** 0.066** 0.129*** 
lagtobin 0.685*** 0.178*** 0.127*** -0.071** 0.011 -0.228*** -0.206*** -0.247*** -0.182*** 0.051 0.109*** 0.217*** 0.086*** 0.045  -0.376*** -0.017 -0.042 
lagroa 0.092*** 0.743*** 0.146*** -0.113*** 0.020 -0.196*** -0.182*** -0.183*** -0.215*** 0.063** 0.194*** -0.368*** 0.207*** 0.416*** 0.198***  0.046 0.217*** 
pshare -0.075** 0.028 -0.324*** 0.217*** -0.451*** -0.104*** -0.162*** -0.108*** -0.129*** -0.052* -0.326*** -0.031 -0.037 0.065** -0.057* 0.022  -0.011 
zscore 0.060* 0.329*** 0.065** -0.002 -0.005 -0.034 -0.013 -0.011 -0.033 0.085*** 0.081*** -0.042 -0.193*** 0.263*** 0.119*** 0.341*** 0.0380  
Variables: Tobin’s Q market based measure of firm performance; ROA operating performance measure of firm performance; bsize board size; bindep board independence; ceodual absence of duality;cgpentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by item 
method; cgnontotal non-penalized total CG index using the Scoring by item method; cg2pentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by category method; cg2nontotal non-penalized total CG index using the Scoring by category method; ownconc ownership 
concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; growth growth opportunities; free cf free cash flow; lagtobin previous year Tobin’s Q; lagroa previous year ROA; pshare powerful CEO; zscore Altman’s z-score 
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
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8.4 Multivariate analysis 
8.4.1 Introduction 
In this section regression tests are employed to examine the effect of multiple 
independent variables on firm performance.  Panel data regression analysis is applied, 
utilizing GMM, as discussed in Chapter 7.  To account for endogeneity various 
instruments are implemented when running the regressions.  Discussion of results for 
each model are presented separately.   
8.4.2 Results– H1 
This section provides the analysis and discussion of H1 looking at the effect of board 
composition on firm performance before and during the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.  
Although extensive research has been conducted on the impact of the board of directors’ 
composition on firm performance, the results are inconclusive.  This study builds on 
existing research by using the Greek sovereign debt crisis to examine how boards affect 
firm performance in crisis situations.   
In order to highlight the role of board composition during the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis, the governance-performance relationship is tested through the use of a crisis year 
dummy variable.  The data is broken into two sub-samples, the pre-crisis period sample 
(2006, 2008, 2009) and the crisis-period sample (2010, 2011, 2012).  As stated earlier 
for purposes of robustness, regressions are also run with data for 2008 and 2009 for the 
pre-crisis period and 2011 and 2012 for the crisis period samples.  It is expected that 
firms with stronger corporate governance, reflected in board size, board independence 
and the absence of CEO duality, are able to resolve crisis problems and thus improve 
financial performance.   
The analysis is broken into two sections, based on the two variables used to measure 
firm performance: Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
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Firm performance – Tobin’s Q 
Table 8-4 reports the GMM regression of firm performance, measured using Tobin’s 
Q, on the individual governance variables: board size, board independence and the 
absence of CEO duality.  It illustrates the results for 2006/2008/2009 (pre-crisis period) 
and 2010/2011/2012 (crisis period), as well as the results of 2008/2009 (pre-crisis 
period) and 2011/2012 (crisis period) that are run for robustness.  The p-value of the J 
statistic ranges from 0.1080 in the pooled sample to 0.1683 in the pre-crisis period 
sample, indicating that the residuals are uncorrelated with the chosen instruments. 
Board size (H1a) 
A significant positive relationship (+0.268), at the 5% significance level, between the 
first key variables of interest, board size, and firm performance is observed in the pre-
crisis period sample.  A similar significant positive relationship is also observed in the 
sample run for robustness, in both the pre-crisis (+0.242) and crisis period (+0.184) 
samples, at the 1% and 5% level of significance respectively.  Thus, firms that have 
larger boards perform best, in line with H1a.  
Examining board size with the interaction crisis year dummy variable, and its effect on 
Tobin’s Q, an insignificant relationship is observed.  However, when examining the 
pooled sample (2008/2009 and 2011/2012), a significant positive relationship (+0.832), 
at the 5% significance level, is observed between Tobin’s Q and board size with the 
interaction crisis year dummy variable, in line with H1a.  This suggests that during the 
crisis period, firms that had more members on their boards performed better, as 
indicated by the higher levels of Tobin’s Q.   
Board independence (H1b) 
An insignificant relationship between board independence and firm performance is seen 
in the pre-crisis period, crisis period and pooled samples.   
A similar insignificant relationship is observed between board independence with the 
interaction crisis year dummy variable and its effect on Tobin’s Q.  These results do 
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not support H1b, which posits a significant positive relationship between firm 
performance and board independence.   
CEO duality (H1c) 
The absence of CEO duality and firm performance has a significant negative 
relationship (-0.631), at the 1% significance level, in the crisis period.  A similar 
significant negative relationship (-0.824), at the 1% level, is observed in the 2011 and 
2012 crisis period sample as well.  This illustrates that during the crisis period, firms 
that did not have CEO duality performed more poorly.  However, in the pooled sample, 
which includes 2008, 2009, 2011 and 2012 a significant positive relationship (+4.046), 
at the 1% level, is noticed.  
Turning to the absence of CEO duality with the interaction crisis year dummy variable, 
and its effect on Tobin’s Q, a significant negative relationship (-3.811), at the 5% level, 
is observed.  A similar negative relationship (-7.387), at the 1% significance level, 
between these two variables is also observed when examining the pooled sample 
(2008/2009 and 2011/2012).  This result indicates that firms that did not have a unitary 
board leadership structure, in the sense of CEO duality, performed more poorly, 
compared to those that did.  This is contrary to H1c.   
Control Variables 
Looking at the effect of firm size on firm performance, a significant negative 
relationship, at the 5% significance level, is observed for both the pre-crisis (-0.256) 
and crisis period (-0.162) samples, indicating that smaller firms have higher firm 
performance. 
A significant positive relationship, at the 1% and 10% significance levels, is observed 
between leverage and firm performance, for the crisis year (+1.130) and pooled sample 
(+0.976) respectively.  Thus, firms that are highly leveraged have higher firm 
performance.   
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As for free cash flow and firm performance, a significant positive relationship at the 
10% level is seen for the pooled sample (+2.010), where firms that have greater levels 
of free cash flow have higher levels of Tobin’s Q.   
Insignificant results are observed between ownership concentration and growth 
opportunities and firm performance. 
In summary, using Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable, a statistically significant 
negative relationship is seen between Tobin’s Q and the absence of CEO duality and 
firm size, while a statistically significant positive relationship is seen between Tobin’s 
Q and board size, free cash flows and leverage.  All other independent variables have a 
statistically insignificant relationship with Tobin’s Q. 
Firm performance – ROA 
Table 8-4 reports the GMM regression of firm performance, measured using ROA, on 
the individual governance variables: board size, board independence and the absence 
of CEO duality.  The p-value of the J statistic ranges from 0.1074 in the pooled sample 
to 0.1636 in the pre-crisis period sample, indicating that the residuals are uncorrelated 
with the chosen instruments. 
Board size (H1a) 
Examining the relationship between board size and operating performance, a significant 
positive relationship (+0.036), at the 5% significance level, is seen between these two 
variables for the crisis period, indicating that larger boards have the resources to 
increase firm performance during the crisis years.  A similar significant positive 
relationship is also observed in the sample run for robustness, in the crisis period 
(+0.055) sample, at the 1% significance level.  These results are consistent with the 
results found when Tobin’s Q is used to measure firm performance and are in line with 
H1a.   
Examining board size with the interaction crisis year dummy variable, and its effect on 
operating performance, an insignificant relationship is observed.   
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Board independence (H1b) 
Table 8-4 shows that a significant negative relationship (-0.393), at the 1% level, 
between board independence and firm performance is evident in the pre-crisis period 
sample, while this relationship becomes significantly positive (+0.423), at the 10% 
level, in the crisis period sample.  A similar negative (-0.228) relationship, at the 1% 
level, is observed in the pre-crisis period sample (2008/2009), contrary to H1b.   
Examining board independence with the interaction crisis year dummy variable, and its 
effect on operating performance, an insignificant relationship is observed, as in the case 
of board size.   
CEO duality (H1c) 
The absence of CEO duality significantly positively (+0.184) affects, at the 10% level, 
firm performance in the pooled sample, as seen in Table 8-4, in line with H1c.   
Looking at the absence of CEO duality with the interaction crisis year dummy variable, 
and its effect on operating performance, an insignificant relationship is observed, 
similar to the other two board composition variables.   
Control Variables 
Looking at the effect of firm size on firm performance, a significant positive 
relationship (+0.026), at the 10% significance level, in the pooled sample is observed.  
Thus, larger firms have higher operating performance.   
A significant negative relationship, at the 1% significance level, is observed between 
leverage and firm performance, in the pre-crisis period (-0.255), crisis period (-0.227) 
and pooled (-0.224) samples.  Similar results are also observed in the pre-crisis period 
(-0.134), crisis period (-0.297) and pooled (-0.207) samples for the sample run for 
robustness.  Thus, firms that are highly leveraged have lower operating performance.   
A significant positive relationship, at the 1% significance level, exists between growth 
opportunities and company performance in all three samples (+0.121/+0.254/+0.197), 
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indicating that firms that invest in capital expenditures have higher operating 
performance. A similar positive relationship in the pre-crisis period (+0.105), crisis 
period (+0.222) and pooled (+0.345) samples is observed for the sample run for 
robustness. 
Similarly, firms that have more free cash flows have greater ability to invest in 
profitable opportunities, resulting in higher firm performance.  This is evident in the 
significant positive relationship, at the 1% significance level, in the pre-crisis period 
(+0.531), crisis period (+0.730) and pooled (+0.569) samples, as seen in Table 8-4.  A 
similar positive relationship is observed in the pre-crisis period (+0.730), crisis period 
(+0.630) and pooled (+0.925) samples for the sample run for robustness. 
Insignificant results are observed between ownership concentration and firm 
performance.   
In summary, using ROA as the dependent variable, a statistically significant negative 
relationship is observed between ROA and the independent variables, board 
independence in the pre-crisis period sample and leverage, while a statistically 
significant positive relationship is seen between ROA and the independent variables 
board size, board independence in the crisis year period sample, the absence of CEO 
duality, firm size, growth opportunities and free cash flows.  All other independent 
variables have a statistically insignificant relationship with ROA. 
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Table 8-4 Board composition and firm performance – Model 1 
 ROA ROA Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
 2006/2008/2009 2010/2011/2012  2008/2009 2011/2012  2006/2008/2009 2010/2011/2012  2008/2009 2011/2012  
 
Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period Pooled sample 
Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period 
Pooled 
sample 
Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period 
Pooled 
sample 
Pre-crisis 
period 
Crisis period Pooled sample 
Variables 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
bsize 
-0.005 
(-0.412) 
0.036 
(2.129)** 
-0.018 
(-1.007) 
0.002 
(0.253) 
0.055 
(2.933)*** 
0.028 
(1.530) 
0.268 
(2.223)** 
0.031 
(0.418) 
0.063 
(0.194) 
0.242 
(2.808)*** 
0.184 
(2.360)** 
-0.315 
(-1.370) 
bindep 
-0.393 
(-3.055)*** 
0.423 
(1.691)* 
0.401 
(1.191) 
-0.228 
(-2.759)*** 
0.414 
(1.222) 
0.424 
(0.890) 
-1.286 
(-0.906) 
-0.474 
(-0.470) 
-3.466 
(-0.705) 
-1.138 
(-1.332) 
1.644 
(1.251) 
-4.251 
(-1.285) 
ceodual 
0.044 
(1.302) 
0.023 
(0.441) 
0.184 
(1.766)* 
0.015 
(0.764) 
-0.050 
(-0.953) 
0.123 
(1.023) 
-0.473 
(-1.478) 
-0.631 
(-2.684)*** 
1.476 
(1.252) 
-0.222 
(-0.817) 
-0.824 
(-3.535)*** 
4.046 
(3.152)*** 
ownconc 
-0.060 
(-1.444) 
-0.008 
(-0.157) 
0.005 
(0.108) 
-0.030 
(-1.151) 
-0.036 
(-0.577) 
-0.009 
(-0.139) 
-0.051 
(-0.132) 
-0.084 
(-0.412) 
-0.117 
(-0.270) 
0.017 
(0.056) 
0.147 
(0.621) 
-0.456 
(-0.938) 
ta 
0.008 
(0.785) 
-0.009 
(-0.557) 
0.026 
(1.820)* 
-0.001 
(-0.152) 
-0.017 
(-1.129) 
-0.019 
(-0.994) 
-0.256 
(-2.010)** 
-0.162 
(-2.561)** 
-0.301 
(-1.428) 
-0.257 
(-2.708)*** 
-0.206 
(-2.997)*** 
-0.138 
(-0.980) 
lev 
-0.255 
(-4.744)*** 
-0.227 
(-5.414)*** 
-0.224 
(-4.007)*** 
-0.134 
(-5.110)*** 
-0.297 
(-8.321)*** 
-0.207 
(-3.176)*** 
0.187 
(0.445) 
1.130 
(5.247)*** 
0.976 
(1.927)* 
0.349 
(0.915) 
1.089 
(5.363)*** 
0.418 
(0.888) 
growth 
0.121 
(3.468)*** 
0.254 
(3.657)*** 
0.197 
(3.661)*** 
0.105 
(7.510)*** 
0.222 
(2.421)** 
0.345 
(4.884)*** 
-0.144 
(-0.366) 
-0.116 
(-0.235) 
0.609 
(1.060) 
0.145 
(0.679) 
0.196 
(0.478) 
0.418 
(0.812) 
free_cf 
0.531 
(8.153)*** 
0.730 
(6.004)*** 
0.569 
(4.874)*** 
0.730 
(14.795)*** 
0.630 
(6.615)*** 
0.925 
(7.354)*** 
0.895 
(1.046) 
1.099 
(1.449) 
2.010 
(1.723)* 
0.556 
(0.836) 
0.556 
(0.766) 
-0.840 
(-0.779) 
crisis_year   
-0.033 
(-0.156) 
  
0.303 
(1.017) 
  
-1.239 
(-0.400) 
  -2.856 
(-1.312) 
bsize*crisis_year   
0.029 
(1.329) 
  
-0.012 
(-0.356) 
  
0.254 
(0.747) 
  0.832 
(2.570)** 
bindep*crisis_year   
-0.558 
(-1.219) 
  
-0.675 
(-1.247) 
  
5.226 
(1.158) 
  2.808 
(0.770) 
ceodual*crisis_year   
-0.085 
(-0.476) 
  
-0.058 
(-0.323) 
  
-3.811 
(-2.030)** 
  -7.387 
(-3.693)*** 
J-statistic 0.1636 0.1340 0.1074 0.1765 0.1515 0.1186 0.1683 0.1470 0.1080 0.1866 0.1678 0.1146 
N 476 536 1012 314 351 665 472 536 1008 312 351 663 
Variables: Tobin’s Q market based measure of firm performance; ROA operating performance measure of firm performance; bsize board size; bindep board independence; ceodual absence of duality; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev 
leverage; growth growth opportunities; free cf free cash flow; crisis_year an indicator variable taking the value of zero for 2006, 2008, 2009 (or 2008 and 2009) and one for 2010, 2011, 2012 (or 2011 and 2012); industry dummies are included in all regressions. 
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10%   
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8.4.3 Results – H2 
This section provides the analysis and discussion of H2 about the effect of CG indices 
on firm performance before and during the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.  Two 
versions of the CG indices, the penalized CG index and the non-penalized CG index 
are created based on how the non-disclosed items are recorded.  Additionally, two rating 
schemes: Scoring by item and Scoring by category are used for each version of the CG 
index.  Hence four regressions are run, two for the penalized CG index and two for the 
non-penalized CG index, as shown in Table 8-5, Table 8-6, Table 8-7, and Table 8-8. 
Firm performance – Tobin’s Q 
Penalized CG indices 
Examining the penalized CG indices, as seen in Table 8-5, it is evident that firms with 
higher CG index scores have higher firm performance, as seen by the positive 
relationship at the 1% level, evident in the pre-crisis year (+2.109 / +3.655) and the 
pooled sample (+4.099 / +4.006) for both rating systems, Scoring by item and Scoring 
by category, in line with H2.  However, in the crisis year sample, for both rating 
schemes, a negative relationship (-4.075 / -4.722) between the CG indices and firm 
performance is observed, contrary to H2. 
This negative effect of governance (measured through the CG index) on firm 
performance, is also evident when examining the CG index with the interaction crisis 
year dummy variable and firm performance for both rating schemes (-3.156 / -4.676).  
During the crisis year, firms that have higher CG index scores have lower firm 
performance.   
Control Variables 
A significant negative relationship for the pre-crisis sample is evident, at the 10% 
significance level, between firm size and firm performance (-0.101 / -0.109), indicating 
that smaller firms have higher firm performance.  This is evident for both rating 
methods, as seen in Table 8-5.   
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Significant positive results, at the 1% level, for the crisis year (+0.918 / +0.830) and the 
pooled samples (+0.559 / +0.648) are found between leverage and firm performance, 
indicating that firms with higher leverage also have higher performance. These results 
are similar for both rating schemes.    
A significant negative relationship, at the 5% level, in the pre-crisis (-0.693 / -0.716) 
and crisis year samples (-0.777 / -0.789), for both rating schemes, is found between 
growth and firm performance, as observed in Table 8-5.  This indicates that firms that 
have higher growth opportunities perform worse.   
Significant positive results, at the 1% significance level, in the crisis period sample 
(+1.492 / +1.522) is observed between free cash flows and firm performance, for both 
rating schemes.  Firms that have more free cash flow perform better.   
Insignificant results are observed between firm performance and ownership 
concentration for both rating schemes.     
Non-penalized CG indices 
Similar positive results, at the 5% level, are observed between firm performance and 
non-penalized CG indices, as is the case with penalized CG indices for the pre-crisis 
(+2.344 / +1.756) and pooled samples (+3.492 / +2.921), as seen in Table 8-6, in line 
with H2.  These results are observed for both rating schemes.   
Conversely, in the Scoring by category rating scheme, a significant negative 
relationship (-5.618), at the 1% significance level, is seen between the CG index and 
firm performance during the crisis period. This significant negative result (-8.206 / -
13.636) is also observed between firm performance and the CG index with the 
interaction crisis year dummy variable, for both rating schemes.  This result shows that 
during the crisis years, firms with higher CG index scores have lower firm performance, 
contrary to H2.  
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Control Variables 
A significant negative relationship between firm size and firm performance, at the 1% 
and 10% levels respectively, for both rating schemes, is observed in the crisis year 
sample (-0.101/ -0.074).  Larger firms perform worse during the crisis years.   
Significant positive relationships, at the 1% level, between leverage and firm 
performance are observed in the crisis year (+0.887 / +0.976) and pooled sample 
(+0.623 / +0.611) for both rating schemes, as seen in Table 8-6.   
Additionally, a significant negative relationship, at the 5% and 10% significance levels, 
for the pre-crisis year sample (-0.717 / -0.630) under both rating schemes is seen 
between growth opportunities and firm performance.  Thus, sample firms in the pre-
crisis period sample that have higher growth opportunities have weaker performance.   
Finally, under both rating schemes, Scoring by item and Scoring by category, a 
significant positive relationship, at the 1% and 5% level, is noticed between free cash 
flows and firm performance for the crisis period (+1.408 / +1.637) and pooled sample 
(+0.935 / +1.421) respectively.  This result is expected since firms that have more free 
cash flow have the ability to invest in various projects, thus increasing firm 
performance.   
Insignificant relationships are seen between firm performance and ownership 
concentration. 
In summary, using Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable, a statistically significant positive 
relationship is observed between both the penalized and non-penalized indices under 
both rating schemes in the pre-crisis period and in the pooled sample.  However, in the 
crisis period sample a statistically significant negative relationship is seen for both 
rating schemes for both the penalized and non-penalized indices.  This negative effect 
on firm performance is also evident when examining the CG index with the interaction 
crisis year dummy variable.  A statistically significant negative relationship is also seen 
between firm size and growth opportunities and firm performance.  A statistically 
significant positive relationship is seen between leverage and free cash flows and firm 
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performance, and an insignificant relationship exists between firm performance and 
ownership concentration.  
Firm performance - ROA  
Penalized CG indices 
Similar results are observed between the penalized CG indices and firm performance, 
when examining both rating schemes of CG indices, the Scoring by item and Scoring 
by category methods.  
More specifically, significant positive relationships at the 1%, 5% and 10% level are 
observed between firm performance and the penalized CG indices as seen in Table 8-7 
in the pre-crisis (+0.211 / +0.337), crisis year (+0.364 / +0.553) and pooled (+0.478) 
samples for both rating schemes.  In line with H2, firms with higher CG index scores 
have higher levels of performance. Nonetheless, when examining the 
2008/2009/2011/2012 sample, which is the sample used to verify the results of the 
original sample, a significant negative relationship (-0.883 / -0.782), at the 10% level 
is observed between firm performance and the CG index with the interaction crisis year 
dummy variable for both rating schemes.  This shows that during the crisis, firms that 
had better governance, measured by higher CG index scores, had lower firm 
performance, contrary to H2. 
Control Variables 
Significant negative relationships, at the 1% level, are observed between firm 
performance and leverage for the pre-crisis (-0.107 / -0.097), crisis (-0.248 / -0.242) 
and pooled (-0.228 / -0.214) samples.  Higher leveraged firms perform worse since they 
have limited cash flows, have additional expenses and thus their net income is 
negatively affected.     
Significant positive relationships, at the 1% level, between firm performance and 
growth opportunities in the pre-crisis (+0.102 / +0.100), crisis (+0.256 / +0.267) and 
pooled samples (+0.205 / +0.212) are seen in Table 8-7, for both rating schemes. 
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Significant positive relationships, at the 1% level, are also observed between firm 
performance and free cash flow in the pre-crisis (+0.510 / +0.482), crisis (+0.636 / 
+0.583) and pooled (+0.666 / +0.623) samples.  Firms that have higher levels of free 
cash flow, as expected, perform better, under both rating schemes. 
Insignificant relationships are observed between firm performance and both ownership 
concentration and firm size, as evident in Table 8-7 .   
Non-penalized CG indices 
Significant positive relationships, at the 5% and 10% levels, are observed between firm 
performance and non-penalized CG indices for the pre-crisis (+0.121) and pooled 
(+0.815 / +0.791) samples, as seen in Table 8-8, for both rating schemes, in line with 
H2.  On the other hand, as in the case of the penalized CG indices, when examining the 
2008/2009/2011/2012 sample, a significant negative relationship, at the 5% level, is 
observed between firm performance and both the CG index for the crisis period sample 
(-0.486) and the CG index with the interaction crisis year dummy variable (-1.651), for 
the Scoring by category rating method is used.  Both results are contrary to H2.  This 
verifies the results stated earlier that during the crisis years, firms that had better 
governance, measured by higher CG index scores, had lower firm performance. 
Control Variables 
Under the Scoring by category rating method, a significant positive relationship 
(+0.007), at the 1% significance level, is seen in the pre-crisis period sample between 
firm size and firm performance. 
Similar to the penalized CG indices a significant negative relationship at the 1% level 
is observed between firm performance and leverage, in the pre-crisis (-0.120 / -0.116), 
crisis (-0.234 / -0.234) and pooled (-0.267 / -0.279) samples.  These results exist in both 
rating schemes.  
Additionally, looking at Table 8-8, a significant positive relationship at the 1% level is 
observed between firm performance and growth opportunities for pre-crisis (+0.098 / 
+0.113), crisis (+0.295 / +0.282) and pooled (+0.243 / +0.217) samples.  Similar 
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significant positive relationship at the 1% level are also observed between free cash 
flows and firm performance for pre-crisis (+0.523 / +0.544), crisis (+0.691 / +0.602) 
and pooled (+0.614 / 0.554) samples.  Thus, the results for the non-penalized CG 
indices are similar to the penalized CG indices.   
Insignificant results are observed between firm performance and ownership 
concentration. 
In summary, using ROA as a dependent variable, a statistically significant positive 
relationship is observed between both the penalized and non-penalized indices under 
both rating schemes in the pre-crisis period, crisis period and pooled samples.  A 
statistically significant negative relationship is observed between leverage and firm 
performance.  A statistically significant positive relationship is also evident between 
firm size, growth and free cash flows and firm performance, and an insignificant 
relationship exists between firm performance and ownership concentration.
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Table 8-5 Penalized CG indices and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) – Model 2 
 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
 2006/2008/2009 2010/2011/2012  2008/2009 2011/2012   2006/2008/2009 2010/2011/2012  2008/2009 2011/2012  
 Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled sample Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled sample  Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled 
sample 
Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled 
sample 
Variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
cgpentotal 2.109 
(1.888)* 
-4.075 
(-3.538)*** 
4.099 
(3.145)*** 
3.170 
(3.906)*** 
-1.178 
(-1.317) 
6.323 
(5.490)*** 
cg2pentotal 3.655 
(2.921)*** 
-4.722 
(-3.736)*** 
4.006 
(3.407)*** 
3.381 
(5.031)*** 
-1.101 
(-1.143) 
6.636 
(5.806)*** 
ownconc 0.029 
(0.101) 
-0.416 
(-1.477) 
0.374 
(1.485) 
0.047 
(0.211) 
0.016 
(0.083) 
0.307 
(1.979)** 
ownconc 0.159 
(0.513) 
-0.419 
(1.476) 
0.342 
(1.368) 
0.057 
(0.259) 
0.055 
(0.292) 
0.347 
(2.199)** 
ta -0.101 
(-1.898)* 
-0.033 
(-0.875) 
0.015 
(0.316) 
-0.119 
(-3.195)*** 
-0.014 
(-0.346) 
-0.020 
(-0.650) 
ta -0.109 
(-1.954)* 
0.003 
(0.082) 
0.011 
(0.231) 
-0.125 
(-3.447)*** 
-0.011 
(-0.262) 
-0.030 
(-0.939) 
lev 0.247 
(0.829) 
0.918 
(5.988)*** 
0.559 
(2.832)*** 
0.227 
(1.223) 
0.718 
(8.191)*** 
0.746 
(6.425)*** 
lev 0.418 
(1.368) 
0.830 
(4.974)*** 
0.648 
(3.187)*** 
0.315 
(1.483) 
0.726 
(8.407)*** 
0.786 
(6.498)*** 
growth -0.693 
(-2.125)** 
-0.777 
(-2.132)** 
-0.423 
(-1.479) 
-0.121 
(-0.654) 
-0.649 
(-2.213)** 
0.040 
(0.204) 
growth -0.716 
(-2.202)** 
-0.789 
(-2.119)** 
-0.384 
(-1.336) 
-0.137 
(-0.756) 
-0.633 
(-2.124)** 
0.087 
(0.449) 
free_cf 0.067 
(0.105) 
1.492 
(4.410)*** 
0.392 
(0.788) 
-0.265 
(-0.535) 
0.705 
(2.370)** 
-0.052 
(-0.191) 
free_cf -0.274 
(-0.411) 
1.522 
(4.684)*** 
0.591 
(1.244) 
-0.323 
(-0.678) 
0.730 
(2.518)** 
-0.046 
(-0.167) 
crisis_year   0.509 
(0.644) 
  1.497 
(2.966)*** 
crisis_year   1.636 
(1.782)* 
  1.872 
(3.357)*** 
cgpentotal*
crisis_year 
  -3.156 
(1.927)* 
  -6.021 
(-4.802)*** 
cg2pentotal*
crisis_year 
  -4.676 
(-2.768)*** 
  -6.464 
(-5.057)*** 
J-statistic 
0.1438 0.1500 0.1455 
0.1576 0.1754 0.1575 J-statistic 
0.1425 0.1507 0.1448 0.1572 0.1754 0.1570 
N 
 
575 538 1113 386 352 738 N 
 
575 
538 1113 386 352 738 
Variables: Tobin’s Q market based measure of firm performance; cgpentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by item method; cg2pentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by category method; ownconc ownership concentration; 
ta total assets; lev leverage; growth growth opportunities; free cf free cash flow; crisis_year an indicator variable taking the value of zero for 2006, 2008, 2009 (or 2008&2009) and one for 2010, 2011, 2012 (or 2011&2012); industry dummies are 
included in all regressions; *** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10%  
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Table 8-6 Non-penalized CG indices and firm performance (Tobin’s Q) – Model 2 
 Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q  Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q 
 2006/2008/2009 2010/2011/2012  2008/2009 2011/2012   2006/2008/2009 2010/2011/2012  2008/2009 2011/2012  
 Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled 
sample 
Pre-crisis 
year 
Crisis years Pooled sample  Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled 
sample 
Pre-crisis 
year 
Crisis years Pooled sample 
Variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
cgnontotal 2.344 
(2.123)** 
-0.417 
(-0.971) 
3.492 
(2.207)** 
3.034 
(3.493)*** 
-2.076 
(-1.854) 
6.006 
(4.976)*** 
cg2nontotal 1.756 
(2.353)** 
-5.618 
(-3.662)*** 
2.921 
(1.725)* 
2.142 
(3.727)*** 
-0.767 
(-0.676) 
5.307 
(5.056)*** 
ownconc -0.049 
(-0.157) 
0.144 
(0.419) 
0.120 
(0.448) 
-0.223 
(-0.865) 
0.056 
(0.315) 
0.284 
(1.759)* 
ownconc 0.095 
(0.325) 
-0.138 
(-0.564) 
-0.085 
(-0.272) 
0.071 
(0.341) 
0.144 
(0.817) 
0.379 
(2.082)** 
ta -0.067 
(-1.167) 
-0.101 
(-3.218)*** 
-0.002 
(-0.031) 
-0.123 
(-2.762)*** 
-0.037 
(-1.040) 
-0.017 
(-0.540) 
ta -0.027 
(-0.461) 
-0.074 
(-1.778)* 
0.003 
(0.045) 
-0.108 
(-2.801)*** 
-0.044 
(-1.278) 
-0.006 
(-0.172) 
lev 0.243 
(0.770) 
0.887 
(6.934)*** 
0.623 
(2.759)*** 
0.117 
(0.439) 
0.777 
(7.046)*** 
0.680 
(5.245)*** 
lev 0.132 
(0.410) 
0.976 
(4.703)*** 
0.611 
(2.223)** 
0.185 
(0.734) 
0.786 
(5.798)*** 
0.647 
(4.582)*** 
growth -0.717 
(-2.211)** 
-0.339 
(-1.137) 
-0.328 
(-1.016) 
-0.197 
(-1.060) 
-0.608 
(-1.869)* 
0.175 
(0.847) 
growth -0.630 
(-1.816)* 
-0.665 
(-1.343) 
-0.177 
(-0.498) 
-0.128 
(-0.720) 
-0.352 
(-1.159) 
0.252 
(1.148) 
free_cf 0.199 
(0.309) 
1.408 
(3.541)*** 
0.935 
(1.821)* 
-0.410 
(-0.710) 
0.748 
(2.113)** 
-0.007 
(-0.024) 
free_cf 0.286 
(0.423) 
1.637 
(3.636)*** 
1.421 
(2.170)** 
-0.311 
(-0.573) 
1.013 
(2.682)*** 
0.058 
(0.192) 
crisis_year   5.380 
(2.316)** 
  3.120 
(2.896)*** 
crisis_year   9.559 
(3.033)*** 
  1.296 
(1.073) 
cgnontotal*
crisis_year 
  -8.206 
(-2.551)** 
  -5.811 
(3.613)*** 
cg2nontotal*
crisis_year 
  -13.626 
(-3.364)*** 
  -3.478 
(-2.188)** 
J-statistic 
0.1412 0.1554 0.1394 
0.1544 0.1799 0.1551 J-statistic 
0.1424 0.1522 0.1457 0.1593 0.1765 0.1572 
N 
575 
538 1113 386 352 738 N 
575 538 1113 386 352 738 
Variables: Tobin’s Q market based measure of firm performance; cgnontotal non-penalized total CG index using the Scoring by item method; cg2nontotal non-penalized total CG index using the Scoring by category method; ownconc 
ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; growth growth opportunities; free cf free cash flow; crisis_year an indicator variable taking the value of zero for 2006, 2008, 2009 (or 2008&2009) and one for 2010, 2011, 2012 (or 
2011&2012); industry dummies are included in all regressions; *** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
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Table 8-7 Penalized CG indices and firm performance (ROA) – Model 2 
 
ROA ROA  ROA ROA 
 2006/2008/2009 2010/2011/2012  2008/2009 2011/2012   2006/2008/2009 2010/2011/2012  2008/2009 2011/2012  
 Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled 
sample 
Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled 
sample 
 Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled 
sample 
Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled 
sample 
Variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
cgpentotal 0.211 
(3.650)*** 
0.364 
(2.117)** 
0.379 
(1.198) 
0.272 
(3.880)*** 
0.141 
(0.952) 
0.896 
(1.749)* 
cg2pentotal 0.337 
(5.202)*** 
0.553 
(2.602)*** 
0.478 
(1.678)* 
0.248 
(4.153)*** 
0.187 
(1.216) 
0.789 
(1.749)* 
ownconc 0.010 
(0.620) 
0.025 
(0.727) 
0.010 
(0.180) 
-0.014 
(-0.894) 
-0.064 
(-2.223)** 
-0.062 
(-0.937) 
ownconc 0.023 
(1.245) 
0.042 
(1.094) 
0.017 
(0.325) 
-0.015 
(-0.909) 
-0.062 
(-2.137)** 
-0.063 
(-0.971) 
ta 0.002 
(0.862) 
0.003 
(0.436) 
0.004 
(0.496) 
0.003 
(1.071) 
-0.004 
(-0.464) 
-0.014 
(-1.149) 
ta 0.000 
(0.149) 
-0.003 
(-0.353) 
0.001 
(0.115) 
0.002 
(0.670) 
-0.006 
(-0.610) 
-0.015 
(-1.247) 
lev -0.107 
(-5.603)*** 
-0.248 
(-10.602)*** 
-0.228 
(-4.716)*** 
-0.111 
(-5.697)*** 
-0.287 
(-18.153)*** 
-0.244 
(4.910)*** 
lev -0.097 
(-4.642)*** 
-0.242 
(-10.335)*** 
-0.214 
(-4.735)*** 
-0.110 
(-5.760)*** 
-0.288 
(18.533)*** 
-0.240 
(-4.923)*** 
growth 0.102 
(5.554)*** 
0.256 
(5.454)*** 
0.205 
(4.395)*** 
0.102 
(7.397)*** 
0.263 
(5.036)*** 
0.298 
(5.496)*** 
growth 0.100 
(5.613)*** 
0.267 
(5.235)*** 
0.212 
(4.635)*** 
0.101 
(7.408)*** 
0.272 
(5.072)*** 
0.294 
(5.392)*** 
free_cf 0.510 
(11.266)*** 
0.636 
(8.175)*** 
0.666 
(6.950)*** 
0.613 
(11.206)*** 
0.596 
(8.602)*** 
0.822 
(8.106)*** 
free_cf 0.482 
(10.701)*** 
0.583 
(7.795)*** 
0.623 
(6.875)*** 
0.620 
(11.473)*** 
0.592 
(8.988)*** 
0.821 
(8.206)*** 
crisis_year   -0.137 
(-1.057) 
  0.227 
(1.288) 
crisis_year   -0.259 
(-1.784)* 
  0.224 
(1.189) 
cgpentotal*
crisis_year 
  0.000 
(0.000) 
  -0.883 
(-1.803)* 
cg2pentotal*
crisis_year 
  0.148 
(0.536) 
  -0.782 
(-1.702)* 
J-statistic 
0.1481 0.1433 0.1433 
0.1588 0.1624 0.1547 J-statistic 
0.1460 0.1430 0.1423 0.1586 0.1623 0.1538 
N 
582 
538 1120 390 352 742 N 
582 538 1120 390 352 742 
Variables: ROA operating performance measure of firm performance; cgpentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by item method; cg2pentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by category method; ownconc ownership 
concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; growth growth opportunities; free cf free cash flow; crisis_year an indicator variable taking the value of zero for 2006, 2008, 2009 (or 2008&2009) and one for 2010, 2011, 2012 (or 2011&2012); industry 
dummies are included in all regressions; *** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
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Table 8-8 Non-penalized CG indices and firm performance (ROA) – Model 2 
 
ROA ROA  ROA ROA 
 2006/2008/2009 2010/2011/2012  2008/2009 2011/2012   2006/2008/2009 2010/2011/2012  2008/2009 2011/2012  
 Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled sample Pre-crisis 
year 
Crisis years Pooled 
sample 
 Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled 
sample 
Pre-crisis year Crisis years Pooled sample 
Variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
Variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
cgnontotal 0.121 
(1.843)* 
0.078 
(0.955) 
0.815 
(2.215)** 
0.166 
(1.822)* 
0.146 
(0.798) 
1.484 
(2.261)** 
cg2nontotal 0.054 
(1.292) 
0.114 
(0.642) 
0.791 
(2.185)** 
0.143 
(2.217)** 
-0.486 
(-2.176)** 
0.839 
(1.772)* 
ownconc -0.007 
(-0.393) 
-0.034 
(-1.132) 
0.014 
(0.258) 
-0.20 
(-1.167) 
-0.063 
(-2.398)** 
-0.043 
(-0.568) 
ownconc -0.005 
(-0.379) 
-0.028 
(-0.883) 
0.004 
(0.084) 
-0.018 
(-0.991) 
-0.115 
(2.846)*** 
-0.071 
(-1.019) 
ta 0.004 
(1.276) 
0.004 
(0.599) 
0.001 
(0.125) 
0.004 
(1.378) 
0.002 
(0.207) 
-0.015 
(-0.953) 
ta 0.007 
(2.822)*** 
0.008 
(1.061) 
0.007 
(0.709) 
0.006 
(1.804)* 
0.009 
(0.897) 
-0.005 
(-0.411) 
lev -0.120 
(-6.037)*** 
-0.234 
(-9.468)*** 
-0.267 
(-4.698)*** 
-0.125 
(-5.584)*** 
-0.284 
(14.766)*** 
-0.272 
(-4.126)*** 
lev -0.116 
(-7.310)*** 
-0.234 
(-7.078)*** 
-0.279 
(-5.050)*** 
-0.128 
(-5.885)*** 
-0.280 
(-9.320)*** 
-0.275 
(-4.196)*** 
growth 0.098 
(5.161)*** 
0.295 
(4.761)*** 
0.243 
(4.795)*** 
0.097 
(5.738)*** 
0.262 
(4.749)*** 
0.360 
(5.559)*** 
growth 0.113 
(5.294)*** 
0.282 
(3.708)*** 
0.217 
(4.467)*** 
0.106 
(6.748)*** 
0.199 
(2.275)** 
0.300 
(4.676)*** 
free_cf 0.523 
(10.937)*** 
0.691 
(8.105)*** 
0.614 
(5.998)*** 
0.618 
(11.029)*** 
0.601 
(8.977)*** 
0.812 
(6.334)*** 
free_cf 0.544 
(12.317)*** 
0.602 
(7.040)*** 
0.554 
(4.982)*** 
0.628 
(12.643)*** 
0.519 
(5.483)*** 
0.806 
(6.326)*** 
crisis_year   -0.755 
(-2.070)** 
  0.528 
(1.175) 
crisis_year   -0.815 
(-1.865)* 
  1.044 
(2.011)** 
cgnontotal*
crisis_year 
  0.798 
(1.630) 
  -1.103 
(-1.552) 
cg2nontotal*
crisis_year 
  0.803 
(1.473) 
  -1.651 
(-2.407)** 
J-statistic 
0.1477 0.1440 0.1371 
0.1570 0.1649 0.1506 J-statistic 
0.1494 0.1407 0.1439 0.1613 0.1671 0.1537 
N 
582 
538 1120 390 352 742 N 
582 538 1120 390 352 742 
Variables: ROA operating performance measure of firm performance; cgpentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by item method; cg2pentotal penalized total CG index using the Scoring by category method; ownconc ownership 
concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; growth growth opportunities; free cf free cash flow; crisis_year an indicator variable taking the value of zero for 2006, 2008, 2009 (or 2008&2009) and one for 2010, 2011, 2012 (2011&2012); 
industry dummies are included in all regressions; *** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10%  
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8.5 Discussion of results 
8.5.1 H1 – Board composition and firm performance 
Board composition is examined using board size, board independence and the absence 
of CEO duality.  Firm performance is studied through a market-based performance 
measure, Tobin’s Q, and an operating based performance measure, ROA.   
8.5.1.1 – Board composition and Tobin’s Q 
Board size (H1a) 
A significant positive relationship between board size and firm performance is observed 
in the pre-crisis period sample and the crisis year samples.  Thus, firms that have larger 
boards perform best.  These results are consistent with the research of Jackling and Johl 
(2009) and Veprauskaité and Adams (2013) which find a positive relationship between 
board size and firm performance and state that small boards lack access to resources 
provided by larger boards, thus negatively affecting firm performance.  Additionally, 
Klein (2002a) suggest that larger boards reduce CEO dominance, thus enhancing the 
value of corporate governance.   
Examining board size with the interaction crisis year dummy variable, and its effect on 
Tobin’s Q, a significant positive relationship between these two variables is seen, in 
line with H1a.  This result demonstrates the need for larger boards during the financial 
crises so as to improve firm performance. 
Board independence (H1b) 
An insignificant relationship between board independence and firm performance is seen 
in the pre-crisis, crisis and pooled samples.  Similar insignificant results between board 
independence and firm performance are reported by Toudas (2009), Jackling and Johl 
(2009), Drakos and Bekiris (2010) and Veprauskaité and Adams (2013).     
A similar insignificant relationship is observed between board independence and 
Tobin’s Q with the interaction crisis year variable. These results do not coincide with 
Chapter 8- Data Analysis and Discussion (CG & FP) 
 
258 
 
H1b, where a significant positive relationship between firm performance and board 
independence is expected.  Examining a crisis-period setting, similar insignificant 
results between the two variables are also reported by Leung and Horwitz (2010) and 
Francis et al. (2012). 
CEO duality (H1c) 
The absence of CEO duality has a significant negative relationship with firm 
performance in the crisis period sample.  The results of this contradict the work of 
Jermias (2007) and Veprauskaité and Adams (2013), who argue that the absence of 
CEO duality positively affects firm performance.  According to this line of thinking, in 
periods of crisis, a unitary leadership structure is preferred and positively affects firm 
performance.  Good governance prescriptions as prescribed by agency theory can prove 
to be counterproductive in a crisis setting.  Similar to the findings of Leung and Horwitz 
(2010) in the Asian financial crisis setting and Essen et al. (2013) in the 2007-2008 
credit crisis setting, the findings of this research conclude that CEO duality positively 
affects firm performance.  Studies such Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) and 
Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994), find that powerful CEOs, who occupy both roles in a 
firm have a favourable effect on firm performance in uncertain times, such as a financial 
crisis.  When fewer constraints are implemented on their roles, they have the ability to 
make quick decisions without the need for continuous consensus.  A unitary leadership 
structure leaves little ambiguity about who is in charge, an element necessary to deal 
with crisis situations.  This positive effect of CEO duality is also evident in this research 
when examining the absence of CEO duality with the interaction variable crisis year 
and its effect on Tobin’s Q.  A significant negative relationship is observed indicating 
that firms that did not have a unitary board leadership structure, in the sense of CEO 
duality, performed more poorly, compared to those that did.  These results contradict 
hypothesis H1c.   
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8.5.1.2 – Board composition and ROA 
Board size (H1a) 
Board size and operating performance exhibit a significant positive relationship for the 
crisis period, validating H1a, consistent with the results found when Tobin’s Q is the 
proxy for firm performance.  Larger boards have the resources to increase firm 
performance during the crisis years.  Consistent with resource dependency theory, large 
boards have access to resources that add value through external links to the 
environment, such as key suppliers, customers and significant stakeholders (Jackling 
and Johl, 2009).  Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) state that large boards have an 
increased pool of knowledge and expertise in comparison to smaller ones, thus 
providing increased value to firms.  Additionally, larger boards have the ability to 
reduce CEO dominance that could lead to negative firm performance.  Similar positive 
results are observed in Dalton et al. (1998) and Jackling and Johl (2009).  A similar 
significant positive relationship between board size and firm performance, in a Greek 
setting, is also reported by Zhou et al. (2018). 
However, when considering the crisis year interaction variable in the pooled sample, 
an insignificant relationship is observed.  This suggests that the positive influence of a 
larger board is less effective during a financial crisis. 
Board independence (H1b) 
A significant negative relationship between board independence and firm performance 
is evident in the pre-crisis sample, while this relationship reverses and becomes 
significantly positive in the crisis years.  This result is similar to the results reported by 
Bhagat and Bolton (2013).  They study the effect of board independence on firm 
performance during 1998-2007 using US data, separating their sample into pre and post 
2002 periods, focusing on the SOX Act regulation enforced in 2002.  In their research, 
a negative relationship between the two variables is identified in the pre-2002 sample, 
and this relationship is reversed in the post-2002 sample.  They state that these results 
are driven by firms that increase their independent directors in the post-2002 period due 
to them conforming to the regulation, and this leads to a positive reaction by the market.  
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These results are also supported by event study results of Chhaochharia and Grinstein 
(2007) and DeFond et al. (2005) that provide independent evidence of the reversal of 
the relationship between board independence and firm performance when firms shift 
from non-compliance to compliance with SOX’s board independence regulation.  More 
specifically, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) find that companies that had a lower 
compliance rate with SOX rules had higher positive abnormal returns on the 
announcement of compliance with these rules.  DeFond et al. (2005) report a positive 
stock market reaction when a member with accounting expertise is appointed to the 
audit committee.  This indicates that although SOX specifically affects board 
independence, the increased scrutiny and interest in corporate governance forces firms 
to implement better governance practices, that in turn potentially positively affects firm 
performance (Bhagat and Bolton, 2013).  Similarly, in Greece firms in the crisis year 
sample (2010, 2011, 2012) comply and disclose more governance items compared to 
the pre-crisis years (2006, 2008, 2009) due to various governance laws (i.e. Law 
3693/2008 and Law 3873/2010) and the Greek CG code created and enforced after 
2010.  Corporate governance received greater scrutiny and interest by stakeholders and 
this could explain the significant positive effect of board independence on firm 
performance during the crisis period.  However, Zhou et al. (2018) for the period 2008-
2012 report a significant negative relationship between board independence and firm 
performance, indicating that independent directors lack firm-specific knowledge that 
could potentially decrease firm performance and when the board’s advisory role is more 
important than its monitoring role, more independence directors decrease firm 
performance.   
Examining board independence with the interaction crisis year variable and its effect 
on operating performance, an insignificant relationship is observed, as in the case of 
board size.   
CEO duality (H1c) 
The absence of a dual leadership structure positively affects firm performance in the 
pooled sample.  This result is consistent with the work of Bhagat and Bolton (2013), 
Veprauskaité and Adams (2013) and Duru et al. (2016).  They find that CEO duality 
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places extensive power in the hands of CEOs that have the opportunity to manipulate it 
to their benefit, which is detrimental for firm’s performance.   
Looking at the absence of CEO duality with the interaction variable crisis year and its 
effect on operating performance, an insignificant relationship is observed, similar to the 
other two board composition variables.   
8.5.2 H2 – CG index and firm performance 
8.5.2.1 – Penalized CG indices and Tobin’s Q 
Positive significant relationships are seen between firm performance and CG indices in 
the pre-crisis and pooled samples.  These results are consistent with the work of Bhagat 
and Bolton (2008) and Gompers et al. (2003).  However, when examining the crisis 
year sample, a negative relationship is observed between the two variables.  These 
results indicate that governance practices that are applicable in a non-crisis setting are 
not always appropriate in a crisis setting.  These results are consistently found in both 
rating schemes.   
Overall, the results support H2 that presumes a significant positive association between 
CG and performance only in a non-crisis setting.  These results are in line with the work 
of Ammann et al. (2011), Bauer et al. (2008), Black et al. (2006c), Drobetz et al. (2004) 
and Alves and Mendes (2004).  However in a crisis setting, H2 is not supported, 
contrary to the results of Gupta et al. (2013), who also examine corporate governance, 
through CG indices, and firm performance in a crisis setting, and find either positive or 
insignificant results between the two variables.   
8.5.2.2 – Non-penalized CG indices and Tobin’s Q 
The results found using the penalized CG indices previously stated, are also confirmed 
through the use of non-penalized indices as well, again under both rating schemes.  
Again, as in the penalized CG indices, results differ between pre-crisis and crisis year 
samples, whereby in the crisis years a significant negative relationship is observed 
between CG indices and firm performance.   
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8.5.2.3 –Penalized CG indices and ROA 
When examining the effect of CG index scores on ROA, H2 is supported, in all three 
sample periods, the pre-crisis, crisis and pooled samples, whereby a positive 
relationship exists between the CG index and firm performance.  It should be noted 
however, that when considering the years 2011 and 2012 as the crisis period (and not 
2010, 2011, 2012), a significant negative relationship exists between the two variables.  
This could potentially indicate that as firms further enter the sovereign debt crisis 
period, governance practices that are applicable in a normal, non-crisis setting might 
not have beneficial effects on firm performance in a crisis setting.  
8.5.2.4 – Non-penalized CG indices and ROA 
The results found using the penalized CG indices, reported in section 8.5.2.3, are also 
found when non-penalized indices are used, again under both rating schemes.  In the 
crisis years a significant negative relationship is noticed between CG indices and firm 
performance, but only when the crisis period examined is 2011 and 2012 and not when 
the crisis period is 2010, 2011 and 2012.   
8.6 Conclusion 
Using non-financial Greek listed firms from 2006-2012, this study examines the 
differences in the CG-performance relationship before and during the Greek sovereign 
debt crisis.  The use of an interaction crisis year dummy variable is implemented so as 
to observe the marginal effect of corporate governance variables on firm performance 
before and during the crisis. 
The first strand of research examines the effect of board composition on firm 
performance before and during the sovereign debt crisis (H1).  Board composition is 
studied through board size, board independence and the absence of CEO duality.  Firm 
performance is examined through the use of Tobin’s Q, a market-based performance 
measure and ROA, an operating performance measure.  It is expected that board size, 
board independence and the absence of CEO duality will positively affect firm 
performance before and during the crisis periods.  This study confirms that board 
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composition, either through board size, board independence or the absence of CEO 
duality does affect firm performance in both the pre-crisis period and the crisis period.   
More specifically, board size has a positive effect on firm performance before and 
during the crisis, indicating that larger boards are beneficial to Greek firms and help 
them improve their performance.   
As for board independence, although a negative effect on firm performance is seen in 
the pre-crisis sample period, its effect on firm performance becomes positive during the 
crisis period.  This could potentially illustrate that during times of crisis, independent 
directors actively improve the firm’s governance practices, resulting in improved 
performance.   
A crucial point of the study is examining the effect of a dual leadership structure on 
firm performance.  Although the pooled sample indicates that the absence of CEO 
duality has a positive effect on firm performance, when examining the crisis period 
sample and the effect of the CG index with the interaction crisis year variable on firm 
performance, it is clear that the absence of CEO duality is unfavorable.  These findings 
imply that governance practices aimed at constraining CEOs power may not be 
appropriate in times of crisis, where boards should ‘loosen the reins’ and allow CEOs 
to respond promptly and effectively to changing business environments.   
Overall, the results of this study support H1a and H1b, concerning board size and board 
independence, while H1c, concerning the absence of CEO duality, is challenged.  
The second element explored in this study is the effect of a multi-dimensional 
governance proxy, in the form of a CG index, which incorporates many governance 
items, on firm performance.  The literature basically illustrates a positive effect of a CG 
index on firm performance, which is the basis for H2. 
Using either penalized CG indices or non-penalized CG indices and the two rating 
schemes, Scoring by item and Scoring by category, similar results are found.  More 
specifically, in the pre-crisis period and pooled sample a positive relationship between 
the CG indices and firm performance is found, supporting H2.  However, it is important 
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to note that during crisis times the positive relationship is transformed into a negative 
one.  This illustrates that during crisis period the positive effects of ‘traditional’ good 
governance practices may be detrimental to firm performance.  What is considered as 
good governance in steady times can prove to be counterproductive in times of crisis.
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Chapter 9 – Concluding Remarks 
9.1 Restatement of the research problem and research questions 
This study examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms in Greece on 
earnings management and firm performance.  Two distinct research questions are 
examined, focusing on corporate governance quality in Greece measured through 
governance attributes pertaining to the board of directors and audit committee 
effectiveness, as well as a holistic measure of corporate governance, in the form of a 
corporate governance index, created to evaluate Greek listed firms’ overall corporate 
governance mechanisms.  The study encompasses all non-financial Greek listed firms 
for the period 2006-2012.130  
The first research question examines whether corporate governance mechanisms in 
Greece restrain earnings management practices and whether this relationship is stronger 
after the implementation of Law 3693/2008.  Motivated by Law 3693/2008, which 
obliges all Greek listed firms to have an audit committee, as well as full disclosure of 
their relationship with the external auditor, the ability of corporate governance 
mechanisms to mitigate earnings management practices is tested.  Changes in corporate 
governance mechanisms, as a result of this law, are examined through audit committee 
characteristics and corporate governance indices.  Earnings management is measured 
using the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones model by Dechow et al. (1995)  
and the DeFond and Park (2001) model.  This study covers all non-financial Greek 
listed companies for the fiscal years 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012 for a pooled sample 
of 788 firm year observations.  These specific years are intentionally chosen to examine 
any potential change in the effect of corporate governance on earnings management 
before and after the implementation of Law 3693/2008.  The data is broken down into 
two periods, the pre-law period sample (2006/2008) and the post-law period sample 
(2010/2012).  It is expected that the effect of corporate governance variables on 
earnings management will be stronger after the implementation of the governance law.   
                                                 
130 Due to the fact that data for corporate governance variables had to be hand-collected from firms’ 
annual reports, limiting the study to six years makes the task feasible within the time available. 
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The second research question initially examines the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm performance and this relationship is also tested in 
light of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.  The relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance in a crisis setting is not a priori clear.  Firms will be 
more resilient if their corporate governance mechanisms respond effectively in a crisis 
setting, as mechanisms that are successful in a non-crisis context might not prove to be 
effective in a crisis setting.  As such, it is of interest to ascertain the role played by 
corporate governance during the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.  Corporate governance 
mechanisms are examined before and during the crisis, through individual variables 
measuring board of directors’ composition and through a holistic corporate governance 
score, in the form of a corporate governance index.  Firm performance is measured 
using the market-based performance measure, Tobin’s Q, and an operating performance 
measure, ROA.  This study covers all non-financial Greek listed companies for the 
fiscal years 2006, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 for a pooled sample of 1,205 firm 
year observations.  The data is decomposed into two periods: the pre-crisis sample in 
2006, 2008 and 2009 and the crisis sample in 2010, 2011 and 2012.  It is expected that 
firms with stronger governance quality will have higher firm performance during the 
sovereign debt crisis years. 
9.2 Summary of research methodology 
The following regression model is used for both research questions, where EM 
represents Earnings Management and FP represents Firm Performance: 
 
𝐸𝑀/𝐹𝑃 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1(𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                               𝐞𝐪 𝟗 − 𝟏 
Panel data estimation is used to analyze the data so as to allow for examination of a 
time series for each cross-sectional variable in the data. Panel data allows for individual 
and time effects in the panel data regressions (Ducassy and Guyot, 2017).  Governance 
quality is tested through different proxies, i.e. board of directors’ composition, audit 
committee effectiveness and a corporate governance index created for the purpose of 
this study.  The analysis is carried out for both studies using Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM).  
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For the first project, motivated by Law 3693/2008, the relationship between CG and 
EM is tested.  As such, each regression is run separately for the pre-law period 
(2006/2008), the post-law period (2010/2012) and the pooled sample.  The potential 
change in the coefficients between the pre-law and post-law period tests indicate 
whether there is a difference (structural change) in the model between the two periods.  
This is tested by using pre-law and post-law data for each sample firm and utilizing a 
dummy year variable in the regression of the pooled sample.  All regressions are run 
twice: once with earnings management captured with the modified Jones model and 
once with the DeFond and Park (2001) model. 
For the second project the relationship between governance quality and firm 
performance is initially tested and a positive relationship between the two is expected.  
In order to examine the role of corporate governance during the sovereign debt crisis in 
Greece, the governance-performance relationship is tested through the use of a crisis 
year dummy variable.  It is expected that firms with stronger corporate governance are 
able to more effectively manage crisis problems, and thus improve their financial 
performance.  Each regression is run separately for the pre-crisis period sample 
(2006/2008/2009), the crisis period sample (2010/2011/2012) and the pooled sample.  
A structural change in the model between the two periods is reflected in the potential 
change in the coefficient between the pre-crisis and crisis period samples.  All 
regressions are run twice: once with firm performance captured by Tobin’s Q and once 
with firm performance captured by ROA.     
9.3 Summary of research results 
The first study examines the effect of CG on EM (H1/H2).   
When examining the relationship between audit committee effectiveness and EM (H1), 
a significant negative relationship between the two variables is observed in the pooled 
sample when EM is measured with both the Modified Jones model and the DeFond and 
Park (2001) model.  This result is in line with H1.  However, a significant positive 
relationship between audit committee effectiveness and EM is seen in the post-law 
sample, as well as when examining audit committee effectiveness with the interaction 
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year dummy variable and its effect on EM, for both measures of EM.  This is not in line 
with H1.  This change in the post-law period is a result of firms adhering to the letter 
of the law and not its spirit.  Firms’ audit committees have the appropriate size, 
independence, number of meetings and expertise, but do not successfully perform their 
role in constraining EM. 
As for H2, concerning the effect of CG indices on EM, mixed results are observed.  
When examining the Modified Jones model to measure discretionary accruals and 
penalized CG indices, a significant negative relationship between EM and the total CG 
index is observed in the pre-law and pooled samples, a result that is in line with H2.  
Similarly, a significant negative relationship is also seen when examining the effect of 
the penalized mandatory CG index on EM in the pre-law and pooled samples, as well 
as the effect of the best practice CG index with the interaction year dummy variable on 
EM.  However, a significant positive relationship is seen between the total CG index 
and the mandatory CG index and EM in the post-law sample period, as well as when 
examining the effect of the total CG index with the interaction year dummy variable on 
EM.  Additionally, a significant positive relationship also exists between the best 
practice CG index and EM in the pre-law and post-law periods and for the pooled 
sample, contrary to H2.  These positive results suggest that firms were more concerned 
with following the letter of the law rather than its spirit.  Similar positive results are 
also observed between EM, when using the Modified Jones model, and non-penalized 
indices.  However, a significant negative relationship is observed between the non-
penalized best practice CG index with the interaction year dummy variable and EM, in 
line with H2.  This result indicates that firms that follow optional, best practice 
recommendations, appear to follow the substance and not the form of these governance 
attributes, and thus are able to mitigate EM.   
When discretionary accruals are measured using the DeFond and Park (2001) model 
and governance quality is measured with penalized CG indices, significant negative 
relationships are observed between the penalized total CG index in the pre-law and 
pooled samples, as well as with the penalized mandatory CG index in the pre-law, post-
law and pooled samples, and with the penalized best practice CG index in the post-law 
sample.  These results are in line with H2.  However, when examining the penalized 
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CG indices with the interaction dummy variable, a significant positive relationship 
between EM and the penalized total CG index and the penalized mandatory CG index 
is observed, contrary to H2, suggesting that form supersedes substance.  When using 
the DeFond and Park (2001) model to measure EM and non-penalized CG indices, a 
significant positive relationship is observed between the non-penalized total CG index 
in the post-law sample, as well as with the non-penalized mandatory CG index in the 
pre-law sample, with the non- penalized best practice CG index in the pooled sample 
and the total CG index with the interaction dummy variable - results that all contradict 
H2.  However, a significant negative relationship, in line with H2, is seen between EM 
and the non-penalized best practice CG index in the post-law period, as well as the non-
penalized best practice CG index with the interaction dummy variable.     
The second study examines the effect of CG on firm performance (H1/H2).   
Examining H1, about the relationship between board composition and firm 
performance measured with Tobin’s Q, a significant positive relationship between 
board size and firm performance is evident in the pre-crisis period sample, in line with 
H1a.  A significant negative relationship between the absence of CEO duality and firm 
performance is seen in the crisis period sample, as well as between the absence of CEO 
duality with the interaction crisis year dummy variable and firm performance.  These 
results contradict H1c and suggest that a unitary leadership structure has a positive 
effect on firm performance in uncertain times, such as the period of the sovereign debt 
crisis.  CEO duality leaves little ambiguity about who is in charge, allowing quick 
decisions to be made without the need for continuous consensus.   
As for firm performance measured using ROA, a significant positive relationship 
between board size and firm performance is observed in the crisis period sample, in line 
with H1a.  A significant negative relationship between board independence and firm 
performance is seen in the pre-crisis period sample, while this relationship becomes 
positive in the crisis-period sample, in line with H1b.  This reversal could be explained 
by corporate governance receiving greater scrutiny and interest during the crisis period, 
thus accounting for the positive effect of board independence on firm performance.  As 
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for the relationship between the absence of CEO duality and firm performance, a 
significant positive relationship exists, in line with H1c. 
H2 examines the relationship between CG indices and firm performance.  A significant 
positive effect of penalized CG indices on Tobin’s Q is observed in the pre-crisis 
sample and the pooled sample for both rating schemes, Scoring by item and Scoring by 
category, in line with H2.  However, this relationship becomes negative, for both rating 
schemes, in the crisis period sample and when examining the CG indices with the 
interaction crisis year dummy variable.  These results suggest that corporate governance 
practices that are appropriate in a non-crisis setting are not always suitable in a crisis 
setting.   
When examining the relationship between the penalized CG indices and ROA, a 
significant positive relationship for both rating schemes is seen in the pre-crisis, crisis 
and pooled samples, in line with H2.   
Similar results to those for the penalized CG indices are also seen with the non-
penalized CG indices and firm performance, for both Tobin’s Q and ROA.  
9.4 Limitations of the research 
The main limitations of the thesis can be summarised as follows. 
Although the necessary procedures were followed to ensure validity and reliability 
when constructing the corporate governance index created for the purpose of this study 
some limitations inevitably exist.  In terms of the validity of the CG index, there is no 
theory that provides guidance on what exact items should be included in a CG index.  
Furthermore, the items chosen had to be quantifiable, verifiable through annual reports 
and as inclusive as possible in the nature of governance items.  However, there is a 
chance that some corporate governance items are missing.  As for reliability, although 
the CG index was also scored independently for a sample of 10 firms by two experts, 
and no significant differences were found in the CG index scores, indicating that the 
research instrument is reliable, CG scoring still entails a degree of subjectivity.    
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Furthermore, the choice of governance attributes is not exhaustive and other 
governance items could also be used to proxy governance quality.  For example, 
additional characteristics of the board, such as board diversity in terms of gender and 
ethnicity, have also been examined in the literature. Female representation on a firm’s 
board is another internal governance mechanism that can influence a firm’s 
performance and earnings management.  Studies such as Carter et al. (2003) and 
Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) reveal that the presence of women on boards 
improve firms’ financial performance.  Krishnan and Parsons (2008) find higher 
earnings quality for firms with more female directors and argue that women are more 
ethical in their behaviour and judgement compared to men.  Arun et al. (2015) find that 
more female directors and more independent female directors on boards have a negative 
effect on EM, while Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) find that the presence of female 
directors on audit committees constrains EM.  Additionally, other earnings 
management and firm performance measures are not used in this study due to data and 
time constraints.  For example, more recent EM measures, such as classification 
shifting, as in the research of Malikov et al. (2018), could also have been used in this 
study.  Additionally, Cheng et al. (2016), and Kang and Kim (2012) examine the 
relationship between real earnings management and corporate governance variables.  
As for firm performance, Shaukat and Trojanowski (2018) using Return on Equity 
(ROE) find a positive relationship between firm performance and a board governance 
index, while Mitton (2002) examine CG attributes effect on firm performance measured 
using stock returns.   
Another limitation is the availability of data.  The sample consists of all non-financial 
listed firms on the ASE for the period 2006-2012.  Although the total number of listed 
firms in the ASE for this period is 1,684 firm-year observations, the exclusion of firms 
in financial, real estate and insurance industries, as well as firms with missing financial 
and corporate governance data, resulted in a final sample consisting of 1,205 firm-year 
observations, representing approximately 72% of the firms listed on the ASE.  
Additionally, some governance attributes were not disclosed in the firms’ annual 
reports.   
Chapter 9- Concluding Remarks 
 
272 
 
When investigating the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings 
management after the implementation of Law 3693/2008, although the sample period 
(2006-2012) includes the Greek sovereign debt crisis, the impact of this crisis on the 
results is not examined.  However, when examining the effect of corporate governance 
on firm performance in a crisis setting, over the same period, the impact of the Greek 
sovereign debt crisis is examined.  Nevertheless, as the period captures only the 
beginning of the Greek sovereign debt crisis in 2010, some findings may not be 
generalized to the entire crisis period.    
9.5 Avenues for future research 
The findings of this study point to a number of avenues for future research.  Some of 
the areas for which the present study can provide motivation are highlighted below. 
This study examines the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings 
management and firm performance using quantitative research methods based on 
publicly available data.  Future research examining Greek companies could use 
qualitative research methods, for example by using interviews with board members and 
other stakeholders, to examine the relationship between corporate governance and both 
earnings management and firm performance, thus complementing the results found in 
this quantitative study.   
Future research could also include additional governance items to measure governance 
quality, such as board diversity, the number of board meetings per annum, the 
qualifications of the directors, the level of CEO pay, thereby creating a complementary 
proxy for the governance quality of Greek listed firms.  Additionally, new variables for 
which data exists in Greece could be included.  For example, the level of supervisory 
oversight in Greece, reflected in the number of employees in the Hellenic Capital 
Market Commission (HCMC), could be incorporated.  Family ownership, an important 
ownership structure variable in the Greek context could also feature as an independent 
variable in future research.   
Finally, the fact that some firms have limited disclosure of board structure data is an 
interesting detail.  Future research could consider using the level of disclosure about 
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the board as an additional governance variable, and could for example consider the use 
of a dummy variable to record the quality of such disclosure.   
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Appendices 
Appendix I - Percentage of firms meeting the requirement of each individual measure of CG in the index 
2006 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Board of Directors
1.       Board of di rectors  cons is ts  of both executives  and non-executives 83% 79% 84% 99% 100% 99%
2.       Non-executive directors  are ≥ 1/3 of the total  board s ize 83% 78% 81% 99% 100% 98%
3.       Board of di rectors  includes  at least two independent non-executives 76% 66% 72% 96% 96% 96%
4.       Board s ize should be between 7 and 15 67% 63% 68% 70% 70% 67%
5.       Board should cons is t of a  majori ty of non-executives  39% 30% 40% 57% 59% 63%
6.       Board should cons is t of at least 2 executive members 78% 77% 81% 91% 92% 88%
7.       Independent members  are at least 1/3 of the members  of the board 37% 31% 36% 54% 46% 51%
8.       Spl i t between the chairman and the CEO roles 57% 60% 56% 58% 60% 58%
9.       If CEO dual i ty exis ts , an independent vice-chairman exis ts 3% 4% 1% 10% 1% 7%
10.     A financia l  chief executive officer i s  appointed to the management team 75% 17% 22% 52% 57% 65%
Internal Auditing and Corporate Services
11.     Internal  auditors  are independent 55% 24% 12% 96% 56% 64%
12.     Internal  auditors  are supervised by the board 50% 13% 12% 96% 73% 90%
13.     Internal  auditors  are appointed by the board 50% 13% 12% 96% 75% 88%
14.     Internal  auditors  are ful l -time employees  of the company 55% 14% 12% 95% 75% 91%
15.     Internal  auditors  are not members  of the board 57% 13% 13% 95% 72% 95%
16.     The company has  an internal  audit function 95% 100% 100% 100% 99% 98%
17.     The company has  an investor relations  function 68% 8% 18% 41% 51% 43%
18.     The company has  a  corporate announcements  function 98% 100% 100% 100% 100% 99%
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Board Committees
19.     Exis tence of an audit committee 20% 8% 31% 97% 98% 97%
20.     Audit committee cons is ts  of 3 non-executives , of which 1 i s  an independent non-executive 6% 3% 21% 88% 91% 90%
21.     The independent non-executive member of the audit committee has  financia l/accounting expertise 6% 0% 4% 55% 58% 66%
22.     The company has  a  nomination committee 1% 0% 0% 8% 13% 9%
23.     The nomination committee has  at least 3 members 1% 0% 0% 14% 20% 18%
24.     The majori ty of the nomination committee should be non-executive 1% 0% 0% 8% 17% 15%
25.     The nomination committee should be chaired by an independent non-executive member 1% 0% 0% 5% 13% 10%
26.     The audit committee should be composed exclus ively of non-executive board members 10% 4% 22% 91% 92% 93%
27.     The audit committee is  chaired by an independent non-executive member 7% 2% 3% 35% 30% 48%
28.     The company has  a  remuneration committee. 3% 0% 1% 14% 18% 17%
29.     The remuneration committee should be composed of entirely non-executive members . 1% 0% 0% 11% 19% 24%
30.     The majori ty of the remuneration committee should be independent 1% 0% 0% 10% 22% 23%
31.     The members  of the remuneration committee should be at least 3 1% 0% 0% 24% 32% 35%
32.     The chair of the remuneration committee should be an independent- non-executive member 1% 0% 0% 6% 16% 16%
Disclosures and Transparency
33.     Separate disclosure of the remuneration of non-executive directors  in the account notes  12% 7% 7% 9% 6% 10%
34.     Disclosure of the ownership s tructure (from Law2190/1920) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
35.     Disclosure of corporate targets  and prospects 80% 92% 100% 97% 100% 98%
36.     The corporate governance s tatement discloses  the term of appointment of each board member and contains  their brief biographies . 19% 0% 2% 49% 52% 53%
37.     The work of the nomination committee and the number of meeting is  described in the corporate governance s tatement. 0% 0% 0% 15% 12% 20%
38.     The annual  corporate governance s tatement i l lustrates  how the performance evaluation of the board and i ts  committees  has  been conducted.  2% 1% 4% 82% 1% 78%
39.     The annual  corporate governance s tatement describes  the work of the audit committee   and the number of meetings  held during the year.  2% 2% 0% 81% 62% 81%
40.     The annual  corporate governance s tatement summarizes  the work of the remuneration committee and the number of meetings  held during the year.  0% 0% 0% 27% 21% 29%
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Appendix II – Combined Industry Classification 
 
 
Firms Classification based on ICB
Classification based on 
combined industries
Justification for combined industries
Alapis Healthcare Consumer goods
Lavipharm Healthcare Consumer goods
Euromedica Healthcare Consumer services
Ygeia Healthcare Consumer services
Iatriko Athinon Healthcare Consumer services
Axon Healthcare Consumer services
Medicon Hellas Healthcare Consumer services
Praxiteleio Healthcare Consumer services
IASO Healthcare Consumer services
Ellinika Petrelaia Oil & Gas industrials
Motor Oil Oil & Gas industrials
OTE Telecommunications Consumer services
Lannet Telecommunications Consumer services
Eydap utilities Consumer services
DEH utilities Consumer services
Thes/niki water utilities Consumer services
Terna utilities Consumer services
Healthcare firms that are involved in the 
production  of medicine are classified as 
consumer goods.
All oil & gas firms are classified as 
industrials
All utilities firms are classified as consumer 
services
Healthcare firms that are hospitals are 
classified as consumer services.
All telecommunication firms are classified 
as consumer services.
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Appendix III – Audit Committee Effectiveness and Earnings Management – Model 1 (signed ni / earn) 
 Modified Jones model DeFond and Park (2001) model 
 Pre-Law Period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law Period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled Sample Pre-Law Period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law Period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled Sample 
Variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
weighase 0.013 
(3.122)*** 
0.038 
(5.979)*** 
-0.164 
(-1.520) 
0.006 
(1.375) 
0.036 
(5.046)*** 
-0.111 
(-1.205) 
ownconc -0.003 
(-0.209) 
-0.002 
(-0.164) 
-0.008 
(-0.436) 
0.012 
(0.978) 
0.008 
(0.590) 
0.011 
(0.924) 
ta -0.010 
(-5.530)*** 
-0.014 
(-6.122)*** 
-0.003 
(-1.069) 
-0.006 
(-3.606)*** 
-0.014 
(-6.105)*** 
-0.006 
(-2.603)*** 
lev 0.025 
(1.266) 
-0.070 
(-4.627)*** 
-0.002 
(-0.079) 
0.019 
(1.127) 
-0.026 
(-1.927)* 
-0.011 
(-0.747) 
ni -0.043 
(-0.999) 
-0.268 
(-6.201)*** 
-0.202 
(-3.679)*** 
-0.116 
(-1.992)** 
-0.177 
(-5.300)*** 
-0.217 
(-5.310)*** 
earn -0.076 
(-1.221) 
0.038 
(0.947) 
0.119 
(2.127)** 
-0.034 
(-0.507) 
0.012 
(0.359) 
0.073 
(1.423) 
salesgrowth 0.013 
(1.241) 
0.019 
(1.267) 
0.010 
(0.781) 
0.016 
(1.575) 
0.023 
(2.431)** 
0.016 
(1.884)* 
dummy   0.025 
(1.207) 
  -0.018 
(-1.003) 
dummy*weighase   0.130 
(1.305) 
  0.107 
(1.270) 
J-statistic 0.0690 0.064 0.1323 0.0695 0.0730 0.1352 
N 392 371 763 392 371 763 
Variables: EM discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model; AWCA abnormal working capital accruals using the DeFond and Park (2001) model; weighace weighted 
audit committee effectiveness; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; ni value of current earnings; earn value of changes in earnings; ni current 
earnings; earn changes in earnings; salesgrowth changes in sales from prior year; dummy an indicator variable where 1 is for 2010/2012 and 0 for 2006/2008. 
*** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
Appendices 
 
301 
 
Appendix IV – Penalized CG indices and Earnings Management – Model 2 (signed ni / earn) 
 Modified Jones model DeFond and Park (2001) model  Modified Jones model DeFond and Park (2001) model 
 Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
 Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled Sample 
variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
cgpentotal 0.328 
(6.120)*** 
0.107 
(2.035)** 
-0.267 
(-2.463)** 
0.251 
(3.485)*** 
-0.056 
(-0.961) 
0.054 
(0.430) 
cgpenmand 0.006 
(0.234) 
0.036 
(5.508)*** 
-0.105 
(-2.954)*** 
0.078 
(2.906)*** 
-0.100 
(-14.493)*** 
-0.039 
(-1.255) 
       cgpenbp 0.276 
(4.635)*** 
0.002 
(0.115) 
0.772 
(3.391)*** 
-0.001 
(-0.024) 
-0.199 
(-13.148)*** 
0.547 
(2.680)*** 
ownconc 0.022 
(1.231) 
0.012 
(0.979) 
-0.019 
(-1.425) 
0.036 
(2.333)** 
0.008 
(0.761) 
0.015 
(1.222) 
ownconc 0.006 
(0.514) 
-0.008 
(-0.781) 
0.008 
(0.819) 
0.021 
(2.318)** 
-0.010 
(-1.044) 
0.016 
(1.725)* 
ta -0.014 
(-6.509)*** 
-0.010 
(-5.413)*** 
-0.007 
(-3.949)*** 
-0.009 
(-4.295)*** 
-0.006 
(-3.665)*** 
-0.008 
(-4.6886)*** 
ta -0.013 
(-8.359)*** 
-0.011 
(-8.196)*** 
-0.014 
(-6.708)*** 
-0.006 
(-5.177)*** 
-0.006 
(-3.920)*** 
-0.011 
(-5.384)*** 
lev 0.049 
(2.400)** 
-0.027 
(-2.028)** 
-0.002 
(-0.099) 
0.036 
(1.748)* 
0.000 
(0.016) 
-0.004 
(-0.341) 
lev 0.040 
(2.405)** 
-0.017 
(-2.053)** 
-0.023 
(-1.715)* 
0.023 
(1.725)* 
0.029 
(2.870)*** 
-0.014 
(-1.124) 
ni -0.088 
(-1.545) 
-0.235 
(-6.231)*** 
-0.187 
(-4.019)*** 
-0.175 
(-2.707)*** 
-0.132 
(-3.749)*** 
-0.226 
(-5.270)*** 
ni -0.097 
(-3.090)*** 
-0.112 
(-18.633)*** 
-0.237 
(-5.934)*** 
-0.159 
(-5.382)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.847) 
-0.234 
(-6.005)*** 
earn -0.106 
(-1.596) 
0.040 
(1.148) 
0.099 
(1.950)* 
-0.047 
(-0.554) 
0.015 
(0.490) 
0.045 
(0.908) 
earn 0.008 
(0.142) 
-0.077 
(-3.217)*** 
0.055 
(1.669)* 
0.033 
(0.480) 
-0.100 
(-4.498)*** 
0.029 
(0.782) 
salesgrowth 0.011 
(1.037) 
0.008 
(0.655) 
0.019 
(1.685)* 
0.018 
(1.656)* 
0.010 
(0.932) 
0.016 
(1.738)* 
salesgrowth 0.014 
(1.713)* 
0.021 
(2.738)*** 
0.011 
(1.312) 
0.023 
(3.090)*** 
0.015 
(1.903)* 
0.015 
(1.750)* 
dummy   0.050 
(1.110) 
  0.027 
(0.585) 
dummy   0.106 
(2.919)*** 
  0.128 
(3.954)*** 
cgpentotal*
dummy 
  0.022 
(0.247) 
  -0.094 
(-1.098) 
cgpenmand
*dummy 
  0.051 
(1.330) 
  0.013 
(0.384) 
       cgpenbp*d
ummy 
  -0.767 
(-3.670)*** 
  -0.624 
(-3.394)*** 
J-statistic 0.0872 0.0597 0.1309 0.0766 0.0733 0.1346 J-statistic 0.1227 0.1179 0.1387 0.1252 0.1266 0.1434 
N 392 371 763 392 371 763 N 392 371 763 392 371 763 
Variables: EM discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model; AWCA abnormal working capital accruals using the DeFond and Park (2001) model; cgpentotal penalized total CG index; cgpenmand penalized mandatory CG 
index; cgpenbp penalized best practice CG index; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; ni value of current earnings; earn value of changes in earnings; salesgrowth changes in sales from prior year; dummy 
an indicator variable where 1 is for 2010/2012 and 0 for 2006/2008. *** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
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Appendix V – Non-Penalized CG indices and Earnings Management – Model 2 (signed ni / earn) 
 Modified Jones model DeFond and Park (2001) model  Modified Jones model DeFond and Park (2001) model 
 Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
 Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008
) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
Pre-Law 
period 
(2006/2008) 
Post-Law  
period 
(2010/2012) 
Pooled 
Sample 
variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
variables coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
coefficient 
(t-stat) 
cgpnonotal 0.359 
(6.027)*** 
0.055 
(2.584)** 
-0.182 
(-2.484)** 
0.346 
(5.033)*** 
-0.014 
(-0.582) 
0.281 
(2.487)** 
cgnonmand 0.002 
(0.199) 
0.016 
(1.945)* 
-0.006 
(-0.312) 
0.064 
(6.098)*** 
-0.024 
(-3.586)*** 
0.001 
(0.034) 
       cgnonbp 0.200 
(7.902)*** 
0.060 
(6.036)*** 
0.258 
(4.894)*** 
0.012 
(0.477) 
-0.036 
(-3.020)*** 
0.324 
(5.186)*** 
ownconc 0.017 
(0.930) 
-0.004 
(-0.368) 
-0.008 
(-0.749) 
0.037 
(2.241)** 
0.007 
(0.737) 
0.023 
(1.936)* 
ownconc 0.008 
(0.751) 
-0.000 
(-0.033) 
0.009 
(0.904) 
0.018 
(2.021)** 
0.008 
(1.043) 
0.023 
(2.409)** 
ta -0.017 
(-7.216)*** 
-0.009 
(-5.192)*** 
-0.008 
(-5.323)*** 
-0.011 
(-4.644)*** 
-0.008 
(-5.060)*** 
-0.012 
(-6.072)*** 
ta -0.015 
(-8.220)*** 
-0.013 
(-10.158)*** 
-0.012 
(-8.743)*** 
-0.006 
(-3.932)*** 
-0.011 
(-8.382)*** 
-0.012 
(--7.062)*** 
lev 0.057 
(2.798)*** 
-0.031 
(-2.482)** 
-0.002 
(-0.155) 
0.047 
(2.133)** 
0.000 
(0.022) 
-0.007 
(-0.508) 
lev 0.035 
(2.201)** 
-0.012 
(-1.500) 
-0.014 
(-1.322) 
0.011 
(1.014) 
0.023 
(3.454)*** 
-0.015 
(-1.398) 
ni -0.020 
(-0.338) 
-0.255 
(-7.364)*** 
-0.211 
(-4.669)*** 
-0.114 
(-1.622) 
-0.156 
(-4.687)*** 
-0.227 
(-4.902)*** 
ni -0.098 
(-3.172)*** 
-0.105 
(-20.485)*** 
-0.215 
(-6.447)*** 
-0.190 
(-7.212)*** 
-0.021 
(-3.265)*** 
-0.218 
(-6.488)*** 
earn -0.179 
(-2.641)*** 
0.042 
(1.363) 
0.079 
(1.687)* 
-0.132 
(-1.492) 
-0.021 
(-0.660) 
0.018 
(0.384) 
earn 0.006 
(0.123) 
-0.071 
(-3.154)*** 
0.041 
(1.255) 
0.090 
(1.712)* 
-0.105 
(-4.823)*** 
0.006 
(0.156) 
salesgrowth 0.008 
(0.706) 
0.012 
(0.978) 
0.019 
(1.889)* 
0.008 
(0.650) 
0.017 
(1.719)* 
0.015 
(1.442) 
salesgrowth 0.014 
(1.588) 
0.025 
(3.168)*** 
0.015 
(1.723)* 
0.019 
(2.660)*** 
0.010 
(1.307) 
0.013 
(1.453) 
dummy   0.052 
(0.686) 
  -0.041 
(-0.629) 
dummy   0.112 
(2.704)*** 
  0.128 
(2.857)*** 
cgnontotal*
dummy 
  -0.057 
(-0.557) 
  -0.033 
(-0.378) 
cgnonmand
*dummy 
  -0.046 
(-2.248)** 
  -0.056 
(-2.301)** 
       cgnonbp* 
dummy 
  -0.251 
(-4.114)*** 
  -0.274 
(-4.171)*** 
J-statistic 0.0880 0.0826 0.1202 0.0774 0.1005 0.1287 J-statistic 0.1312 0.1363 0.1300 0.1298 0.1367 0.1327 
N 392 371 763 392 371 763 N 392 371 763 392 371 763 
Variables: EM discretionary accruals using the Modified Jones model; AWCA abnormal working capital accruals using the DeFond and Park (2001) model; cgnontotal non-penalized total CG index; cgnonmand non-penalized 
mandatory CG index; cgnonbp non-penalized best practice CG index; ownconc ownership concentration; ta total assets; lev leverage; ni value of current earnings; earn changes in earnings; salesgrowth changes in sales from 
prior year; dummy an indicator variable where 1 is for 2010/2012 and 0 for 2006/2008. *** significant at level 1%; ** significant at level 5%; *significant at level 10% 
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Appendix VI – Concentrated ownership (family ownership) 
 
 
Year # of firms
total family 
firms
% family 
firms
from family firms how 
many have a family 
member as the largest 
shareholder (ownership 
concentration)
% of family firms 
that are biggest 
shareholder
2006 220 107 49% 88 82%
2008 217 112 52% 96 86%
2009 221 115 52% 97 84%
2010 187 105 56% 92 88%
2011 203 105 52% 90 86%
2012 190 102 54% 92 90%
